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‘Thus, when any environmental issue is pursued to its origins, it reveals an inescapable 
truth – that the root cause of the crisis is not to be found in how [people] interact with 
nature, but in how they interact with each other - that to solve the environmental crisis 
we must solve the problems of poverty, racial injustice and war ...’ 
 
(Commoner B “Ecology and Social Action” in Albright H (ed)  
The Horace M. Albright Conservation Lectureship,  
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This dissertation examines whether the concept of communally-conserved areas provides a useful tool for 
bridging the current apparent impasse between South Africa’s conservation and land reform agendas. 
Part 1 of the dissertation begins by reflecting on the role of protected areas in conserving the natural 
commons. It considers the nature and form of the natural commons and the increasing recognition 
accorded to communal property regimes in regulating common pool resources. It similarly considers the 
nature and form of protected areas and recent attempts to distil a range of protected areas governance 
typologies to aid in their analysis and implementation. Having highlighted the inherent frailties of the 
contemporary protected areas governance typology, a new approach is advocated, one founded on the 
main elements influencing governance in protected areas, namely: land tenure; management; and 
beneficiation. Using this approach, the concept of communally-conserved areas is introduced and 
defined, effectively constituting protected areas which seek to conserve common pool resources through 
communal property regimes. The dissertation then considers the range of ideological shifts in the 
scholarship of economists, property rights theorists, human rights advocates, ecologists and 
conservationists that have raised the prominence accorded to this form of protected areas governance in 
the past two decades. This part of the dissertation concludes by considering the elements that 
theoretically underpin successful communally-conserved areas. Part 2 of the dissertation considers South 
Africa’s current legal framework of relevance to communally-conserved areas. This legal framework, 
which is founded on South Africa’s constitutional dispensation, sits somewhat uncomfortably between two 
legal domains, namely conservation and land reform. These domains, the institutions tasked with their 
administration and the policies and programmes which inform their implementation are considered in turn. 
So too are recent initiatives undertaken in the course of the past decade to bridge the apparent impasse 
between South Africa’s conservation and land reform regimes in so far as they relate to the 
implementation of communally-conserved areas. Part 3 of the dissertation then critically assesses the 
manner in which this legal framework has been implemented during the course of the past two decades 
to balance domestic conservation and land reform agendas. This assessment is undertaken through the 
consideration of four case studies, namely: Richtersveld National Park; Pafuri Region of the Kruger 
National Park; Dwesa-Cwebe Nature Reserve; and the Eastern Shores Region of the Isimangaliso 
Wetland Park. Each of these case studies is assessed according to the essential elements identified in 
Part 2 which theoretically underlie successful communally-conserved areas. Part 4 of the dissertation 
concludes by drawing together the constituent parts of the dissertation and proposes an array of broad 
legislative reforms that appear necessary to provide for the more effective utilisation of communally-
conserved areas in South Africa. In so doing, the dissertation seeks to provide a better understanding of 
the nature and value of communally-conserved areas as a tool for managing the natural commons. It 
aims to provide a lucid governance paradigm for protected areas that more accurately reflects their 
diverse nature. It identifies the core elements that underpin their successful implementation. It provides a 
critical analysis of South Africa’s legal framework and the extent to which it contains an effective and 
equitable regime for implementing communally-conserved areas. Finally, through the consideration of an 
array of case studies, it distils several recommendations for domestic policy-makers tasked with revising 
and implementing South Africa’s statutory framework of relevance to communally-conserved areas. 
Ultimately, it seeks to promote communally-conserved areas as an essential tool for managing South 
Africa’s dwindling natural commons and bridging the divide between South Africa’s land reform and 













TABLE OF CONTENTS 
 
DECLARATION ............................................................................................................................................ iii 
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS ............................................................................................................................ iv 
NOTE ON REFERENCING ........................................................................................................................... v 
ABSTRACT  ............................................................................................................................................ vi 
LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS........................................................................................................................ xiii 
LIST OF FIGURES ..................................................................................................................................... xv 
 
CHAPTER 1   INTRODUCTION ................................................................................................................... 1 
 
1. THE CONTEXT ............................................................................................................................. 1 
1.1 ENVIRONMENTAL, SOCIAL AND ECONOMIC REALITIES ....................................................... 2 
1.2 PROTECTION, DISPLACEMENT AND ELITISM ......................................................................... 5 
1.3 REFORM OF CONSERVATION MANAGEMENT AND LAND-HOLDING PATTERNS ............... 8 
1.4 CURRENT MANAGEMENT AND SETTLEMENT PATTERNS .................................................. 14 
2. KEY ISSUES FOR CONSIDERATION ....................................................................................... 18 
3. STRUCTURE AND METHOD ..................................................................................................... 18 
3.1 PART I – THE CONTEXT ............................................................................................................ 19 
3.2 PART II – THE LAW .................................................................................................................... 20 
3.3 PART III – THE PRACTICE ......................................................................................................... 21 
3.4 PART IV – THE SOLUTION ........................................................................................................ 22 
 
PART I  THE CONTEXT ................................................................................................................. 23 
 
CHAPTER 2 THE ROLE OF PROTECTED AREAS AS A TOOL FOR MANAGING THE NATURAL  
COMMONS ....................................................................................................................... 24 
 
1. INTRODUCTION ......................................................................................................................... 24 
2. THE NATURAL COMMONS, COMMON PROPERTY & COMMON POOL RESOURCES ...... 24 
2.1 DEFINING THE NATURAL COMMONS ..................................................................................... 25 
2.2 REGULATING THE NATURAL COMMONS THROUGH COMMUNAL PROPERTY      
REGIMES .................................................................................................................................... 29 
3. PROTECTED AREAS ................................................................................................................. 33 
3.1 DEFINING PROTECTED AREAS ............................................................................................... 33 
3.2 MANAGEMENT CATEGORIES .................................................................................................. 35 
3.3 GOVERNANCE TYPES .............................................................................................................. 38 
3.3.1 ‘Governance’ and ‘Protected Areas Governance’ ....................................................................... 38 
3.3.2 Overview of the Current IUCN Governance Matrix ..................................................................... 43 












3.3.2.2 Shared Governance ..................................................................................................................... 45 
3.3.2.3 Private Governance ..................................................................................................................... 47 
3.3.2.4 Governance by Indigenous Peoples and Local Communities ..................................................... 49 
3.3.3 Intersection of Governance Types and Management Categories ............................................... 52 
3.3.4 Critique of the IUCN Governance Matrix ..................................................................................... 55 
3.3.5. Towards a Different Approach to Protected Areas Governance ................................................. 58 
4. CONCLUSION ............................................................................................................................. 63 
 
CHAPTER 3    THE NATURE, FORM & FACTORS INFLUENCING COMMUNALLY-CONSERVED 
AREAS .............................................................................................................................. 65 
 
1. INTRODUCTION ......................................................................................................................... 65 
2. DEFINITIONAL ISSUES ............................................................................................................. 65 
3. IDEOLOGICAL SHIFTS WHICH HAVE FACILITATED THE RISE OF COMMUNALLY-
CONSERVED AREAS ................................................................................................................ 69 
3.1 TRENDS CONTRIBUTING TO THE ‘TECTONIC SHIFT’ ........................................................... 70 
3.1.1 Rise of Indigenous Peoples’ Tenure and Resource Rights ......................................................... 70 
3.1.2 Recognition of Sustainable Use, Access and Benefit-Sharing Imperatives ................................ 75 
3.1.3 Systems Thinking, Participatory Management and Adaptive Management ................................ 78 
3.1.4 Appreciation that Communal Property Regimes are Effective Forms of Tenure for Managing the 
Natural Commons ........................................................................................................................ 82 
3.1.5 Acknowledgement of the Diversity of Protected Areas Governance ........................................... 82 
3.2 THE NATURE OF THE TECTONIC SHIFT ................................................................................. 83 
3.2.1 Conventional Protectionist, Exclusionary, State-Centred Approach ........................................... 83 
3.2.2 Contemporary Inclusive, Participatory, Human-Centred Approach............................................. 85 
3.3 AFTERMATH OF THE TECTONIC SHIFT .................................................................................. 88 
4. ESSENTIAL ELEMENTS OF COMMUNALLY-CONSERVED AREAS ..................................... 90 
4.1 TYPES OF COMMUNALLY-CONSERVED AREAS ................................................................... 91 
4.2 PLANNING .................................................................................................................................. 92 
4.3 CONSULTATION AND NEGOTIATION ...................................................................................... 94 
4.4 LAND TENURE ........................................................................................................................... 97 
4.5 DECLARATION ........................................................................................................................... 99 
4.6 INSTITUTIONS .......................................................................................................................... 100 
4.7 MANAGEMENT ......................................................................................................................... 103 
4.8 ACCESS, USE AND BENEFIT-SHARING ................................................................................ 106 
4.9 FINANCING AND SUPPORT .................................................................................................... 107 
















PART II  THE LAW .......................................................................................................................  112 
 
CHAPTER 4 SOUTH AFRICA’S CONSTITUTIONAL REGIME OF RELEVANCE TO  
COMMUNALLY-CONSERVED AREAS ......................................................................... 113 
 
1. INTRODUCTION ....................................................................................................................... 113 
2. CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHTS .................................................................................................... 113 
2.1 ENVIRONMENTAL RIGHT........................................................................................................ 113 
2.2 PROPERTY CLAUSE ................................................................................................................ 116 
2.3 OTHER RELEVANT RIGHTS.................................................................................................... 117 
3. RECOGNITION OF CUSTOMARY LAW AND TRADITIONAL INSTITUTIONS ..................... 119 
4. GOVERNANCE ......................................................................................................................... 121 
5. CONCLUSION ........................................................................................................................... 123 
 
CHAPTER 5 SOUTH AFRICA’S CONSERVATION REGIME OF RELEVANCE TO COMMUNALLY-
CONSERVED AREAS .................................................................................................... 125 
 
1. INTRODUCTION ....................................................................................................................... 125 
2. THE PRE-2005 REGIME ........................................................................................................... 126 
3. THE POST-2005 REGIME ........................................................................................................ 133 
3.1 THE LAWS ................................................................................................................................ 134 
3.1.1 National Environmental Management: Biodiversity Act ............................................................. 135 
3.1.2 National Environmental Management: Protected Areas Act ..................................................... 139 
3.2 POLICIES, PLANS AND PROGRAMMES ................................................................................ 145 
3.2.1 Guidelines for Implementation of CBNRM in South Africa ........................................................ 146 
3.2.2 Stewardship Programmes ......................................................................................................... 147 
3.2.3 People and Parks Programme .................................................................................................. 149 
3.2.4 National Spatial Biodiversity Assessment ................................................................................. 151 
3.2.5 National Biodiversity Strategy and Action Plan & National Biodiversity Framework ................. 151 
3.2.6 National Protected Areas Expansion Strategy .......................................................................... 153 
3.3 KEY INSTITUTIONS .................................................................................................................. 154 
3.3.1 Ministries, Departments and Statutory Authorities .................................................................... 155 
3.3.2 Management Authorities ............................................................................................................ 157 
3.3.3 Advisory Institutions ................................................................................................................... 158 
4. CONCLUSION ........................................................................................................................... 160 
 
CHAPTER 6 SOUTH AFRICA’S LAND REFORM REGIME OF RELEVANCE TO COMMUNALLY 
CONSERVED AREAS  ................................................................................................... 162 
 
1. INTRODUCTION ....................................................................................................................... 162 
2. LAND RESTITUTION LAWS .................................................................................................... 169 












2.2 PRACTICAL CHALLENGES FACING THE REGIME ............................................................... 179 
3. LAND TENURE REFORM LAWS ............................................................................................. 183 
3.1 COMMUNAL PROPERTY ASSOCIATIONS ACT .................................................................... 184 
3.2 COMMUNAL LAND RIGHTS ACT ............................................................................................ 190 
4. POLICIES, PLANS AND PROGRAMMES ............................................................................... 198 
4.1 COMPREHENSIVE RURAL DEVELOPMENT PROGRAMME ................................................ 199 
4.2 SETTLEMENT & IMPLEMENTATION SUPPORT STRATEGY FOR LAND AND AGRARIAN 
REFORM IN SOUTH AFRICA ................................................................................................... 200 
5. KEY INSTITUTIONS ................................................................................................................. 202 
5.1 MINISTRIES, DEPARTMENTS AND STATUTORY AUTHORITIES ........................................ 203 
5.2 COMMUNAL PROPERTY INSTITUTIONS ............................................................................... 205 
5.3 INSTITUTIONS OF TRADITIONAL AUTHORITY ..................................................................... 205 
6. CONCLUSION ........................................................................................................................... 209 
 
CHAPTER 7    LINKING SOUTH AFRICA’S CONSERVATION AND LAND REFORM REGIMES ....... 211 
 
1. INTRODUCTION ....................................................................................................................... 211 
2. RECENT GOVERNMENT INITIATIVES TO LINK CONSERVATION & LAND REFORM ...... 213 
2.1 MEMORANDUM OF AGREEMENT .......................................................................................... 213 
2.2 NATIONAL CO-MANAGEMENT FRAMEWORK ...................................................................... 216 
2.2.1 The ‘Co-Management Models’ .................................................................................................. 216 
2.2.2 Assessment of the National Co-Management Framework ........................................................ 220 
3. LEGAL OPTIONS FOR LINKING THE CONSERVATION & LAND REFORM REGIMES ..... 222 
3.1 UNDERSTANDING THE ROLE OF COMMUNITIES IN PROTECTED AREAS ...................... 223 
3.1.1 Owner ........................................................................................................................................ 223 
3.1.2 Manager ..................................................................................................................................... 224 
3.1.3 Developer .................................................................................................................................. 224 
3.1.4 Beneficiary ................................................................................................................................. 225 
3.2 CURRENT LEGAL OPTIONS FOR FACILITATING THE ROLE OF COMMUNITIES IN 
PROTECTED AREAS ............................................................................................................... 226 
3.2.1 Owner/Manager Option ............................................................................................................. 227 
3.2.2 Owner/Co-Manager Option ....................................................................................................... 228 
3.2.3 Owner/Beneficiary Option .......................................................................................................... 230 
3.2.4 Non-Owner/Manager Option ..................................................................................................... 232 
3.2.5 Non-Owner/Co-Manager Option ................................................................................................ 234 
3.2.6 Non-Owner/Non-Manager/Beneficiary Option ........................................................................... 235 
















PART III    THE PRACTICE ..................................................................................................................... 239 
 
CHAPTER 8    SOUTH AFRICA’S EXPERIMENTATION WITH COMMUNALLY-CONSERVED          
AREAS ............................................................................................................................ 240 
 
1. INTRODUCTION ....................................................................................................................... 240 
2. THE CASE STUDIES ................................................................................................................ 241 
2.1 RICHTERSVELD CASE STUDY ............................................................................................... 242 
2.2 MAKULEKE CASE STUDY ....................................................................................................... 247 
2.3 DWESA-CWEBE CASE STUDY ............................................................................................... 253 
2.4 BHANGAZI CASE STUDY ........................................................................................................ 260 
3. CONCLUSION ........................................................................................................................... 265 
 
CHAPTER 9 EVALUATING SOUTH AFRICA’S EXPERIMENTATION WITH COMMUNALLY-
CONSERVED AREAS .................................................................................................... 266 
 
1. INTRODUCTION ....................................................................................................................... 266 
2. TYPES OF COMMUNALLY-CONSERVED AREAS ................................................................ 266 
3. PLANNING ................................................................................................................................ 271 
4. LAND TENURE ......................................................................................................................... 272 
4.1 FORM OF LAND TENURE ........................................................................................................ 272 
4.2 CLARITY OF LAND TENURE RIGHTS .................................................................................... 276 
4.3 LAND TENURE PROCESS ....................................................................................................... 276 
4.4 RECOGNITION OF COMMUNAL NATURE OF TENURE ....................................................... 278 
5. CONSULTATION AND NEGOTIATION ................................................................................... 279 
5.1 NEGOTIATION PROCESS ....................................................................................................... 280 
5.2 FOUNDING AGREEMENTS ..................................................................................................... 287 
6. DECLARATION ......................................................................................................................... 291 
7. INSTITUTIONS .......................................................................................................................... 293 
7.1 GOVERNMENT INSTITUTIONS ............................................................................................... 293 
7.2 COMMUNAL PROPERTY INSTITUTIONS ............................................................................... 297 
8. MANAGEMENT ......................................................................................................................... 304 
8.1 FORM OF MANAGEMENT ....................................................................................................... 304 
8.2 MANAGEMENT INSTITUTIONS ............................................................................................... 306 
8.3 MANAGEMENT PLANNING ..................................................................................................... 309 
8.4 DECISION-MAKING PROCESS ............................................................................................... 311 
8.5 DE FACTO MANAGEMENT ...................................................................................................... 316 
9. ACCESS, USE AND BENEFIT-SHARING ............................................................................... 319 
9.1 NEGOTIATION PROCESS ....................................................................................................... 320 
9.2 NATURE AND FORM OF THE RIGHTS AND BENEFITS ....................................................... 322 












9.4 DISTRIBUTION ......................................................................................................................... 327 
10. FINANCING AND SUPPORT ................................................................................................... 329 
11. CONCLUSION ........................................................................................................................... 334 
 
PART IV     THE SOLUTION .................................................................................................................... 337 
 
CHAPTER 10 TWEAKING THE DOMESTIC LEGAL LANDSCAPE TO IMPROVE ITS 
EFFECTIVENESS & SUSTAINABILITY ........................................................................ 338 
 
1. INTRODUCTION ....................................................................................................................... 338 
2. A BRIEF REFLECTION ............................................................................................................ 339 
2.1 THE CONTEXT ......................................................................................................................... 339 
2.2 THE LAW ................................................................................................................................... 341 
2.3 THE PRACTICE ........................................................................................................................ 344 
3. OPTIONS FOR REFORM ......................................................................................................... 346 
3.1 TYPES OF COMMUNALLY-CONSERVED AREAS ................................................................. 347 
3.2 PLANNING ................................................................................................................................ 348 
3.3 LAND TENURE ......................................................................................................................... 349 
3.4 CONSULTATION AND NEGOTIATION .................................................................................... 353 
3.5 DECLARATION ......................................................................................................................... 356 
3.6 INSTITUTIONS .......................................................................................................................... 357 
3.7 MANAGEMENT ......................................................................................................................... 360 
3.8 ACCESS, USE AND BENEFIT-SHARING ................................................................................ 364 
3.9 FINANCING AND SUPPORT .................................................................................................... 366 
4. THE LAST WORD ..................................................................................................................... 368 
 
BIBLIOGRAPHY ....................................................................................................................................... 370 
 
INTERNATIONAL INSTRUMENTS .......................................................................................................... 370 
NATIONAL LEGISLATION ........................................................................................................................ 371 
PROVINCIAL LEGISLATION .................................................................................................................... 374 
GOVERNMENT NOTICES & REGULATIONS ......................................................................................... 375 
GOVERNMENT DOCUMENTS, POLICIES, REPORTS & PRESENTATIONS ....................................... 377 
CASES  ................................................................................................................................................... 382 
BOOKS  ................................................................................................................................................... 383 
CHAPTERS IN BOOKS ............................................................................................................................ 388 
JOURNAL ARTICLES ............................................................................................................................... 395 
REPORTS, GUIDELINES AND OCCASSIONAL PAPERS ..................................................................... 406 
UNPUBLISHED PAPERS ......................................................................................................................... 415 
THESES  ................................................................................................................................................... 416 












LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS 
 
 
Biodiversity Act National Environmental Management: 
Biodiversity Act 
CASS      Centre for Applied Social Studies 
CCA      Communally-Conserved Area 
CMC Co-Management Committee 
CDRP Comprehensive Rural Development 
Programme 
CEESP Commission on Environment, Economic & 
Social Policy 
COP      Conference of the Parties 
CPA Communal Property Association 
CPI Communal Property Institution 
CRLR Commission on the Restitution of Land Rights 
DAFF Department of Agriculture, Forestry & Fisheries 
DCNR      Dwesa-Cwebe Nature Reserve 
DCLT      Dwesa-Cwebe Land Trust 
DEA      Department of Environmental Affairs 
DEAET Department of Economic Affairs, Environment 
& Tourism (Eastern Cape) 
DEAT Department of Environmental Affairs & Tourism 
DRD&LR Department of Rural Development & Land 
Reform 
DWA      Department of Water Affairs 
DWAF Department of Water Affairs & Forestry 
KNP      Kruger National Park 
Kumleben Report Report of the Board of Investigation into the 
Institutional Arrangements for Nature 
Conservation in South Africa 
ICCA Indigenous Community Conserved Area 
ICCA Consortium Indigenous and Community Conserved Area 
Consortium 













IUCN Management Guidelines (2008) Guidelines for Applying Protected Areas 
Management Categories 
IWP Isimangaliso Wetland Park 
JMB Joint Management Board 
LAC Land Administration Committee 
LARP Land & Agrarian Reform Project 
LCC Land Claims Court 
MCPA Makuleke Communal Property Association 
MEC Provincial Member of Executive Council 
MPC Management Planning Committee 
NGO Non-Government Organisation 
NBF National Biodiversity Framework 
NBSAP National Biodiversity Strategy & Action Plan 
NPB National Parks Board 
NPAES National Protected Areas Expansion Strategy 
NSBA National Spatial Biodiversity Assessment 
Protected Areas Act National Environmental Management: 
Protected Areas Act 
PLAAS Institute for Poverty, Land & Agrarian Studies 
PLAS Proactive Land Acquisition Strategy 
RCT Richtersveld Community Trust 
RNP Richtersveld National Park 
SANBI South African National Biodiversity Institute 
SANParks South African National Parks 
SIS Strategy Settlement and Implementation Support 
Strategy for Land and Agrarian Reform in 
South Africa 
TL&GFA Traditional Leadership and Governance 
Framework Act  
UNEP United Nations Environmental Law Programme 
WCPA World Commission on Protected Areas 
White Paper on Biodiversity White Paper on the Conservation and 














LIST OF FIGURES 
 
 
Figure 1 IUCN Protected Areas Matrix: A Classification       53 
System for Protected Areas Comprising both  
Management Category and Governance Type 
Figure 2 Factors Influencing Protected Areas Governance     61 
Figure 3 Stewardship Options       148 
Figure 4 Owner/Manager Option       228 
Figure 5 Owner/Co-Manager Option      229 
Figure 6 Owner/Beneficiary Option       231 
Figure 7 Non-Owner/Manager Option      233 
Figure 8 Non-Owner/Co-Manager Option      235 



















1. THE CONTEXT 
 
As highlighted by Barry Commoner almost 40 years ago, the ‘root cause’ of many an 
environmental crisis is frequently found in the manner in which people ‘interact with 
each other’ – and that ‘to solve the environmental crisis we must solve the problems of 
poverty, racial injustice and war’.1 Nowhere are these sentiments more clearly depicted 
than in South Africa. Racial injustices underpinned by discriminatory land legislation, 
fractured communities, destroyed their relationship with their land, undermined 
traditional landownership and use patterns, deepened poverty and created yawning 
caverns between conservationists and disenfranchised local communities. 
 
While having avoided the ravages of civil war, the country faces the ongoing challenge 
of simultaneously remedying the racial injustices of the past, alleviating widespread 
poverty, conserving the nation’s rich yet rapidly dwindling natural resources and 
grappling with the ravages of climate change. In an effort to overcome these challenges, 
domestic policy-makers have introduced broad legal reforms in the land and 
conservation sectors. The agendas perpetuated by these legal reforms while 
theoretically reconcilable, frequently counteract one another in practice. The 
rudimentary question at the core of this dissertation is whether the notion of 
communally-conserved areas (CCAs),2 provide a useful model for bridging the gap 
                                                     
1 Commoner B “Ecology and Social Action” in Albright H (ed) The Horace M. Albright Conservation 
Lectureship (1973) 13 University of California, School of Forestry and Conservation 62. 
2 In this dissertation I distil and use the following definition of communally-conserved areas: ‘a clearly 
defined geographical space, established, recognised, used and managed by indigenous peoples and 
local communities, themselves or in partnership with others, through legal or other effective means, to 
commonly achieve the enduring conservation of nature with associated ecosystem services and cultural 
values’. See further Chapter 3, which provides a detailed analysis of this definition and the nature, form 












between South Africa’s conservation and land reform agendas; and if so, how to provide 
for their effective and equitable implementation. 
 
Prior to addressing this question, it would appear prudent to provide the necessary 
context by briefly considering the following four issues. First, South Africa’s current 
environmental social and economic realities. Second, the country’s historic approach to 
conservation – characterised by protectionist attitudes, the physical displacement of 
communities and elitist tendencies. Thirdly, the reform of conservation management 
and land-holding patterns following the country’s transition to a constitutional democracy 
in the mid-1990s. Finally, the country’s current management and settlement patterns 
emanating from such reform.  
 
1.1 ENVIRONMENTAL, SOCIAL AND ECONOMIC REALITIES 
 
South Africa is fortunate currently to rank as the third most biologically diverse country 
in the world.3 Although occupying less than 2 % of the world’s land surface, it is home to 
nearly 10 % of the world’s plant species and 7 % of the world’s reptile, bird and mammal 
species.4 The nation’s rich biological diversity is, however, one of the most threatened 
on the planet5 and in the most recent assessment of the nation’s biological resources, 
34 % of terrestrial ecosystems, 82 % of signature rivers and 65 % of marine bio-zones 
were classified as threatened.6 In addition, 50 % of South Africa’s wetlands have been 
                                                     
3 Department of Environmental Affairs and Tourism White Paper on the Conservation and Use of South 
Africa’s Biodiversity (1997) (published in GN 1095 GG No. 18163 dated 28 July 1997) 12. Of the 18 000 
plant species found in South Africa, for example, 80 % occur nowhere else in the world. See further: 
World Conservation Monitoring Centre Global Biodiversity Status of the Earth’s Living Resources (1992) 
Chapman & Hall London. 
4 Endangered Wildlife Trust The Biodiversity of South Africa - Indicators, Trends and Global Impacts 
(2002) Struik Cape Town. 
5 Wynberg R “A Decade of Biodiversity Conservation and Use in South Africa: Tracking Progress from 
Rio Earth Summit to the Johannesburg World Summit on Sustainable Development” (2002) 98 SA 
Journal of Science 233-243. The key sources of this threat are agricultural and forestry activities, the 
spread of alien invasive species, rapid urban expansion and genetic engineering. 
6 Driver A, Maze K, Rouget M, Lombard A, Nel J, Turpie J, Cowling R, Desmet P, Goodman P, Harris J, 
Jonas Z, Reyers B, Sink K & Strauss T National Spatial Biodiversity Assessment 2004: Priorities for 
Biodiversity Conservation in South Africa (2005) Strelitzia 17 South African National Biodiversity Institute, 
Pretoria ix-xiiii. See further: Department of Environmental Affairs and Tourism South African 












destroyed7 and many species situated within and outside these ecosystems have been 
identified as vulnerable, endangered and critically endangered.8 Recent assessments 
have indicated that approximately 10 % of South Africa’s birds and frogs, and 20 % of 
its mammals are threatened.9 The status of the country’s plants is currently being re-
assessed but according to previous assessments, 10 % of plant species are threatened 
with extinction.10 Furthermore, 36 % of South Africa’s freshwater fish are threatened.11 
These statistics are somewhat surprising if one considers that the Government has 
enacted, in the course of the past few decades, a complex network of laws to regulate 
the numerous threats posed to South Africa’s biodiversity.12 
 
South Africa’s biological resources and ecosystems are clearly in a perilous state. So 
too, however, is the socio-economic plight facing the country’s approximately 49.9 
million13 human inhabitants. Almost 35 % of these inhabitants earn less than US$2.5 a 
day14 resulting in high infant mortality rates, low life expectancy, malnutrition and 
                                                     
7 See generally: Kotze D, Breen C & Quinn N “Wetland Losses in South Africa” in Cowan G (ed) 
Wetlands of South Africa (1995) Department of Environmental Affairs and Tourism Pretoria. 
8 Department of Environmental Affairs and Tourism South Africa’s National Biodiversity Strategy and 
Action Plan (2005) 14-16. See further: National Spatial Biodiversity Assessment (2005) 9-17. 
9 See generally: South Africa’s National Biodiversity Strategy and Action Plan (2005) 13-14; Minter L, 
Burger M, Harrison J, Braack H, Bishop P & Kloepfer D (eds) Atlas and Red Data Book of the Frogs of 
South Africa, Lesotho and Swaziland (2004) SI/MAB Series No.9, Smithsonian Institution Washington 
DC; Friedmann Y & Daly B (eds) Red Data Book of the Mammals of South Africa: A Conservation 
Assessment (2004) Conservation Breeding Specialist Group Southern Africa & Endangered Wildlife Trust 
Johannesburg; and Barnes K (ed) The Eskom Red Data Book of Birds of South Africa, Lesotho and 
Swaziland (2000) Birdlife South Africa Johannesburg. 
10 Ibid. 
11 Driver A, Smith R & Maze K Specialist Review Paper on Biodiversity for the National Strategy for 
Sustainable Development (2005) Department of Environmental Affairs and Tourism Pretoria. 
12 National laws of relevance to conservation include: National Environmental Management: Biodiversity 
Act (10 of 2004); National Environemntal Management: Protected Areas Act (57 of 2003); World Heritage 
Convention Act (49 of 1999); National Heritage Resources Act (25 of 1999); National Environmental 
Management Act (107 of 1998); National Forests Act (84 of 1998); Animal Improvement Act (62 of 1998); 
National Water Act (36 of 1998); Marine Living Resources Act (18 of 1998); Genetically Modified 
Organisms Act (15 of 1997); Environment Conservation Act (73 of 1989); Forest Act (122 of 1984); 
Conservation of Agricultural Resources Act (43 of 1983); Plant Improvement Act (53 of 1976); Plant 
Breeders’ Rights Act (15 of 1976); Lake Areas Development Act (39 of 1975); Sea Birds and Seals 
Protection Act (46 of 1973); and Mountain Catchment Areas Act (63 of 1970). Provincial laws of 
relevance include: Eastern Cape Parks and Tourism Act (2 of 2010); Northern Cape Nature Conservation 
Act (9 of 2009); Mpumalanga Tourism and Parks Agency Act (5 of 2005); Provincial Parks Board Act 
(Eastern Cape) (12 of 2003); Limpopo Environmental Management Act (7 of 2003); Limpopo Tourism and 
Parks Board Act (8 of 2001); Mpumalanga Nature Conservation Act (10 of 1998); Kwazulu-Natal Nature 
Conservation Management Act (9 of 1997); and Kwazulu-Natal Nature Conservation Act (29 of 1992). 
13 Statistics South Africa Mid-Year Population Estimates (2010) 3. 












disease.15 The latter problems are compounded by the dire state of the country’s water 
treatment and sewage infrastructure.16 Some 3.3 million people still lack access to 
adequate and clean water supplies, and a further 15.3 million people lack access to 
satisfactory sanitation services.17 
 
The population continues to grow at a rate of 2.38 % per annum,18 official 
unemployment rates remain in the region of 25 %19 and the desired levels of economic 
growth required to reduce unemployment and poverty are not being realised.20 It would 
therefore appear that the Government is very unlikely to achieve any of the United 
Nation’s Millennium Development Goals21 and a significant proportion of South Africa’s 
inhabitants will remain locked in the poverty cycle for decades to come.22 
 
Ironically, some of the Government’s efforts to grow the economy to attain these goals 
are simultaneously frustrating their realisation. This is best epitomised in the arena of 
climate change, where the broad impacts of the country’s heavy reliance on coal-based 
                                                     
15 For a comprehensive overview of the latest statistics on these issues, see: Mid-Year Population 
Estimates (2010); and Millennium Development Goals: Country Report (2010). 
16 For a comprehensive overview of these issues, see: Department of Water Affairs Green Drop Report: 
South African Waste Water Quality Treatment Performance (2009) (Version 1); and Department of Water 
Affairs Blue Drop Report: South Africa’s Drinking Water Quality Management Performance (2010) 
(Version 1). 
17 Ibid. 
18 Mid-Year Population Estimates (2010) 7. 
19 Statistics South Africa Quarterly Labour Force Survey (Quarter 3) (2010) vi. 
20 In 2004, the South African Government undertook to halve poverty and unemployment by 2014. In 
order to meet these commitments, the Government estimated that it would need to grow the economy by 
on average 4.5 % or higher during the period 2005 to 2009; and 6 % or higher during the period 2010 
(The Presidency: Republic of South Africa Accelerated and Shared Growth Initiative - South Africa 
(ASGISA) – A Summary (2006)). This commitment was reiterated in the Government’s Medium Term 
Strategic Framework, published in 2009 (The Presidency: Republic of South Africa Medium Term 
Strategic Framework (2009)). To date, the economy has grown at an average rate of 3.2 % between 2005 
and 2009 (Millennium Development Goals: Country Report (2010) 112). 
21 Government of the Republic of South Africa Draft National Climate Change Response Green Paper 
(2010) 27. The United Nations Millennium Development Goals originated from the development priorities 
recorded in United Nations GA Resolution 55/2 (Millennium Declaration) (2000). They have most recently 
been complemented by a Global Action Plan to achieve their realisation recorded in United Nations, GA 
Resolution 65/1 (2010 World Summit Outome) (2010). For further information on the Millennium 
Development Goals, see: http://www.un.org/millenniumgoals/. 
22 For an overview of the extent to which South Africa has progressed towards the realisation of the 













energy generation23 are acknowledged as undermining the health and well-being of the 
country’s human inhabitants and the state of the country’s biological resources.24 
 
While evident in urban areas, the above realities are most vividly illustrated in the rural 
areas of South Africa, which are inhabited by 39 % of the population.25 These rural 
areas, which support 70 % of the country’s poorest households,26 are characterised by 
limited infrastructure, development and employment opportunities.27 These households 
live in close proximity to, and depend on, the country’s diminishing biological resources 
for their survival. Therefore, any efforts to conserve the latter have to be aligned with 
measures to address the socio-economic plight of these rural communities.  
 
1.2 PROTECTION, DISPLACEMENT AND ELITISM 
 
One traditional conservation mechanism used in South Africa to conserve its biological 
resources is setting aside protected areas. Twenty-one laws currently provide for the 
designation of over 25 different types of protected areas28 and to date approximately 6.5 
% of South Africa’s terrestrial environment and 21.5 % of its coastal environment have 
been accorded formal protected areas status.29 As highlighted above, the demise of 
                                                     
23 Coal currently accounts for approximately 85 % of South Africa’s electricity generation capacity and 
contributes 75 % to its greenhouse gas emissions (Draft National Climate Change Response Green 
Paper (2010) 8-13). 
24 For the most recent restatement of these impacts, see: Draft National Climate Change Response 
Green Paper (2010) 7-28. 
25 Draft National Climate Change Response Green Paper (2010) 27. 
26 Ibid. 
27 National Biodiversity Strategy and Action Plan (2005) 9. 
28 National laws providing for protected areas include: National Environmental Management: Biodiversity 
Act (10 of 2004); National Environmental Management: Protected Areas Act (57 of 2003); World Heritage 
Convention Act (49 of 1999); National Heritage Resources Act (25 of 1999); National Forests Act (84 of 
1998); Marine Living Resources Act (18 of 1998); Environment Conservation Act (73 of 1989); National 
Parks Act (57 of 1976); Mountain Catchment Areas Act (63 of 1970); and Sea Birds and Seals Protection 
Act (46 of 1973). Provincial laws providing for protected areas include: Provincial Parks Board Act 
(Eastern Cape) (12 of 2003); Limpopo Environmental Management Act (7 of 2003); Mpumalanga Nature 
Conservation Act (10 of 1998); Transkei Environmental Conservation Decree (9 of 1992); Kwazulu-Natal 
Nature Conservation Act (29 of 1992); Nature Conservation Act (Ciskei) (10 of 1987); Protected Areas Act 
(Bophuthatswana) (24 of 1987); Nature Conservation Ordinance (Transvaal) (12 of 1983); Nature 
Conservation Ordinance (Cape) (19 of 1974); Bophuthatswana Nature Conservation Act (3 of 1973); and 
Nature Conservation Ordinance (OFS) (8 of 1969). 
29 Department of Environmental Affairs and Tourism National Biodiversity Framework (2009) (published in 












South Africa’s biological resources continues at an alarming rate notwithstanding this 
relatively extensive network of protected areas. Commentators have argued that this is 
partly due to the country’s historic reliance on an exclusionary, protectionist and state-
centred approach to conservation.30 
 
The Government’s historic approach to biodiversity regulation was based on the 
premise that effective conservation within protected areas required the exclusion of 
humans from them. The result saw the alienation of conservation from the people, and 
people from conservation. This policy was particularly clearly reflected in South Africa’s 
pre-2005 protected areas legislation. Express provision for public participation in the 
formation and management of protected areas was almost entirely absent, as too was 
recognition of the need to ensure equitable access, use and benefit-sharing. Protected 
areas were often established on land formerly owned or occupied by indigenous and 
local communities who were frequently displaced and denied access and use rights.31 
 
This problem did not affect protected areas only. With private landownership recorded 
at approximately 84 % and a large proportion of this land being held by the minority 
white population, the majority of citizens had no opportunity to access, use and enjoy 
biological resources situated within South Africa. This was compounded by the absence 
of a coherent regime for regulating access, use and benefit-sharing associated with 
biological resources situated on private land. Conservation therefore became regarded 
                                                     
30 Other issues which have been identified as undermining South Africa’s protected areas regime include: 
the lack of political will; the absence of an adequate planning framework; legislative and institutional 
fragmentation; reliance on command-and-control strategies; and capacity and resource constraints. See 
generally: Paterson A “Wandering About South Africa’s New Protected Areas Regime” (2007) (1) SA 
Public Law 1-33; Kumleben M, Sangweni S & Ledger J Board of Investigation into the Institutional 
Arrangements for Nature Conservation in South Africa: Report (1998) 9-10; Hanks J & Glavovic B 
“Protected Areas” in Fuggle R & Rabie A (eds) Environmental Management in South Africa (1992) Juta & 
Co Ltd Cape Town 712-714; and White Paper on Biodiversity (1997) 30. 
31
 Kumleben Board of Investigation Report (1998) 42. See further: Amend T, Ruth P, Eissing S & Amend 
S Land Rights are Human Rights: Win-Win Strategies in Sustainable Nature Conservation - Contributions 
from South Africa (2008) Sustainability Has Many Faces No.4, GTZ Eschborn 16; and Summers R “Legal 
and Institutional Aspects of Community-Based Wildlife Conservation in South Africa, Zimbabwe and 












as an elitist concern, the ‘preserve of the privileged members of society’;32 and 
protected areas the ‘playgrounds for the privileged elite’.33 
 
Following South Africa’s transition to a constitutional democracy in the mid-1990s, the 
exclusionary, protectionist state-centred approach became subject to increasing 
domestic criticism. Commentators argued that it was unsustainable especially in a 
developing economy such as South Africa where broad sectors of society were 
dependant on accessing biological resources to sustain their livelihoods.34 Calls were 
made for the introduction of a more human-centred approach to biodiversity regulation 
with a focus on community-based natural resource management.35 It was argued that in 
order for such an approach to be implemented successfully in South Africa, both within 
and outside of protected areas, genuine proprietorship, in other words, the right to use 
resources and determine the mode of usage, distribution of such benefits and rules of 
access, had to be granted to local communities.36 In the context of protected areas, 
critics argued that public participation needed to extend to determining reserve 
boundaries, preparing management plans and sharing in the economic benefits derived 
from their establishment.37 Although various initiatives were undertaken to facilitate local 
community access to and the use of resources situated within various protected areas, 
these were few and far between.38 Accordingly, there were calls for local community 
participation to be prescribed as a matter of law, rather than retained as a discretionary 
administrative policy.39 
 
                                                     
32 Kumleben Board of Investigation Report (1998) 42. 
33 White Paper Biodiversity (1997) 33. 
34 Summers (1999) Acta Juridica 189. See further: Bothma J & Glavovic B “Wild Animals” in Fuggle R & 
Rabie J (eds) Environmental Management in South Africa (1992) Juta & Co Ltd Cape Town 251 & 258. 
35 Mandondo A Dialogue of Theory and Empirical Evidence: A Weighted Decision and Tenurial Niche 
Approach to Reviewing the Operation of Natural Resource Policy in Rural Southern Africa (2005) 
Commons Southern Africa: Occasional Paper Series No.10, CASS/PLAAS Harare/Bellville 11; and 
Summers (1999) Acta Juridica 191. 
36 Murphree M Communities as Resource Management Institutions (1992) Gatekeeper Series No.36, IIED 
London 11. 
37 Bothma & Glavovic “Wild Animals” in Environmental Management in South Africa (1992) 258. 
38 See the examples cited in: Kumleben Board of Investigation Report (1998) 44-47; and Department of 
Environmental Affairs and Tourism People Parks and Transformation in South Africa: A Century of 
Conservation, A Decade of Democracy (2003) 48-52. 












1.3 REFORM OF CONSERVATION MANAGEMENT AND LAND-HOLDING 
PATTERNS 
 
In light of the above, the Government initiated a significant reform process in the late 
1990s. It commissioned various policy papers and reports to guide it in revising its 
approach to biodiversity regulation. The most notable of these were the White Paper on 
the Conservation and Sustainable Use of South Africa’s Biological Diversity (White 
Paper on Biodiversity)40 and the Report of the Board of Investigation into the 
Institutional Arrangements for Nature Conservation in South Africa.41 These documents 
reflected many of the above criticisms. They advocated a fundamental shift in approach 
to biodiversity regulation from ‘… preservation to conservation and sustainable use; 
from exclusivity to participation and sharing; … from fences and fines to incentives and 
individual responsibility.’42 The Government has subsequently been grappling with 
designing a new legal regime to implement this more inclusive, participatory and 
human-centred approach to conservation, a process which culminated in the 
promulgation of the National Environmental Management: Protected Areas Act 
(Protected Areas Act)43 and its sister law, the National Environmental Management: 
Biodiversity Act (Biodiversity Act),44 some seven years ago. These laws are 
complemented by an array of domestic policies and plans that highlight the need to 
expand the country’s protected areas network, increase the role of rural communities 
and communal land within this network, ensure that protected areas realise tangible 
benefits and facilitate socio-economic development for local communities living adjacent 
to them.45 
                                                     
40 The White Paper Biodiversity (1997) outlines broad proposals for the efficient establishment and 
management of a representative and effective system of protected areas which promotes sound and 
sustainable development within, and adjacent to, these areas (27-33). 
41 Kumleben Board of Investigation Report (1998). The Report was commissioned by the Minister of 
Environmental Affairs and Tourism to make recommendations on the following aspects relating to the 
domestic administration of protected areas: institutional arrangements; classification of protected areas; 
declaration and management regimes; financing protected areas; and increasing local community 
involvement. 
42 Department of Environmental Affairs and Tourism 10 Year Review (1994-2004) (2005) 44. 
43 Act 57 of 2003. 
44 Act 10 of 2004. 
45 These key policies include: Department of Environmental Affairs National Co-Management Framework 













The above domestic policy shift largely mimicked developments in the international 
sphere where there was growing adherence to the three central tenets of the 
Convention on Biological Diversity,46 namely: to conserve biological diversity; to provide 
for the sustainable use of its components; and to provide for the fair and equitable 
sharing of the benefits derived from such use.47 This was accompanied by increasing 
international acceptance that effective regulation of biodiversity had to be socially and 
economically relevant and required public support and co-operation.48 Taking their lead 
from these developments, several international environmental organisations, most 
notably the International Union for Conservation of Nature (IUCN), sought to garner 
support for recognising the existing role, and promoting the extended role, of indigenous 
peoples and local communities within protected areas as a tool for facilitating this 
approach.49 
 
One mechanism through which the IUCN has sought to generate such support is to 
provide greater clarity on the diverse forms of protected areas governance, namely who 
owns, controls, or has the responsibility to manage these areas. This process led to the 
                                                                                                                                                                           
Expansion Strategy for South Africa 2008 (2009); National Biodiversity Strategy and Action Plan (2005); 
and the National Spatial Biodiversity Assessment (2005). For a comprehensive discussion of these 
policies and plans see: Chapter 5 (Part 3.2). 
46 (1992) 31 ILM 818. 
47 Article 1. 
48 This has been recognised within many international policy documents and conventions such as: 
Borrini-Feyerabend G, Kothari A & Oviedo G Indigenous and Local Communities and Protected Areas: 
Towards Equity and Enhanced Conservation - Guidance on Policy and Practice for Co-Managed 
Protected Areas and Community Conserved Areas (2004) Best Practice Protected Area Guidelines 
Series No.11, IUCN/Cardiff University Gland/Cambridge 8-10; Resolution VII.8 on Local Communities and 
Indigenous People, adopted by the Conference of the Parties (San José, 1999) to the Convention on the 
Protection of Wetlands of International Importance Especially as Waterfowl Habitats (1983) 22 ILM 698; 
Convention on Biological Diversity (1992) 31 ILM 818 (Article 8(j)); and Munro D & Holgate M (eds) 
Caring for the Earth: A Strategy for Sustainable Living (1991) IUCN, WWF & UNEP Gland 57-63. 
49 See generally: Borrini-Feyerabend G Strengthening What Works - Recognising and Supporting the 
Conservation Achievements of Indigenous Peoples and Local Communities (2010) IUCN/CEESP Briefing 
Note 10, Cenesta Tehran; Borrini-Feyerabend G (ed) Bio-Cultural Diversity Conserved by Indigenous 
Peoples and Local Communities - Examples and Analysis (2010) Report prepared by ICCA Consortium 
for GEF, SGP, GTZ, IIED and IUCN/CEESP; Borrini-Feyerabend G & Kothari A Recognising and 
Supporting Indigenous and Community Conservation - Ideas & Experiences From the Grassroots (2008) 
IUCN/CEESP Briefing Note 9, Cenesta Tehran; Borrini-Feyerabend G Implementing the CBD Programme 
of Work on Protected Areas - Governance as Key for Effective and Equitable Protected Area Systems 
(2008) IUCN/CEESP Briefing Note 8, Cenesta Tehran; and Beltran J Indigenous and Traditional Peoples 
and Protected Areas: Principles, Guidelines and Case Studies (2000) Best Practice Protected Area 












IUCN recently publishing a series of Guidelines for Applying Protected Areas 
Management Categories50 (IUCN Management Guidelines (2008)) which go as far as 
distilling four protected areas governance types: governance by government;51 private 
governance;52 shared governance; and governance by indigenous peoples and local 
communities.53  
 
While the former two types of governance have been fairly extensively tested globally 
during the past decade, the latter two are the most novel. These forms of governance 
are of key relevance to establishing and/or recognising what I refer to as ‘communally-
conserved areas’. Shared governance (otherwise known as ‘co-managed protected 
areas’, ‘collaboratively managed protected areas’ and/or ‘jointly managed protected 
areas’) is defined as: 
 
 ‘...officially designated protected areas where decision-making power is shared between 
state agencies and other parties, including indigenous peoples and local communities, 
and/or NGOs and individuals or the private sector’.54 
 
Governance by indigenous peoples and local communities (otherwise referred to as 
‘indigenous and community conserved areas’ and/or ‘community conserved areas’) is 
defined as: 
 
‘…protected areas where the management authority and responsibility rest with 
indigenous peoples and/or local communities through various forms of legal, formal or 
informal, institutions and rules’.55 
 
                                                     
50 Dudley N (ed) Guidelines for Applying Protected Area Management Categories (2008) IUCN Gland. 
51 Under this form of governance, the protected area is generally owned and managed by a government 
agency. See further: Dudley Guidelines for Applying Protected Area Management Categories (2008) 26. 
52 Under this form of governance, the protected area is generally owned or managed by a private entity. 
See further: Dudley Guidelines for Applying Protected Area Management Categories (2008) 26. 
53 Dudley Guidelines for Applying Protected Area Management Categories (2008) 26-32. 
54 Kothari A “Collaboratively Managed Protected Areas” in Lockwood M, Worboys G & Kothari A (eds) 
Managing Protected Areas - A Global Guide (2006) Earthscan London 528. 












As with anything novel, there is still much uncertainty regarding the exact nature of 
protected areas subject to shared governance and governance by indigenous and local 
communities. If one scrutinises recent relevant literature, guidelines and recently cited 
practical examples of these forms of governance, as distilled in the IUCN Management 
Guidelines (2008), it is clear that they include an exceedingly diverse array of land 
tenure options, institutional frameworks, management structures, access and benefit-
sharing arrangements.56 It is acknowledged that the IUCN’s recent effort to delineate 
these forms of governance, and thereby afford greater recognition to the valuable role 
played by indigenous and local communities in protected areas governance, is a 
valuable initiative. There is, however, significant overlap in the proposed governance 
types and their formulation appears to be largely founded on one component of 
governance, namely management.57 Their overlapping nature and the apparent 
indifference shown to other key components of governance when formulating the four 
governance types, specifically who owns or controls the land in question, may well 
come to haunt the practical application and utility of the proposed governance types.58 
Drawing a distinction between these two specific types of governance is therefore 
perhaps unwise. Perhaps it would be more prudent to refer to them collectively as 
‘communally-conserved areas’ and focus on their common features that have been 
identified as key to their successful implementation. 
                                                     
56 See generally: Nelson F (ed) Community Rights, Conservation and Contested Land: The Politics of 
Natural Resource Governance in Africa (2010) Earthscan London; Kothari A, Menon M & O’Reilly S 
Territories and Areas Conserved by Indigenous Peoples and Local Communities (ICCAs): How Far Do 
National Laws and Policies Recognise Them? (2010) Report prepared for IUCN/CEESP, TILCEPA, 
WCPA and Kalpavriksh; Borrini-Feyerabend Strengthening What Works (2010); Borrini-Feyerabend Bio-
Cultural Diversity (2010); Borrini-Feyerabend & Kothari Recognising and Supporting Indigenous and 
Community Conservation (2008); Borrini-Feyerabend Implementing the CBD Programme of Work on 
Protected Areas (2008); Blomley R, Nelson F, Martin A & Ngobo M Community Conserved Areas: A 
Review of Status and Needs in Selected Countries of Central and Eastern Africa (2007) Draft Report 
prepared for TILCEPA, TGER, IUCN/CEESP, SwedBio & WCPA; Goriup P (ed) “Community Conserved 
Areas” (2006) 16(1) Special Edition of Parks: International Journal for Protected Areas Managers; Kothari 
“Collaboratively Managed Protected Areas” and “Community Conserved Areas” in Managing Protected 
Areas - A Global Guide (2006); Pathak N, Bhatt S, Balasinorwala T, Kothari A & Borrini-Feyerabend G 
Community Conserved Areas: A Bold Frontier for Conservation (2004) TILCEPA, Cenesta Tehran; 
Oviedo G Lessons Learned in the Establishment and Management of Protected Areas by Indigenous and 
Local Communities in South America (2003) WCPA Ecosystems, Protected Areas and People Project, 
IUCN Gland; and Beltran Indigenous and Traditional Peoples and Protected Areas (2000). 
57 Paterson A “Clearing or Clouding the Discourse: A South African Perspective on the Utility of the IUCN 














Many countries are experimenting with establishing and recognising a diverse array of 
CCAs as part of their domestic protected areas networks and some commentators have 
gone as far as stating that this is perhaps ‘the most exciting conservation development 
of the 21st century’.59 It is accordingly not surprising that they have been the focus of the 
bulk of recent attention from international and domestic protected area policy-makers, 
scholars and managers.60 It is these CCAs that form the focus of this dissertation, and 
most specifically the manner in which South Africa has sought to integrate them within 
its protected areas regime. 
 
If one scrutinises South Africa’s contemporary protected areas framework, as principally 
reflected in the Protected Areas Act, there is a clear acknowledgement that the 
Government alone cannot halt the rapid demise of the nation’s biodiversity. The Act 
expressly states that the objects of the new protected areas regime can only be 
achieved in partnership with the people,61 thereby entrenching a far more human-
centred approach based on the premise that one cannot divorce people from 
conservation and protection from sustainable use. This bodes well for the growth of this 
new form of protected areas governance in South Africa. Although not afforded express 
recognition in the Protected Areas Act, the Act does contain an array of legal 
mechanisms for implementing such an approach. It provides for the establishment of 
contract reserves on private and communal land;62 the appointment of private and 
communal landowners as management authorities for protected areas;63 and the 
                                                     
59 Kothari “Community Conserved Areas” in Managing Protected Areas - A Global Guide (2006) 549. 
60 See the resources cited in note 56 above. 
61 Section 3(b). 
62 In terms of the Protected Areas Act, private and communal land can be incorporated within a protected 
area through the conclusion of a written agreement entered into between the landowner and the Minister 
or relevant provincial Member of the Executive Council (MEC) (section 18(3) (special nature reserves); 
section 20(3) (national parks); and section 23(3) (nature reserves)). These written agreements must be 
recorded in a notarial deed and registered against the title deed of the property (section 35(3)(a) read 
with: section 18(1) (special nature reserves); section 20(1) (national parks); and section 23(1) (nature 
reserves)). 
63 In terms of the Protected Areas Act, the Minister or relevant MEC must in writing assign the 
management of the protected area to a management authority (section 38). Such assignment can only 
take place with the concurrence of the prospective management authority (section 39(1)). The range of 
persons or institutions to which this function can be assigned includes suitable persons, organisations 












conclusion of co-management agreements between the Government and private 
citizens, communities and organisations.64 
 
Owing to the relative novelty of this regime, South Africa’s experience with using the 
above mechanisms to establish and recognise CCAs is currently very limited. That is 
not to say that the country’s experience with seeking to afford such areas recognition is 
limited. It is just that the majority of this experience has been garnered from a different 
context, one preceding the entrance of the new protected areas regime, namely land 
reform. 
 
Following South Africa’s transition to a constitutional democracy in the mid-1990s, the 
country embarked on a massive land reform programme to redress past inequalities. 
Two key components of this land reform programme are land tenure reform, particularly 
the move to recognise informal and communal land rights;65 and land restitution, 
whereby those persons previously dispossessed of land for political reasons are 
enabled to reclaim such land.66 Over 79 000 claims were lodged under the latter 
component of the programme, of which 75 884 had been settled as of March 2010.67 Of 
these settled claims, 43 have dealt with land falling within established protected areas.68 
In the majority of these instances, communal land rights were granted to the land 
claimants (largely indigenous and local communities) on condition that they agreed: not 
to reside in the park; to retain the conservation status of the area; and to enter into a 
                                                                                                                                                                           
private citizens and communities where suitable. 
64 In terms of the Protected Areas Act, the management authority has discretion to conclude co-
management agreements with organs of state, local communities or individuals to co-manage the 
protected area or regulate human activities affecting it (section 42). 
65 This process is regulated by the Communal Property Association Act (28 of 1996) and Interim 
Protected of Informal Land Rights Act (31 of 1996). 
66  This process is regulated by the Restitution of Land Rights Act (22 of 1994). 
67 Commission on Restitution of Land Rights Presentation of Annual Report (2009-2010) (2010). 
68 Department of Environmental Affairs Conservation for the People with the People: A Review of the 
People and Parks Programme (2010) 37; Department of Environmental Affairs Status of Land Claims in 
Protected Areas (2010) Unpublished document, dated February 2010. These documents state that 121 
land claims have been lodged in protected areas, with 43 having been settled to date. However, a closer 
reading of these documents would appear to illustrate that a total of 141 claims (as opposed to 121 
claims) have been lodged in protected areas with 57 claims (as opposed to 43 claims) having been 
settled to date. Nonetheless, for the purpose of this dissertation, the figures as quoted by the Department 












contractual park and/or co-management agreement with the conservation authorities.69 
The land is generally held by a communal property institution and leased back to the 
conservation authorities for due remuneration.70 The duration of these agreements 
ranges from fifteen to fifty years. 
 
1.4 CURRENT MANAGEMENT AND SETTLEMENT PATTERNS 
 
The principal mechanism used to settle the majority of these claims would on the face of 
it appear to be one of co-management, falling under the broader rubric of the shared 
governance typology, and has been labelled as such by the relevant authorities.71 This 
model of governance would also appear to be the Government’s favoured choice for 
settling future land claims within protected areas. This is evidenced by the phraseology 
contained in the Memorandum of Agreement72 concluded between the former Minister 
of Agriculture and Land Affairs and Minister of Environmental Affairs and Tourism in 
May 2007, the express purpose of which is to guide the resolution of all outstanding 
restitution claims in protected areas. 
 
However, below the surface of these settlement arrangements, there appears to be a 
diverse array of governance options at play. These vary in respect of land tenure, 
institutional structures, management options, and access and benefit-sharing schemes. 
This diversity clearly illustrates the frailty of the four IUCN governance typologies in the 
context of CCAs. These areas do not appear to fall neatly into the four typologies 
proposed in the IUCN Management Guidelines (2008), which may pose significant 
problems for the Government seeking to report on its obligations under the Convention 
on Biological Diversity, specifically with the Programme of Work on Protected Areas 
                                                     
69 This approach has now been concretised in two recent documents published by the Government: 
Minister of Agriculture and Land Affairs & Minister of Environmental Affairs and Tourism Memorandum of 
Agreement (2007); and Department of Environmental Affairs National Co-Management Framework 
(2010). 
70 Ibid. 
71 Minister of Agriculture and Land Affairs & Minister of Environmental Affairs and Tourism Memorandum 













adopted by signatories at COP7.73 It would accordingly appear desirable to formulate a 
more nuanced array of governance typologies which better account for the array of 
governance options, particularly those at play in the context of CCAs. The South African 
context provides a useful microcosm for illustrating these frailties and attempting to distil 
a revised set of governance typologies. 
 
This analysis provides a process for evaluating the success of South Africa’s treatment 
of CCAs to date, as a tool for bridging the gap between land reform and conservation, 
and promoting the participation of indigenous peoples and local communities within 
protected areas management. While some have lauded South Africa’s co-management 
model as a great success in achieving this somewhat elusive goal,74 it is subject to 
increasing domestic criticism in that it has largely failed to achieve an equitable balance 
between conservation and land reform imperatives; local communities are frequently 
excluded from accessing the resources situated in the protected areas and participating 
in its management; and few resources or benefits have flowed back to the local 
communities.75 Commentators have argued that the Government has been misguided 
                                                     
73 Convention on Biological Diversity (1992) 31 ILM 818, Decision VII/28. 
74 The most frequently cited example in this regard is the Makuleke claim to the northern Pafuri Region of 
the Kruger National Park. See generally: Fabricius C “The Makuleke Story, South Africa” in Lockwood et 
al Managing Protected Areas - A Global Guide (2006) 537; Reid H “Contractual National Parks and the 
Makuleke Community” (2002) 29(2) Human Ecology 135-155; Ramutsindela M “The Perfect Way to 
Ending a Painful Past? Makuleke Land Deal in South Africa” (2002) 33 GeoForum 15-24; Steenkamp C & 
Uhr J The Makuleke Land Claim: Power Relations and Community-Based Natural Resource Management 
(2000) Evaluating Eden Series Discussion Paper No.18, IIED London; and De Villiers B Land Claims and 
National Parks: The Makuleke Experience (1998) HSRC Press Pretoria. 
75 See generally: Benjaminsen A, Kepe T & Brăthen S “Between Global Interests and Local Needs: 
Conservation and Land Reform in Namaqualand, South Africa” (2008) 78(2) Africa 223-244; Kepe T 
“Land Claims and Co-management of Protected Areas in South Africa: Exploring the Challenges” (2008) 
41 Environmental Management 311-321; Bradstock A Key Experiences of Land Reform in the Northern 
Cape Province of South Africa (2005) FARM-Africa Policy & Research Series, FARM-Africa London; 
Kepe T, Wynberg R & Ellis W “Land Reform and Biodiversity Conservation in South Africa: 
Complementary or in Conflict” (2005) 1 International Journal of Biodiversity Science and Management 3-
16; Kepe T, Saruchera M & Whande W “Poverty Alleviation and Biodiversity Conservation: A South 
African Perspective” (2004) 38(2) Oryx 143-145; Palmer R From Title to Entitlement: The Struggle 
Continues at Dwesa-Cwebe (2003) Fort Hare Institute of Social and Economic Research Working Paper 
No.46, University of Fort Hare Alice; Ramutsindela M “Land Reform in South Africa’s National Parks: A 
Catalyst for the Human-Nature Nexus” (2003) 20 Land Use Policy 41-49; De Villiers B Land Reform: 
Issues and Challenges: A Comparative Overview of Experiences in Zimbabwe, Namibia, South Africa and 
Australia (2003) Occasional Paper Series, KAS Johannesburg; Isaacs M & Mohammed N Co-Managing 
the Commons in the ‘New’ South Africa: Room to Manoeuvre (2000) Commons Southern Africa: 
Occasional Paper No.5, CASS/PLAAS Harare/Bellville; and Kepe T “Communities, Entitlements and 












and inflexible in the application of co-management and that the entire process has been 
driven or clouded by an underlying outdated and exclusionary conservation agenda.76  
 
This growing criticism and dissatisfaction on the part of successful land claimants may 
have contributed to the existence of approximately 78 validated, yet unsettled claims for 
land situated within several of South Africa’s protected areas.77 These claims are 
extensive and have potential to have a significant impact on South Africa’s established 
protected areas network and the Government’s role as trustee of the nation’s biological 
resources.78 
 
What is interesting in this regard is that the Government appears to remain in a real 
quandary regarding how to approach the settlement of these claims. In a statement 
released by the Cabinet in January 2009, it was stated that ‘equitable redress’ and not 
‘co-management’ is the only model for resolving the significant outstanding land claims 
in the Kruger National Park.79 Some twenty months later, the Government published a 
National Co-Management Framework80 that proposes co-management as the desired 
model. The initial drafts of the National Co-Management Framework expressly 
recognised the disjuncture between Government policy and community expectation in 
its opening paragraph: 
 
‘…there is a high expectation from communities with claims in protected areas that co-
management is the same as joint-management, that the eventual outcome of the co-
management process is community driven management and that this will be achieved 
through a long term process of capacity building.’
81 
 
                                                     
76 Ibid. 
77 SANParks Annual Report (2007/2008) (2008). See further: Conservation for the People with the People 
(2010) 37; Status of Land Claims in Protected Areas (2010); and Commission on Restitution of Land 
Rights Presentation of Annual Report (2008/2009) (2009). 
78 The Government is appointed as the trustee of the nation’s biological resources under the Biodiversity 
Act (section 2). 
79 Cabinet “State Announces Decision on Kruger National Park Land Claims” Press Release dated 28 
January 2009. 
80 National Co-Management Framework (2010). 
81 Department of Environmental Affairs and Tourism, Department of Land Affairs, SANParks, Ezemvelo 












In an effort to resolve this disjuncture, three nuanced models for co-management are 
proposed, namely: full co-management;82 full lease;83 and part co-management.84 While 
the proposition of a diverse set of ‘co-management’ models appears to be a move in the 
right direction, the exact nature of the three models remains unclear. Furthermore, a 
thorough reading of the National Co-Management Framework would appear to indicate 
that the ‘contemporary’ proposal reverts to the troublesome narrow vision of co-
management traditionally relied upon by the Government under which conservation 
authorities generally controlled and managed, and indigenous and local communities 
received some form of predominantly financial benefit for relinquishing their residence, 
access and use rights. This is reflected in the National Co-Management Framework’s 
heavy focus on the ‘full lease model’ which, by document’s authors own admission, 
affords conservation authorities almost carte blanche to manage the area to the 
exclusion of the land claimants.85 This approach is patently at odds with the country’s 
requisite policy and statutory framework which, as previously mentioned, expressly 
recognises the need to foster community-based natural resource management and that 
the protected areas framework needs to be implemented in partnership with the people. 
 
South Africa accordingly appears to be some way off in, or perhaps heading in the 
wrong direction for, achieving the equitable and effective balance between its land 
reform and conservation agenda through the vehicle of CCAs. It is this currently fraught 
area that the dissertation seeks to address. We are not alone in this enterprise. Several 
foreign jurisdictions have relatively recently been grappling with similar issues, most 
notably Australia,86 Canada87 and Namibia.88 The issues are complex. The vested 
interests are vast. The stakes are high. The solutions are neither simple nor resolved.  
                                                     
82 Under this model, compensation for no physical occupation will take the form of socio-economic 
beneficiation and participation in co-management. The application of this model is anticipated for those 
circumstances where viable socio-economic opportunities exist within the protected area. 
83 Under this model, the Government will lease the land from the land claimants. The application of this 
model is anticipated for those circumstances where few (if any) socio-economic opportunities exist and 
would result in inadequate compensation for loss of beneficial occupation. Treasury approval will be 
required for this model. 
84 This model will constitute a blend of the two former models. 
85 National Co-Management Framework (2010) 8. 
86 See generally: Smyth D “Indigenous Protected Areas in Australia” (2006) 16(1) Parks 14-20; and 












2. KEY ISSUES FOR CONSIDERATION 
 
This dissertation seeks to explore the primary question of whether CCAs provide a 
useful tool for bridging the gap between South Africa’s conservation and land reform 
agendas. In order to satisfy the imperative, especially within the environmental 
discipline, for legal research to be of theoretical and practical relevance and value, the 
dissertation explores seven subsidiary questions. First, how do the three concepts of 
the natural commons, protected areas and governance relate to one another? 
Secondly, what are CCAs and why have they become a prominent form of protected 
areas governance? Thirdly, what elements underpin successful CCAs? Fourthly, how 
does South Africa’s current legal framework provide for CCAs to balance the country’s 
conservation and land reform agendas? Fifthly, how has this legal framework been 
implemented to date to provide for CCAs? Sixthly, has the implementation of this legal 
framework been successful and to what extent does it reflect the elements identified by 
international protected areas scholars as integral to well-functioning CCAs? Finally, how 
can South Africa’s regime as regards CCAs be improved to strike an optimal balance 
between the country’s conservation and land reform agendas? 
 
3. STRUCTURE AND METHOD 
 
In this dissertation, the main and subsidiary research questions are considered from a 
theoretical and practical perspective. The nature of the legal analysis is a collection and 
ordering of existing legal norms to provide insight into the regulation of the relationship 
between conservation and land reform, accompanied by a critical analysis of such 
norms in view of their practical efficacy in dealing with this often vexed relationship. 
                                                                                                                                                                           
Australia’s National System of Protected Areas’ in Jaireth H & Smyth D (eds) Innovative Governance: 
Indigenous Peoples, Local Communities and Protected Areas (2003) Ane Books New Delhi. 
87 See generally: Brown J, Lyman M & Proctor A “Community Conserved Areas: Experience from North 
America” (2006) 16(1) Parks 35-42. 
88 See generally: Holden P, Grossman D & Jones B “Community Conserved Areas in Some Southern 
African Countries” (2006) 16(1) Parks 68-73; and Bandyopadhyay S, Humavindu M, Shyamsundar P & 
Wang L Do Households Gain from Community-Based Natural Resource Management? An Evaluation of 













Drawing from the structure of the core and subsidiary research questions outlined 
above, the dissertation is divided into four main parts. 
 
3.1 PART I – THE CONTEXT 
 
The first part analyses four contextual issues requiring consideration prior to addressing 
the primary question underpinning this dissertation. The first issue relates to the main 
objective of CCAs - managing the natural commons. What are the natural commons? 
How does one theoretically and practically seek to regulate and manage the natural 
commons? How have the debates about natural commons regulation and management 
shifted over the past half-century or so? The second issue follows on from the above 
enquiry and relates to the form of CCAs – protected areas. What are protected areas? 
What is their general form and nature? Have contemporary debates about protected 
areas governance assisted in developing a coherent common language for 
understanding, planning for and recording their diversity of forms across the globe? 
Finally, have these debates fostered an appropriate understanding of the link between 
communal property regimes, common-pool natural resources and protected areas? 
These two aspects are considered in Chapter 2 (titled The Role of Protected Areas as a 
Tool for Managing the Natural Commons). 
 
The third issue relates to the nature of CCAs. What do I mean by a CCA? How does 
this concept differ from or relate to previously defined forms of governance? How have 
significant shifts in economic, property rights, ecology, human rights and conservation 
discourses contributed to their rise in prominence in the past decade? The fourth issue 
relates to the third. What general elements are relevant to their successful 
implementation? These two aspects are considered in Chapter 3 (titled The Nature 
















3.2 PART II – THE LAW 
 
Having distilled the objective, nature, form and essential elements of CCAs in Part I of 
the dissertation, Part II considers the manner in which South Africa’s legal framework 
provides for their domestic introduction. The requisite domestic legal framework sits 
somewhat uncomfortably between two legal regimes, namely conservation and land 
reform. Both legal regimes have undergone significant transformation in the past 
decade or so. Many different authorities administer these legal regimes. Their actions 
are in turn informed by a diverse array of domestic policies and programmes. 
Furthermore, overarching these two legal regimes is South Africa’s comprehensive 
constitutional dispensation. It provided the mandate for, and framework within which, 
the contemporary conservation and land reform regimes were formulated and are 
implemented. 
 
Part II is divided into four chapters. Commencing from the broadest perspective, 
Chapter 4 (titled South Africa’s Constitutional Regime of Relevance to Communally-
Conserved Areas) examines South Africa’s constitutional dispensation, specifically the 
relevant constitutional rights it grants citizens and the relevant competences it affords 
the different spheres of government to make and administer laws of relevance to CCAs. 
Chapter 5 (titled South Africa’s Conservation Regime of Relevance to Communally-
Conserved Areas) considers South Africa’s conservation regime, specifically the laws, 
policies and institutions that respectively inform, provide for and administer CCAs. 
Chapter 6 (titled South Africa’s Land Reform Regime of Relevance to Communally-
Conserved Areas) comprises of a similar examination of the domestic laws, policies and 
institutions at play in South Africa’s land reform regime. Integrated within Chapters 4, 5 
and 6 is a critical analysis of the factors which have shaped South Africa’s 
contemporary conservation and land reform regimes, and which have similarly 
influenced the domestic implementation of CCAs. Chapter 7 (Linking South Africa’s 
Conservation and Land Reform Regimes) concludes this part of the dissertation by 
surveying recent domestic efforts to traverse the artificial and dysfunctional divide 












both recent tangible efforts by domestic policy-makers to do so and the untapped 
options prevalent in South Africa’s domestic legal framework for doing so. 
 
3.3 PART III – THE PRACTICE 
 
Having canvassed South Africa’s policy, legal and institutional framework of relevance 
to the domestic implementation of CCAs in Part II of this dissertation, Part III evaluates 
the manner in which administrators have sought to implement it. This evaluation is 
undertaken through two distinct yet related enquiries: first, through the consideration of 
four domestic case studies; and secondly, by way of an assessment of the extent to 
which these case studies reflect the presence or absence of the essential elements 
underlying CCAs highlighted in Part I (specifically Chapter 3).  
 
Part III is accordingly divided into two chapters. Chapter 8 (titled South Africa’s 
Experimentation with Communally-Conserved Areas) considers four South African case 
studies in which domestic administrators have sought to use the legal framework 
discussed in Part II to bridge the country’s conservation and land reform agendas. 
These case studies are the Richtersveld National Park, the Pafuri Region of the Kruger 
National Park, the Dwesa-Cwebe Nature Reserve and the Eastern Shores Region of 
the Isimangaliso Wetland Park. The four selected case studies are the most well 
documented in South Africa and have been central to shaping the country’s 
contemporary legal regime of relevance to CCAs. Within this chapter I briefly set out the 
history of each CCA and detail the different governance options and elements that 
underpin them. Chapter 9 (titled Evaluating South Africa’s Experimentation with 
Communally-Conserved Areas) critically assesses the extent to which the case studies 
reflect adherence to the essential elements that theoretically underlie successful CCAs. 
This chapter does not provide an exhaustive analysis of the extent to which each case 
study reflects the presence or absence of each of these elements. It rather seeks to 
draw pertinent examples from the four case studies which illustrate the challenges faced 












inherent strengths and frailties of the existing legal framework and which hold lessons 
for future legislative reform. 
 
3.4 PART IV – THE SOLUTION 
 
Part IV of the dissertation seeks to plot the way forward for the extended use of CCAs 
as a tool for bridging South Africa’s conservation and land reform imperatives. Chapter 
10 (titled Tweaking the Legal Landscape to Improve its Effectiveness and Sustainability) 
seeks to distil a series of concrete recommendations on how to tweak the current 
domestic legal framework regime to create a more effective and sustainable regime for 
CCAs. In doing so, it draws together the following key aspects discussed in the previous 
chapters of the dissertation. First, the elements identified by international and domestic 
scholars during the past two decades as essential to the proper regulation of the natural 
commons and CCAs (discussed in Chapters 2 and 3). Secondly, the strengths and 
weakness of South Africa’s current regime of relevance to CCAs (discussed in Chapters 
4, 5, 6 and 7). Thirdly, how these are manifest in several domestic case studies 

















As has been highlighted above, the key research question to be addressed in this dissertation is 
whether communally-conserved areas provide a useful tool for bridging the gap between South 
Africa’s conservation and land reform agendas. Prior to considering this question in any detail it 
is essential to seek out, circumscribe and understand its context. This involves a consideration 
of four main aspects. The first relates to the object of a communally-conserved area – managing 
the natural commons. What are the natural commons? How does one theoretically and 
practically seek to regulate and manage the natural commons? How have the debates about 
natural commons regulation and management shifted over the past half-century or so? The 
second aspect requiring attention follows on from the above enquiry and relates to the form of a 
communally-conserved area – a protected area. What are protected areas? What is their 
general form and nature? Have contemporary debates about protected areas governance 
assisted in developing a coherent common language for understanding, planning for and 
recording the diversity of forms across the globe? Finally, have these debates fostered an 
appropriate understanding of the link between communal property regimes, common-pool 
natural resources and protected areas? These two aspects are considered in Chapter 2 of the 
dissertation (titled The Role of Protected Areas as a Tool for Managing the Natural Resources). 
The third aspect relates to the nature of ‘communally-conserved areas’. What do I mean by a 
‘communally-conserved area’? How does this concept differ from or relate to previously defined 
forms of governance? How have significant shifts in economic, property rights, ecology, human 
rights and conservation discourses contributed to their rise in prominence in the past decade? 
The fourth aspect relates to the third, what general elements are relevant to their successful 
implementation? These two aspects are considered in Chapter 3 of the dissertation (titled The 

















THE ROLE OF PROTECTED AREAS AS A TOOL FOR 





In contextualising the nature of communally-conserved areas (CCAs), two main aspects 
must be considered. The first relates to the object of a CCA – managing the natural 
commons. What are the natural commons? How does one theoretically and practically 
seek to regulate and manage the natural commons? How have the debates about 
natural commons regulation and management shifted over the past half-century or so? 
The second aspect requiring attention follows on from the above enquiry and relates to 
the form of a CCA – a protected area. What are protected areas? What is their general 
form and nature? Have contemporary debates about protected areas governance 
assisted in developing a coherent common language for understanding, planning for 
and recording the diversity of forms across the globe? Finally, have these debates 
fostered an appropriate understanding of the link between communal property regimes, 
common-pool natural resources and protected areas? 
 
2. THE NATURAL COMMONS, COMMON PROPERTY AND COMMON POOL 
RESOURCES 
 
‘In the literature on natural resources and environmental policy, it would be difficult to 




                                                     
1 Bromley D “The Commons, Property and Common Property Regimes” (1990) Unpublished paper 
presented at first Annual Meeting of the International Association for the Study of Common Property, 












2.1 DEFINING THE NATURAL COMMONS 
 
Finding its origins in the work of property rights theorists such as Gordan,2 Scott3 and 
Demsetz,4 and brought to global notoriety in 1968 by Hardin5 in his controversial article 
‘The Tragedy of the Commons’,6 the concept of the commons, particularly in the context 
of natural resources, has been, and remains, the subject of ongoing debate as 
commentators seek to unpick its ambiguity. Notwithstanding the protracted duration of 
these debates, traversing almost sixty years, a clear definition of the commons remains 
as elusive as consensus on how best to regulate it. 
 
What is clear is that the notion of the commons is integrally related to issues of land 
tenure and property rights,7 and it is for this reason that it is frequently used 
interchangeably with terms such as ‘common property’, ‘common property resources’ or 
‘common pool resources’, all of which are the subject of extensive academic attention. 
 
In its simplest sense, ‘common property’, as it applies to natural resources, has been 
defined as ‘a distribution of property rights in resources in which a number of owners 
are co-equal in their rights to use the resource’ with ‘property’ referring to ‘a bundle of 
rights in the use and transfer ... of natural resources’.8 This understanding of the 
‘commons’ as ‘common property’ has caused much controversy. Drawing on a rise in 
documented case studies of successful community-based natural resource 
management initiatives across the globe, many commentators now argue that conflating 
                                                     
2 Gordan H “The Economic Theory of a Common Property Resource: The Fishery” (1954) 62 Journal of 
Political Economy 124-142. 
3 Scott A “The Fishery: The Objectives of Sole Ownership” (1955) 63 Journal of Political Economy 116-
124. 
4 Demsetz H “Toward a Theory of Property Rights” (1967) 57 American Economic Review 347-359. 
5 Hardin G “The Tragedy of the Commons” (1968) 162 Science 1243-1247. 
6 According to Hardin, drawing on an example of a group of herdsman grazing a common pasture, ‘Each 
man is locked into a system that compels him to increase his herd without limit – in a world that is limited. 
Ruin is the destination toward which all men rush, each pursuing his own best interest in a society that 
believes in the freedom of the commons. Freedom in a commons brings ruin to all.’ (Hardin (1968) 
Science 1244). 
7 Cotula L, Odhiambo M, Orwa N & Muhanji A (eds) Securing the Commons in an Era of Privatisation: 
Policy and Legislative Challenges (2005) Securing the Commons Series No.10, IIED London 1. 
8 Ciriacy-Wantrup S & Bishop R “‘Common Property’ as a Concept in Natural Resources Policy” (1975) 












the ‘commons’ with ‘common property’, erroneously superimposes Hardin’s Tragedy of 
the Commons, and its array of common assumptions,9 onto settings where it is of little 
relevance, specifically those where common-pool natural resources are sustainably held 
and used under communal ownership.10 Some scholars have gone as far as arguing 
that the ambiguity it causes has been manipulated in the past to further global political 
agendas seeking, through privatisation and state control, to entrench exclusionary, 
protectionist, state-centred approaches to conservation in areas previously subject to 
communal ownership by indigenous peoples and local communities.11 In the words of 
Ostrom et al, Hardin’s Tragedy of the Commons ‘has been used by many scholars and 
policy-makers to rationalize central government control of all common-pool resources 
and to paint a disempowering, pessimistic vision of the human prospect’.12 
 
Contemporary property rights and economic theorists have accordingly called for a 
separation between two aspects in order to foster a better understanding of the 
commons, namely: the intrinsic nature of the resource system; and the nature of 
property rights applicable to it.13 Regarding the intrinsic nature of the resource system, 
one is ordinarily dealing with ‘common property resources’ or ‘common pool resources’. 
                                                     
9 These assumptions include: all common natural resources suffer the same fate irrespective of the 
applicable property rights regime; when dealing with common natural resources, demand will always 
exceed supply; the behaviour of individual resource users is unconstrained by existing institutional 
arrangements; individual resource users are incapable of co-operating toward their common interest (the 
sustainable management of the common natural resource); and these resource users are incapable of 
creating or altering the rules applicable to common natural resources. See further: Feeny D, Berkes F, 
McCay B & Acheson J “The Tragedy of the Commons: Twenty-Two Years Later” (1990) 18(1) Human 
Ecology 12; and Berkes F, Feeny D, McCay B & Acheson J “The Benefits of the Commons” (1989) 340 
Nature 93. 
10 See generally: Basurto X & Ostrom E “The Core Challenges of Moving Beyond Garrett Hardin” (2009) 
1 Journal of Natural Resources Policy Research 255-259; Van Laerhoven F & Ostrom E “Traditions and 
Trends in the Study of the Commons” (2007) 1(1) International Journal of the Commons 3-28; Monu E 
“The Tragedy or Benefits of the Commons? Common Property and Environmental Protection” (2005) 9(1) 
Botswana Journal of African Studies 81-95; Ostrom E “Reformulating the Commons” (2002) Ambiente & 
Sociedade 1-21; Ostrom E, Burger J, Field C, Norgarrd R & Policansky D “Revisiting the Commons: Local 
Lessons and Global Challenges” (1999) 284 Science 278-282; Ostrom E Governing the Commons: The 
Evolution of Institutions for Collective Action (1990) Cambridge University Press New York; Feeny et al 
(1990) Human Ecology 1-19; Berkes et al (1989) Nature 91-93; Berkes F (ed) Common Property 
Resources: Ecology and Community-Based Sustainable Development (1989) Belhaven Press London; 
and McCay B & Acheson J The Question of the Commons: The Culture and Ecology of Communal 
Resources (1987) University of Arizona Press Tucson. 
11 See for instance: Cotula et al Securing the Commons in an Era of Privatisation (2005) 2; and Monu 
(2005) Botswana Journal of African Studies 82. 













Berkes defines ‘common property resources’ as ‘... a class of resources for which 
exclusion is difficult and joint use involves subtractability’.14 Ostrom defines ‘common 
pool resources’ as ‘natural ... resources in which (i) exclusion of beneficiaries through 
physical and institutional means is especially costly, and (ii) exploitation by one user 
reduces resource availability for the others’.15 It is accordingly not surprising that these 
two terms are frequently used interchangeably. What both definitions do highlight are 
the two fundamental characteristics of these common resources, namely the difficulty of 
exclusion and the principle of subtractability. 
 
Regarding the nature of property rights applicable to these resources, several scholars16 
draw a clear distinction between four different property rights regimes at play in the 
context of common-pool resources, namely: private property;17 state property;18 
communal property (also sometimes referred to rather confusingly as common property 
or the commons);19 and open-access regimes.20 It is the latter two regimes that 
historically have been somewhat misunderstood and used interchangeably, creating 
confusion. If one retains a clear distinction between ‘communal property’ and ‘open-
access’ regimes, Hardin’s Tragedy of the Commons is theoretically of little relevance to 
the former, where ‘co-owners’ have both a defined set of reciprocal rights and duties in 
respect of the land (minimising the impacts of the subtractability principle) and the 
authority to exclude non-owners (alleviating the problems of exclusion).21 The practical 
validity of this hypothesis has been vividly illustrated by several studies of communal 
                                                     
14 Berkes et al (1989) Nature 92. 
15 Ostrom (1999) Science 278. 
16 See for example: Bromley “The Commons, Property and Common Property Regimes” (1990) 1; Berkes 
et al (1989) Nature 91; and Ciriacy-Wantrup & Bishop (1975) Natural Resources Journal 714-716. 
17 The individual owner has the right to reasonably use (and a reciprocal duty to conserve) the natural 
resources situated on the property. The owner also has the right to exclude such use by non-owners.  
18 The state either owns or holds the property in trust for the general public. The property is generally 
managed by a government authority, which has the right to grant access and use rights to non-owners.  
This form of property would constitute res publicae under the common law. 
19 Defined groups of co-owners have a right to reasonably use (and a reciprocal duty to conserve) the 
natural resources situated on the property, and exclude such use by non-owners. This form of property 
would constitute res communes under the common law. 
20 There is no defined owner or user with preferential use rights. The property and/or natural resource in 
question are accessible to everyone and may accordingly be used freely. This form of property would 
constitute res nullius under the common law. 
21 Coelho M, Filipe J & Ferreira M Tragedies on Natural Resources - A Commons and Anticommons 













property regimes undertaken in the past couple of decades which have found 
communities to be far more activist; devising, maintaining and adapting communal 
arrangements to successfully self-manage common-pool natural resources.22 These 
studies have interestingly also illustrated that subtractability and exclusion conundrums 
also arise under private and state property regimes.23 The nature of the property rights 
regime under which the common-pool resource is held does not appear itself to 
determine tragedy or success, as originally anticipated. The situation is far more 
complex and management success is determined by a broad array of additional factors 
including the nature of the resources and the social, political, institutional, cultural and 
physical context within which they are situated. 
 
Owing to the above complexities potentially impacting on the success or failure of 
communal property regimes, it is vital to understand that the term property in this 
context ‘refers not to an object or a natural resource but rather to the benefit stream that 
arises from the use of that object or resource’.24 If one thinks of common property in this 
sense, one recognises the importance of property as a ‘social relation’ and that 
communal property rights are effectively ‘a set of economic and social relations defining 
the position of each individual with respect to the utilisation of scarce resources’ as 
opposed to a ‘relationship between men and things’.25 As mentioned above, in order to 
understand how to manage the commons effectively, one needs to grapple with the 
myriad factors which impact on the ‘social relation’. 
 
It is this aspect of the ‘natural commons’, specifically the rights and duties to natural 
resources held under communal ownership, which is the focus of this dissertation. It 
draws a distinction between communal property and state property, private property and 
importantly open-access regimes. It embraces the varied form and nature of natural 
resource rights that may be held under communal ownership. It recognises the 
                                                     
22 See the summary of several relevant studies in Feeny et al (1990) Human Ecology 6-12. 
23 Ibid. 
24 Coelho et al Tragedies on Natural Resources (2009) 4. See further: Bromley “The Commons, Property 
and Common Property Regimes” (1990) 2-3; and Furubotn E & Pejovich S “Property Rights and 













importance of understanding the economic, social and cultural elements underpinning 
common property regimes when seeking to create or evaluate them. It debunks the 
historical use of the ‘Tragedy of the Commons’ as a rationale for undermining local and 
indigenous communal tenure and community-based natural resource management 
regimes. Finally, it will provide a clearer lens through which to analyse and give effect to 
commons regulation within protected areas. 
 
2.2 REGULATING THE NATURAL COMMONS THROUGH COMMUNAL 
PROPERTY REGIMES 
 
Historically undermined by colonialism and on occasion megalomaniacal local leaders 
for personal gain,26 communal property regimes are increasingly recognised as having a 
significant role to play in natural resource management. Their rise in prominence 
appears to be closely tied to the emergence of concepts such as community-based 
natural resources management and community-based conservation in the past two 
decades.27 This is not surprising, as common-pool resources and communal property 
regimes frequently lie at the heart of such conservation initiatives. 
 
As a result, the debates relating to these communal property regimes and their 
relationship to managing common-pool natural resources have significantly shifted in 
the past two decades. With the original focus28 of attention falling on the applicability or 
inapplicability of Hardin’s Tragedy of the Commons to such communal property 
regimes, the current focus29 is on distilling an array of essential elements which foster or 
                                                     
26 Bromley “The Commons, Property and Common Property Regimes” (1990) 4-13. See further Murphree 
M Communities as Resource Management Institutions (1992) Gatekeeper Series No.36, IIED London 3-
5. 
27 These concepts are considered in detail in Chapter 3. 
28 See generally: Feeny et al (1990) Human Ecology 1-19; Bromley “The Commons, Property and 
Common Property Regimes” (1990) 1-25; Berkes et al (1989) Nature 91-94; and Ciriacy-Wantrup & 
Bishop (1975) Natural Resources Journal 714-716. 
29 See generally: Basurto & Ostrom (2009) Journal of Natural Resources Policy Research 255-259; 
Cross-Sectoral Commons Governance In Southern Africa Project Commons Governance in Southern 
Africa (2009) Policy Brief No.28, PLAAS Bellville 1-3; Roe et al Community Management of Natural 
Resources in Africa: Impacts, Experiences and Future Directions (2009) Natural Resource Issues No.18, 
IIED London; Murphree Communities as Resource Management Institutions (1992) 1-14; Monu (2005) 












undermine their role as potential effective institutions for overcoming the limitations of 
privatisation and state regulation, Hardin’s proposed solution for overcoming the 
Tragedy.30 
 
So what are these elements that are emerging from the pyre of Hardin’s Tragedy? 
Perhaps the most definitive statement of these elements has been put forward by 
Ostrom who distilled the following eight ‘Design Principles Illustrated by Long-Enduring 
Common-Pool Resource Institutions’:31 
 
 clearly defined boundaries - for the common-pool resource. 
 congruence - between the distribution of benefits and associated costs imposed 
by operational rules providing for the use and regulation of the common-pool 
resource. 
 collective-choice arrangements - which enable individuals affected by the 
operational rules to participate in their formulation and modification. 
 monitoring - effective, accountable and transparent monitoring of the state of the 
common-pool resources and user behaviour. 
 graduated sanctions - imposed by members of the community, government 
officials or both on individuals who violate the operational rules. 
 conflict-resolution mechanisms - readily accessible, low cost and locally situated 
conflict-resolution mechanisms for resolving disputes between individuals and/or 
the community and officials. 
 minimum recognition of rights to organise - recognition of the rights of the 
community to devise and create their own institutions with little interference of 
external government interference. 
                                                     
30 Whilst these solutions were not proposed in Hardin’s original treatise, he subsequently proposed 
private enterprise and socialism (control by government) as solutions for overcoming the Tragedy of the 
Commons. See Hardin G “Political Requirements for Preserving our Common Heritage” in Brokaw H (ed) 
Wildlife and America (1978) Council on Environmental Quality Washington DC 310-317. 












 nested enterprises - ‘appropriation, provision, monitoring, enforcement, conflict 
resolution, and governance activities are organised in multiple layers of nested 
enterprises’. 
 
To these I would add supportive legal and policy structures that enable communities to 
self-organise, recognise their institutions and operational rules, and affords clear and 
defined tenure rights over common-pool resources.32 
 
Several authors have sought to distil an array of additional elements which facilitate the 
communal ownership and management of common-pool natural resources in the 
Southern African context. 33 Drawing on the ‘Institutional Conditions for Sustainable 
Natural Resource Management Related to Decentralisation and Rural Autonomy’,34 
Monu identifies the following: provision of incentives for resource users to sustainably 
manage the natural resources; a recognised governance structure to control access and 
membership; recognition and integration of indigenous knowledge or a combination of 
western and indigenous knowledge within the regulatory institutions; existence of self-
governing local institutions in the resource area; meaningful participation of local 
resource users in the decisions that affect the management of the resource/s; provision 
for a communal level conflict resolution mechanism; and the creation, through national 
and regional policies and institutions, of an enabling environment for sustainable 
                                                     
32 This additional criterion is alluded to by Ostrom (2002) Ambiente & Sociedade 16. See further Cross-
Sectoral Commons Governance In Southern Africa Project Commons Governance in Southern Africa 
(2009) 2. 
33 For a general discussion of CBNRM in Southern Africa, see: Nelson F (ed) Community Rights, 
Conservation and Contested Land: The Politics of Natural Resource Governance in Africa (2010) 
Earthscan London; Roe et al Community Management of Natural Resources in Africa (2009); Mukamuri 
B, Manjengwa J & Anstey S (eds) Beyond Proprietorship: Murphree’s Laws on Community-Based Natural 
Resource Management in Southern Africa (2009) Weaver Press Harare; Fabricius C, Koch E, Magome H 
& Turner S (eds) Rights, Resources and Rural Development: Community-Based Natural Resource 
Management in Southern Africa (2004) Earthscan London; Benjaminsen T, Cousins B & Thompson L 
(eds) Contested Resources: Challenges to the Governance of Natural Resources in Southern Africa 
(2002) PLAAS Bellville; and Fabricius C, Koch E & Magome H Community Wildlife Management in 
Southern Africa: Challenging the Assumptions of Eden (2001) Evaluating Eden Series No.6, IIED London. 
34 Associated in Rural Development Inc. Decentralisation and Local Authority: Conditions for Achieving 












resource use including clear rules of tenure, adequate enforcement; and relevant 
education and extension support.35 
 
Hulme, Hutton and Murphree further argue that unless contemporary policies on land 
tenure and conservation seriously consider community-based natural resource 
management regimes, there is little reason to be optimistic about the future of 
conservation.36 Murphree identifies the following as key principles for successfully 
implementing regimes of this nature: effective management of natural resources is best 
achieved by providing a ‘focused value for those who live with them’; ‘differential inputs 
must result in differential benefits’; there must be a positive relationship between the 
‘quality management and the magnitude of benefits’; genuine ‘proprietorship’37 over the 
natural resources must be granted to local communities; the ‘unit of such proprietorship 
should be the unit of production, management and benefit’; and the ‘unit of 
proprietorship should be as small as practicable within ecological and socio-political 
constraints’.38 
 
These international and regionally defined elements provide valuable guidance for not 
only forging workable communal property regimes for common-pool natural resources 
but also for perpetuating the relatively recent shift in conservation ideology from 
exclusionary, state-centred protectionist regimes to more inclusive, participatory and 
human-centred regimes. This shift, together with the above elements, is discussed more 
fully in Chapter 3. 
 
                                                     
35 Monu (2005) Botswana Journal of African Studies 90-92. 
36 See further: Hulme D & Murphree M “Community Conservation in Africa: An Introduction” in Hulme D & 
Murphree M (eds) African Wildlife and Livelihoods, The Promise and Performance of Community 
Conservation (2001) James Currey Oxford 1-8; Hutton J, Adams W & Murombedzi J “Back to the 
Barriers? Changing Narratives in Biodiversity Conservation” (2005) 2 Forum for Development Studies 
341-370; and Murphree Communities as Resource Management Institutions (1992).  
37 ‘Proprietorship’ is defined as a ‘sanctioned use right, including the right to decide whether to use the 
resource at all, determine the mode and extent of their use, and the right to benefit fully from the 
exploitation in the way they choose’ (Murphree Communities as Resource Management Institutions 
(1992) 5). 












For now, it is simply relevant to note that whilst the concept of ‘the commons’ remains 
somewhat ambiguous and its regulation subject to continued debate, shifting 
conservation paradigms in the past twenty years have significantly altered the path of 
these debates from the purely theoretical to the more practical. This dissertation seeks 
to focus on and solve but one small part of the broader common’s puzzle, namely how 
to practically conserve common-pool natural resources situated in protected areas 
through effective communal property regimes. So what are these protected areas which 
some commentators regard ‘as no more than another form of “commons” – areas set 
aside for a constituency which require protection through controls on their access and 
use’?39 
 
3. PROTECTED AREAS 
 
‘To illustrate how difficult communication can be internationally, here is an example 
from outside of conservation. If you walk into a Starbucks in America and ask for a 
café grande, they will give you a medium-sized cup of coffee. If you ask for a café 
grande in Mexico, they may give you a bowl of coffee and a quizzical look. Ask for a 
café grande in Venice, and they will direct you to a shop on the Piazza Indipendenza. 
To understand parks and protected areas globally, we have to have a common 
language.’40 
 
3.1 DEFINING PROTECTED AREAS 
 
While the creation of a common language for variations in coffee servings has been 
significantly expedited through the proliferation of global coffee chains, the task of 
creating a common language for protected areas remains a vexed issue 
notwithstanding their existence as the foundation of the majority of national and 
international biodiversity conservation strategies.41 Largely under the auspices of the 
                                                     
39 Martin R “Murphree’s Laws and Principles, Rule and Definitions’ in Mukamuri et al Beyond 
Proprietorship (2009) 17. 
40 Mitchell B “‘Who’s Doing the Protecting in Protected Areas?’ A Global Perspective on Protected Area 
Governance” 2007 24(3) The George Wright Forum 81. 












IUCN, particularly its World Commission on Protected Areas (WCPA), and the United 
Nations Environmental Programme (UNEP), the past twenty years has seen the 
emergence of various global definitions for ‘protected areas’. Based on the somewhat 
broad definition of protected area contained in the Convention on Biological Diversity,42 
the most contemporary version is reflected in the IUCN Management Guidelines 
(2008),43 which define a protected area as: 
 
‘…a clearly defined geographical space, recognised, dedicated and managed, through 
legal or other effective means, to achieve the long-term conservation of nature with 
associated ecosystem services and cultural values’.44 
 
Each of the elements of the above definition has in turn been defined and elaborated on 
in the above Guidelines.45 It is not however the purpose of this dissertation to analyse 
the merits of the definition and each of its requirements, save to point out the following 
aspects. Whilst the definition encompasses clearly defined geographical spaces of land, 
inland water, coastal and marine areas, or a combination thereof - the scope of this 
dissertation is predominantly concerned with terrestrial protected areas. Whilst the 
definition is sufficiently broad to recognise a diversity of governance types including 
state governance, private governance, shared governance and governance by 
indigenous peoples and local communities – the scope of this enquiry is particularly 
concerned with the latter two forms of governance, those which can be facilitated 
through communal property regimes. Whilst the definition includes areas dedicated and 
managed through legal or other effective means, this enquiry focuses on those areas 
prescribed by and managed under statutory frameworks. Whilst the definition dictates 
that the areas should achieve long-term conservation, namely management in 
perpetuity, this enquiry includes an analysis of several arrangements that are not 
entirely perpetual in nature, but nonetheless constitute significant stepping stones 
towards long-term conservation. As will be subsequently argued in this dissertation, to 
                                                     
42 31 ILM 818 (1992). ‘Protected area’ is defined in article 2 of the Convention as a “geographically 
defined area which is designated or regulated and managed to achieve specific conservation objectives”. 
43 Dudley Guidelines for Applying Protected Area Management Categories (2008). 
44 Dudley Guidelines for Applying Protected Area Management Categories (2008) 8. 












apply this requirement of perpetuity strictly, would render the protected areas not only of 
South Africa, but many fellow Southern African nations, a fictional nullity.  
 
Save for the above exceptions, the remaining elements of the definition are relied on for 
the purpose of this enquiry, specifically the effective in situ conservation of nature with 
associated ecosystems services (those related to but which do not interfere with the 
broad aim of nature conservation) and cultural values (similarly those which do not 
impact with the primary conservation outcomes). 
 
3.2 MANAGEMENT CATEGORIES 
 
Notwithstanding the apparent clarity of the above definition, the diversity of forms, 
designations and objectives associated protected areas across the globe is exceedingly 
diverse. Originating at the International Conference for the Protection of Flora and 
Fauna held in London in 1933, the international community has accordingly sought for 
approximately 80 years to develop a coherent terminology and typology - a common 
language - for describing, recognising and ultimately promoting an exceptionally diverse 
array of types protected areas.46 This is reflected in the assorted array of Guidelines 
published predominantly under the auspices of the IUCN in the past 30 years,47 which 
                                                     
46 For a historical overview of the development of the IUCN Management Guidelines (2008) see: Dudley 
Guidelines for Applying Protected Area Management Categories (2008) 3-5. See further: Bishop K, 
Dudley N, Phillips A & Stolton S Speaking a Common Language - The Use and Performance of the IUCN 
System of Management Categories for Protected Areas (2004) Cardiff University, IUCN & UNEP WCMC 
Cardiff. 
47 These guidelines include in chronological order: Lausche B Guidelines for Protected Areas Legislation 
(1980) IUCN & UNEP Gland; IUCN Guidelines for Protected Areas Management Categories (1994) IUCN 
Gland; Davey A National System Planning for Protected Areas (1998) Best Practice Protected Ares 
Guidelines Series No.1, IUCN Gland; World Commission on Protected Areas, Principles and Guidelines 
on Indigenous and Traditional Peoples and Protected Areas (1999) IUCN Gland; Beltran J Indigenous 
and Traditional Peoples and Protected Areas: Principles, Guidelines and Case Studies (2000) Best 
Practice Protected Area Guidelines Series No.4, IUCN Gland; Phillips A (ed) Financing Protected Areas - 
Guidelines for Protected Areas Managers (2000) Best Practice Protected Area Guidelines Series No.5, 
IUCN Gland; Sandwith T, Shine C, Hamilton L & Sheppard D Transboundary Protected Areas for Peace 
and Co-operation (2001) Best Practice Protected Area Guidelines Series No.7, IUCN Gland; Eagles P, 
McCool S & Haynes C Sustainable Tourism in Protected Areas - Guidelines for Planning and 
Management (2002) Best Practise Protected Area Guidelines Series No.8, IUCN Gland; Phillips A 
Management Guidelines for IUCN Category V Protected Areas, Protected Landscapes/Seascapes (2002) 
Best Practice Protected Area Guidelines Series No.9, IUCN Gland; Thomas L & Middleton J Guidelines 
for Management Planning of Protected Areas (2003) Best Practice Protected Area Guidelines Series 












have cumulatively culminated in the recent publication of the IUCN Management 
Guidelines (2008). Building on the original version developed by the IUCN in 1994,48 the 
IUCN Management Guidelines (2008) expressly seek to standardise descriptions of 
protected areas and thereby: facilitate planning of protected areas and protected areas 
systems; improve information management about protected areas; and assist in 
regulating activities in protected areas.49 Based predominantly on the main objectives 
for which protected areas are declared, the IUCN Management Guidelines (2008) distil 
the following six protected areas management categories: 
 
 Strict nature reserves (Category Ia) - ‘…areas set aside to protect biodiversity 
and also possibly geologically/geomorphological features, where human 
visitation, use and impacts are strictly controlled and limited to ensure protection 
of conservation values. Such protected areas can serve as indispensible 
reference areas for scientific research’;50  
 Wilderness areas (Category Ib) - ‘...usually large unmodified or slightly modified 
areas, retaining their natural character and influence, without permanent or 
significant human habitation, which are protected and managed so as to 
preserve their natural condition’;51 
 National parks (Category II) - ‘...large natural or near natural areas set aside to 
protect large-scale ecological processes, along with the complement of species 
and ecosystems characteristics of the area, which also provide a foundation for 
                                                                                                                                                                           
Protected Areas: Towards Equity and Enhanced Conservation - Guidance on Policy and Practice for Co-
Managed Protected Areas and Community Conserved Areas (2004) Best Practice Protected Area 
Guidelines Series No.11, IUCN/Cardiff University Gland/Cambridge; Hamilton L & McMillan L Guidelines 
for Planning and Managing Mountain Protected Areas (2004) IUCN Gland; Dudley N & Phillips A Forests 
and Protected Areas - Guidance on the Use of IUCN Protected Area Management Categories (2006) 
Best Practice Protected Area Guidelines Series No.12, IUCN Gland; Emerton L, Bishop J & Thomas L 
Sustainable Financing of Protected Areas: A Global Review of Challenges and Options (2006) Best 
Practice Protected Area Guidelines Series No.13, IUCN Gland; Hockings M, Stolton S, Leverington F, 
Dudley N & Courrau J Evaluating Effectiveness - A Framework for Assessing the Management of 
Protected Areas (2nd Edition) (2006) Best Practice Protected Area Guidelines Series No.6, IUCN Gland; 
and Lockwood M, Worboys G & Kothari A (eds) Managing Protected Areas: A Global Guide (2006) 
Earthscan London. 
48 IUCN Guidelines for Protected Areas Management Categories (1994). 
49 Dudley Guidelines for Applying Protected Area Management Categories (2008) 6. 
50 Dudley Guidelines for Applying Protected Area Management Categories (2008) 13. 












environmentally and culturally compatible spiritual, scientific, educational, 
recreational and visitor opportunities’;52 
 Natural monument or feature (Category III) - ‘...set aside to protect a specific 
natural monument, which can be a landform, sea mount, submarine cavern, 
geological feature such as a cave or even a living feature such as an ancient 
grove. They are generally quite small protected areas and often have huge visitor 
value’;53 
 Habitat/species management areas (Category IV) - ‘...aim to protect particular 
species or habitats and management reflects this priority. Many category IV 
protected areas will need regular, active interventions to address the 
requirements of particular species or maintain habitats, but this is not a 
requirement’;54 
 Protected landscapes/seascapes (Category V) - ‘…where the interaction of 
people and nature over time has produced an area of distinct character with 
significant ecological, biological, cultural and scenic value; and where 
safeguarding the integrity of this interaction is vital to protecting and sustaining 
the area and its associated nature conservation and other values’;55 and  
 Protected areas with sustainable use of natural resources (Category VI) - 
‘conserve ecosystems and habitats, together with associated cultural values and 
traditional natural resource management systems. They are generally large, with 
most of the area in a natural condition, where a proportion is under sustainable 
natural resource management and where low-level non-industrial use of natural 
resources compatible with nature conservation is seen as one of the main aims 
of the area’.56 
 
As evidenced by the above definitions, and specifically acknowledged in the IUCN 
Management Guidelines (2008) themselves, these management categories are largely 
neutral regarding who owns, controls or has the responsibility for managing protected 
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55 Dudley Guidelines for Applying Protected Area Management Categories (2008) 20. 












areas – issues of protected areas governance.57 The management categories are 
accordingly largely irrelevant to this enquiry. However, as the issue of governance 
appears to lie at the heart of understanding how to practically conserve common-pool 
natural resources situated in protected areas through communal property regimes, it 
deserves comprehensive attention.  
 
3.3 GOVERNANCE TYPES 
 
As one commentator has recently noted, ‘governance’ has emerged as the new ‘buzz 
word’ of the 21st Century and appears to be regarded as a ‘sort of magic wand’ 
potentially applicable to a diversity of challenges and contexts.58 So what is this notion 
of governance and why has it come to the fore in the context of protected areas?59 
 
3.3.1 ‘Governance’ and ‘Protected Areas Governance’ 
 
Definitions of governance are plentiful and they appear to be as varied as the array of 
commentators responsible for their creation. These definitions include: ‘the action or 
manner of governing or being governed’;60 ‘the institutions, processes and traditions 
which determine how power is exercised, how decisions are taken and how citizens 
have their say’;61 ‘the traditions and institutions by which authority in a country is 
exercised’;62 ‘the use of institutions, structures of authority and even collaboration to 
                                                     
57 Dudley Guidelines for Applying Protected Area Management Categories (2008) 26. 
58 Kotze L “Environmental Governance Perspectives on Compliance and Enforcement in South Africa” in 
Paterson A & Kotze L Environmental Compliance and Enforcement in South Africa: Legal Perspectives 
(2009) Juta & Co Ltd Cape Town 104. 
59 Aspects of the following discussion of governance, protected areas governance and the critique of the 
IUCN protected areas governance contained in Chapter 2 (Parts 3.3-3.5) have been published in: 
Paterson A “Clearing or Clouding the Discourse: A South African Perspective on the Utility of the IUCN 
Protected Areas Governance Typology” (2010) 10(3) South African Law Journal 490-514. 
60 The New Penguin English Dictionary (2000). 
61 Johnson I Redefining the Concept of Governance (1997) CIDA Quebec 3. See further Graham J, Amos 
B & Plumptre T Governance Principles for Protected Areas in the 21st Century (2003) A Discussion 
Paper, Institute on Governance, Parks Canada & CIDA Ottawa. The latter authors define governance 
along very similar lines as ‘... the interactions among structures, processes, and traditions that determine 
direction, how that power is exercised, and how the views of citizens or stakeholders are considered by 
those making decisions’ (at 2). 
62 World Bank A Decade of Measuring the Quality of Governance: Governance Matters (2007) World 












allocate resources and coordinate or control activity in society or the economy’;63 ‘the 
sum of the many ways individuals and institutions, public and private, manage their 
common affairs’;64 and ‘the exercise of political, economic and administrative authority 
in the management of a country’s affairs at all levels.’65 
 
As is evident from the above definitions, the scope of governance is accordingly 
exceptionally broad. It is fundamentally concerned with the exercise of authority and 
specifically with who exercises such authority, how such authority is exercised, and the 
outcome of the exercise of such authority. The source of this authority can stem from 
statute, custom and tradition. The manner in which this authority is exercised can 
similarly be informed or circumscribed by statute, custom and tradition. Those 
empowered to exercise authority include international organisations, government 
institutions, non-government organisations (NGOs), community organisations and 
private citizens. The objects subject to the exercise of authority are varied, as are the 
desired outcomes that seek to satisfy social, economic, political and environmental 
agendas. 
 
What is furthermore reflected in the above definitions of governance, is that it is 
inherently a neutral concept, fundamentally concerned with describing the types of 
‘complex mechanisms, processes, relationships and institutions through which citizens 
and groups articulate their interests, exercise their rights and obligations and mediate 
their differences’.66 As such, it needs to be distinguished from its subjective counterpart, 
the notion of ‘good governance’, which is concerned with the quality of governance and 
specifically the prevalence of characteristics such as participation, transparency, 
accountability, rule of law, effectiveness and equity.67 The importance of, commitment to 
                                                     
63 Bell S Economic Governance and Institutional Dynamics (2002) Oxford University Press Melbourne. 
64 Curtin D & Dekker I “Good Governance: The Concept and its Application by the European Union” in 
Curtin D & Wessels R (eds) Good Governance and the European Union: Reflections on Concepts, 
Institutions and Substance (2005) Intersentia Antwerp 5. 
65 United Nations Development Programme Governance for Sustainable Human Development (2005) 
UNDP Policy Paper. 
66 Ibid. 
67 Ibid. The United Nations Development Programme has gone as far as distilling the following nine 
characteristics of ‘good governance’: participation; rule of law; transparency; responsiveness; consensus 












and recent work68 associated with fostering good governance within protected areas is 
simply acknowledged. It is addressed in more detail in Chapter 3. The principal concern 
here, is with the former objective component of governance, specifically the process by 
which institutions afforded authority in diverse contexts are established, exercise 
authority and held accountable for their actions, which should in turn lead to the 
attainment of good governance.  
 
What is protected areas governance? According to Borrini-Feyerabend, it refers to ‘who 
holds management authority and responsibility and can be held accountable according 
to legal, customary or otherwise legitimate rights’.69 It is accordingly concerned with the 
interactions between the myriad of structures, processes, institutions and traditions that 
have a role to play in the formation and management of protected areas, how the power 
is allocated and exercised within the protected areas, and the manner in which those 
who exercise such power are held accountable.  
 
If one surveys the scholarship on protected areas which has arisen during the course of 
particularly the past two decades,70 one is immediately struck by the diversity of 
structures, processes, institutions and traditions at play and the variance in the quality 
and consistency of governance across and between them. Following a comprehensive 
review of trends in global protected area governance between 1992 and 2002, Dearden 
et al acknowledged this diversity and concluded that protected areas governance has 
                                                     
68 See further on the notion of good governance and protected areas: Borrini-Feyerabend G Implementing 
the CBD Programme of Work on Protected Areas - Governance as Key for Effective and Equitable 
Protected Area Systems (2008) IUCN/CEESP Briefing Note 8, Cenesta Tehran 6-8; Dudley Guidelines for 
Applying Protected Area Management Categories (2008) 28; Lockwood et al Managing Protected Areas: 
A Global Guide (2006) 134-140; and Graham et al Governance Principles for Protected Areas in the 21st 
Century (2003) 7-10. See further the Programme of Work on Protected Areas (adopted at COP 7 of the 
Convention on Biological Diversity held in Kuala Lampur in 2004 and annexed to COP 7 Decision VII/28) 
which specifically requests parties to ‘consider governance principles, such as the rule of law, 
decentralization, participatory decision-making mechanisms for accountability and equitable dispute 
resolution institutions and procedures’ (Programme Element 1, Goal 3, para. 3.1.4). 
69 Borrini-Feyerabend G “Governance of Protected Areas, Participation and Equity” in Biodiversity Issues 
for Consideration in the Planning, Establishment and Management of Protected Areas Sites and 
Networks (2004) Convention on Biological Diversity Technical Series No.15, Secretariat of the 
Convention on Biological Diversity Montreal 100. 
70 For a comprehensive distillation and discussion of this literature, see Lockwood et al Managing 












no ‘one best way’.71 Borrini-Feyerabend et al have similarly concluded that governance 
is a ‘complex and nuanced phenomenon that … [is] … not easy to circumscribe’.72 
 
However, if one sifts through this diversity and complexity, there appear to be three 
broad issues which fundamentally shape protected areas governance and accordingly 
the rights/benefits and responsibilities/costs of those tasked with planning for, 
establishing, managing, regulating and financing protected areas.73 The first relates to 
who holds tenure over the land situated within a protected area. This issue is in turn 
shaped by the following specific issues: the range of actors holding tenure (which can 
include national, provincial and local government institutions; NGOs; community 
organisations; juristic and natural persons); the form of tenure (which can include legal 
or formal tenure, customary tenure, common tenure; de jure and de facto tenure); and 
the content of the tenure (full ownership rights or more limited rights relating to 
development, use, access and/or occupation).74 
 
The second broad issue relates to management and specifically who is responsible for 
managing a protected area, and the form and nature of such management. The actors 
at play here are as diverse as those listed above in the context of tenure and whilst they 
may be the same as those who hold tenure, this is not always the case.  These actors 
may either undertake their role individually or in partnership with other actors through 
some form of co-management arrangement. The nature of the management rights and 
obligations is similarly varied and range from statutorily prescribed management 
schemes to those informed by customary laws and traditions. Finally, the actual nature 
of the management activities can include the preparation of management plans, the 
                                                     
71 Dearden P, Bennett M & Johnston J “Trends in Global Protected Area Governance, 1992-2002” (2005) 
36(1) Environmental Management 99. 
72 Borrini-Feyerabend G, Johnston J & Pansky D “Governance in Protected Areas” in Lockwood et al 
Managing Protected Areas: A Global Guide (2006) 117. 
73 These function are distilled from the five powers identified by Graham et al, namely: planning powers; 
regulatory (including law enforcement) powers; spending powers; revenue generating powers; and the 
power to enter into agreements to share or delegate such powers (Graham et al Governance Principles 
for Protected Areas in the 21st Century (2003) 13). 
74 For a general discussion of the varying form and content of rights and tenure that exists within 
protected areas, see: Wilkie D, Adams W & Redford K “Protected Areas, Ecological Scale, and 
Governance: A Framing Paper” in Redford K & Grippo C (eds) Protected Areas, Governance and Scale 












prescription of rules, norms and standards, permitting schemes, environmental 
assessment and reporting. 
 
The third broad issue is what I would call beneficiation, namely the range of 
rights/benefits and associated responsibilities/costs, which may flow from a protected 
area. As in the case of land tenure and management, two issues impact on the 
beneficiation component of protected areas governance: who has the rights/benefits 
and who bares the responsibilities/costs; and what is the basis or form of beneficiation. 
Regarding the former question, the rights/benefits and responsibilities/costs may fall on 
one or more person or institution, which could include: government authorities; 
community institutions; non-government organisations, companies; and ordinary people. 
Regarding the latter question, the rights/benefits and responsibilities/costs can be based 
in law, custom and agreement. The selection of the appropriate institution and form of 
beneficiation will largely depend on the capacity of key stakeholders.75 
 
These issues of tenure, management and beneficiation in turn significantly influence the 
quality of governance in protected areas – inclusive of participation, transparency, 
accountability, rule of law, effectiveness and equity – commonly referred to as good 
governance.  It is accordingly not surprising that having expressly reaffirmed the vital 
current and future role protected areas play in conserving the globe’s biological 
diversity, those attending the Vth World Parks Congress held in Durban (South Africa) 
in 2003 identified governance as ‘central to the conservation of protected areas 
throughout the world’ and that ‘success in the coming decade will depend in part on 
strengthening the governance of protected areas’.76 It was at this Congress that an 
initial attempt was made to formulate a common language for understanding and 
describing the different forms of protected areas governance.77 Four governance 
typologies were proposed (government; co-managed; private; and community 
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capacity to manage staff); and strategic (the capacity to establish strategic partnerships). 













conserved areas)78 and the World Commission on Protected Areas was specifically 
mandated to include a governance dimension in the IUCN’s protected areas 
management category system to reflect the plurality of protected area governance types 
accurately.79 The past four Conference of Parties (COP) to the Convention on Biological 
Diversity80 have further reiterated the need to improve and where necessary diversify 
and strengthen protected areas governance types, and for parties specifically to 
recognise the contribution of co-managed protected areas, private protected areas, and 
indigenous and local community conserved areas within the national protected area 
system.81 
 
3.3.2 Overview of the Current IUCN Governance Matrix 
 
This process culminated in the inclusion of four forms of governance in the IUCN 
Management Guidelines (2008), the express purpose of which is to assist the 
international community and domestic policy-makers to understand, plan for and 
accurately record protected areas governance.82 These forms largely mimic those 
proposed by Graham et al and Borrini-Feyerabend at the Vth World Parks Congress83 
and are: governance by government; shared governance; private governance; and 
governance by indigenous peoples and local communities. 
 
                                                     
78 These four governance typologies were specifically based on the preparatory work of: Graham et al 
Governance Principles for Protected Areas in the 21st Century (2003); and Borrini-Feyerabend 
“Governance of Protected Areas, Participation and Equity” in Biodiversity Issues for Consideration (2004) 
100-105. 
79 World Commission on Protected Areas Durban Action Plan (2003) IUCN Gland 258. 
80 31 ILM 818 (1992). 
81 The importance of protected areas governance was affirmed in the Programme of Work on Protected 
Areas (adopted at COP 7 (Kuala Lumpur, 2004) and annexed to Decision VII/28) which emphasises the 
need to recognise and promote a broad set of protected area governance types, including areas 
conserved by indigenous and local communities and private nature reserves. See Programme Element 1 
(Goal 1.1, para. 1.1.4) and Programme Element 2 (Goal 2.1: para. 2.1.2 and paras. 2.1.4-2.1.6; and Goal 
2.2: paras. 2.2.1-2.2.2, paras. 2.2.4-2.2.5 and para. 2.2.7). See further: COP 10 (Nagoya, 2010) Decision 
X/31 (Protected Areas) para. 30-32; COP 9 (Bonn, 2008) Decision IX/18 (Protected Areas) para. 6a-6d; 
and COP 8 (Curitiba, 2006) Decision VIII/24 (Protected Areas) para. 18g. 
82 Dudley Guidelines for Applying Protected Area Management Categories (2008) 25. See further, Borrini-
Feyerabend G Implementing the CBD Programme of Work on Protected Areas - Governance as Key for 
Effective and Equitable Protected Area Systems (2008) IUCN/CEESP Briefing Note 8, Cenesta Tehran 2-
4. 












3.3.2.1 Governance by Government 
 
This is the traditional form of protected areas governance whereby a government body, 
usually a government agency or statutory authority, ‘holds the authority, responsibility, 
and accountability for managing the area’, determining its conservation objectives, 
developing and enforcing its management plan.84 The government body usually owns or 
holds in trust the land, water and resources situated in the protected area. It is generally 
held directly accountable to the Ministry providing for its appointment or designation. 
Consultation with relevant stakeholders regarding the establishment of the protected 
areas and its management is not the norm although even under this form of 
governance, public participation and accountability are apparently increasingly common 
and generally regarded as desirable. It is for this reason that even under this form of 
governance, provision for the delegation of planning or management functions to 
parastatals, NGOs, local communities, and or indigenous peoples is recognised. The 
ultimate authority however always vests in the government body. Owing to this diversity, 
three self-explanatory sub-categories are identified in the IUCN Management 
Guidelines (2008), namely: national ministry or agency in charge; sub-national ministry 
or agency in charge; government-delegated management.  
 
The nature and ambit of this form of governance is generally clearly defined and 
understood. However, one potential for confusion relates to the recognition that the 
government body may delegate various functions to an array of institutions including 
NGOs, local communities or indigenous peoples. Although it is anticipated that the 
government body retains the ultimate authority over the area, the provision for 
delegation may often practically result in the transfer of some authority to the latter 
institutions. Uncertainty may therefore arise regarding the point on the ‘delegation 
continuum’ at which the governance typology transcends into one of shared governance 
as opposed to governance by government. 
 
 
                                                     












3.3.2.2 Shared Governance 
 
In its simplest sense, shared governance involves governance by two or more actors.85 
Its practical manifestation is however far from simple, and involves the employment of 
far more diverse and ‘complex institutional mechanisms and structures … to share 
management authority and responsibility among a plurality of (formally and informally) 
entitled governmental and non-governmental actors’.86 The IUCN Management 
Guidelines (2008) seek to collapse this diversity under two main sub-categories, namely 
‘collaborative management’ (also referred to as ‘co-management’) and ‘joint 
management’. The former encapsulates the scenario where authority vests in one body 
(predominantly a government agency or statutory authority), but this body ‘is required - 
by law or policy - to inform and consult other stakeholders’.87 These stakeholders, 
traditionally limited to other relevant government agencies, have over time been 
extended to include local communities, indigenous peoples, NGOs, user associations, 
corporations, private landowners, or some combination thereof. The consultation 
process can be formalised through the establishment of multi-stakeholder bodies to 
assist in the formulation of management policies and proposals for consideration and 
adoption by the body formally appointed to manage the protected areas.  
 
The latter, ‘joint management’ differs from ‘collaborative management’ in that decision-
making authority vests in a range of bodies such as those identified above in the context 
of collaborative management. The decision-making process is varied and may or may 
not require consensus. Once a decision is made, its implementation is assigned or 
delegated to various agreed bodies or individuals. 
 
While the above two sub-categories of shared governance reflect variations in the 
decision-making process, the IUCN Management Guidelines (2008) identify a third sub-
                                                     
85 See generally: Dudley Guidelines for Applying Protected Area Management Categories (2008) 26; 
Kothari A “Collaboratively Managed Protected Areas” in Lockwood et al Managing Protected Areas: A 
Global Guide (2006) 528-548; and Borrini-Feyerabend et al Indigenous and Local Communities and 
Protected Areas (2004) 32-50. 













category reflecting the geographical construct of ‘collaborative management’, namely 
‘transboundary management’. This involves protected areas which traverse international 
borders and which accordingly involve elaborate predominantly joint-management 
schemes involving one or more government bodies and other stakeholders. It falls 
under the broad realm of shared governance to the extent that it involves the conclusion 
of bilateral or regional agreements to harmonise management of two or more adjacent 
protected areas situated in different sovereign states. 
 
What is somewhat confusing is how the above formulation of shared governance 
contained in the IUCN Management Guidelines (2008), particularly the sub-categories 
of co-management and joint management, differ from the approach initially proposed in 
the IUCN Guidelines on Indigenous and Local Communities and Protected Areas88 and 
which is reinforced in contemporary texts on collaboratively managed protected areas.89 
Both identify the following as common features of co-managed protected areas: arenas 
of social engagement, encounter and experimentation; capitalising on multiplicity, 
diversity and flexibility; based upon a negotiated, joint decision-making approach and 
some degree of power sharing; and promoting shared responsibilities and the equitable 
distribution of benefits.90 The IUCN Guidelines on Indigenous and Local Communities 
and Protected Areas specifically define a co-managed protected area as a: 
 
‘…government-designated protected area where decision making power, responsibility 
and accountability are shared between governmental agencies and other stakeholders, 
in particular indigenous peoples and local and mobile communities that depend on that 
area culturally and or for their livelihoods.’91  
 
This formulation of co-management would appear to equate ‘co-management’ with the 
formulation of ‘joint-management’ as described under the IUCN Management 
                                                     
88 Borrini-Feyerabend et al Indigenous and Local Communities and Protected Areas (2004) 32-50. 
89 Kothari “Collaboratively Managed Protected Areas” in Lockwood et al Managing Protected Areas: A 
Global Guide (2006) 528-529. 
90 Borrini-Feyerabend et al Indigenous and Local Communities and Protected Areas (2004) 38-39; and 
Kothari “Collaboratively Managed Protected Areas” in Lockwood et al Managing Protected Areas: A 
Global Guide (2006) 528-529. 












Guidelines (2008). Furthermore, the above definition of co-management is contained in 
a chapter titled ‘Guidelines for Co-managed Protected Areas’ that is in turn contained in 
the IUCN Guidelines on Indigenous and Local Communities and Protected Areas. Some 
contemporary commentators simply conflate the meaning of collaborative management, 
co-management, joint management and multi-stakeholder management.92 The mixed 
use of terminology and the apparent lack of clarity regarding where to draw the line 
between shared governance and governance by indigenous peoples and local 
communities have potential for creating great confusion. It would appear to be 
diametrically opposed to one of the principal aims of creating governance typologies - 
the desire to create a common language for protected areas governance. 
 
3.3.2.3 Private Governance 
 
This form of governance has been introduced in order to recognise the growing number 
of protected areas largely voluntarily established by ‘private’ entities across the globe to 
promote conservation objectives.93 These ‘private protected areas’, whilst often 
contributing to conservation, have frequently gone unnoticed and have accordingly often 
been omitted from recordal in the World Directory of Protected Areas.94 
 
Private governance encapsulates protected areas owned or controlled by private 
entities including individuals, NGOs, corporations acting individually or collectively.95 
They are accordingly generally not subject to direct government authority. The IUCN 
Management Guidelines (2008) do however recognise that other entities, notably 
indigenous peoples and local communities, can also ‘privately’ own or control land 
situated in protected areas.96 It may on occasion accordingly be difficult to distinguish 
                                                     
92 Kothari “Collaboratively Managed Protected Areas” in Lockwood et al Managing Protected Areas: A 
Global Guide (2006) 528. 
93 See the sentiments reflected in the CBD Programme of Work on Protected Areas (adopted at COP 7 of 
the Convention on Biological Diversity held in Kuala Lampur in 2004 and annexed to COP 7 Decision 
VII/28) - specifically Programme Element 1 (Goal 1.1, para. 1.1.4) and Programme Element 2 (Goal 2.1, 
paras. 2.1.2-2.1.3; and Goal 2.2, para. 2.2.4 and para. 2.2.7). 
94 Dudley Guidelines for Applying Protected Area Management Categories (2008) 32. 













this form of governance from the fourth form of governance described below, namely 
governance by indigenous peoples and local communities. 
 
The rationale for private entities establishing such areas range from generating profit 
(such as accruing eco-tourism revenue) to promoting purely philanthropic conservation 
interests. Within such areas, all decision-making authority relating to setting 
conservation objectives and developing and implementing management planning is 
generally statutorily vested in the private entity. However, the existence of a relevant 
statutory framework providing for the establishment, recognition and management of 
such areas, whilst desirable to ensure necessary accountability, is not a prerequisite. 
Incentives schemes (such as property tax and income tax benefits) frequently support 
the implementation of this form of governance. Three sub-categories are highlighted in 
the IUCN Management Guidelines (2008), which are based upon whether the area is 
declared and run by: individual landowners; non-profit organisations (such as NGOs or 
universities); or by for-profit organisations (corporations or cooperatives).  
 
There are a number of troubling aspects associated with this form of governance. 
Firstly, as mentioned above, it may be difficult to distinguish this form of governance 
from ‘governance by indigenous peoples and local communities’ as these peoples and 
communities can also operate in the private realm. Secondly, the IUCN Management 
Guidelines (2008) fail to properly reflect the diverse array of tenure options under which 
the land or natural resources may be held by ‘private’ landowners or the nuanced array 
of ‘effective means’ through which these areas may be managed. Thirdly, there may 
frequently be a degree of overlap between this form of governance and the former – 
namely shared governance – as private landowners may well enter into some form of 
collaborative or joint management scheme in order to share the management 
obligations and costs with government agencies and NGOs. Fourthly, the IUCN 
definition of protected areas provides that a protected area must be managed in 
perpetuity.97 Private protected areas are frequently established for certain defined 
periods that can generally be extended with the agreement of the private entity holding 
                                                     












the land. While contributing significantly to conservation during their tenure, their 
temporary nature may well preclude them from being regarded, and accordingly 
recorded, as protected areas. Finally, unlike land owned or controlled by organisations, 
no distinction is made between whether individual landowners establish the protected 
area for profit or not-for profit motives. This is rather inconsistent. 
 
3.3.2.4 Governance by Indigenous Peoples and Local Communities 
 
It is this form of governance that has largely precipitated the increased focus on 
protected areas governance in recent times.98 Some commentators have even labelled 
it as the ‘most exciting conservation development of the 21st century’.99 Having existed 
for hundreds or even thousands of years, its rise in prominence can partly be allied to 
the recognition of the rights of indigenous peoples and of local and mobile communities 
in several international instruments.100 Notwithstanding its apparent prevalence, this 
often complex form of governance is perhaps the least understood.101 There is however 
growing recognition that areas subject to this form of governance do contribute to 
biodiversity conservation, can fall within the bounds of the IUCN’s definition of a 
protected area and should accordingly be the focus of significant future enquiry.102 The 
most comprehensive outcomes of this relatively recent enquiry have been: the 
publication of the IUCN Guidelines on Indigenous and Local Communities and 
Protected Areas103 and a range of Briefing Notes prepared under the auspices of the 
                                                     
98 See generally: Dudley Guidelines for Applying Protected Area Management Categories (2008) 26 & 28-
32; Kothari “Community Conserved Areas” in Lockwood et al Managing Protected Areas: A Global Guide 
(2006) 549-572; Kothari A “Community Conserved Areas: Towards Ecological and Livelihood Security” 
(2006) 16(1) Parks 3-13; and Borrini-Feyerabend et al Indigenous and Local Communities and Protected 
Areas (2004) 51-81. 
99 Kothari “Community Conserved Areas” in Lockwood et al Managing Protected Areas: A Global Guide 
(2006) 549. 
100 These instruments include: International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (1976) 21 
ILM 925; ILO Convention Concerning Indigenous and Tribal Peoples in Independent Countries (1989) 28 
ILM 1382; and most recently the United Nations Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples (2007) 
46 ILM 1013. See further the following decisions of the CBD COP (COP 8 Decision VIII/24 (para. 18g) 
and COP 9 Decision IX/18 (para. 6)), which specifically recognised the value of this form of protected 
area governance. 
101 Dudley Guidelines for Applying Protected Area Management Categories (2008) 28. 
102 Dudley Guidelines for Applying Protected Area Management Categories (2008) 28-31. See further 
Kothari (2006) Parks 3. 












IUCN Commission on Environment, Economic and Social Policy (CEESP);104 the formal 
establishment of the Indigenous and Community Conserved Areas (ICCA) Consortium 
in 2010;105 and the commissioning of a range of studies to more fully understand the 
extent and nature of these protected areas.106 
 
This form of governance has been defined as ‘protected areas where the management 
authority and responsibility rest with indigenous peoples and/or local communities 
through various forms of customary or legal, formal or informal, institution and rules’.107 
The diversity of arrangements, institutions and areas that potentially fall under this 
exceedingly broad definition is vast and not necessarily static.108 These areas range 
from those in which the land, water or resources are subject to collective and/or 
                                                                                                                                                                           
Enhanced Conservation (2004). 
104 Borrini-Feyerabend G Strengthening What Works - Recognising and Supporting the Conservation 
Achievements of Indigenous Peoples and Local Communities (2010) IUCN/CEESP Briefing Note 10, 
Cenesta Tehran; Borrini-Feyerabend G (ed) Bio-Cultural Diversity Conserved by Indigenous Peoples and 
Local Communities - Examples and Analysis (2010) Report prepared by ICCA Consortium for GEF, SGP, 
GTZ, IIED and IUCN/CEESP; Borrini-Feyerabend G & Khotari A Recognising and Supporting Indigenous 
and Community Conservation - Ideas & Experiences From the Grassroots (2008) IUCN/CEESP Briefing 
Note 9, Cenesta Tehran; and Borrini-Feyerabend Implementing the CBD Programme of Work on 
Protected Areas (2008) 10-16. 
105 The ICCA Consortium, formally registered as a non-profit organisation in Switzerland in July 2010, 
comprises of a range of international non-government organisations which seek to accord appropriate 
recognition of ICCAs at national and international levels, and appropriate support to the indigenous 
peoples and local communities governing them. See further: http://www.iccaforum.org/.  
106 See for example: Khotari A, Menon M & O’Reilly S Territories and Areas Conserved by Indigenous 
Peoples and Local Communities (ICCAs): How Far Do National Laws and Policies Recognise Them? 
(2010) Preliminary Report dated October 2010, prepared for IUCN/CEESP, TILCEPA, WCPA and 
Kalpavriksh; and Blomley R, Nelson F, Martin A & Ngobo M Community Conserved Areas: A Review of 
Status and Needs in Selected Countries of Central and Eastern Africa (2007) Draft Report dated August 
2007, prepared for TILCEPA, TGER, IUCN/CEESP, SwedBio & WCPA. 
107 Dudley Guidelines for Applying Protected Area Management Categories (2008) 26. 
108 For a comprehensive discussion of the nuanced governance types underpinning community 
conserved areas across the globe, see: Kothari et al Territories and Areas Conserved by Indigenous 
Peoples and Local Communities; Blomley et al Community Conserved Areas: A Review of Status and 
Needs in Selected Countries of Central and Eastern Africa (2007); Smyth D “Indigenous Protected Areas 
in Australia” (2006) 16(1) Parks 14-20; Rivera V, Cordero P, Borras M, Govan M & Varela V “Community 
Conservation Areas in Central America: Recognising them for Equity and Good Governance” (2006) 
16(1) Parks 21-27; Bassi M “Community Conserved Areas in the Horn of Africa” (2006) 16(1) Parks 28-
34; Brown J, Lyman M & Proctor A “Community Conserved Areas: Experience from North America” 
(2006) 16(1) Parks 35-42; Ferrari M “Rediscovering Community Conserved Areas in South-East Asia: 
Peoples; Initiative to Reverse Biodiversity Loss” (2006) 16(1) Parks 43-48; Pathak N “Community 
Conserved Areas in South Asia” (2006) 16(1) Parks 56-62; Holden P, Grossman D & Jones B 
“Community Conserved Areas in Some Southern African Countries” (2006) 16(1) Parks 68-73; Oviedo G 
Lessons Learned in the Establishment and Management of Protected Areas by Indigenous and Local 
Communities in South America (2003) WCPA Ecosystems, Protected Areas and People Project, IUCN 












individual tenure. The forms of tenure vary from full title to limited real rights afforded 
under customary law and/or statute. The land or resources in question may even be 
subject to government ownership but with management authority attributed down to one 
or more community. This management authority can similarly be founded in customary 
law and/or statute. The communities responsible for governing these areas can be 
sedentary and/or mobile and the boundaries of these areas fixed or flexible. There may 
accordingly be several communities exercising authority over an area or resource at any 
one time.  The following three traits have however been identified as central to this form 
of governance: the relevant indigenous peoples or local communities are closely 
concerned with the preservation of the area (although the objective of such concern 
varies from strict conservation to sustainable use); they hold the main authority 
(stemming from varied sources including custom or statute) to make and implement 
decisions in respect of the area; and the exercise of such authority leads to or 
contributes to the sustainability of the area notwithstanding the fact that this need not 
necessarily have been the rationale for the action.109 
 
To make some sense of this diversity, the IUCN Management Guidelines (2008) divide 
this form of governance into the following two sub-categories: l) indigenous or traditional 
peoples areas, and territories established and run by these peoples, and 2) community 
conserved areas established and run by local communities. The merit of drawing a 
distinction between ‘indigenous peoples’110 and ‘local communities’111 is not immediately 
                                                     
109 See Borrini-Feyerabend et al Indigenous and Local Communities and Protected Areas (2004) 51; and 
Dudley Guidelines for Applying Protected Area Management Categories (2008) 29. 
110 ‘Indigenous peoples’ are defined in the ILO Convention 169 on Indigenous and Tribal Peoples in 
Independent Countries (1989) as including: ‘tribal peoples in indigenous countries whose social, cultural, 
and economic conditions distinguish them from other sections of the national community, and whose 
status is regulated wholly or partially by their own customs or traditions or by special laws or regulations; 
(and) peoples in independent countries who are regarded as indigenous on account of their descent from 
the populations which inhabited the country, or a geographical region to which the country belongs, at the 
time of conquest or colonialisation or the establishment of present state boundaries and who, irrespective 
of their legal status, retain some or all of their own social, economic, cultural and political institutions’ 
(Article 1). 
111 ‘Community’ is defined by Borrini-Feyerabend et al as ‘... a human group sharing a territory and 
involved in different but related aspects of livelihoods – such as managing natural resources, producing 
knowledge and culture, and developing productive technologies and practices’; with ‘local community’ 
referring to those communities where members ‘are likely to have face-to-face encounters and/or direct 
mutual influences in their daily life’ (Borrini-Feyerabend et al Indigenous and Local Communities and 












clear as the former are frequently regarded as the latter, and the latter the former, 
depending on where you are and to whom you talk.112 This is expressly noted in the 
IUCN Management Guidelines (2008)113 but the confusing terminology is nonetheless 
retained as part of an apparent compromise to accommodate the whims of all interest 
groups. Ironically, this form of governance is frequently conflated under terms such as 
indigenous community conserved areas (ICCAs) or simply ‘community conserved 
areas’. As mentioned in the context of shared governance, this mixed use of 
nomenclature would similarly appear to undermine the desire to create a common 
language for describing, planning for and recording protected areas governance. 
 
Confusing, further, is the potential of this type of governance to overlap with other types, 
most notably private governance and shared governance. How would one distinguish 
between a community conserved area and private governance where, for example, the 
community owns the land through an entity such as a trust or company (entities which 
are inherently private in nature) and exercises sole management authority over it? 
Furthermore, how would one distinguish between an indigenous people’s protected 
area and co-management where, for example, several indigenous peoples or local 
communities residing within a given area collaborate in the management of it? Finally, 
how would one distinguish between governance by government and a community 
conserved area, where the area is state owned, and the state grants a lease to local 
community to use and manage the area on their behalf? 
 
3.3.3 Intersection of Governance Types and Management Categories 
 
Notwithstanding these anomalies, to the extent that the governance types reflected in 
the IUCN Management Guidelines (2008) promote the use and appreciation of a 
diverse array of governance types they should be welcomed. This is in keeping with the 
sentiments expressed at the 5th World Parks Congress where it was recognised that 
‘…national protected area systems which combine different governance types are likely 
                                                     
112 For a full discussion of the distinction between the definition of ‘indigenous peoples’ and ‘local 
communities’ see: Borrini-Feyerabend et al Indigenous and Local Communities and Protected Areas 
(2004) 8-9. 












to be more resilient, responsive and adaptive under various threats to conservation, and 
hence more sustainable and effective in the long run’.114 
 
Significant thought has clearly gone into identifying and clarifying the differing forms of 
protected areas governance prior to and following the 5th World Parks Congress. This 
thought has been accompanied by an initiative to integrate the various forms of 
governance with the IUCN Management Categories for protected areas to create a so-
called ‘protected areas matrix’ – a classification system for protected areas comprising 
both management category and management type. The outcome of this process is 
reflected in Figure 1 below. 
 
 
FIGURE 1: IUCN Protected Areas Matrix: A Classification System for Protected Areas 
Comprising both Management Category and Governance Type115 
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The authors of the above IUCN Protected Areas Matrix acknowledge that it describes 
the different types of management authority and responsibility that can exist for 
protected areas, but only affords passing recognition to issues of land tenure.116 
However, is land tenure not an essential determinant of authority and warranting 
comprehensive reflection in the above matrix?117 The authors appear to draw a 
distinction between ownership and governance stating that in ‘some of the governance 
types … governance and ownership will often be the same’.118 However, is ownership 
not an integral component or determinant of the form of governance and not something 
to juxtapose it against? The authors clearly seek to afford recognition to a diversity of 
governance options (four main types and several sub-categories thereof). However, are 
these governance options sufficiently broad to capture such diversity accurately, or will 
the attempt to straightjacket them into four main categories ultimately confuse, 
undermine and lead to the inaccurate recordal of such diversity. As identified by several 
commentators, governance options effectively exist on a continuum with formal 
government controlled protected areas existing on the extreme and informal 
communally-conserved areas on the other.119 Is it therefore wise to attempt to box 
governance types strictly within four main typologies when protected areas governance 
appears to be frightfully nuanced and frequently traverses the boxes? The practical 
implementation of this approach may prove problematic given the apparent inherent 
anomalies plaguing the current protected areas governance types and IUCN Protected 





                                                     
116 Ibid. This is similarly reflected in Graham et al Governance Principles for Protected Areas in the 21st 
Century (2003) 15. This latter document was fundamental in informing the development of the protected 
areas governance types included in the IUCN Management Guidelines (2008). 
117 According to Mitchell, ‘… ownership models (have) particular implications for management’ (Mitchell 
(2007) The George Wright Forum 85). 
118 Mitchell (2007) The George Wright Forum 85. 
119 Borrini-Feyerabend et al Indigenous and Local Communities and Protected Areas: Towards Equity and 
Enhanced Conservation (2004) 30. See further the similar governance continuum proposed by Dearden 
et al ranging from full agency (or state) control to full control by others (Dearden et al (2005) 












3.3.4 Critique of the IUCN Governance Matrix 
 
On a precursory first reading, the governance types reflected in the IUCN Protected 
Areas Matrix contained in the IUCN Management Guidelines (2008) provide a vital step 
toward developing a ‘common language’ for understanding the myriad protected areas 
governance options adopted across the globe – including those subject to communal 
property regimes. However, as can hopefully be ascertained from the above review, 
there are four main issues that may well undermine their utility as a tool for 
understanding, planning for and recording protected area.120 
 
The first is confusing terminology. Distinguishing co-management from joint 
management from collaborative management is not an easy task given the disparate 
meanings accorded to these terms by several preceding IUCN guideline documents. 
Similarly, the distinction, and rationale underlying the distinction, between indigenous 
peoples and local communities; and for that matter between indigenous community 
conserved areas and community conserved areas, is not immediately apparent. 
 
The second is misconceiving governance. As is argued above, there appear to be three 
fundamental elements impacting on protected areas governance, namely issues of 
tenure (who holds the land); issues of management (who manages the land); and 
issues of beneficiation (who holds the rights/benefits and is accountable for the 
responsibilities/costs associated with the land and resources situated within the 
protected area). The governance types reflected in the IUCN Management Guidelines 
(2008) largely ignore the first and last of these issues, therefore potentially providing a 
very skewed viewed of the authority and dynamics at play in protected areas. The 
apparent indifference shown to these other key components of governance may well 
come to haunt their practical application and utility. This is especially relevant in the 
context of communal property situated within protected areas. 
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The third may be described as fudging the divides. As I have illustrated in the above 
discussion, and as is partially acknowledged in the IUCN Management Guidelines 
(2008) themselves, there is significant overlap in the proposed governance types. As I 
have argued above, it may, for example, be difficult to distinguish governance by 
government from shared governance where the government authority elects to delegate 
certain management functions to an NGO, individual or local community. It may similarly 
be difficult to distinguish shared governance from governance by indigenous and local 
communities where several distinct community organisations seek to collaborate in the 
management of a certain area.  The design of the IUCN Protected Areas Matrix appears 
to anticipate that the form of governance for each protected area can neatly fall within 
one of eleven governance sub-categories identified by its authors. It is in fact proposed 
that the governance type of each protected area should be identified, along the lines of 
the proposed categories, and recorded in the relevant national and international 
protected areas databases.121 However, on many occasions there will frequently be 
more than one type of governance at play within a particular protected area. It is 
accordingly perhaps unworkable, unwise and unhelpful to try and squash protected 
areas governance into certain predefined and exclusive governance categories. 
 
The fourth I would call clouding description and prescription. It must be remembered 
that it is currently the protected areas management categories contained in the IUCN 
Management Guidelines (2008), and not the governance categories contained therein, 
which act as the screen for determining whether a protected area is worthy of global 
recordal and recognition. The issue of governance is therefore more descriptive than 
prescriptive, something partially recognised in the IUCN Management Guidelines (2008) 
themselves. They state that ‘management objectives for the categories can be 
developed and assigned without regard for governance’ and that the listing of 
governance type in World Database on Protected Areas is largely about enhancing an 
understanding of, comparison between and ultimate improving the effectiveness of 
protected areas.122 Is it not unwise to include descriptive elements and prescriptive 
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elements within one matrix and to require countries to identify and record the 
governance type in relevant national and international protected areas databases? It 
holds significant potential for prescriptive elements to be confused with descriptive 
elements. Perhaps for this reason alone, the current formulation and integration of 
governance types within the IUCN Management Guidelines (2008) (particularly within 
the IUCN Protected Areas Matrix) should be reconsidered, to avoid their unwarranted 
rise to a global prescriptive requirement for affording formal recognition to protected 
areas. 
 
Given their overlapping nature, confused use of terminology, narrow formulation of 
governance and potential to cloud the distinction between prescriptive management 
categories and descriptive governance types, the value of the current governance 
typology and matrix as tools for understanding, planning for and accurately recording 
protected areas must be questioned. Developing typologies, matrices and check boxes 
do have their value in many contexts. However, perhaps it is too early to do so in the 
context of protected areas governance given the diversity, complexity and relative 
novelty of the discipline. I do not wish to underscore the value of the significant scholarly 
work that has gone into distilling many essential elements or characteristics of 
relevance to protected areas governance over the past decade.123 The packaging of 
these elements is simply problematic as are the efforts to compress an unruly concept 
in certain prescribed boxes. This makes it difficult to adopt the four defined governance 
types contained in the IUCN Management Guidelines (2008) for the remainder of this 
dissertation. However, as previously mentioned, the issue of governance is central to 
understanding, planning for and recording the rise of communal property regimes as 
                                                     
123 This scholarly work would include: Abrams P, Borrini-Feyerabend G, Gardner J & Heylings P 
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tools for facilitating common-pool natural resource management within statutorily 
prescribed protected areas. So what would be an alternative and desirable approach for 
considering the issue of protected areas governance in general and in the context of 
those founded on communal property regimes? How can one move towards an 
approach which more accurately describes and records the rich diversity of governance 
options which have been used and/or could be used to foster communal property 
regimes within protected areas - rather than one which seeks to squash this rich 
diversity into somewhat unruly boxes for the purpose of analysis and reporting? 
 
3.3.5. Towards a Different Approach to Protected Areas Governance 
 
The first step is to develop a proper understanding of protected areas governance. As 
mentioned above, there are three fundamental issues that appear to underlie the 
source, allocation and exercise of authority within a protected area.124 First, who owns 
or holds rights in the land and resources situated within a protected area – a question of 
land tenure. Secondly, who has the authority to manage the land and resources situated 
within a protected area - a question of land management. Thirdly, who holds the 
rights/benefits and is accountable for the responsibilities/costs associated with the land 
and resources situated within the protected area – a question of beneficiation. In 
respect of each of these components, two further issues require attention – the 
questions who holds the rights and/or authority; and what the basis and form of such 
rights and/or authority is. 
 
If one considers these latter two questions in the context of the land tenure component 
of governance, the land and/or natural resources falling within the protected areas could 
be owned and/or held by one or more entities. These entities could include the 
government, communities (acting through communal property associations, trusts and 
similar structures) and individuals (comprising of natural and juristic persons, including 
NGOs). The form of tenure could include legal or formal tenure, customary tenure, 
common tenure, de jure and de facto tenure. Finally, the content of such tenure could 
                                                     












comprise of full ownership rights or more limited rights relating to development, use, 
access and/or occupation. 
 
In the context of the land management component of governance, the protected area 
could similarly be managed by one or more entities. The array of entities responsible for 
management and the source/basis for the management authority are as identified 
above in the context of the land tenure component of governance. However, where one 
is dealing with multiple entity management, a further distinction could be drawn between 
co-management, joint management and transboundary management (as defined in 
IUCN Management Guidelines (2008)). The basis of management could be founded in 
statute, customary law or even contract, where for example management contracts or 
concessionary agreements are entered into between the entity which holds tenure rights 
and a third party.  
 
In the context of the beneficiation component of governance, the rights/benefits and 
responsibilities/costs could once again fall to one or more entities of the variety listed 
above. The basis of beneficiation could be founded in statute, customary law or even 
contract. The nature of the rights/benefits and responsibilities/costs are very diverse and 
will vary in each situation. Relevant rights/benefits could include:125 
 Decision-Making Rights - the right to make decisions regarding the protected 
area and the resources located within it. 
 Access Rights - the right to access the protected area for non-consumptive 
purposes (for cultural/spiritual/recreational purposes). 
 Occupation Rights - the right to reside within the protected area. 
 Resource Use Rights - the right to harvest and use resources in the protected 
area. 
 Commercial Rights - the right to develop certain parts of the protected area for 
commercial gain. 
                                                     
125 This list is adapted and expanded from the list of rights/benefits espoused by De Koning (De Koning M 
“Co-Management in Protected Areas” (2010) Presentation & Document Prepared for the People & Parks 












 Equity Rights - the right to share in financial benefits associated with commercial 
activities undertaken in the protected area. 
 Lease Benefits - financial benefits that arise from the lease of land in the 
protected area to the government or to private companies (in terms of 
concession agreements). 
 Employment Benefits - benefits that arise from employment in the protected area. 
 Grant benefits - benefits that arise through access to government grants. 
 Tax Benefits - tax incentives which accrue to people who contract their land into 
a protected area, assist in managing the protected area or who donate land or 
money to the protected area. 
 Climate change benefits - benefits that could accrue through climate change 
incentive schemes relating predominantly to mitigation projects undertaken in the 
protected area. 
 
Relevant responsibilities/costs could in turn include those related to:126 
 
 Ownership - the responsibilities/costs associated with ownership and compliance 
with general environmental legal obligations.127 
 Management - the responsibilities/costs associated with managing the protected 
area.128 
 Development - the responsibilities/costs associated with tourism developments 
undertaken withi  the park.129 
                                                     
126 This list is similarly adapted and expanded from the list of responsibilities/costs espoused by De 
Koning (De Koning “Co-Management in Protected Areas” (2010) 43-45). 
127 The responsibilities/costs associated with ownership could include: payment of relevant rates and 
taxes; fencing the land; regulating access to the land; undertaking alien-invasive clearing; preventing and 
managing veld fires; conserving natural resources; and preventing general pollution and degradation. 
128 The responsibilities/costs associated with management could include: financing management costs; 
preparing management plans; implementing the management plan; employing and managing staff; 
maintaining infrastructure (roads; fences, watering holes; staff houses; etc.); and research, monitoring 
and reporting. 
129 The responsibilities/costs associated with development could include: providing and/or sourcing capital 
to undertake the development; entering into contractual arrangements with service providers; managing 
the relationship with and performance of service providers; employing and managing staff to construct, 
operate or manage the development; ensuring compliance with environmental legal obligations (planning 













The above understanding of protected areas governance and the main issues that 




FIGURE 2 – Factors Influencing Protected Areas Governance 
 
It is argued that the above approach which seeks to extract and focus on the essential 
elements impacting on protected areas governance could facilitate a better 
understanding of governance options prevalent in existing protected areas, and the 
myriad of alternatives available to those seeking to establish and/or afford formal 
recognition to new areas held under nuanced forms of propriety rights and subject to 
varied forms of management and beneficiation regimes. 
 
This is, however, but the first step in the process. The second is the need to move away 
from what could be called the ‘squash into a box’ approach adopted in the IUCN 
Management Guidelines (2008). As mentioned above, there will be many instances 
where it will not be possible to compress the form of governance prevalent in a 





































































protected area neatly into one box on a matrix.130 Nor would this tell one much about 
the many distinct elements impacting on the governance of that protected area, such as 
those reflected in Figure 2 above. Therefore, one needs to adopt a different approach to 
understanding, planning for and ultimately recording protected areas governance, one 
which is less prescriptive (where one is compelled to tick a single box in a matrix of 
options) and more descriptive (where one can tick a range of boxes which seek to 
reflect the essential components underlying the practical manifestation of governance 
within a particular protected area). Figure 2 could over time be elaborated and 
developed into a separate descriptive matrix containing check boxes next to each 
element – enabling domestic conservation authorities to record (tick) accurately which 
governance elements are present in a particular protected area.  
 
Some may argue that the above approach to describing, planning for and recording 
protected areas governance is far more complex than that adopted in the IUCN 
Management Guidelines (2008) and may accordingly lead to confusion. However, 
protected areas governance is complex. We should not seek to conceal this complexity 
by squeezing protected areas governance into a few boxes. We should rather seek to 
embrace its glorious diversity and promote the creativity shown by numerous 
jurisdictions in affording recognition to previously marginalised areas. Through this 
process that we can seek to understand protected areas governance and promote the 
adoption of a blend of its components that may lead to the attainment of the ideal of 
good governance within a particular protected area. 
 
It is this more descriptive approach to protected areas governance that I adopt in this 
enquiry. Rather than blindly relying on and applying the protected areas governance 
types and IUCN Protected Areas Matrix reflected in the IUCN Management Guidelines 
(2008), I seek to understand the elements of governance at play when evaluating 
existing statutory protected areas subject to communal property regimes and seeking to 
plot their way forward in South Africa. This venture is informed by the significant 
research undertaken by protected areas governance scholars during the last decade. 
                                                     















This chapter has traversed two broad contextual and largely theoretical issues relating 
to protected areas founded on communal property regimes, namely: the objective of the 
CCAs – managing the natural commons; and the general form of CCAs – a protected 
area.  
 
Regarding their object, I sought to highlight how the meaning of the natural commons 
remains troubled but is integrally connected to issues of property rights and land tenure. 
I emphasised how the failure by traditional scholars of the ‘commons’ to draw clear 
distinctions between the nature of the resource system and the nature of the property 
rights applicable to it, has been manipulated in the past to promote global political 
agendas. I underlined how prior regimes have, through privatisation and state control, 
sought to entrench exclusionary, protectionist and state-centred approaches to 
conservation in areas previously subject to effective communal property regimes. I 
furthermore stressed the need to recognise these communal property regimes, not as a 
relationship between man and thing, but rather as a social relation. I concluded by 
highlighting that although the concept of ‘the commons’ remains somewhat ambiguous 
and its regulation subject to continued debate, shifting conservation paradigms in the 
past twenty years have significantly altered the path of these debates which now largely 
focus on identifying necessary prerequisites for implementing effective communal 
property regimes aimed at conserving common-pool natural resources. It is this aspect 
of the broader commons puzzle and its relationship to protected areas, specifically 
terrestrial and statutory prescribed protected areas subject to communal property 
regimes, which form the focus of further enquiry.  
 
Regarding their form, I traversed the array of recent efforts to improve the 
understanding, planning for and recording of the diversity of protected areas that exist 
across the globe. I illustrated how the management categories contained in the IUCN 












are largely superfluous to the main enquiry. I furthermore sought to demonstrate that 
notwithstanding the importance of governance to the current enquiry, the governance 
types contained in the IUCN Management Guidelines (2008) are somewhat problematic 
due to their overlapping nature, confused use of terminology, rather narrow formulation 
of governance and potential to cloud the distinction between prescriptive management 
categories and descriptive governance types. As previously mentioned, significant work 
has gone into distilling many essential elements or characteristics of relevance to 
protected areas governance during the past decade. In this dissertation, I hope to 
contribute to the continuing investigation by scrutinising the packaging of these 
elements under four predefined governance types. To overcome ‘packaging’ problems, I 
accordingly proposed a revised approach to understanding the key issue of protected 
areas governance, one that seeks to identify the elements underpinning protected areas 
governance, rather than uncomfortably delimit governance types within pre-labelled 
boxes. 
 
In sum, the rationale for having undertaken the above analysis is three-fold. Firstly, it 
intends to circumscribe the meaning of several very anomalous terms of relevance to 
this enquiry, namely: the commons; common pool resources; communal property; 
protected areas; governance; and protected areas governance. Secondly, the analysis 
aims to clearly delimit the ambit of the general enquiry to terrestrial and statutory 
prescribed protected areas subject to communal property regimes. Thirdly, it hopes to 
provide the necessary context for the subsequent theoretical analysis on CCAs. It is to 
























Having criticised the underlying protected areas governance paradigm owing to the 
overlapping nature of its typology, confused use of terminology, narrow formulation of 
governance and potential to cloud the distinction between prescriptive management 
categories and descriptive governance types in the previous chapter, it would be 
imprudent to use its terminology. Furthermore, having criticised the underlying 
governance paradigm and its associated terminology, new terminology can be 
introduced. In particular, the proposed concept of ‘communally-conserved areas’ 
(CCAs) may aid in transcending the anomalies associated with the previous terminology 
and provide a more workable lens through which to describe, plan for and evaluate the 
exceedingly diverse efforts to conserve common-pool natural resources through 
communal property regimes. 
 
I now turn to questions such as the meaning of ‘communally-conserved areas’; how this 
concept differs from or relates to previously defined forms of governance; how 
significant shifts in economic, property rights, ecology, human rights and conservation 
discourses have contributed to their rise in prominence in the past decade; and finally, 
what general elements are relevant to their successful implementation? 
 
2. DEFINITIONAL ISSUES 
 
Prior to formulating a new definition, it is necessary to understand certain key concepts 












canvassed in Chapter 2 including: ‘commons’; ‘common-pool resources’; ‘common 
property’; ‘communal property’; ‘private property’; ‘state property’; ‘open-access 
regimes’; ‘protected areas’; ‘governance’; ‘protected areas governance’; ‘governance by 
government’; ‘private governance’; ‘shared governance’; ‘governance by indigenous 
peoples and local communities’; ‘indigenous peoples areas’; ‘community conserved 
areas’; ‘co-managed areas’; and ‘collaboratively managed protected areas’. These 
concepts do not need to be repeated here. There is however one broad concept which 
does require further attention, the notion of ‘communal’ or ‘communally’, as it underpins 
the subsequent definition of ‘communally-conserved area’. 
 
‘Communally’ is defined as ‘... shared or used in common by members of a group or 
community’.1 It is an exceedingly broad concept. It does not delimit the nature or scope 
of the object subject to the sharing or use. It does not delimit the proprietary regime 
governing the object subject to the sharing or use. It does not delimit the management 
institutions or rules that inform the sharing or use. It does not delimit the specific 
purpose or objective of such sharing or use save in two respects. First, the nature of 
such sharing or use must be ‘in common’ – ‘belonging to or shared by two or more 
individuals or by all members of a group’ and/or shared or used for the benefit ‘of the 
community at large’.2 Secondly, the common sharing or use must be by ‘members of a 
group or community’.3 Importantly, the concept clearly recognises sharing and use as 
integral components. 
 
The notion of a CCA logically inherits such traits. It encompasses protected areas 
established to conserve a broad array of common-pool natural resources (objects) 
including those situated in the terrestrial and marine context. It encompasses protected 
areas subject to a diverse array of proprietary regimes, both in respect to the form of 
tenure (custom, statutory, contractual, de facto) and nature of that tenure (full ownership 
                                                     
1 Allen R (ed) The New Penguin English Dictionary (2000) Penguin Books Ltd 278. 
2 Allen The New Penguin English Dictionary (2000) 277. See definition of ‘common’. 
3 ‘Group’ is defined as ‘…a number of people or things gathered together or regarded as forming a single 
unit…’ (Ibid 617). ‘Community’ is defined as ‘…(a) a group of people living in a particular area; (b) all the 
interacting populations of various living organisms in a particular areas; (c) a group of individuals with 
some common characteristic … (d) a body of people or nations having a common history or common 












rights or more limited rights relating to development, use, access and/or occupation). It 
encompasses protected areas subject to a diverse range of management institutions 
and rules both in respect of the basis of such management (custom, statutory, 
contractual, de facto) and the form of management (including co-management; joint 
management and transboundary management). It encompasses protected areas falling 
within the majority of the IUCN Management categories given the broad objects 
underlying their creation (save for those in which some form of communal access and 
use are precluded). The protected area must, however, be communal in nature to the 
extent that it (the land and the common-pool natural resources situated within its 
borders) must belong to or be shared by members of a ‘group’ or ‘community’, terms 
which themselves are broadly defined and would include indigenous peoples4 and local 
communities.5 
 
Being founded on the essential elements of governance that afford the area its 
communal nature – issues of tenure and management – the concept of a CCA traverses 
the artificial and anomalous divides created by the IUCN governance typology. It clearly 
includes various governance types identified in the IUCN Management Guidelines 
(2008), namely governance by indigenous peoples and local communities and shared 
governance. It however excludes others, namely governance by government and 
private governance, due to their non-communal nature. Therefore, based on the IUCN’s 
                                                     
4 ‘Indigenous peoples’ is defined in the ILO Convention 169 on Indigenous and Tribal Peoples in 
Independent Countries (1989) 28 ILM 1382 as including: ‘tribal peoples in indigenous countries whose 
social, cultural, and economic conditions distinguish them from other sections of the national community, 
and whose status is regulated wholly or partially by their own customs or traditions or by special laws or 
regulations; (and) peoples in independent countries who are regarded as indigenous on account of their 
descent from the populations which inhabited the country, or a geographical region to which the country 
belongs, at the time of conquest or colonialisation or the establishment of present state boundaries and 
who, irrespective of their legal status, retain some or all of their own social, economic, cultural and 
political institutions’ (Article 1). 
5 ‘Community’ is defined by Borrini-Feyerabend et al as ‘a human group sharing a territory and involved in 
different but related aspects of livelihoods - such as managing natural resources, producing knowledge 
and culture, and developing productive technologies and practices’; with ‘local community’ referring to 
those communities where members ‘are likely to have face-to-face encounters and/or direct mutual 
influences in their daily life’ (Borrini-Feyerabend G, Kothari A & Oviedo G Indigenous and Local 
Communities and Protected Areas: Towards Equity and Enhanced Conservation - Guidance on Policy 
and Practice for Co-Managed Protected Areas and Community Conserved Areas (2004) Best Practice 












most contemporary definition of protected areas,6 and drawing from contemporary 
definitions of those governance types feasibly falling within its ambit, a CCA could be 
defined as: 
 
‘a clearly defined geographical space, established, recognised, used and managed by 
indigenous peoples and local communities, themselves or in partnership with others, 
through legal or other effective means, to commonly achieve the enduring conservation 
of nature with associated ecosystem services and cultural values’. 
 
It is this definition of CCA on which I shall rely for the remainder of this dissertation. I 
have purposely omitted two words from the general IUCN definition of ‘protected area’, 
namely ‘dedicated’ and ‘long-term’. The former is superfluous as the sentiments 
associated with its inclusion can be inferred from other words such as ‘recognised’ and 
‘to...achieve’. I have omitted the latter owing to its association in the IUCN Management 
Guidelines (2008) with notions of perpetuity7 that, as I have previously mentioned, 
would render a significant portion of the established protected areas in South and 
Southern Africa a fictional nullity. I have accordingly replaced the word ‘long-term’ with 
‘enduring’ – affording the latter its ordinary meaning, ‘lasting or durable’,8 as opposed to 
perpetual. I have inserted the wording ‘... by indigenous peoples and local communities, 
themselves or in partnership with others ... to commonly...’ - to afford necessary 
recognition to their communal nature. I wish to reiterate that I do not seek to grapple 
here with all forms of CCAs falling under this definition, only those prescribed by statute 
and situated in the terrestrial environment. 
 
Receiving little attention some twenty years ago, CCAs are now the centre of protected 
areas scholars’ attention. Why is this so? The answer lies in shifting discourses 
prevalent in the scholarship of economists, property right theorists, human rights 
advocates, ecologists and conservationists. 
 
                                                     
6 Dudley N (ed) Guidelines for Applying Protected Area Management Categories (2008) IUCN Gland 8. 
7 Dudley Guidelines for Applying Protected Area Management Categories (2008) 9. 












3. IDEOLOGICAL SHIFTS WHICH HAVE FACILITATED THE RISE OF 
COMMUNALLY-CONSERVED AREAS 
 
As with the landscapes, ecosystems and species CCAs seek protect, the ideologies 
informing their protection, management and regulation are in a constant state of flux. 
The past two decades have witnessed, in the words of one commentator, a ‘tectonic 
shift’ from the conventional protectionist, exclusionary, state-centred approach to 
conservation towards a more inclusive, participatory, human-centred approach to 
conservation.9 Prior to grappling with the nature of this tectonic shift in any detail, and its 
practical manifestation through CCAs, it would appear prudent to reflect briefly on 
several relevant and related trends arising from several scholarly discourses that have 
contributed to it. These trends, several of which are now concretised in international 
instruments, are: the rise of indigenous peoples’ tenure and resource rights within the 
human rights discourse; the acknowledgment of sustainable use, access and benefit-
sharing imperatives within the conservation discourse; the recognition of systems-
thinking, adaptive management and participatory management within the ecological 
discourse; the acceptance of communal property regimes as effective forms of tenure 
for managing the common-pool natural resources within the economic and property 
rights discourse; and finally, the appreciation of the diversity of protected areas 







                                                     
9 Sanderson S & Bird S “The New Politics of Protected Areas” in Brandon K, Redford K & Sanderson S 
Parks in Peril (1998) The Nature Conservancy, Island Press Washington DC 441. See further: Nelson F & 
Agrawal A “Patronage or Participation? Community-based Natural Resource Management Reform in 
Sub-Saharan Africa” (2008) 39(4) Development and Change 557-585; Khotari A, Balasinorwala T, Jaireth 
H & Rahimzadeh A “Local Voices in Global Discussions: How Far Have International Conservation Policy 
and Practice Integrated Indigenous Peoples and Local Communities” (2008) Unpublished paper 
presented at Symposium on Sustaining Cultural and Biological Diversity in a Rapidly Changing World: 
Lessons for Global Policy, American Museum of Natural History, New York (April 2008) 1-3; and Brown K 













3.1 TRENDS CONTRIBUTING TO THE ‘TECTONIC SHIFT’  
 
3.1.1 Rise of Indigenous Peoples’ Tenure and Resource Rights 
 
The human rights discourse has had a significant influence on the conservation 
discourse through affording recognition to indigenous peoples’ tenure and resource 
rights. No longer can indigenous peoples be treated as the scourge of conservation; 
weak yet irritating and unnecessary annoyances able to be forcibly moved, constrained, 
silenced, or simply ignored in the interest of conservation. 
 
Finding its origins in the mid-twentieth Century following the end of World War 2, and 
first acknowledged in international human rights instruments such as Universal 
Declaration on Human Rights (1948) and the International Covenant on Economic, 
Social and Cultural Rights (1966),10 indigenous peoples and local communities had to 
wait some forty years for the first comprehensive global expression of their rights – in 
the form of the ILO Convention No.169 Concerning Indigenous and Tribal Peoples in 
Independent Countries (1989).11 Many of rights contained in the ILO Convention have 
subsequently been duplicated in the recent United Nations Declaration on the Rights of 
Indigenous Peoples (2007).12 These rights include the right of indigenous peoples: to 
'freely determine their political status and pursue their economic, social and cultural 
                                                     
10 The role of regional instruments such as the American Declaration on the Rights and Duties of Man 
(1948) and the American Convention on Human Rights (1969) in raising the international profile of 
indigenous peoples’ rights over land and natural resources is acknowledged. However, a full discussion 
of the numerous relevant policy documents emanating from the Inter-American Commission on Human 
Rights and the Inter-American Court on Human Rights falls outside the purview of this dissertation. See 
further in this regard: Inter-American Commission on Human Rights Indigenous and Tribal Peoples’ 
Rights Over Their Ancestral Lands and Natural Resources - Norms and Jurisprudence of the Inter-
American Human Rights System (2009) OEA/Ser.L/V/ii.Doc.56/09. 
11 The ILO Convention 169 on Indigenous and Tribal Peoples in Independent Countries (1989) 
specifically recognises their rights: to have their social, cultural, religious and spiritual values and 
practices recognised and protected (Article 5); to be consulted with and participate in decisions which 
may directly affect them (Article 6); to define their development priorities (Article 7); to own or possession 
land traditionally occupied by them (Article 14); to participate in the use, management and conservation of 
renewable and non-renewable natural resources (Article 15); and crucially not to be removed from the 
lands that they occupy and, if this is necessary as an exceptional measure, to relocate them only with 
their free and informed consent and with an assured right of return and proper compensation (Article 16). 
12 (2007) 46 ILM 1013. For a comprehensive analysis of the history and content of this Declaration, see: 
Allen S & Xanthaki A (eds) Reflections on the UN Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples (2011) 












development’;13 not to be forcibly removed from their lands and not to be relocated 
‘without their free, prior and informed consent’ and only ‘after agreement on just and fair 
compensation and, where possible, with the option of return’;14 ‘to participate in 
decision-making in matters which would affect their rights’;15 ‘to maintain and strengthen 
their distinctive spiritual relationship with their traditionally-owned or otherwise occupied 
and used lands, territories, waters and coastal seas and other resources’;16 ‘to own, 
use, develop and control the lands, territories and resources that they possess by 
reason of traditional ownership or other traditional occupation or use, as well as those 
which they have otherwise acquired’;17 ‘to redress, by means that can include restitution 
or, when this is not possible, just, fair and equitable compensation, for the lands, 
territories and resources which they have traditionally owned or otherwise occupied or 
used, and which have been confiscated, taken, occupied, used or damaged without 
their free, prior and informed consent’;18 to conserve and protect, with the state’s 
assistance, the ‘environment and the productive capacity of their lands or territories and 
resources’;19 and ‘to determine and develop priorities and strategies for the 
development or use of their lands or territories and other resources’.20 
 
Not to be outdone by their human rights counterparts, and no doubt particularly 
influenced by the sentiments reflected in the ILO Convention and draft texts of the 
United Nations Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples, international 
conservation organisations such as WWF, UNEP and the IUCN21 have for the past two 
decades been grappling with the link between conservation and indigenous peoples’ 
tenure and resource rights.22 Clearly reflected in the Caring for the Earth: A Strategy for 
                                                     
13 Article 3. 
14 Article 10. 
15 Article 18. 
16 Article 25. 
17 Article 26(2). 
18 Article 28(2). 
19 Article 29(1). 
20 Article 32(1). 
21 The work within the IUCN has largely been facilitated by its World Commission on Protected Areas 
(WCPA); and Commission on Environmental Economic and Social Policy’s (CEESP): Theme on 
Indigenous and Local Communities, Equity and Protected Areas; and Theme on Governance, Equity and 
Rights. 












Sustainable Living23 published in 1991, granted significant impetus through the inclusion 
of Article 8j24 in the Convention on Biological Diversity and the creation of the 
Progamme of Work on the Implementation of Article 8(j) and Related Provisions of the 
Convention on Biological Diversity,25 it took some ten years for the link to be clearly 
enunciated: first, in the IUCN Policy on Social Equity in Conservation and Sustainable 
Use;26 and secondly, in the Principles and Guidelines on Indigenous and Traditional 
Peoples and Protected Areas27 developed under auspices of IUCN and WWF. The 
latter document neatly summarise the concerns of indigenous peoples in relation to 
protected areas28 and expressly recognises that: protected areas will survive only if they 
                                                                                                                                                                           
Global Discussions” (2008) 1-7. 
23 Munro D & Holgate M (eds) Caring for the Earth: A Strategy for Sustainable Living (1991) IUCN, WWF 
& UNEP Gland. The document specifically urges all governments to encourage communities to debate 
their environmental priorities, develop local strategies and convert their strategies into action (Action 
Recommendation 7.5. at 57-63). 
24 Article 8j compels parties, as far to relevant and appropriate, and ‘subject to [their] national legislation, 
respect, preserve and maintain knowledge, innovations and practices of indigenous and local 
communities embodying traditional lifestyles relevant for the conservation and sustainable use of 
biological diversity and promote their wider application with the approval and involvement of the holders 
of such knowledge, innovations and practices and encourage the equitable sharing of the benefits arising 
from the utilization of such knowledge, innovations and practices’. 
25 Programme of Work on the Implementation of Article 8(j) and Related Provisions of the Convention on 
Biological Diversity (annexed to COP5 Decision V/16). See specifically Element 1 (Task 2) thereof, which 
requires parties to ‘develop appropriate mechanisms, guidelines, legislation or other initiatives to foster 
and promote the effective participation of indigenous and local communities in decision-making, policy 
planning and development and implementation of the conservation and sustainable use of biological 
diversity at international, regional, subregional, national and local levels, including access and benefit-
sharing and the designation and management of protected areas, taking into account the ecosystem 
approach’. 
26 IUCN Policy on Social Equity in Conservation and Sustainable Use (2000). It expressly recognises the 
social, economic and cultural rights of indigenous peoples including: their right to lands and territories and 
natural resources; the respect of their social and cultural identity, customs, traditions and institutions; their 
right to full and just participation in all conservation activities supported and implemented by the IUCN; 
their right to make their own decisions affecting their lands, territories and resources; and the need to 
promote equity within conservation, and a more balanced distribution of costs and benefits, access and 
control, and decision-making opportunities, over natural resources (at 4). 
27 Beltran J Indigenous and Traditional Peoples and Protected Areas: Principles, Guidelines and Case 
Studies (2000) Best Practice Protected Area Guidelines Series No.4, IUCN Gland. 
28 These concerns include the need to: effectively protect the ecological domains, as well as the people 
and cultures they contain, from external threats; recognise indigenous and other peoples’ rights to their 
lands, territories and resources; recognise their rights to control and co-manage these resources within 
protected areas; allow participation of traditional institutions in co-management arrangements; recognise 
the right of indigenous and other traditional peoples to determine their own development priorities - as 
long as these are compatible with protected areas objectives; declare protected areas only at their 
initiative, and/or with their free and prior informed consent; and incorporate sustainable use of natural 
resources using methods that maintain the integrity of the ecosystem and that have been used 













are seen to be of value, in the widest sense, to the nation as a whole and to local 
people in particular; the territorial and resource rights of indigenous and other traditional 
peoples inhabiting protected areas must be respected by promoting and allowing full 
participation in the co-management of resources, and in a way that would not affect or 
undermine the objectives for the protected areas as set out in its management plan; 
knowledge, innovations and practices of indigenous and other traditional peoples have 
much to contribute to the management of protected areas; and governments and 
protected area managers should incorporate customary and indigenous tenure and 
resource use, and control systems, as a means of enhancing biodiversity 
conservation.29 
 
The anticipated approach for overcoming these concerns is outlined in the five 
principles and their 22 underlying guidelines contained in Principles and Guidelines on 
Indigenous and Traditional Peoples and Protected Areas, which according to the 
document itself, jointly provide the basis upon which to develop partnerships between 
indigenous and other traditional peoples and protected area planners and managers.30 
The key principles in this regard are:31 
 
 Principle 1 – ‘Indigenous and other traditional peoples have long associations 
with nature and a deep understanding of it. Often they have made significant 
contributions to the maintenance of many of the earth’s most fragile ecosystems, 
through their traditional sustainable resource use practices and culture-based 
respect for nature. Therefore, there should be no inherent conflict between the 
objectives of protected areas and the existence, within and around their borders, 
of indigenous and other traditional peoples. Moreover, they should be recognised 
as rightful, equal partners in the development and implementation of 
conservation strategies that affect their lands, territories, waters, coastal seas, 
and other resources, and in particular in the establishment and management of 
protected areas’. 
                                                     
29 Beltrán Indigenous and Traditional Peoples and Protected Areas (2000) 4. 
30 Beltrán Indigenous and Traditional Peoples and Protected Areas (2000) x. 












 Principle 2 – ‘Agreements drawn up between conservation institutions, including 
protected area management agencies, and indigenous and other traditional 
peoples for the establishment and management of protected areas affecting their 
lands, territories, waters, coastal seas and other resources should be based on 
full respect for the rights of indigenous and other traditional peoples to traditional, 
sustainable use of their lands, territories, waters, coastal seas and other 
resources. At the same time, such agreements should be based on the 
recognition by indigenous and other traditional peoples of their responsibility to 
conserve biodiversity, ecological integrity and natural resources harboured in 
those protected areas’. 
 Principle 3 – ‘The principles of decentralisation, participation, transparency and 
accountability should be taken into account in all matters pertaining to the mutual 
interests of protected areas and indigenous and other traditional peoples.’ 
 Principle 4 – ‘Indigenous and other traditional peoples should be able to share 
fully and equitably in the benefits associated with protected areas, with due 
recognition to the rights of other legitimate stakeholders’. 
 
The distillation of the above principles and guidelines have provided significant impetus 
for the subsequent inclusion of elements of the new conservation ideology in the 
recommendations and outputs of the World Parks Congress (Durban) 2003,32 IUCN 
World Conservation Congr sses33 and the Convention on Biological Diversity’s 
Conferences of the Parties (COP).34 
                                                     
32 World Parks Congress (Durban, 2003) - Durban Accord; Durban Action Plan; WPC Message to the 
CBD; and WPC Recommendations (V.17 Recognising and Supporting a Diversity of Governance Types 
for Protected Areas; V.24 Indigenous Peoples and Protected Areas; V.25 Co-Management and Protected 
Areas; V.26 Community Conserved Areas; V.27 Mobile Indigenous Peoples and Conservation; V.29 
Poverty and Protected Areas). 
33 World Conservation Congress (Barcelona, 2008) - Resolution 4.47 Empowering Local Communities to 
Conserve and Manage Natural Resources in Africa; Resolution 4.48 Indigenous Peoples Protected Areas 
and Implementation of the Durban Accord; Resolution 4.49 Supporting Indigenous Conservation 
Territories and Other Indigenous Peoples and Community Conserved Areas; Resolution 4.52 
Implementing the UN Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples; Resolution 4.53 Mobile 
Indigenous Peoples and Biodiversity Conservation; Resolution 4.56 Rights-Based Approaches to 
Conservation; and Recommendation 4.127 Indigenous Peoples Rights in the Management of Protected 
Areas Fully or Partially in the Territories of Indigenous Peoples. World Conservation Congress (Bangkok, 
2004) - Resolution 3.15 Conserving Nature and Reducing Poverty by Linking Human Rights and 
Conservation; Resolution 3.18 Mobile Peoples and Conservation; Resolution 3.49 Community Conserved 













Originally focussing on affording indigenous peoples’ substantive and procedural rights, 
the resultant impact of the human rights discourse has been far broader. It has also 
contributed to the realisation that indigenous peoples can and do play a valuable role in 
conservation; conservation and use are not mutually exclusive; and, in accordance with 
the dictates of equity, indigenous peoples should share in the benefits and costs 
associated with conservation. 
 
3.1.2 Recognition of Sustainable Use, Access and Benefit-Sharing Imperatives  
 
Entrenched in the concept of ‘sustainable development’,35 and similarly brought to 
public notoriety at the United Nations Conference for Environment and Development 
held in Rio in 1992,36 international recognition of the notion of ‘sustainable use’ has 
propelled the tectonic shift.  Defined as the ‘use of components of biological diversity in 
a way and at a rate that does not lead to the long-term decline of biological diversity, 
                                                                                                                                                                           
World Conservation Congress (Amman, 2000) - Resolution 2.15 IUCN Collaborative Management for 
Conservation Programme; Resolution 2.29 IUCN Policy Statement on Sustainable Use of Wild Living 
Resources; and Recommendation 2.92 Indigenous Peoples, Sustainable Use of Natural Resources and 
International Trade. World Conservation Congress (Montreal, 1996) - Resolution 1.33 Conservation on 
Community and Privately Owned Land; Recommendation 1.42 Collaborative Management for 
Conservation; Resolution 1.49 Indigenous Peoples and the IUCN; Resolution 1.50 Indigenous Peoples, 
Intellectual Property Rights and Biological Diversity; and Resolution 1.53 Indigenous Peoples and 
Protected Areas. 
34 See, for example: COP 10 (Nagoya, 2010) Decision X/31 (Protected Areas) and Decision X/40 (Article 
8j and Related Provisions: Mechanisms to Promote the Effective Participation of Indigenous and Local 
Communities in the Work of the Convention); COP 9 (Bonn, 2008) Decision IX/13 (Article 8j and Related 
Provisions) and Decision IX/18 (Protected Areas); COP 8 (Curitiba, 2006) Decision VIII/5 (Article 8j and 
Related Provisions) and Decision VIII/24 (Protected Areas); and COP 7 (Kuala Lampur, 2004) Decision 
VII/16 (Article 8j and Related Provisions) and Decision VII/28 (Protected Areas). 
35 For a concise overview of the origin of the term ‘sustainable development’, see: Cordonier Segger M & 
Khalfan A Sustainable Development Law: Principles, Practices and Prospects (2004) Oxford University 
Press Oxford 15-23; and Marong A “From Rio to Johannesburg: Reflections on the Role of International 
Legal Norms in Sustainable Development” (2003) 16 (1) Georgetown International Environmental Law 
Review 22-29. The origin of the term is commonly identified as including: 1962 General Assembly 
Resolution on Economic Development and the Conservation of Nature (GA Resolution 
1831(XVII)UNGAOR 17th Session Supp No 17, UN Doc A/RES/1831 (XVII)(1962)); the Stockholm 
Declaration on the Human Environment (1972) 11 ILM 1461; the World Conservation Strategy (1980) 
IUCN, WWF, UNEP, FAO & UNESCO; and Our Common Futures (1987) Report of the World 
Commission on Environment and Development, United Nations. ‘Sustainable development’ is defined in 
Our Common Futures as ‘development which meets the needs of the present without compromising the 
ability of future generations to meet their own needs’. 
36 The notion of sustainable development underpins the two key outputs of this Conference, namely: the 
Rio Declaration and Agenda 21 (Rio Declaration on Environment and Development, Report of the United 












thereby maintaining its potential to meet the needs and aspirations of present and future 
generations’,37 it has compelled the realm of conservation to abandon its traditional 
belief that conservation and use are mutually exclusive, and that people are an 
obstruction to conservation. It has entrenched the recognition that whilst ‘resource use 
without resource management is non-sustainable’, equally any ‘attempt to establish 
resource management without resource use is likely to be futile’.38 No longer can 
society ‘frame conservation solutions as either “we touch it” or “we don’t touch it”’.39 It 
has furthermore highlighted the integral link between biodiversity, politics, economics 
and culture – specifically the feasibility of addressing poverty and livelihood security 
through enhancing the generation of conservation-related benefits to local people.40  
 
Permeating the entire tenor of the Convention on Biological Diversity,41 the concept of 
‘sustainable use’ is specifically articulated in Article 10 which requires parties, as far as 
possible and appropriate, to: ‘integrate consideration of conservation and sustainable 
use of biological resources into national decision-making’; and ‘protect and encourage 
customary use of biological resources in accordance with traditional cultural practices 
that are compatible with conservation or sustainable use requirements’. Given its central 
prominence, it is accordingly not surprising that the concept of sustainable use been 
recognised as a cross-cutting theme of the Convention on Biological Diversity,42 
permeated all subsequent decisions of its COPs,43 and significantly influenced the 
                                                     
37 Convention on Biological Diversity (1992) 31 ILM 818 (Article 2). 
38 Murphree M Communities as Resource Management Institutions (1992) Gatekeeper Series No.36, IIED 
London 12 
39 Steiner A “Critical Conservation - New Strategies for Engaging with Society” in Biodiversity Science and 
Governance: Proceedings of the International Conference (2005) Museum National d’Histoire Naturelle 
(Paris) 90. 
40 Kothari A “Protected Areas and People: The Future and the Past’ (2007) 17(2) Parks 23. 
41 References to ‘sustainable use’ are crucially found in: Article 1 (Objectives); Article 6 (General 
Measures for Conservation and Sustainable Use); Article 7 (Identification and Monitoring); Article 8 (In 
Situ Conservation); Article 10 (Sustainable Use of Components of Biological Diversity); Article 11 
(Incentive Measures); Article 12 (Research and Training); and Article 13 (Public Education and 
Awareness).  
42 COP 5 (Nairobi, 2000) Decision V/24 (Sustainable Use as a Cross-Cutting Theme). 
43 See for instance: COP 10 (Nagoya, 2010) Decision X/31 (Protected Areas) and Decision X/32 
(Sustainable Use); COP 7 (Kuala Lumpur, 2004) Decision VII/12 (Sustainable Use); COP 5 (Nairobi, 
2000) Decision VI/13 (Sustainable Use); COP 4 (Bratislava, 1998) Decision IV/4 (Status and Trends of 
the Biological Diversity of Inland Water Ecosystems and Options for Conservation and Sustainable Use); 
COP 3 (Buenos Aires, 1996) Decision III/9 (Implementation of Articles 6 and 8 of the Conservation); and 












resolutions and recommendations emanating from the IUCN’s World Conservation 
Congresses.44 
 
The prominence afforded to ‘sustainable use’ is integrally connected to four additional 
conceptual shifts inherent in the Convention on Biological Diversity, namely the 
recognition of:  the need to improve equitable access to natural resources by particularly 
indigenous and local communities; the value of and need to respect, preserve and 
maintain the knowledge, innovations and practices of indigenous and local 
communities; the need to promote the wider application of such knowledge, innovations 
and practices and involvement of the indigenous and local communities in conservation; 
and the necessity and equity in sharing the benefits arising from the use of such 
knowledge, innovations and practices with indigenous and local communities. These 
shifts are similarly reflected in the text of the Convention itself,45 and recent decisions 




                                                                                                                                                                           
important outputs of the recent COPs has been the adoption of the Nagoya Protocol on Access to 
Genetic Resources and the Fair and Equitable Sharing of Benefits Arising from their Utilisation and 
Benefit-Sharing (annexed to COP 10 (Nagoya, 2010) Decision X/1 (Access to Genetic Resources and the 
Fair and Equitable Sharing of Benefits Arising from their Utilization); and the Addis Ababa Principles and 
Guidelines for the Sustainable Use of Biodiversity (annexed to COP 7 (Kuala Lumpur, 2004) Decision 
VII/12). 
44 World Conservation Congress (Barcelona, 2008) - Resolution 4.13 Sustainable Use and Accountability; 
Resolution 4.39 Cross-Commission Collaboration on Sustainable Use of Biological Resources; 
Resolution 4.47 Empowering Local Communities to Conserve and Manage Natural Resources in Africa; 
Resolution 4.58 Conservation and Poverty Reduction; and Recommendation 4.127 Indigenous Peoples 
Rights in the Management of Protected Areas Fully or Partially in the Territories of Indigenous Peoples. 
World Conservation Congress (Bangkok, 2004) - Resolution 3.12 Governance of Natural Resources for 
Conservation and Sustainable Development; Resolution 3.14 Poverty Reduction, Food Security and 
Conservation; and Resolution 3.174 Implementing the Addis Ababa Principles and Guidelines for 
Sustainable Use of Biodiversity. World Conservation Congress (Amman, 2000) - Resolution 2.29 IUCN 
Policy Statement on Sustainable Use of Wild Living Resources; Resolution 2.36 Poverty Reduction and 
Conservation; and Resolution 2.92 Indigenous Peoples, Sustainable Use of Natural Resources. World 
Conservation Congress (Montreal 1996) - Resolution 1.39 Sustainable Use Initiative; Resolution 1.42 
Collaborative Management for Conservation; Resolution 1.50 Indigenous Peoples, Intellectual Property 
Rights and Biological Diversity. 
45 These shifts are evident in the following articles of the Convention on Biological Diversity (1992): Article 
1 (Objectives); Article 8 (In Situ Conservation); Article 10 (Sustainable Use of Components of Biological 
Diversity); and Article 15 (Access to Genetic Resources). 
46 See note 43 above. 












3.1.3 Systems Thinking, Participatory Management and Adaptive Management 
 
Conceptual shifts in ecological thinking have also contributed to the tectonic shift in 
conservation ideology. Four trends are discernible, namely: the shift from reductionism 
to systems thinking; the recognition of humans as integral components of ecosystems; 
the shift from an expert-based scientific approach to a multidisciplinary participatory 
approach to conservation; and the recognition of the principle of adaptive 
management.48  
 
For centuries, ecologists have sought to break down complex systems into their 
smallest components (an array of simple systems) in order to understand each of these 
components and ultimately the complex system as a whole. However, the growing 
realisation that complex ecological systems have a number of attributes which do not 
lend themselves to such analysis (such as non-linearity, uncertainty, emergence, scale 
and self-organisation) have compelled ecologists to rethink the merits of their 
reductionist thinking and adopt of a systems-thinking approach which seeks to analyse 
all components of the system simultaneously, recognizing the relationships between 
them and their attributes which defy reduction.49 This shift towards a systems-thinking 
approach has compelled conservationists to reconsider their understanding of 
ecological functioning, the processes which impact on it, and the shape and form of 
governance structures suitable for managing these impacts.  
 
                                                     
48 Several of these trends are reflected in decisions and recommendations emanating from the CBD 
COPs. See, for example: COP 9 (Bonn, 2008) Decision IX/7 (Ecosystems Approach); COP 5 (Nairobi, 
2000) Decision V/6 (Ecosystems Approach). They are further reflected in the decisions emanating from 
the IUCN World Conservation Congresses. See, for example: World Conservation Congress (Barcelona, 
2008) - Resolution 4.47 Empowering Local Communities to Conserve and Manage Natural Resources in 
Africa; World Conservation Congress (Amman, 2000) - Resolution 2.2 Integrating Ecosystem 
Management in the IUCN Programme; Resolution 2.15 IUCN Collaborative Management for 
Conservation Programme; Resolution 2.29 IUCN Policy Statement on Sustainable Use of Wild Living 
Resources; and Recommendation 2.92 Indigenous Peoples, Sustainable Use of Natural Resources and 
International Trade; and World Conservation Congress (Montreal, 1996) - Recommendation 1.42 
Collaborative Management for Conservation. 
49 Berkes F “Rethinking Community-Based Conservation” (2004) 18(3) Conservation Biology 622-623. 
See further: Brooks R, Jones R & Virginia R Law and Ecology: The Rise of the Ecosystems Regime 
(2002) Ashgate Publishing Ltd Aldershot; Levin S Fragile Dominium: Complexity and the Commons 
(1999) Perseus New York; and Gunderson l & Holling C Panarchy: Understanding Transformations in 












Allied to the above, is the trend to recognise humans as integral components of nature, 
and not as distinct elements to, or the masters of, it. Inherent in the notion of social-
ecological systems, and facilitated through the rise of transdisciplinary fields such as 
political ecology,50 it has transformed thinking about the appropriate modes and forms of 
natural resource governance, and raised interest in traditional and/or customary forms 
of governance which have sustained many social-ecological systems for centuries prior 
to the advent, or in many cases imposition, of western modes of conservation.51  
 
Environmental problems tend to be very complex and are inherently unsuitable for 
analysis through a conventional scientific approach that seeks to define the problem, 
collect the data, analyse the data and come to a decision on the basis of such 
analysis.52 They involve ‘wicked problems’, problems that are not easily resolved 
through conventional expert-based scientific enquiry as they are frequently shifting, 
require constant redefinition and are permeated with values and principles of equity and 
social justice.53 The above realisation has led ecologists to seek new approaches to 
understanding and describing the complexities inherent in social-ecological systems – 
placing greater reliance on what has been called ‘traditional ecological knowledge’ or 
‘fusion knowledge’ – knowledge generated through participatory interdisciplinary enquiry 
as opposed to through static expert-based scientific enquiry; knowledge which is 
‘neither strictly local or traditional, nor external or scientific’.54 In the realm of 
                                                     
50 Originating in the 1980’s, political ecology seeks to ‘analyse environmental or ecological conditions as 
the product of political and social processes, related at a number of nested scales from the local to the 
global’ (Adams W & Hutton J “People, Parks and Poverty: Political Ecology and Biodiversity 
Conservation” (2007) 5(2) Conservation and Society 148-149). See further: Bryant R & Bailey S Third 
World Political Ecology (1997) Routledge London. 
51 Berkes (2004) Conservation Biology, 623. See further: Berkes F & Folke C (eds) Linking Social and 
Ecological Systems: Management Practices and Social Mechanisms for Building Social Resilience (1998) 
Cambridge University Press Cambridge; and Berkes F, Colding J & Folke C (eds) Navigating Social 
Ecological Systems: Building Resilience for Complexity and Change (2003) Cambridge University Press 
Cambridge. 
52 Berkes (2004) Conservation Biology, 623-624. 
53 Rittel H & Webber M “Dilemmas in a General Theory of Planning” (1973) 4 Policy Sciences 155-169. 
See further: Jones M “Trying to Make Sense of it All: Dealing with the Complexities of Community-Based 
Natural Resource Management” in Mukamuri B, Manjengwa J & Anstey S (eds) Beyond Proprietorship: 
Murphree’s Laws on Community-Based Natural Resource Management in Southern Africa (2009) Weaver 
Press Harare 184-187; and Ludwig D “The Era of Management is Over” (2001) 4 Ecosystems 758-764. 
54 Brown (2003) Global Ecology & Biogeography 90; and Berkes (2004) Conservation Biology 623-625. 
For further information on traditional ecological knowledge, see: Berkes F, Colding J & Folke C 












conservation, this has altered the approach to distilling effective forms of natural 
resource governance, raised the profile of alternative forms of natural resource 
governance (including community-based conservation) and led to the inclusion of 
indigenous peoples’ and local communities’ practices, knowledge, interests and 
personnel in research enterprises.55 This approach is clearly reflected in the Convention 
on Biological Diversity’s Strategic Plan (2011-2020) and the Aichi Targets adopted at 
COP10 in Nagoya in 2010.56 
 
The final shift in ecological thinking relates to adaptive management, which is founded 
on the recognition that humans do not have sufficient understanding of social-ecological 
systems to accurately and predictably manage them; and that the imposition of 
predefined inflexible expert-based management solutions is accordingly an 
inappropriate conservation response.57 In contrast, adaptive management ‘formulates 
management policies as experiments that probe the responses of ecosystems as 
people’s behaviour in them changes’ and that it is through these experiments that 
humans can ‘learn something about the ecosystem’s processes and structures’ and 
‘seek to design better policies’ for managing them.58 It effectively amounts to ‘learning 
by doing’.59 Its rise in prominence in the ecological discourse has led to the evolution of 
associated concepts, crucially:  ‘adaptive co-management’, defined as ‘... a process by 
which institutional arrangements and ecological knowledge are tested and revised in 
                                                                                                                                                                           
Applications 1251-1262; and Berkes F Sacred Ecology: Traditional Ecological Knowledge and Resource 
Management (1999) Taylor & Francis Philadelphia. 
55 Berkes (2004) Conservation Biology 624-625. 
56 COP 10 (Nagoya, 2010) Decision X/2 (Strategic Plan for Biodiversity 2011-2020). See specifically 
Strategic Goal E (Enhance Implementation Through Participatory Planning, Knowledge Management and 
Capacity Building) which mandates parties by 2020, to respect the ‘traditional knowledge, innovations and 
practices of indigenous and local communities relevant for the conservation and sustainable use of 
biodiversity’ and promote the ‘full and effective participation of indigenous and local communities at all 
levels’ (Target 18). 
57 For further discussion on ‘adaptive management’, see: Oglethorpe J Adaptive Management: From 
Theory to Practice (2002) Sui Technical Series Vol. 3, IUCN Gland; Mclain R & Lee R “Adaptive 
Management: Promises and Pitfalls” (1996) 20(4) Environmental Management 437-448; Walters C 
Adaptive Management of Renewable Resources (1986) McGraw Hill New York; and Holling C (ed) 
Adaptive Environmental Assessment and Management (1978) Wiley London (reprinted by Blackburn 
Press in 2005). 
58 Lee K “Appraising Adaptive Management (1999) 3(2) Conservation Ecology, Article 3 (available online 
at http://www.ecologyandsociety.org/vol3/iss2/art3/). 
59 Berkes F, “Evolution of Co-Management: Role of Knowledge Generation, Bridging Organisations and 












dynamic, ongoing, self-organised process of trial-and-error’;60 and ‘adaptive co-
management systems’, defined as ‘flexible community-based systems of resource 
management tailored to specific places and situations and supported by, and working 
with, various organisations at different levels’.61  
 
Two essential traits inherent in adaptive management, and its offspring adaptive co-
management and adaptive co-managed systems, have significantly contributed to the 
tectonic shift in conservation ideology.62 First, its recognition that the inherent 
uncertainty and unpredictability in social-ecological systems requires the frequent re-
evaluation and adaptation of management solutions; management solutions that cannot 
simply be imposed from the top-down, but should rather be informed and generated 
from the bottom-up. Secondly, in its recognition of the merits of co-management, the 
fact that effective conservation frequently involves and requires collaborative 
governance between several institutions as opposed to centralised top-down state 
control. These traits, some commentators argue, are similarly inherent in, and 
perpetuated through, the increased reliance placed on traditional ecological knowledge 





                                                     
60 Folke C, Carpenter S, Elmqvist T, Gunderson L, Holling C, Walker B, Bengtsson J, Berkes F, Colding J, 
Danell K, Falkenmark M, Moberg F, Gordon L, Kaspersson R, Kautsky N, Kinzig A, Levin S, Mäler K, 
Ohlsson L, Olsson P, Ostrom E, Reid W, Rockström J, Savenije H & Svedin U Resilience and 
Sustainable Development: Building Adaptive Capacity in a World of Transformations (2002) Series on 
Science for Sustainable Development No.3, ICSU Paris 20. See further: Ruitenbeek J & Cartier C The 
Invisible Wand: Adaptive Co-Management as an Emergent Strategy in Complex Bio-Economic Systems 
(2001) Occasional Paper No.34, CIFR Bogor 8. The latter authors define ‘adaptive co-management’ as ‘a 
long-term management structure the permits stakeholders to share management responsibility and to 
learn from their actions’. 
61 Olsen P, Folke C & Berkes F “Adaptive Co-Management for Building Resilience in Social-Ecological 
Systems” (2004) Environmental Management 34(1) 75. See further: Folke C, Carpenter S, Elmqvist T, 
Gunderson L, Holling C & Walker B “Resilience and Sustainable Development: Building Adaptive 
Capacity in a World of Transformations" (2002) 31(5) Ambio 437-440. 
62 See Berkes (2009) Journal of Environmental Management 1698; Berkes (2004) Conservation Biology 
626; and Olsen et al (2004) Environmental Management 75. 












3.1.4 Appreciation that Communal Property Regimes are Effective Forms of Tenure for 
Managing the Natural Commons 
 
As comprehensively canvassed in Chapter 2, and accordingly not meriting repetition 
here, the past two decades have evidenced significant shifts in the scholarship of 
economists and property rights theorists as they have sought to deal with the aftermath 
of Hardin’s Tragedy of the Commons.64 Key recent trends in their discourse have 
included: the rejection of regulation and privatisation as the only solutions for conserving 
common-pool natural resources; the drawing of a clear distinction between open-access 
regimes and communal property regimes; the resultant recognition of communal 
property as a viable form of tenure for facilitating the conservation of common-pool 
natural resources; and the recent concentration on distilling the essential elements 
which contribute to, or undermine its ability to do so. 
 
The theoretical and empirical research underpinning the above shift in common’s 
scholarship has had a profound impact on the conservation discourse and is largely 
responsible for: debunking the conventional reliance on privatisation and state 
regulation as the only workable solutions for managing common-pool natural resources; 
raising the profile and potential of community-based conservation initiatives; and 
triggering an interest in different models of protected areas governance. 
 
3.1.5 Acknowledgement of the Diversity of Protected Areas Governance 
 
Similarly comprehensively canvassed in Chapter 2, the past decade of scholarship 
emanating from the realm of conservation, has been characterised by an increased 
focus on governance, particularly the diversity of governance options at play in the 
context of protected areas.65 Originating in the run-up to the World Parks Congress 
(2003) and culminating in the recent inclusion of governance types in the IUCN 
Management Guidelines (2008), this scholarship has led to the recognition of a diversity 
                                                     
64 See Chapter 2 (Part 2). 












of forms of protected governance, notably community conserved areas and co-
managed areas, which it is argued above fall neatly under the broader rubric of CCAs. 
 
As in the context of commons scholarship, the theoretical and empirical research 
surrounding the contemporary focus on governance has highlighted the merits of 
decentralisation, possible models for such decentralisation, and the key role indigenous 
peoples and local communities can play as both potential partners in government and 
private protected areas, and as custodians and managers in the own right through 
CCAs.66 
 
3.2 THE NATURE OF THE TECTONIC SHIFT 
 
The above five broad trends permeating the discourse of human rights advocates, 
economists, property rights theorists, ecologists and conservationists in the past twenty 
years have cumulatively compelled policy-makers to rethink the merits of their almost 
wholesale reliance on the conventional protectionist, exclusionary state-centred 
approach to conservation. So what were the fundamental elements of this approach and 
how did they manifest in protected areas. 
  
3.2.1 Conventional Protectionist, Exclusionary, State-Centred Approach 
 
For the majority of the nineteenth and twentieth century the dominant conservation 
ideology was largely protectionist, exclusionary and state-centred. This approach was 
founded on the belief that effective conservation required the exclusion of people and 
stringent centralised top-down state control. Human access to and use of natural 
resources subject to protection were viewed as diametrically opposed to the objects of 
conservation, and therefore rural communities residing adjacent to natural resources 
requiring conservation were viewed as ‘enemies’. Furthermore, rural development 
agendas and conservation agendas were viewed as mutually exclusive. 
 
                                                     












In the context of protected areas, the conventional approach was for governments to 
establish protected areas on state-owned land, or where this was unavailable, on other 
land they conveniently regarded as res nullius irrespective of the existence of customary 
communal proprietary rights of indigenous peoples and local communities over such 
land.67 The latter was the favoured approach of African colonialists with the result that 
many rural African communities were forcibly relocated and deprived access to the very 
natural resources they relied on for their physical, spiritual and cultural well-being.68  
 
The past two decades have, however, evidenced a significant shift in conservation 
ideology with scholars questioning the theoretical assumptions underpinning the 
conventional approach.69 Driven by continued disquiet on the part of disenfranchised 
rural communities, the heightened socio-economic challenges facing these communities 
                                                     
67 See generally: Buscher B & Whande W “Whims of the Winds of Time? Emerging Trends in Biodiversity 
Conservation and Protected Area Management” 2007 (5) Conservation and Society 22-43; Borrini-
Feyerabend et al Indigenous and Local Communities and Protected Areas (2004) 8-10; Summers R 
“Legal and Institutional Aspects of Community-Based Wildlife Conservation in South Africa, Zimbabwe 
and Namibia” (1999) Acta Juridica 188-210; and Munro D & Holgate M (eds) Caring for the Earth: A 
Strategy for Sustainable Living (1991) IUCN, WWF & UNEP Gland 57-63. 
68 See generally: Roe D & Nelson F “The Origins and Evolution of Community-Based Natural Resource 
Management in Africa” in Roe D, Nelson F & Sandbrook C (eds) Community Management of Natural 
Resources in Africa: Impacts, Experiences and Future Directions (2009) Natural Resource Issues No. 18, 
IIED London 5-6; Hoole A Lessons from the Equator Initiative: Common Property Perspectives for 
Community-Based Conservation in Southern Africa and Namibia (2007) IDRC, UNEP & University of 
Manitoba Winnipeg 1; Reid H, Fig D, Magome H & Leader-Williams N “Co-management of Contractual 
National Parks in South Africa: Lessons from Australia” (2004) 2 Conservation and Society 378; Adams 
W “Nature and the Colonial Mind” in Adams W & Mulligan M (eds) Decolonizing Nature: Strategies for 
Conservation in a Post-colonial Era (2003) Earthscan London 16-50; Plumwood V “Decolonizing 
Relationships with Nature” in Adams et al Decolonizing Nature (2003) 51-78; Fabricius C, Kock D & 
Magome H “Towards Strengthening Collaborative Ecosystem Management: Lessons from Environmental 
Conflict and Political Change in Southern Africa” (2001) 31(4) Journal of the Royal Society of New 
Zealand 832; Summers (1999) Acta Juridica 188; Kiss A (ed) Living with Wildlife: Wildlife Resource 
Management With Local Participation in Africa (1990) World Bank Technical Paper No.130 (Africa 
Technical Department Series) Washington 5; Anderson D & Grove R “Introduction: The Scramble for 
Eden: Past, Present and Future in African Conservation” in Anderson D & Grove R Conservation in 
Africa: People, Policies and Practice (1987) Cambridge University Press Newcastle Upon Tyne 7. 
69 These assumptions include: protected areas require strict protection; biodiversity is a moral imperative; 
conservation linked to development does not protect biodiversity; harmonious, ecologically friendly local 
communities are myths; and emergency situations require extreme measures. See generally: Hutton J, 
Adams W & Murombedzi J “Back to the Barriers? Changing Narratives in Biodiversity Conservation” 
(2005) 2 Forum for Development Studies 356-363; Wilhusen P, Brechin S, Fortwangler C & West P 
“Reinventing A Square Wheel: Critique of a Resurgent ‘Protection Paradigm’ in International Biodiversity 
Conservation” (2002) 15 Society and Natural Resources 19-35; and Adams W & Hulme D “Conservation 
and Community: Changing Narratives. Policies & Practices in African Conservation” in Hulme D & 
Murphree M (eds) African Wildlife and Livelihoods: The Promise and Performance of Community 












and the demise of many conventional protected areas, policy-makers have been 
compelled to rethink their ‘outdated and unrealistic’ ideology aimed at what one 
commentator refers to as the ‘total preservation of wildlife sanctuaries as some kind of 
glorified zoo’.70 
 
3.2.2 Contemporary Inclusive, Participatory, Human-Centred Approach 
 
In sharp contrast to the above, the contemporary conservation ideology affords 
conservation an ‘increasingly human form’71 and identifies the provision of benefits to, 
and attainment of the cooperation of, local communities as necessary prerequisites for 
effective conservation.72 It recognises that communities can, under the right 
circumstances, be effective institutions for resource management,73 and calls for ‘new, 
more ethical, forms of engagement with such communities’.74 It is accordingly integrally 
tied to concepts such as ‘community-based natural resource management’75 and/or 
‘community-based conservation’76 which have arisen from the scholarship surrounding 
the natural commons and its recognition of communal property, and the communities 
holding such land tenure, as viable and effective options and agents for conservation.77 
These concepts, which are frequently used interchangeably, envisage the possible co-
                                                     
70 Summers (1999) Acta Juridica 189. See further: Kothari (2007) Parks 24; and Berkes F “The 
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72 Summers (1999) Acta Juridica 189. 
73 Murphree Communities as Resource Management Institutions (1992) 12. 
74 Adams W & Mulligan M “Introduction” in Adams et al Decolonizing Nature (2003) 10. 
75 ‘Community-based natural resource management’ focuses of the ‘collective management of 
ecosystems to improve human well-being, and aims to ‘devolve authority for ecosystem management to 
the local (community) level, thereby empowering communities to manage their own resources without 
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Resource Management: Governing the Commons” (2007) 9(2) Water Policy 84). See further: Fabricius C 
“Conservation and Communities - Learning from Experience” in Palmer R, Timmermans H & Fay D (eds) 
From Conflict to Negotiation - Nature-Based Development on South Africa’s Wild Coast (2002) HSRC 
Press Pretoria 257. 
76 ‘Community-based conservation’ has been defined as ‘the coexistence of people and nature, as distinct 
from protectionism and the segregation of people and nature’ and as including ‘natural resources or 
biodiversity protection by, for, and with the local community’. See: Western D & Wright R “The 
Background to Community Based Conservation” in Western D, Wright & Strum S. (eds) Natural 
Connections: Perspectives in Community-Based Conservation (1994) Island Press Washington DC 7-8. 












existence of people and nature and are based on the idea that if conservation and 
development are simultaneously achieved, the interests of both can be served.78 
In the context of protected areas, this new ideology would appear to vary from its 
conventional counterpart in four main respects. First, it recognises that ‘(c)onservation is 
a positive concept embracing preservation, maintenance, sustainable utilization, 
restoration and enhancement of the natural environment’.79 It accordingly recognises 
the close connection, and not mutual exclusivity, of conservation and sustainable use, 
and the possibility of granting access and use rights to local communities over natural 
resources situated in protected areas.80  
 
Secondly, rather than seeking to conceal the political and socio-economic agendas 
frequently underlying or impacting on their conservation counterpart, it recognises that 
conservation is a ‘very political issue’,81 some would argue a ‘social and political 
process’;82 and that protected areas are frequently a ‘ olitical construct’.83 It accordingly 
advocates the proper disclosure and consideration of the broader political and socio-
economic context when formulating and implementing conservation policy, including 
that associated with the declaration and management of protected areas.84 According to 
Brechin et al,85 this should include a consideration of the following six key elements: 
human dignity;86 legitimacy;87 governance;88 accountability;89 adaptation and learning;90 
                                                     
78 Murphree M “Protected Areas and the Commons” (2002) Common Property Resource Digest 2. See 
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South Africa (1991) Oxford University Press Oxford. 
79 Makombe K Sharing the Land - Wildlife, People and Development in Africa (1994) Environmental Issue 
Series No.1, IUCN/ROSA Harare 4. 
80 Brown (2003) Global Ecology & Biogeography 89; and Summers (1999) Acta Juridica 191. 
81 Anderson et al “Introduction” in Anderson et al Conservation in Africa (1987) 6. 
82 Brechin S, Wilshusen P, Fortwangler C & West P “Beyond the Square Wheel: Toward a More 
Comprehensive Understanding of Biodiversity Conservation as a Social and Political Process” (2002) 15 
Society and Natural Resources 42-51. 
83 Sanderson et al “The New Politics of Protected Areas” in Brandon et al Parks in Peril (1998) 441. 
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Brandon et al Parks in Peril (1998) 415-439. 
85 These issues are highlighted in Brechin et al (2002) Society and Natural Resources 42-51. 
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and the impact of non-local forces on the conservation initiative.91  In so doing, it seeks 
to overcome the historic hostility frequently shown by local communities towards those 
protected areas established in a fictional political, social and economic vacuum; hostility 
which has often led to the wilful obstruction and ultimate demise of many protected 
areas in the past.92 
 
Thirdly, it emphasises the need to decentralise authority over protected areas, and the 
natural resources situated within them, to the local communities who depend on them 
for their very survival, as without such decentralisation, local communities have few 
incentives to collectively invest in natural resource management.93 It accordingly 
envisages collective governance and seeks to empower local communities, drawing on 
their localised knowledge and proximate location, to manage the resources on which 
they are dependent in a sustainable manner.94 It views local communities as potential 
‘adaptive co-managers’ as opposed to ‘powerless spectators’,95 partners which are able 
to both share the load of conventional conservation authorities and adapt their practices 
to changing ecological, social and economic conditions. In so doing, it seeks to 
                                                                                                                                                                           
participation; self-representation and self-determination). 
87 Affording recognition to legitimacy seeks to strengthen the agreements, institutional structure and rules 
underpinning the conservation initiative - essential in light of the fact that conservation frequently involves 
placing restrictions on peoples’ interests. 
88 Affording recognition to governance seeks to ensure the decision-making and power-sharing structures 
are tailored to suit the context of the conservation initiative. 
89 Affording recognition to accountability seeks to ensure that responsibilities in relation to the 
conservation initiative are clearly defined and that the requisite performance monitoring and reporting 
processes are in place. 
90 Affording recognition to adaptation and learning seeks to ensure constant reflection on the performance 
of the conservation initiative and the adaptation of it to suit changing circumstances. 
91 Affording recognition to non-local forces ensures that the scale of the conservation initiative is 
appropriate, and that the necessary measures and relationships are in place to mitigate the impacts of 
external forces on the conservation initiative. 
92 Hoole Lessons from the Equator Initiative (2007) 1; Agrawal A & Redford K Poverty, Development and 
Biodiversity Conservation: Shooting in the Dark (2006) Working Paper No.26, Wildlife Conservation 
Society New York 17; and Summers (1999) Acta Juridica 188. 
93 Fabricius et al (2007) Water Policy 84; Brown (2003) Global Ecology & Biogeography 89; Nelson et al 
(2008) Development and Change 558; Summers (1999) Acta Juridica 191; and McNeely J “Protected 
Areas and Human Ecology: How National Parks Can Contribute to Sustaining Societies of the Twenty-
First Century” in Western D & Pearl M (eds) Conservation for the Twenty-first Century (1992) Oxford 
University Press New York 156. 
94 Fabricius et al (2007) Water Policy 84. 
95 Fabricius C, Folke C, Cundill G & Schultz L “Powerless Spectators, Coping Actors and Adaptive Co-













overcome several of the problems associated with protected areas established under 
the conventional paradigm, such as: government capacity and resource constraints; 
overly bureaucratic and managerially distanced conservation authorities; a lack of 
knowledge of local ecological dynamics and the factors impacting on them; and a lack of 
local community support.96 
Finally, it adopts a market-based orientation that focuses on making protected areas not 
simply environmentally desirable but also economically feasible.97 In so doing, it 
recognises the link between conservation and development, and that the former can 
facilitate the latter, and the latter the former. It furthermore emphasises the need to 
create the necessary mechanisms and incentives for conservation to become an 
economically viable land-use and for local communities to contribute to and 
economically benefit from the establishment of protected areas.98 
 
3.3 AFTERMATH OF THE TECTONIC SHIFT 
 
Whilst the tectonic shift in conservation ideology has permeated global and domestic 
conservation and protected areas policy frameworks, its practical manifestation appears 
to have fallen short of expectation.99 This is expressly recognised in the latest In-Depth 
Review of the Implementation of the Programme of Work on Protected Areas,100 
undertaken under the auspices of the CBD Subsidiary Body on Scientific, Technical and 
Technological Advice, where it is stated that the implementation of Programme Element 
2 (Governance, Participation, Equity and Benefit-Sharing) is ‘way behind’ global and 
regional targets.101 
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Many jurisdictions, notably in Southern Africa, which have sought to give effect to the 
new conservation ideology through CCAs, have faced a myriad of problems often 
leading to the depletion of the very biodiversity they seek to conserve and/or the 
undermining of the livelihoods of the very communities they seek to improve.102 This 
has fuelled rich debate among scholars during the past ten years regarding the merits of 
the shift towards a more inclusive, participatory human-centred conservation paradigm. 
 
If one surveys these debates, there appear to be two main schools of thought. The first 
school, comprising of predominantly natural science scholars, argues for the return to 
the conventional exclusionary, state-centred protectionist approach owing to several 
apparent flawed assumptions underlying the contemporary human-centred approach.103 
The second school, comprising of predominantly social science scholars, supports 
continued reliance on a more inclusive, participatory human-centred approach and 
argue that whilst there may be problems with its practical implementation, these are but 
teething problems and insufficient to render the entire approach fatally flawed.104 Falling 
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within the second school of thought are those working tirelessly to highlight the many 
CCA success stories.105 
 
As should be evident from the concretisation of several elements of the new 
conservation ideology in the CBD, the decisions of its COP, and the resolutions and 
recommendations emanating from recent IUCN World Conservation Congresses and 
World Parks Congresses, the latter school of thought appears to have triumphed. As a 
result, contemporary scholarly debates fortunately focus less on the divides, and rather 
on examining the elements inherent in successful and unsuccessful efforts to implement 
the inclusive, participatory, human-centred approach within protected areas.106 It is to 
an analysis of these elements that I now turn; elements that theoretically facilitate the 
implementation of this contemporary approach through CCAs. 
 
4. ESSENTIAL ELEMENTS OF COMMUNALLY-CONSERVED AREAS 
 
Debates regarding the elements inherent in successful and unsuccessful efforts to 
implement a more inclusive, participatory and human-centred approach to conservation 
within protected areas have arisen from four different yet related discourses. These are 
the regulation of the natural commons through communal property regimes; the 
promotion of good-governance within protected areas, the regulation of co-managed (or 
otherwise known as collaboratively managed) protected areas; and the regulation of 
community (or otherwise known as indigenous people’s) protected areas. 
 
I purposely introduced a broad definition of CCAs. The definition seeks to traverse the 
somewhat arbitrary divide between these four discourses. In so doing, the elements 
identified in each becomes of relevance when seeking to distil a series of elements 
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underpinning the potential of CCAs to facilitate a more inclusive, participatory and 
human-centred approach to conservation within protected areas. Owing to the diversity 
of forms of CCAs, it is impossible to distil a comprehensive list applicable in every 
context. I have therefore sought to extract from the relevant literature the main elements 
that should underlie most forms of CCAs. For the purpose of analysis, I have divided 
these elements under the following main themes: types of communally-conserved 
areas; planning; consultation and negotiation; land tenure; declaration; institutions; 
management; access, use and benefit-sharing; and financing and support. As the scope 
of this dissertation is delimited to those forms of CCAs prescribed by statute, my 
analysis of these elements is similarly so circumscribed.  
 
4.1 TYPES OF COMMUNALLY-CONSERVED AREAS 
 
As I have argued in Part 2 above, CCAs are underpinned by communal land rights that 
differ in respect of their basis and form. Regarding their basis, communal land rights 
may stem from statute, contract, common law or custom. Regarding their form, they 
may entail full ownership, lease and other forms of limited real rights. CCAs are similarly 
subject to a diverse array of management regimes, both in respect of the basis of such 
management (custom, statutory, contractual, de facto) and the form of management 
(including co-management; joint management and transboundary management). 
Finally, CCAs are subject to a range of beneficiation regimes that may differ in respect 
of the basis of beneficiation (custom, statutory, contractual, de facto) and form of 
beneficiation (rights/benefits and responsibities/costs). This diversity needs to be 
recognised in any regime seeking to promote CCAs. A failure to do so may unduly 
preclude the ability of administrators and communities to fashion solutions best fitted to 
the specificity of the area and the often varying interests of relevant stakeholders. 
 
This diversity could be recognised in several ways. First, the statutory framework could 
provide for different categories of CCAs. These could include those identified in the 
IUCN Management Guidelines (2008), such as collaboratively managed areas, joint 












However, as I have argued in Chapter 2 above, I do not advocate such an approach. I 
rather propose the fashioning of a range of legal tools to enable communities to become 
involved in protected areas in varying capacities such as landowners, rights-holders, 
managers, co-managers, resource users and beneficiaries. Any statutory framework 
providing for CCAs should accordingly prescribe such tools. The legal mechanism 
underpinning the majority of these tools would be an agreement concluded between the 




The legal framework should empower both the government and/or relevant community 
to initiate the process to establish a CCA.108 Comprehensive planning underpins the 
success of all protected areas, including CCAs.109 Prior to their establishment, the 
area’s environmental, social, economic and political context needs to be fully 
understood.110 Relevant studies should be commissioned and distributed to 
stakeholders.111 Care should be taken in identifying these stakeholders given the 
diversity of formal and informal institutions with a potential interest in, or potentially 
affected by, the establishment of the area.112 These stakeholders could include: 
government authorities from all three spheres (fulfilling their conservation, land and 
socio-economic development mandates); local community representatives; traditional 
leaders; surrounding landowners; non-government organisations; and third parties with 
potential commercial interests in the area. Given that local communities are rarely 
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homogenous, clear distinctions need to be drawn between communal rights holders and 
other stakeholders, with the former receiving preference in the subsequent negotiation 
process.113 An additional contextual issue that needs to be understood are the different 
values, interests, concerns and motivations of these stakeholders for establishing the 
CCA.114 These may be of a conflicting nature and any approach that ‘downplays 
community differentiation’ and seeks to treat local communities as a homogenous unit 
are ‘inherently flawed’.115  
 
One contemporary mechanism recently finding favour in the international conservation 
discourse to specifically promote the formulation of a collective and unified community 
position in advance of subsequent negotiations with conservation authorities and third 
parties in the context of CCAs, is the adoption of internal agreements116 or community 
protocols.117 These effectively comprise statements by local communities of their 
‘intentions to self-determine their futures’ in respect of their land, natural resources and 
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4.3 CONSULTATION AND NEGOTIATION 
 
Such consultation and negotiation should be informed by the relevant factual context 
(articulated in the relevant studies) and based on the principles of equity, inclusivity, 
mutual respect, openness and transparency.119 They should accordingly be: ‘invited 
rather than imposed’; ‘directed rather than directive’; and ‘facilitative rather than 
manipulative’.120 All stakeholders should be duly represented during these negotiations 
and should reciprocally share relevant information and advice with one another.121 
Given the diversity of interests and issues at play, it is essential that the interests of 
expediency do not outweigh the value of protracted and rigorous consultation and 
negotiation. In other words, ‘the process is more important than the short-term 
product’;122 and it must be recognised that this process is never going to be ‘a quick 
job’.123 These negotiations are important in not only reaching consensus on the 
objectives for establishing the CCAs and the best form of governance for it, but also in: 
reconciling political and scientific imperatives; determining and building community 
identity; developing organisational and institutional capacity; improving communication; 
fostering human relationships and collaborative partnerships; and overcoming the trust 
deficit often prevalent between the relevant stakeholders.124 This trust deficit is not only 
present between government authorities and the relevant community, but also within the 
community itself, and between the community and its neighbouring communities.125 The 
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often highly politicised nature of these negotiations should furthermore be 
acknowledged. The negotiation process should accordingly provide necessary 
opportunities for conflicting interests to be aired and not seek to shroud these conflicting 
interests in overly technicist approaches to development planning.126 
 
The government must provide contextually specific capacity building to strengthen all 
stakeholders’ governance capacity, management capacity, legal capacity and 
accounting capacity to enable them to engage effectively in these negotiations.127 It 
must furthermore ensure that all stakeholders have the requisite financial resources to 
prepare for and participate equitably in these negotiations.128 These measures should 
seek to level the negotiation playing field and thereby promote the credibility of the 
outcome.129 The government must finally ensure that the cultural identity and rights of 
the communities to manage, use, access and benefit from the natural resources 
situated within the CCA are duly acknowledged during these negotiations and reflected 
in an appropriate form in the ultimate agreement.130  
 
During the consultation and negotiation process, due respect must be proffered to the 
traditional/indigenous institutions representing such communities and their decision-
making mechanisms and processes.131 As negotiations may reach an impasse, 
provision should be made for conflict resolution, preferably by way of readily accessible, 
low cost and locally situated mechanisms.132 These processes need to be available to 
resolve potential conflicts between government authorities and communities, between 
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constituent members of a community, and between neighbouring communities. 
Furthermore, given the extensive time and resources frequently invested in the 
consultation and negotiation process, it would be preferable for the resultant agreement 
to be of a satisfactory duration. An agreement of too short a duration may undermine 
the interests of long-term conservation, preclude substantial investments by the 
government and third parties with commercial interests, and engrain stakeholders in 
perpetual re-negotiations frequently fraught with political uncertainty.133 Provision should 
nonetheless be made for the periodic review and amendment of the agreement where 
necessary. Such flexibility and adaptability is essential given that the establishment of 
these areas frequently constitute ‘situations of social engagement, encounter and 
experimentation’.134 The resultant agreement should accordingly be regarded as a more 
of a ‘process than as a stable and definitive end point or product’.135 
 
The contents of the agreement should be consistent with the country’s broad 
conservation objectives as prescribed in relevant laws and policies.136 It should 
furthermore clarify the parties’ common objectives and commitment to establishing the 
area; their respective rights and obligations regarding managing, accessing and using 
the natural resources situated in the area; the anticipated land tenure and management 
regime; and the manner in which costs incurred and benefits derived from the area are 
equitably distributed between the parties.137 When determining such content, care must 
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4.4 LAND TENURE 
 
Communal land rights underpin CCAs. Their rise in prominence is frequently associated 
with local political activism and the recognition of indigenous people’s tenure and 
resource rights.139 Not surprisingly, establishing a CCA is in many jurisdictions 
associated with land reform initiatives seeking to afford communal land and resource 
rights to previously dispossessed communities. Secure communal tenure and genuine 
proprietorship of the natural resources situated in the area are frequently identified as 
necessary prerequisites for long enduring common-pool natural resource institutions140 
and CCAs.141 Secure tenure also theoretically enables the communities to adopt a long-
term approach to natural resource management.142 The rights and obligations that 
underlie such tenure must be clearly defined so as to avoid potential confusion and 
conflict.143 
 
Any land reforms seeking to promote communal tenure need to be carefully formulated. 
They need to give due recognition to the characteristics of pre-existing indigenous 
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communal tenure regimes which have for centuries promoted sustainable resource 
management in many areas. These characteristics include: ‘land and resource rights 
are directly embedded in a range of social relationship units’; these units are often 
‘multiple, overlapping and therefore “nested” or layered in character’; ‘rights are 
inclusive rather than exclusive in character, being shared and relative’; ‘rights are 
derived primarily from accepted membership of a social group’; ‘these rights are ‘both 
“communal” and “individual” in character’; ‘access to land (through defined rights) is 
distinct from control of land (through system of authority and administration)’; control is 
‘often located within a hierarchy of nested systems of authority, with many functions 
located at local or “lower” levels’; and ‘social, political and resource boundaries, while 
often relatively stable, are also flexible and negotiable to an important extent’.144 They 
furthermore need to acknowledge the potential pitfalls of replacing these regimes with 
westernised notions of land-titling, which are often inappropriate to deal with rural 
communal property contexts.145 
 
Conservation regimes (providing for the establishment of a CCA) and land reform 
regimes (providing for the restoration of communal land tenure and resource rights) are 
by their nature intertwined.146 The implementation of these two regimes, often 
administered by separate authorities, should therefore be aligned. There is clearly no 
point in conservation authorities initiating a process to declare or recognise a CCA 
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where the associated land reform process has not yet been initiated.147 Those tasked 
with formulating and administering these regimes need to recognise that communal land 
reform beneficiaries frequently hold different forms of tenure such as full ownership, 
lease and other limited real rights.148 Any successful CCA regime should recognise 
such diversity and provide a variety of tools to enable administrators and communities 
to tailor-make solutions best fitted to the nature of tenure rights held by the community. 
Finding such solutions may involve a complex web of authorities and take some time.149 
Provision may accordingly need to be made for interim management, access, use and 
benefit-sharing arrangements, pending the negotiation of formal agreements and/or the 




Having finalised the relevant agreements and land tenure arrangements, provision 
should be made for the formal declaration of the CCA. In the interests of openness and 
transparency, procedures should be put in place to ensure that all relevant stakeholders 
are properly informed of, and have an opportunity to participate in, the decision to 
establish a CCA.151 The procedures should as a minimum include the publication of a 
notice in the relevant national, provincial and/or local media inviting comment. The 
content of the notice should contain information on the location of the area, the purpose 
for establishing the area, the proposed governance option and the anticipated 
management authority.152 It should furthermore seek to clearly define the boundaries of 
the area as a whole, any access and resource use zones, and where several different 
authorities are afforded responsibility over different parts of the area, the boundaries of 
these decision-making units.153  
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Provision should be made for the submission of final comments by all relevant 
stakeholders.154 The nature and extent of comment forthcoming should provide a clear 
indication of the adequacy of the initial consultation and negotiation process. It therefore 
effectively operates as a safeguard to ensure that all stakeholders have been duly 
consulted and all stakeholder concerns duly considered. The initial agreement/s and 
declaration should be amended where necessary. Provision should thereafter be made 
for the formal declaration of the area by way of promulgation of a government notice. 
While this function would ordinarily lie with the national conservation authorities, it could 
be assigned or delegated to relevant provincial and municipal authorities where 
appropriate. The relevant statutory framework should also provide for the agreement/s 
to be registered against the title deeds of the properly to ensure its/their long-term 
protection.155 Similar processes should also be prescribed for de-proclaiming or altering 




A further key element is the need for representative, open and transparent institutions to 
oversee the CCA.157 The requisite statutory framework should accordingly provide for 
the establishment of such institutions and prescribe their composition, powers and 
functions. These institutions could be administrative in nature (responsible for managing 
the area) and/or advisory in nature (responsible for providing advice to the 
administrative agency). Where a range of institutions have a role to play in a single 
area, prescribing mechanisms for promoting coordination and cooperation between 
them is essential.158 
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Any regime which excludes community representation on these institutions and 
participation within their decision-making processes is unlikely to be sustainable.159 
Clear procedures should be prescribed to facilitate communication between community 
representatives and their constituency.160 Provision for the inclusion of traditional 
leaders, although often proving a difficult exercise, is an important element for ensuring 
the long-term success of such institutions.161 The nature of community representation 
will vary according to the nature of the institutions involved and the form of governance 
underpinning the CCA.162 Where the principal management function is assigned to a 
government authority, the inclusion of a degree of community representation in the 
decision-making structures of such an authority may suffice. Where some collaborative 
form of governance is anticipated, the community representation will ordinarily need to 
be far more extensive and the decision-making processes more clearly defined.163 This 
may entail the formation of co-management boards or similar institutions comprising of 
equal representation of government officials and community members. Where this is the 
case, it is valuable to note the following traits acknowledged as central to effective and 
sustainable co-management institutions: their form and membership should be 
negotiated not imposed; they operate optimally when they are ‘small, internally diverse, 
and fully accountable’; and the overarching regime should provide a fine balance 
between flexibility and clearly defined roles, responsibilities and decision-making 
processes.164 No matter what the governance option, the inclusion of community 
representation on relevant advisory institutions hold potential for providing a continued 
role for traditional authorities; ensuring that community interests remain central to 
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decision-making; and that relevant indigenous knowledge, customary law and traditional 
resource management practices are integrated into the area’s management regime. 
 
When forming these institutions, regard must be had to the nested, overlapping and 
frequently competing nature of communal resource rights and how these traits manifest 
in the often diverse institutions traditionally responsible for their administration.165 In 
many contexts, it may be problematic to coerce all relevant communal institutions to sit 
on one body where their interests are varied and competing or to effectively 
straightjacket communal institutions into predetermined standard ‘institutional types’.166 
It may be preferable to recognise issues of scale and divide these institutions into 
smaller decision-making units; assign them different functions; and provide mechanisms 
to enable them to interact with one another where necessary.167 When doing so, care 
must be taken to define the boundaries of these decision-making units clearly.168 
Furthermore, when selecting community members to participate in these decision-
making units or larger institutions, clear distinctions must be drawn again between 
communal rights holders and stakeholders, with the former receiving preference.169 
Where necessary, steps must be taken to ensure that community members are 
capacitated to enable them to actively participate in these institutions and that the 
communities’ internal governance structures are sufficiently robust and democratic to 
enable them to adapt to new internal and external pressures brought to bear on them.170 
Provision must be made to enable the composition and nature of these institutions to 
adapt to changing circumstances as communities, their environment and their needs 
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are infrequently static.171 As in the process leading up to their establishment, conflict-
resolution procedures should be prescribed to resolve conflicts both between 
conservation authorities and the communities, and between constituent parts of a 
community.172 Finally, in giving effect to the several principles of good governance for 
protected areas distilled during the course of the past five years,173 the decision-making 
processes adopted by all the above institutions must be based on the principles of 




As highlighted above, the form of management governing the CCA needs to be 
collaboratively determined and clearly defined.175 It may vary from sole management 
(by either the government or the community) to several forms of collaborative 
management (ordinarily between the government and the community or between 
several community institutions). Irrespective of the form of management, a management 
authority needs to be designated for the area and its powers and functions clearly 
delineated. The requisite legal framework should further provide for generally accepted 
management tools such as the preparation of management plans; the prescription of 
internal rules and zoning; and the imposition of monitoring and reporting obligations on 
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the management authority.176 Traditional knowledge and management practices should 
be acknowledged and integrated into the management regime where appropriate.177 
Efforts should furthermore be made to link or engrain the communities’ culture with the 
management regime,178 thereby affording recognition to, or promoting the development 
of, cross-cultural communal stewardship ethics.179 
 
When formulating the requisite management regime, care must be taken to ensure that 
the measures are locally relevant, realistic and verifiable.180 Provision should be made 
for them to be relatively flexible, thereby enabling them to respond to changing 
circumstances and needs.181 Adaptive management182 and ‘dynamic governance’183 are 
generally favoured to ‘straitjacket approaches’184 and narrow ‘packaged prescription’.185 
Such flexibility and adaptability could be achieved practically, f r example, by providing 
for the periodic review of a management plan, altering the composition of a 
management authority and even terminating a management authority’s mandate where 
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it fails to fulfil its obligations. Mechanisms promoting clear and frequent communication 
between all stakeholders should facilitate an adaptive management approach.186 
 
Decentralisation and the devolution of the management authority to the communal 
institutions is a frequently stated ideal.187 It must be remembered, however, that the 
allocation of ‘authority without responsibility is likely to be dysfunctional or obstructive’ 
and that similarly the allocation of ‘responsibility without authority lacks the necessary 
instrumental and motivational components for its efficient exercise’.188 The devolution of 
such authority and/or responsibility should ideally be to ‘nested sets’ of communal 
institutions at ‘different levels of scale’.189 Care must be taken to ensure that these 
communal institutions are suitably empowered, capacitated and supported; that such 
decentralisation does not lead to unnecessary fragmentation; and that the requisite 
safeguards are in place to ensure accountability and transparency.190 Given the 
capacity and resource constraints of many communities, collaborative forms of 
management are frequently favoured. These often comprise of some form of co-
management regime where authority for the management of the area is shared between 
one of more community and government authorities. It has been argued that the 
following four conditions are prerequisites for the success of this form of governance: 
the existence of appropriate institutions; the prevalence of trust between the respective 
parties; the recognition and protection of community rights of access and use; and the 
provision of economic incentives to those communal institutions partner to the co-
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management arrangement.191 Recent commentators have added the following to the 
list: pluralism; communication and negotiation; transactive decision-making; social 
learning; and shared action or commitment.192  
 
The majority of these elements similarly underpin the success or failure of CCAs in 
general. However, given that this form of governance involves distributing management 
across two or more institutions, it is imperative to provide clarity on the respective rights 
and obligations of the partner institutions.193 It is furthermore essential to clearly 
delineate the composition of the decision-making bodies (the number of representatives 
from each institution; the qualification criteria and the method for electing/appointing 
them) and the decision-making process (by consensus or majority vote).194 Finally, the 
need for real as proposed to fictional participation – true co peration as opposed to 
cooption and coercion – has been identified as an additional key to well-functioning co-
management regimes. 195  
 
4.8 ACCESS, USE AND BENEFIT-SHARING 
 
One of the central tenets of the contemporary approach to conservation is that seeking 
to promote resource management without simultaneously providing for resource use ‘is 
likely to be futile’.196 Any conservation regime that aims to exclude access and use 
rights, effectively promotes conservation at the expense of local communities, and may 
ultimately lead to a vicious circle of encroachment and unsustainable use.197 Provision 
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should ideally therefore be made in all CCA regimes for some form of access and use 
rights, and the equitable sharing of the benefits and costs associated with the area.198 
There should, where possible, be a direct correlation or congruence between 
inputs/costs and benefits; with differential inputs attracting differential benefits.199 When 
considering the potential benefits, care must be taken not to explore only the economic 
benefits such as prospective employment opportunities, gate fees and tourism 
concession levies. The notion of benefits should be more broadly defined and 
‘encompass the meaning of land, culture, social and symbolic relations’.200 In this 
sense, potential benefits would include rights of access for the purpose of small-scale 
agriculture, hunting, grazing, medicinal plant collection, and spiritual and cultural 
purposes; the formal recognition of traditional land and resource rights; and the ability to 
participate in decision-making.201 These benefits should preferably be agreed upon in 
advance and recorded in the agreement/s underpinning the CCA. In the interest of 
flexibility and adaptability, these benefits should similarly be the subject of temporal 
review and renegotiation.202 Measures also need to be put in place to ensure that 
access to the opportunities and benefits stemming from the CCA is transparent and not 
skewed in favour of well-placed local political elites.203 
 
4.9 FINANCING AND SUPPORT 
 
Following the establishment of the CCA, the government must assess whether those 
tasked with managing it have the requisite capacity, financing and support to do so.204 
Where capacity constraints are ascertained, contextually specific, appropriate, long-
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term and flexible capacity-building programmes should be implemented.205 These 
programmes should promote ‘learning-by-doing’ by all stakeholders, including 
government authorities.206 
 
These capacity-building initiatives will not alone ensure the sustainability of the CCA. 
They need to be accompanied by the provision of appropriate incentives and resources 
to encourage their formation and fund their management.207 Financing is a perpetual 
problem facing all forms of protected areas.208 By far the majority of protected areas are 
not financially self-sufficient and rely on external funding from foreign and domestic 
sources. This problem is often exacerbated in the context of CCAs, areas that are 
frequently tasked with fulfilling not only conservation objectives, but also simultaneously 
socio-economic imperatives. The government should therefore seek to create an 
enabling policy and legislative environment for implementing a broad array of tools for 
ensuring the financial sustainability of CCAs209 and providing opportunities for private 
sector investment.210 Those tools currently receiving international attention include:211 
economic incentives;212 environmental funds;213 debt-for-nature swaps;214 biodiversity 
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208 Emerton L, Bishop J & Thomas L Sustainable Financing of Protected Areas: A Global Review of 
Challenges and Options (2006) Best Practice Protected Areas Guidelines Series No.13, IUCN Gland 5-
15. 
209 Borrini-Feyerabend et al Community Conserved Areas: A Review of State and Needs (2008) 24; 
Kothari A “Community Conserved Areas” in Lockwood et al Managing Protected Areas - A Global Guide 
(2006) 571-572; and Beltran Indigenous and Traditional Peoples and Protected Areas (2000) 11. 
210 Cotula et al Securing the Commons in an Era of Privatisation (2005) 6. 
211For a full discussion of these tools see: Emerton et al Sustainable Financing of Protected (2006) 25-72; 
Lockwood M & Quintela C “Finance and Economics’ in Lockwood et al Managing Protected Areas - A 
Global Guide (2006) 331-337. 
212 Economic incentives seek (through the grant of tax rebates, reductions and exemptions) to encourage 
various activities such as: contracting land into protected areas; managing protected areas; and donating 
money or land to protected areas.  
213 Environmental funds are generally created by large once-off contributions from donor agencies and 
replenished from various sources such as private sector contributions, fiscal revenues and earnings from 
charges for goods and services in protected areas. The income from the fund is earmarked for spending 
on protected areas. 
214 Debt-for-nature swaps are a mechanism by which public debt is purchased at a discount by an outside 
agency (often an international NGO) and redeemed in exchange for government commitments to fund 












offset schemes;215 benefit-sharing and revenue-sharing schemes;216 contracting private 
investment;217 investment, credit and enterprise funds;218 resource extraction fees;219 
bio-prospecting charges;220 payments for ecosystem services;221 and most recently 
climate change incentive schemes given the general role played by protected areas in 
climate change mitigation and adaptation.222 The requisite safeguards must however be 
prescribed to ensure that funding directly allocated to CCAs is administered in an 
equitable and accountable manner; local communities do not entirely abandon their 
existing livelihoods; and that the above financing tools do not result in perverse 
outcomes.223 Care must also be taken to ensure that local communities are not subject 
to abuse by private investors when concluding any community-public-private 
partnerships. Several commentators sceptically view such schemes as a means by 
which the private sector secures, or effectively privatises, large tracts of natural 
                                                     
215 Biodiversity offsets are ‘…conservation actions intended to compensate for the residual, unavoidable 
harm to biodiversity caused by development projects, so as to ensure no net loss of biodiversity’ (Ten 
Kate K, Bishop J & Bayon R, Biodiversity Offsets: Views, Experience, and the Business Case (2004) 
IUCN Gland and Insight Investment London, 6). 
216 Benefit-sharing and revenue-sharing schemes take many different forms but are based on the premise 
that creating mechanisms to allow local communities to participate in and benefit financially from 
conservation will offset the local opportunity and other social costs associated with the establishment of 
protected areas. 
217 This involved contracting the management of protected areas to private groups, companies and 
individuals through commercial and lease agreements. 
218 Biodiversity enterprise funds are funds that provide long-term capital, typically combined with technical 
advice, to commercial ventures based on the conservation or sustainable use of biodiversity. These 
ventures are typically small-and-medium scale and engaged in activities that contribute to conservation 
such as: eco-tourism; sustainable forestry; and harvesting of wild food products. 
219 These would include fees for harvesting, processing and selling products derived from protected areas 
and can range from royalties and concession fees to large-scale extractive operations such as mining. 
220 The commercial potential of biological resources is on the rapid increase. Numerous of these 
resources are situated within the boundaries of protected areas and the use of up-front payments, 
royalties and profit-sharing agreements associated with any bio-prospecting could raise significant 
funding. 
221 Protected areas provide many ‘ecosystem services’ to people such as water filtration, resource 
generation and carbon sequestration. Systems of payment for these ecosystem services seek to create 
financial incentives for resource users to adopt voluntary activities and technologies that generate 
environmental goods. These can take the form of payments to private landowners who adopt low-impact 
land-uses to the sale of carbon credits on the international market. 
222 See further: Dudley N, Stolton S, Belokurov A, Krueger L, Lopoukhine N, MacKinnon K, Sandwith T & 
Sekhran N (eds) Natural Solutions: Protected Areas Helping People Cope with Climate Change (2010) 
IUCNWCPA, TNC, UNDP, WCS, World Bank & WWF; Gland, Switzerland, Washington DC & New York, 
78-86. 
223 Cross-Sectoral Commons Governance In Southern Africa Project Commons Governance in Southern 
Africa (2009) 2-3; Borrini-Feyerabend et al Recognising and Supporting Indigenous and Community 
Conservation (2008) 25-26; and Borrini-Feyerabend et al Community Conserved Areas: A Review of 












resources, levering control from the very local communities dependent on them for their 
livelihood.224 
 
Financial support is but one form of support and frequently the non-financial benefits for 
communities are more significant.225  The government could consider supplementing 
the above measures with several non-financial forms of support. First, it could initiate 
publicity campaigns to assist local communities to gain social recognition through 
raising general public awareness of their rights, values and practices; and highlighting 
the valuable role they play in natural resource management.226 Secondly, it could take 
measures to strengthen the cultural identity of local communities.227 Thirdly, it could 
assist communities in strengthening their communal property institutions and traditional 





Within this chapter I sought to introduce and define the concept of CCAs. I proposed 
that this concept provides a more workable lens than the IUCN protected area 
governance paradigm, through which to describe, plan for and evaluate the exceedingly 
diverse efforts to conserve common-pool natural resources through communal property 
regimes. I further surveyed the trends inherent in recent economic, property rights, 
ecology, human rights and protected areas dialogues which have contributed to the 
tectonic shift in conservation ideology – a shift from conventional protectionist, 
exclusionary, state-centred approaches to contemporary inclusive, participatory, 
human-centred approaches. I illustrated how this shift has led to the rise in prominence 
of CCAs and how current debates focus less on the merits of the conventional versus 
                                                     
224 Spierenburg et al (2008) Conservation & Society 89-90; Fakir S Globalisation and its Influence on 
Poverty and Environment (2004) Policy Think Tank Series No.17, IUCN-ROSA Harare; and Dzingirai V 
“The New Scramble for the African Countryside” (2003) 34(2) Development & Change 243-263. 
225 Fabricius et al (2001) Journal of the Royal Society of New Zealand 838. 
226 Borrini-Feyerabend et al Indigenous and Local Communities and Protected Areas (2004) 75-76; and 
Beltran Indigenous and Traditional Peoples and Protected Areas (2000) 11 
227 Borrini-Feyerabend et al Indigenous and Local Communities and Protected Areas (2004) 84-87. 












contemporary approach, and more on the elements that promote its successful 
implementation. I thereafter drew from relevant discourses to distil a series of elements 
that I argue should underpin any regime seeking to provide for CCAs. I arranged these 
elements under a series of themes, namely: types of CCAs; land tenure; planning; 
consultation, negotiation and declaration; institutions; management; access, use and 
benefit-sharing; and financing and support.  
 
Having defined the concept of CCAs and having distilled the elements that theoretically 
underlie their successful implementation, I am now in a position to initiate my evaluation 
of the extent to which South Africa’s legal framework provides for their use as a tool for 

















Having distilled the objective, nature and form of communally-conserved areas in Part I of the 
dissertation, Part II considers the manner in which South Africa’s legal framework provides for 
their domestic introduction. This is no simple task. The requisite domestic legal framework sits 
somewhat uncomfortably between two legal domains, namely conservation and land reform, 
which have both undergone significant transformation in the past decade or so. Numerous 
different institutions oversee the administration of these legal domains. Their actions are in turn 
informed by a diverse array of domestic policies and programmes. Furthermore, overarching 
these two legal domains is South Africa’s comprehensive constitutional dispensation. It provided 
the mandate for, and framework within which, the contemporary conservation and land reform 
legislation was formulated and is implemented. Part II is divided into four chapters. 
Commencing from the broadest perspective, Chapter 4 (titled South Africa’s Constitutional 
Regime of Relevance to Communally-Conserved Areas) examines South Africa’s constitutional 
dispensation, specifically the relevant constitutional rights it grants citizens and the relevant 
competences it affords the different spheres of government to make and administer laws of 
relevance to communally-conserved areas. Chapter 5 (titled South Africa’s Conservation 
Regime of Relevance to Communally-Conserved Areas) considers South Africa’s conservation 
laws, policies and institutions that respectively inform, provide for and administer communally-
conserved areas. Chapter 6 (titled South Africa’s Land Reform Regime of Relevance to 
Communally-Conserved Areas) comprises of a similar examination of the domestic laws, 
policies and institutions at play in South Africa’s land reform regime. Integrated within both 
Chapter 5 and Chapter 6, is a critical analysis of the factors which have shaped South Africa’s 
contemporary conservation and land reform regimes, and which have similarly influenced the 
domestic implementation of communally-conserved areas. Chapter 7 (titled Linking South 
Africa’s Conservation and Land Reform Regimes) concludes this part of the dissertation by 
surveying recent domestic efforts in the context of communally-conserved areas to traverse the 

















SOUTH AFRICA’S CONSTITUTIONAL REGIME OF 





The Constitution of the Republic of South Africa1 (the Constitution) is the supreme law 
of South Africa, to which all law and conduct is subject.2 To the extent that any law or 
conduct is inconsistent with the Constitution, it is invalid.3 From the perspective of 
communally-conserved areas (CCAs), the Constitution is significant for the following 
three main reasons. First, it elevates an array of concerns to the status of fundamental 
human rights. The most relevant of these concerns in the context of CCAs are the 
environment, property, administrative justice, access to information and access to 
justice. Secondly, it confirms the standing of customary law and institutions in South 
Africa’s legal dispensation. Thirdly, it prescribes the competence of the different spheres 
of government (national, provincial and local) to make and administer laws of relevance 
to CCAs. While a comprehensive examination of these three issues falls outside the 
ambit of this dissertation, they do warrant a brief consideration as they have provided 
the impetus and foundation for a diverse array of domestic laws, plans and programmes 
which have arisen in the past two decades of direct relevance to CCAs. 
 
2. CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHTS 
 
2.1 ENVIRONMENTAL RIGHT 
 
Perhaps the most significant step in the development of South Africa’s contemporary 
environmental regime, and therefore its conservation regime, has been the inclusion of 
                                                     
1 Constitution of the Republic of South Africa, 1996. 
2 Section 2. 












an environmental right in the Bill of Rights chapter of the Constitution.4 Section 24 
provides that: 
 
 ‘Everyone has the right –  
(a) to an environment that is not harmful to their health or well-being; and 
(b) to have the environment protected, for the benefit of present and future 
generations, through reasonable legislative and other measures that – 
(i) prevent pollution and ecological degradation; 
(ii) promote conservation; and 
(iii) secure ecologically sustainable development and use of natural 
resources while promoting justifiable economic and social development.’ 
 
While the grant in section 24(a) of a classic first generation right to all citizens is 
noteworthy and has significantly raised the status of environmental issues in South 
Africa, it is the second part of the environmental right enshrined in section 24(b) which is 
probably of more significance in the context of CCAs. It imposes a duty on the 
Government to, amongst other things, ‘promote conservation’ and ‘secure ecologically 
sustainable development and use of natural resources while promoting justifiable 
economic and social development’. Clearly evident in these sentiments are elements of 
the tectonic shift in the conservation discourse discussed in Chapter 3 above. These 
include recognition of both ‘conservation’ and ‘sustainable use’ as integral and mutually 
supportive components of any environmental regime; and the acknowledgment of the 
socio-economic context within which these ideals should be promoted and secured. 
                                                     
4 For a general discussion on the environmental right, see: Feris L “Constitutional Rights and Locus 
Standi” in Paterson A & Kotze L (eds) Environmental Compliance and Enforcement in South Africa (2009) 
Juta & Co Ltd Cape Town 129-151; Feris L “Constitutional Environmental Rights: An Underutilised 
Resource” (2008) (24(1) South African Journal on Human Rights 29-49; Glazewski J “The Environmental 
Right” in Cheadle H, Davis D & Haysom N South African Constitutional Law: The Bill of Rights (2nd Ed) 
(2005) Butterworths Durban 19(1)-19(30); Glazewski J Environmental Law in South Africa (2nd Ed) (2005) 
Lexis Nexis Butterworths Cape Town 65-102; Winstanley T “Entrenching Environmental Protection in the 
New Constitution” (1995) South African Journal of Environmental Law & Policy 85-97. The pre-eminence 
of the environmental right has similarly been recognised by the judiciary in several cases, including: Fuel 
Retailers Association of Southern Africa v Director-General: Environmental Management, Department of 
Agriculture, Conservation and the Environment, Mpumalanga Province 2007 (6) SA 4 (CC); MEC for 
Agriculture v Sasol Oil (Pty) Ltd 2006 (5) SA 483 (SCA); BP Southern Africa (Pty) Ltd v MEC for 
Agriculture, Conservation, Environment and Land Affairs 2004 (5) SA 124 (WLD); The Director: Mineral 
Development, Gauteng Region v Save the Vaal Environment 1999 (2) SA 709 SCA; and Minister of 













Heeding this duty, South Africa’s national environmental authorities have recently 
overhauled the nation’s protected areas and biodiversity regimes through the 
promulgation of the National Environmental Management: Protected Areas Act5 and the 
National Environmental Management: Biodiversity Act.6 Several provincial authorities 
have followed suit and promulgated new conservation laws.7 These contemporary 
national and provincial conservation regimes provide the statutory framework for the 
domestic establishment, management and regulation of CCAs. 
 
The interventions of national and provincial conservation authorities have not however 
been limited to the statutory context. Owing to the breadth of their constitutional duty to 
include ‘reasonable legislative and other measures’, national and provincial authorities 
have also introduced a number of policies, plans and programmes relevant to CCAs. 
These include in chronological order: Guidelines for the Implementation of Community-
Based Natural Resource Management in South Africa;8 Stewardship Programmes;9 the 
People and Parks Programme;10 National Biodiversity Strategy and Action Plan;11 the 
National Protected Areas Expansion Strategy;12 and the National Co-Management 
Framework.13 The manner in which these laws, policies, plans and programmes provide 
for and facilitate the domestic implementation of CCAs in South Africa is considered in 
detail in Chapter 5 (Part 3.2) below. 
 
                                                     
5 Act 57 of 2003. 
6 Act 10 of 2004. 
7 These provincial laws include: Provincial Parks Board Act (Eastern Cape) (12 of 2003); Limpopo 
Environmental Management Act (7 of 2003); Limpopo Tourism and Parks Board Act (8 of 2001); 
Mpumalanga Nature Conservation Act (10 of 1998); Kwazulu-Natal Nature Conservation Management 
Act (9 of 1997); Mpumalanga Parks Board Act (6 of 1995). 
8 Department of Environmental Affairs and Tourism Guidelines for the Implementation of Community-
Based Natural Resource Management (CBNRM) in South Africa (2003). For a discussion of these 
Guidelines, see: Chapter 5 (Part 3.2.1). 
9 For a discussion of these Progammes, see: Chapter 5 (Part 3.2.2). 
10 For a discussion of this Programme, see: Chapter 5 (Part 3.2.3). 
11 Department of Environmental Affairs and Tourism South Africa’s National Biodiversity Strategy and 
Action Plan (2005). For a discussion of this Strategy, see: Chapter 5 (Part 3.2.5). 
12 Government of South Africa National Protected Areas Expansion Strategy for South Africa 2008 
(2009). For a discussion of this Strategy, see: Chapter 5 (Part 3.2.6). 
13 Department of Environmental Affairs National Co-Management Framework (2010). For a discussion of 












2.2 PROPERTY CLAUSE 
 
As the environmental right has been central in shaping the country’s conservation 
regime, the inclusion of a property right in the Constitution could similarly be argued to 
be the most significant step in the development of South Africa’s contemporary land 
regime.14 Whilst not affording citizens a positive right to property, section 25 provides for 
both the deprivation15 and expropriation16 of property. The meaning of ‘property’ is ‘not 
limited to land’17 and therefore in the context of CCAs, crucially includes limited real 
rights in property such as rights of access and use. 
 
It is however the provisions in the latter half of the property clause which are most 
relevant to recent reforms in the domestic communal land tenure regime, and 
accordingly to CCAs. Section 25(5) places a duty on the Government to ‘take 
reasonable legislative and other measures, within its available resources, to foster 
conditions which enable citizens to gain access to land on an equitable basis’. Section 
25(6) entitles any person or community whose ‘tenure of land is legally insecure as a 
result of past racially discriminatory law or practices’ to secure legal tenure or 
‘comparable redress’. Finally section 25(7), read together with section 25(8), entitles 
any person or community dispossessed of property after 19 June 1913 through ‘past 
racially discriminatory laws and practices’ to the restitution of such property or to 
‘equitable redress’; and furthermore enables the Government to take ‘legislative and 
other measures ... to achieve reform, in order to redress the results of past racial 
discrimination’. These three aspects of the property right respectively provide the 
                                                     
14 See generally: Van der Walt A Constitutional Property Law (2005) Juta & Co Ltd Cape Town; Roux T & 
Davis D “Property” in Cheadle et al South African Constitutional Law (2nd Ed) (2005) 20(1)-20(28); Roux T 
“Property” in Woolman S, Roux T & Bishop M (eds) Constitutional Law of South Africa (2nd Ed) (2002) 
Juta & Co Ltd Cape Town 46(1)-46(37); and Mostert H & Badenhorst P “Property and the Bill of Rights” in 
Bill of Rights Compendium (1996) 3FB1-3FB124. 
15 Section 25(1) provides that, ‘No one may be deprived of property except in terms of a law of general 
application, and no such law may permit the arbitrary deprivation of property’. 
16 Section 25(2) provides for the expropriation of property ‘in terms of a law of general application: (a) for 
a public purpose or in the public interest; and (b) subject to compensation...’. Such compensation must be 
‘just and equitable’ and the factors for determining what is ‘just and equitable’ are set out in section 25(3). 












constitutional foundation for the three main components of South Africa’s land reform 
programme, namely: land redistribution; land tenure reform; and land restitution.18  
 
Heeding their constitutional duty to provide the requisite legal framework for 
implementing this programme, the national authorities have promulgated a diverse array 
of laws in the past couple of decades, the most important of which include in 
chronological order: Land Titles Adjustment Act;19 Provision of Land and Assistance 
Act;20 Restitution of Land Rights Act;21 Land Administration Act;22 Communal Property 
Association Act;23 Interim Protection of Informal Land Rights Act;24 Extension of 
Security of Tenure Act;25 Transformation of Certain Rural Areas Act;26 and Communal 
Land Rights Act.27 The relevance of these programmes and laws to the domestic 
implementation of CCAs is considered in detail in Chapter 6 bel w. 
 
2.3 OTHER RELEVANT RIGHTS 
 
Several additional rights are of tangential relevance to CCAs. The promotion of open 
and accountable governance relating to their establishment and management is 
facilitated through the inclusion of a right of access to information and a right to just 
administrative action. Provision for the resolution of disputes relating to their 
establishment and management is guaranteed through the grant of liberal legal standing 
and a right of access to the courts. 
 
Section 32 affords everyone a right of access to information held by the Government 
and information that is held by any other person which is required for the exercise or 
                                                     
18 For a discussion of this programme, and the laws and policies that have been implemented to give 
effect to it, see: Chapter 6. 
19 Act 111 of 1993. 
20 Act 126 of 1993. 
21 Act 22 of 1994. 
22 Act 2 of 1995. 
23 Act 28 of 1996. 
24 Act 31 of 1996. 
25 Act 62 of 1997. 
26 Act 94 of 1998. 












protection of any constitutional right.28 In compliance with its constitutional obligation to 
introduce national legislation to give effect to the right,29 the Government has 
promulgated the Promotion of Access to Information Act30 that regulates access to 
information held by both ‘public bodies’31 and ‘private bodies’.32 It imposes strict 
obligations on these bodies to provide access to certain types of information held by 
them and prescribes detailed access procedures.33 Both public and private bodies must 
generally give the public access to information held by them unless it falls within one of 
the prescribed grounds of refusal.34 Cumulatively, the above regime affords 
communities and authorities the means to obtain information from each other of 
relevance to the establishment and management of CCAs. 
 
Section 33 grants everyone a right to ‘administrative action’35 that is ‘lawful, reasonable 
and procedurally fair’.36 It also affords anyone whose rights have been adversely 
affected by administrative action, the right to written reasons.37 This right has been 
codified in the Promotion of Administrative Justice Act.38 It prescribes detailed 
provisions regarding what constitutes procedurally fair administrative action,39 the 
                                                     
28 Section 32. See generally: Davis D “Access to Information” in Cheadle et al South African 
Constitutional Law (2nd Ed) (2005) 26(1)-26(14); and Rautenbach I “Introduction to the Bill of Rights” in 
Bill of Rights Compendium (1996) 1A78. 
29 Section 32(2).  
30 2 of 2000. 
31 ‘Public bodies’ are defined as national, provincial and local government departments and other 
authorities undertaking public functions or exercising public power (section 1). 
32 ‘Private bodies’ are defined as natural or juristic persons not undertaking public functions or exercising 
public power (section 1). 
33 See sections 14-32 (relating to public bodies) and sections 51-61 (relating to private bodies). 
34 The grounds for refusing access to information held by public bodies and private bodies are prescribed 
in sections 33-46 and sections 62-70 respectively, and include: protecting the privacy of a third party; 
protecting commercial or confidential information; protecting the safety of individuals; protecting privileged 
information; and protecting information relating to defence, security and international relations.   
35 ‘Administrative action’ is broadly defined in the Promotion of Administrative Justice Act (2 of 2000) as 
‘…any decision taken, or any failure to take a decision’ by:  (a) an organ of state exercising a power or 
performing a function in terms of the Constitution, a provincial constitution or any legislation; and (b) a 
natural or juristic person when exercising a public power or performing a public function in terms of an 
empowering provision – which adversely affects the rights of any person and which has a direct, external 
legal effect’ (section 1). 
36 Section 33(1). See generally: Corder H “Administrative Justice” in Cheadle et al South African 
Constitutional Law (2nd Ed) (2005) 27(1)-27(26); and Rautenbach I “Introduction to the Bill of Rights” in 
Bill of Rights Compendium (1996) 1A79. 
37 Section 33(2). 
38 3 of 2000. 












grounds for judicial review,40 the procedures for obtaining written reasons41 and the 
remedies available to courts in the event that the action is held to be unlawful, 
unreasonable and/or procedurally unfair.42 Given that the establishment and 
management of CCAs frequently involve the exercise of administrative discretion and 
decision-making, the above constitutional provisions are of relevance. 
 
Finally, section 34 affords everyone the right ‘to have any dispute that can be resolved 
by the application of law decided in a fair public hearing before a court or, where 
appropriate, another independent and impartial tribunal or forum’.43 The practical 
realization of this right is reinforced through section 38 that grants a diverse array of 
persons standing to approach a competent court where their rights have been 
threatened or infringed.44 These provisions are of relevance given the propensity for 
disputes to arise regarding the establishment and management of CCAs. 
 
3. RECOGNITION OF CUSTOMARY LAW AND TRADITIONAL INSTITUTIONS 
 
As highlighted in the preceding chapter,45 customary law and institutions play a central 
role in the regulation of many CCAs, both in respect of regulating land tenure and 
providing for natural resource management. It is accordingly noteworthy that the 
Constitution expressly acknowledges ‘the existence of any other rights or freedoms that 
are recognised or conferred by ... customary law ... to the extent that they are consistent 
with the Bill (of Rights)’.46 
 
                                                     
40 Section 6 and section 7. 
41 Section 5. 
42 Section 8. 
43 See generally: Davis D “Access to Courts” in Cheadle et al South African Constitutional Law (2nd Ed) 
(2005) 28(1)-28(11); and Rautenbach I “Introduction to the Bill of Rights” in Bill of Rights Compendium 
(1996) 1A80. 
44 These persons are: anyone acting in their own interest; anyone acting on behalf of another person who 
cannot act in their own name; anyone acting as a member of, or in the interest of, a group or class of 
persons; and anyone acting in the public interest; and an association acting in the interests of its 
members. See generally: Davis D “Enforcement of Rights” in Cheadle et al South African Constitutional 
Law (2nd Ed) (2005) 32(1)-32(7); and Rautenbach I “Introduction to the Bill of Rights” in Bill of Rights 
Compendium (1996) 1A84-1A92. 
45 See further Chapter 3 (Part 4.6). 












The Constitution furthermore recognises the ‘institution, status and role of traditional 
leadership, according to customary law’ and provides that these traditional authorities, 
which observe a system of customary law, may continue to function and apply such 
customary law, subject however, to the ‘Constitution and any applicable legislation’.47 
With respect to these traditional authorities, the Constitution affords national and in 
some cases provincial government discretion to promulgate legislation providing for ‘the 
role of traditional leadership as an institution at local level on matters affecting local 
communities’; and the establishment of ‘houses of traditional leaders’ and a ‘council of 
traditional leaders’.48 The status afforded to traditional authorities under the Constitution 
is far from clear. In the words of Marais, ‘(p)erhaps the most neglected contradiction in 
South Africa’s quest for transformation is the ambiguous status and powers conferred 
on ‘traditional’ authority systems’.49 According to other commentators, the constitutional 
dispensation has ‘left a number of questions unanswered’ and was perhaps left 
‘deliberately vague’ owing to the new political elite’s ambivalence towards the future role 
of traditional leaders at the time the Constitution was negotiated. 50 
 
In an attempt to provide some clarity, the Government has promulgated several 
national51 and provincial laws52 prescribing the powers and functions of the traditional 
institutions provided for in the Constitution. Notwithstanding these statutory enactments, 
the merits of affording statutory recognition to traditional authorities, particularly in the 
context of land administration remains the subject of ongoing debate. These debates 
                                                     
47 Section 211. 
48 Section 212. 
49 Marais H South African Limits to Change: The Political Economy of Transition (2001) Zed Books 
London 303; and Williams M “Legislating ‘Tradition’ in South Africa” (2009) 35(1) Journal of Southern 
African Studies 194. 
50 Beall J & Ngonyama M Indigenous Institutions, Traditional Leaders and Elite Coalitions for 
Development: The Case of Greater Durban (2009) Working Paper No.55, Crisis States Research Centre 
London, 8-9. See further: Sithole P & Mbele T Fifteen Year Review on Traditional Leadership: A 
Research Paper (2008) Cato Manor: Democracy and Governance Programme, HSRC Pretoria; and 
Ntsebeza L “Democratic Decentralisation and Traditional Authority: Dilemmas of Land Administration in 
Rural South Africa” (2004) 16 (1) European Journal of Development Research 72. 
50 Section 40(1). 
51 These include: Traditional Leadership and Governance Framework Act (41 of 2003); and National 
House of Traditional Leaders Act (10 of 1997). 
52 These include: Traditional Leadership and Governance Act (Mpumalanga) (3 of 2005); Traditional 
Leadership and Governance Act (Eastern Cape) (4 of 2005); Traditional Leadership and Governance Act 












centre particularly on the extent to which it amounts to a ‘retreat from democracy’,53 and 
a regression to the ‘decentralised despotism’ which characterised the role of such 
authorities in the administration of rural land under South Africa’s pre-constitutional 
dispensation.54 These laws, particularly the manner in which they purport to afford 
authority to traditional authorities in the context of communal land ownership, are 




The South African Government comprises of three ‘distinct, interdependent and 
interrelated’ spheres, namely national, provincial and local government.55 The legislative 
and executive capacity of these three spheres, including their ability to make and 
administer laws of relevance to CCAs, is prescribed in the Constitution and accordingly 
warrants brief consideration.56 
 
Consequent of their ‘distinct, interdependent and interrelated’ nature, the allocation of 
functional areas between the three spheres of government is far from simple. This is 
clearly epitomised in the context of CCAs where the relevant functional areas of the 
three spheres of government intersect one another in a rather illogical manner. Land 
affairs, national parks, national botanical gardens and marine resources are exclusive 
national competences.57 The administration of indigenous forests, environment, cultural 
                                                     
53 Ntsebeza L Democracy Compromised: Chiefs and the Politics of Land in South Africa (2006) HSRC 
Press/Brill Cape Town/Leiden 287. See further: Sithole et al Fifteen Year Review on Traditional 
Leadership (2008); Bentley K “Are Powers of Traditional Leaders in South Africa Compatible with 
Women’s Equal Rights? Three Conceptual Arguments” (2005) 6(4) Human Rights Review 48-68; Cousins 
B & Claassens A “Communal Land Rights, Democracy and Traditional Leaders in Post-Apartheid South 
Africa” in Saruchera M (ed) Securing Land and Resource Rights in Africa: Pan-African Perspectives 
(2004) PLAAS Bellville 139-158; and Lungisile N Land Tenure Reform, Traditional Authorities and Rural 
Local Government in Post-Apartheid South Africa: Case Studies from the Eastern Cape (1999) PLAAS 
Bellville. 
54 Ntsebeza (2004) European Journal of Development Research 73. 
55 Section 40(1). 
56 For a full discussion of the legislative and executive competences of the three spheres of government 
see: Department of Provincial and Local Government Practitioners Guide to Intergovernmental Relations 
in South Africa (2007) 14-19. 
57 Section 44(1)(ii) read with Schedule 4. Schedule 4 specifically reserves competence over national 
parks, national botanical gardens and marine resources for national government. Land affairs and forestry 












matters, indigenous law, customary law, nature conservation, regional planning and 
development, soil conservation, tourism, urban and rural development, local tourism 
and municipal planning are concurrent national and provincial competences.58 
Provincial planning, provincial cultural matters, beaches and municipal parks are 
exclusive provincial competences.59 Local government also has competence over 
beaches, local tourism, municipal parks and municipal planning.60 Provision is made for: 
the assumption of legislative competence by any sphere of government over any matter 
that it ‘reasonably necessary for, or incidental to, the effective’ performances of the 
above allocated competences;61 the assignment of allocated functions between the 
spheres of government;62 and the resolution of conflicts between national, provincial 
and local legislation.63 
 
This constitutional allocation of legislative competences has not surprisingly resulted in 
the land reform regime being administered by national authorities and the conservation 
regime by both national and provincial authorities. Whilst the overlapping constitutional 
mandates between the national and provincial conservation authorities held potential for 
conflict, this has largely been circumvented by initially the assignment of many of the 
powers under the old conservation regime to the provincial authorities,64 and more 
recently, the express allocation of significant authority within contemporary national 
conservation legislation to provincial environmental Ministers.65 
 
Notwithstanding the dictates of cooperative governance enshrined in Chapter 3 of the 
Constitution,66 the country’s national conservation and land reform authorities have in 
                                                                                                                                                                           
competence of national government.  
58 Section 44(1)(ii) read together with section 104(1)(b)(i) and Schedule 4.  
59 Section 104(1)(b)(ii) read together with Schedule 5.  
60 Section 156 (1) read together with Schedule 4 (Part B) and Schedule 5 (Part B). 
61 See section 44(3), section 104(4) and section 156(5). 
62 Section 44(1)(3) and section 104(1(c). 
63 See section 146 (conflicts between national and provincial legislation) and section 156(3) (conflicts 
between national/provincial legislation and municipal legislation).  
64 For example, the now-repealed section 18 which provided for the declaration of special nature reserves 
under the Environment Conservation Act (73 of 1989), was assigned to the provinces. 
65 Extensive powers have, for example, been allocated to the provincial environmental Ministers under the 
Biodiversity Act and the Protected Areas Act. 












contrast been operating in dysfunctional isolation from one another for the bulk of the 
past fifteen years. Various recent initiatives specifically seek to bridge the divide 
between these two administrations. These initiatives are: the conclusion of a 
Memorandum of Agreement67 between the erstwhile Minister of Agriculture and Land 
Affairs and the Minister of Environmental Affairs and Tourism to expedite the resolution 
of land claims within protected areas; and the development of a National Co-
Management Framework68 to guide the resolution of such claims. The concerns relating 
to cooperative governance and the above recent efforts to resolve the dysfunctional 
relationship between the country’s conservation and land reform authorities are 




Within this chapter I have briefly discussed the broad constitutional framework of 
potential relevance to the domestic regulation of CCAs. Three broad areas have been 
canvassed. The first is the array of relevant rights enshrined in the Constitution, most 
notably the environmental right and the property clause. The former has raised the 
profile of environmental issues, provided the impetus for the revision of South Africa’s 
environmental regime (including its protected areas regime) and afforded express 
recognition to the mutual and respective merits of the conservation and sustainable use 
paradigms. The latter has provided the framework for South Africa’s comprehensive 
land reform programme. Whilst providing the constitutional foundation for biodiversity 
                                                                                                                                                                           
and inter-governmental relations. Section 41(1) provides in this regard that: ‘All spheres of government 
and all organs of state within each sphere must - (i) provide effective, transparent, accountable and 
coherent government for the Republic as a whole; (ii) respect the constitutional status, institutions, 
powers and functions of government in the other spheres; (iii) not assume any power or function except 
those conferred on them in terms of the Constitution; (iv) exercise their powers and perform their 
functions in a manner that does not encroach on the geographical, functional or institutional integrity of 
government in another sphere; and (v) co-operate with one another in mutual trust and good faith by - (vi) 
fostering friendly relations; (vii) assisting and supporting one another; (viii) informing one another of, and 
consulting one another on, matters of common interest; (ix) co-ordinating their actions and legislation with 
one another; (x) adhering to agreed procedures; and (xi) avoiding legal proceedings against one another.’ 
Section 40(2) further provides that all spheres of government are required to ‘observe and adhere to the 
principles in this Chapter and must conduct their activities’ accordingly (section 40(2)). 
67 Minister of Agriculture and Land Affairs & Minister of Environmental Affairs and Tourism Memorandum 
of Agreement dated 2 May 2007. 












conservation and land reform in South Africa, very little clarity is unfortunately provided 
as to the intersection of these realms and which should triumph over the other where 
conflicts arise. According to Kepe, this ‘apparent disjuncture’ in the Constitution has 
similarly permeated the domestic legal framework governing conservation and land 
reform.69 
 
The second is the recognition afforded to customary laws and institutions of traditional 
authority. What is noteworthy in this regard is that while customary law and traditional 
authorities play a significant role in the context of land administration, their role in the 
context of conservation is yet to be fully realised. 
 
The final area discussed in this chapter is that of governance. I highlighted the 
legislative and executive competences afforded to the three spheres of government to 
make and administer laws of relevance to CCAs. I argued that the overlapping and 
fragmented nature of these competences is partly to blame for the dysfunctional divide 
that has characterised the relationship between the conservation and land reform 
regimes for the bulk of the past two decades. 
 
Prolific legislative activity has permeated all three of the above areas during the course 
of the past two decades. Through this legislative reform, the three spheres of 
Government have sought to give effect to the rights enshrined in the Constitution; 
provide for the recognition of customary laws and institutions; and simultaneously 
adhere to the bounds of their constitutional competence and the dictates of cooperative 
governance. It is to a detailed analysis of this comprehensive legal framework, the 
policies that inform it and the institutions that administer it, that the enquiry now turns. 
 
                                                     
69 Kepe T “Land Claims and Comanagement of Protected Areas: Exploring the Challenges” (2008) 41 
Environmental Management 319. This ‘apparent disjuncture’ and the steps that have been taken to 

















SOUTH AFRICA’S CONSERVATION REGIME OF RELEVANCE 





Over the past two centuries, South Africa has developed a comprehensive legal 
framework aimed at conserving the country’s natural resources. Until as recently as five 
years ago, this legal framework was largely founded on the traditional exclusionary and 
state-centred approach to conservation. It is accordingly not surprising that during this 
legislative era, South Africa’s conservation regime made little provision for the domestic 
implementation of communally-conserved areas (CCAs). However, the commencement 
of the National Environmental Management: Protected Areas Act1 (Protected Areas Act) 
and the National Environmental Management: Biodiversity Act2 (Biodiversity Act) in late 
2004, have cumulatively precipitated a shift towards a more inclusive, participatory and 
human-centred approach to conservation. These two laws contain an array of legal 
mechanisms that can be used to implement CCAs. For the purpose of analysis, a 
distinction is accordingly drawn between these two regulatory eras: the pre-2005 
conservation regime, a d the post-2005 conservation regime. The bulk of attention will 






                                                     
1 Act 57 of 2003. The bulk of the Act commenced on 1 November 2004 (GN 52 GG No. 26960 dated 2 
November 2004). 













2. THE PRE-2005 REGIME 
 
Although the origins of South Africa’s conservation regime can be found in colonial 
forestry reserve laws dating back to 1888,3 the forging of a comprehensive national and 
provincial conservation regime really arose in the 1970s with the promulgation of the 
National Parks Act4 and a series of provincial Nature Conservation Ordinances.5 This 
legislative base has, during the course of the past twenty years, been supplemented by 
a vast array of national and provincial laws of relevance to conservation.6 Inherent in 
this regime are traditional legal approaches to conserving and managing natural 
resources, namely area regimes and species regimes. 
 
During this era, twenty laws provided for the designation of ver twenty-five different 
types of protected areas,7 resulting is approximately 6.5 % of South Africa’s terrestrial 
                                                     
3 See: Child B “The Emergence of Parks and Conservation Narratives in Southern Africa” in Suich H, 
Child B & Spenceley A (eds) Evolution and Innovation in Wildlife Conservation (2009) Earthscan London 
21-23; Department of Environmental Affairs and Tourism White Paper on the Conservation and Use of 
South Africa’s Biodiversity (1997) (published in GN 1095 GG No.18163 dated 28 July 1997) Ch 1 (para. 
1.3) and Grove R “Early Themes in African Conservation: The Cape in the Nineteenth Century’ in 
Anderson D & Grove R Conservation in Africa: People, Policies and Practice (1987) Cambridge University 
Press, Newcastle Upon Tyne 21-39. 
4 Act 57 of 1976. 
5 These are: Nature Conservation Ordinance (Transvaal) (12 of 1983); Nature Conservation Ordinance 
(Cape) (19 of 1974); Nature Conservation Ordinance (Natal) (15 of 1974); and Nature Conservation 
Ordinance (OFS) (8 of 1969). Various conservation Acts and Decrees were also promulgated in respect 
of the homelands declared under the apartheid regime and those still in operation today include: Transkei 
Environmental Conservation Decree (9 of 1992); Nature Conservation Act (Ciskei) (10 of 1987); 
Protected Areas Act (Bophuthatswana) (24 of 1987); and the Bophuthatswana Nature Conservation Act 
(3 of 1973). 
6 National laws of relevance to conservation include: World Heritage Convention Act (49 of 1999); 
National Heritage Resources Act (25 of 1999); National Environmental Management Act (107 of 1998); 
National Forests Act (84 of 1998); Animal Improvement Act (62 of 1998); National Water Act (36 of 1998); 
Marine Living Resources Act (18 of 1998); Genetically Modified Organisms Act (15 of 1997); Environment 
Conservation Act (73 of 1989); Forest Act (122 of 1984); Conservation of Agricultural Resources Act (43 
of 1983); Mountain Catchment Areas Act (63 of 1970); Plant Improvement Act (53 of 1976); Sea Birds 
and Seals Protection Act (46 of 1973); Lake Areas Development Act (39 of 1975); and Plant Breeders’ 
Rights Act (15 of 1976). Provincial laws of relevance include: Eastern Cape Parks and Tourism Act (2 of 
2010); Northern Cape Nature Conservation Act (9 of 2009); Mpumalanga Tourism and Parks Agency Act 
(5 of 2005); Provincial Parks Board Act (Eastern Cape) (12 of 2003); Limpopo Environmental 
Management Act (7 of 2003); Limpopo Tourism and Parks Board Act (8 of 2001); Mpumalanga Nature 
Conservation Act (10 of 1998); Kwazulu-Natal Nature Conservation Management Act (9 of 1997); and 
Kwazulu-Natal Nature Conservation Act (29 of 1992). 
7 National laws providing for protected areas include: National Parks Act; Environment Conservation Act; 
Forests Act; National Forests Act; Marine Living Resources Act; Mountain Catchment Areas Act; World 












environment and 21.5 % of its coastal environment being accorded formal protected 
areas status.8 An array of national9 and provincial10 planning laws, principally through 
the application of municipal zoning schemes, secured additional land for conservation.11 
Species regimes, in terms of which various species of fauna or flora are listed and 
activities strictly regulated, were also prevalent.12 A licence was generally required prior 
to undertaking any activity that impacted on a listed species. Finally, various laws 
identified activities generally, or in respect of certain specific areas, with potential to 
negatively impact on South Africa’s natural resources.13 Any person wishing to 
undertake such an activity was generally required to obtain prior formal authorisation, 
frequently preceded by some form of environmental impact assessment. 
 
                                                                                                                                                                           
and Seals Protection Act. Provincial laws providing for protected areas include: Mpumalanga Nature 
Conservation Act; Limpopo Environmental Management Act; Kwazulu-Natal Nature Conservation 
Management Act; Provincial Parks Board Act (Eastern Cape); Nature Conservation Ordinance (Cape); 
Nature Conservation Ordinance (Transvaal); Nature Conservation Ordinance (OFS); Transkei 
Environmental Conservation Decree; Nature Conservation Act (Ciskei); Protected Areas Act 
(Bophuthatswana); and the Bophuthatswana Nature Conservation Act. 
8 National Biodiversity Framework (GN 813 GG No. 32474 dated 3 August 2009) 78. 
9 National planning laws include: Development Facilitation Act (67 of 1995); Local Government Transition 
Act (209 of 1993); Physical Planning Act (125 of 1991); Black Communities Development Act (4 of 1984); 
and Less Formal Townships Establishment Act (113 of 1991). 
10 Each province in South Africa promulgated its own Planning Ordinance or Act to regulate planning at 
provincial level. These include: Land-Use Planning Ordinance (15 of 1985) (applicable in the Western 
Cape, Northern Cape and Eastern Cape); Townships Ordinance (9 of 1969) (applicable in the Free 
State); Town Planning and Township Ordinance (19 of 1986) (applicable in Gauteng, Mpumalanga, 
Limpopo, North West Province); and the KwaZulu-Natal Planning and Development Act (5 of 1998). 
11 Zoning schemes, developed and implemented by local government, currently provide for a range of 
land-use categories including open space. Land zoned as ‘open space’ is typically reserved for nature 
reserves and conservation use. Development is subject to strict control and generally requires the prior 
approval of an environmental management plan. 
12 The lists of species and permitting arrangements are generally found in provincial legislation such as: 
Mpumalanga Nature Conservation Act; Limpopo Environmental Management Act; Kwazulu-Natal Nature 
Conservation Management Act; Nature Conservation Ordinance (Cape); Nature Conservation Ordinance 
(Transvaal); and Nature Conservation Ordinance (OFS). 
13 The lists of activities and permitting arrangements can be found in many laws most notably: 
Environmental Impact Assessment Regulations (GNR 543-546 GG No. 33306 dated 18 June 2010) 
promulgated under the National Environmental Management Act, which regulate activities with the 
potential to detrimentally impact on the environment; the Outeniqua Sensitive Coastal Area Regulations 
(GNR 879-881 GG No. 17213 dated 31 May 1996) and Pennington and Umtamvuna Sensitive Coastal 
Area Regulations (GNR 1529-1531 GG No. 19493 date 27 November 1998) promulgated under the 
Environment Conservation Act, which regulate activities which may detrimentally impact on these 
sensitive coastal areas; Genetically Modified Organisms Act which regulates genetically modified 
organism; National Forests Act, which regulates forest resources; National Water Act, which regulates 
water resources; Minerals and Petroleum Resources Development Act (28 of 2002), which regulates 













However, notwithstanding the existence of this extensive network of laws, the demise of 
the country’s natural resources continued at an alarming rate. Commentators argued 
that this was partly due to South Africa’s ineffective and outdated regulatory 
framework.14 Many issues appear to have contributed to its failure, namely: lack of 
political will; the absence of an adequate planning framework; legislative and 
institutional fragmentation; capacity and resource constraints; reliance on command-
and-control strategies; and the adoption of an exclusionary approach to conservation.15 
The latter three, discussed in detail below, are of key relevance to the current enquiry. 
 
Conservation is an expensive exercise.16 Raising sufficient funds to support 
conservation is a significant challenge especially where competing socio-economic 
imperatives such as health care, housing, education, welfare, security, economic growth 
and job creation are generally prioritised over conservation.17 This is very evident if one 
considers that South Africa’s national budgetary allocation to biodiversity conservation 
has decreased from 0.28 % of the national budget in 199618 to 0.048 % in 2010.19 
 
These meagre Government allocations have significantly undermined the ability of key 
national and provincial institutions to implement and enforce conservation legislation.20 
                                                     
14 In his regard see: Kumleben M, Sangweni S & Ledger J Board of Investigation into the Institutional 
Arrangements for Nature Conservation in South Africa: Report (1998) 9-10; Hanks J & Glavovic B 
“Protected Areas” in Fuggle R & Rabie A (eds) Environmental Management in South Africa (1992) Juta & 
Co Ltd Cape Town 712-714; and White Paper on the Biodiversity (1997) 30. 
15 These problems were identified in the White Paper on Biodiversity  (1997) Ch 1 (para. 1.5). For a full 
discussion of these problems, see: Paterson A “Wandering About South Africa’s New Protected Areas 
Regime’ (2007) (1) SA Public Law 2-10. 
16 Expenses associated with biodiversity regulation include: developing strategic planning frameworks; 
identifying and monitoring the status of vital biological resources; formulating policy and legislation to 
manage these resources; funding administration, compliance and enforcement; securing land for 
inclusion within protected areas; managing the biological resources situated both within and outside these 
areas; and increasing public awareness. 
17 Schmidtz D & Willott E “2003 Symposium: Environmental Ethics and Policy: Bringing Philosophy Down 
to Earth: Reinventing the Commons: An African Case Study” (2003) 37 U.C. Davis Law Review 224. See 
further Turpie J & Siegfried W “The Conservation-Economic Imperative: Securing the Future of Protected 
Areas in South Africa” (1996) 4 Africa Environment & Wildlife 36. 
18 Kumleben Board of Investigation Report (1998) 32-34. 
19 Accordingly to National Treasury Estimates of National Expenditure 2010 (2010) only R399.3 million of 
the total expenditure of R818.1 billion (constituting 0.048 % of the annual budget) was directly allocated to 
biodiversity conservation. 
20 Take, for example, the obligations imposed on landowners to clear alien invasive vegetation in South 












They have also impacted on the Government’s ability to administer South Africa’s 
protected areas properly. Management responsibilities have been neglected in certain 
circumstances and the continued viability of several protected areas has been placed in 
jeopardy.21 Given that national conservation budgets are unlikely to be increased in the 
near future and the fallacy of protected areas becoming economically self-sufficient, the 
Government recognised the need to identify alternative sources of funding to manage 
protected areas and create opportunities to share the management of these areas with 
the public, including local communities.22 The pre-2005 conservation regime did not, 
however, contain adequate legal mechanisms to enable them to co-opt such support. 
 
Raising resources to manage the existing protected areas network was but one financial 
concern. In compliance with its international obligations, the Government originally 
committed to increasing the proportion of South Africa’s terrestrial territory situated 
within protected areas from 6.5 % to 10 %.23 It has however recently increased its 
commitment to having 12 % of all terrestrial ecosystems included in protected areas in 
the next 20 years.24 This is estimated to amount to an additional 8.8 % of the country’s 
territory given the fact that certain key eco-systems are currently under represented in 
the protected areas network.25 The decreasing availability of suitable state land 
compelled the Government to focus its attention on private land, and more recently 
communal land, which jointly constitute approximately 84 % of the country’s territory. 
                                                                                                                                                                           
1984). Although having been on the statute books for over twenty years and alien invasive vegetation 
posing one of the greatest threats to the nation’s biodiversity, not one conviction has been successfully 
prosecuted under the Act. See further Preston G & Siegfried W “The Protection of Biological Diversity in 
South Africa: Profiles and Perceptions of Professional Practitioners in Nature Conservation Agencies and 
Natural History Museums” (1995) 25 (2) South African Journal of Wildlife Research 49-56. 
21 Geach B & Peart R “Land, Resource Use, Biodiversity and Desertification in South Africa: An Overview 
and Analysis of Post-1994 Policies, Programmes, Institutions and Financial Mechanisms” Unpublished 
paper presented at Workshop on Financial Innovations to Combat Desertification, 12th Global Biodiversity 
Forum, Dakar, December 1998, 24. See further: Kumleben Board of Investigation Report (1998) 37. 
22 Kumleben Board of Investigation Report (1998) 30,31 & 37-39. 
23Department of Environmental Affairs and Tourism 10 Year Review (1994-2004) (2005) 44. These 
targets have recently been restated in Government of South Africa National Protected Areas Expansion 
Strategy for South Africa 2008 (2009) 1. These percentages accord with those recommended by the 
IUCN and agreed to by parties attending the World Parks Congress (2003). In this regard, see the 
Durban Accord, the Durban Action Plan and World Park Congress Recommendations (all of which are 
available at www.iucn.org/themes/wcpa/wpc2003/). These documents reflect the outcomes and plan of 
action following the World Parks Congress. 













The Government did not, however, have the resources to purchase this land, and it 
therefore acknowledged the need for alternative mechanisms to enable, and incentives 
to encourage, the incorporation of private and communal land within protected areas.26 
Its problems were further compounded by the impact of South Africa’s land reform 
process under which ownership of large tracts of state land situated within existing 
protected areas were restored to local communities. The pre-2005 conservation regime 
did not provide appropriate legal mechanisms to facilitate the voluntary incorporation of 
non-state land with protected areas, or to deal with those situations where communal 
land rights were granted over land situated within existing protected areas through the 
land reform process. 
 
A further problem characterising the pre-2005 era, was the Government’s reliance on 
the command-and-control approach to regulation. The laws promulgated during this era 
generally prescribed a range of legislative standards, prohibitions and restrictions. Non-
compliance with these was subject to potential prosecution and sanction. However, as 
has been identified both internationally27 and domestically,28 wholesale reliance on this 
command-and-control approach in any regulatory context is problematic. High costs 
associated with the administration, compliance and enforcement of direct regulation 
often plagues effective implementation. Prescribed standards, prohibitions and 
restrictions are frequently inflexible and unable to cater for geographical, sectoral or 
individual specificities. In addition, the command-and-control approach does not 
generally facilitate and encourage voluntary action. 
                                                     
26 Crowe T “Developing a National Strategy for the Protection and Sustainable Use of South Africa’s 
Biodiversity” (1996) 92 South African Journal of Science 219. 
27 See generally: Wilke K What Is In It For Me: Exploring Natural Capital Incentives (2005) Canada West 
Foundation Calgary 2-4; Milne J, Deketelaere K, Kreiser L & Ashiabor H Critical Issues in Environmental 
Taxation (2003) 27-51; James D Environmental Incentives: Australian Experience with Economic 
Instruments for Environmental Management (1997) Environmental Economics Research Paper No.5, 
Environment Australia Canberra 13; Bruce N & Ellis G Environmental Taxes and Policies for Developing 
Countries (1993) World Bank Policy Research Working Paper No.WPS1177, World Bank Washington 
DC; Westin R “Understanding Environmental Taxes” (1992) 46 (2) Tax Lawyer 327-330; and Pearce D, 
Markandya A & Barbier E Blueprint for a Green Economy (1989) Earthscan London 153-172. 
28 See generally: Paterson A “Property Tax a Friend or Foe for Landscape Protection in South Africa” 
(2005) 12 South African Journal of Environmental Law & Policy 97; Paterson A “Tax Incentives - Valuable 
Tools for Biodiversity Conservation in South Africa” (2005) 122 South African Law Journal 182; 
Henderson P “Fiscal Incentives for Environmental Protection - Introduction” (1994) 1 South African 
Journal of Environmental Law & Policy 50-52; and Stauth R & Baskind P “Resource Economics” in 













These problems played out very vividly in the context of domestic conservation efforts.29 
Given the Government’s resource constraints, it was unable to effectively fund the high 
costs associated with direct regulation. Given the diversity of species, ecosystems, 
threats and stakeholders, inflexible regulation proved unworkable. Given the situation of 
the majority of biological resources on private land, the failure to facilitate and 
encourage extensive voluntary public action proved to be unviable. While the pre-2005 
conservation legislation contained a few mechanisms for co-opting public support for 
various forms of protected areas,30 these largely fell into disuse owing to the absence of 
associated incentives to encourage and reward such support.31 The Government 
accordingly recognised the need to reassess its regulatory approach and consider a 
more cooperative and incentive-based approach aimed at enabling and encouraging the 
public, including local communities, to become active participants in conservation.32 
 
Finally, the majority of pre-2005 conservation legislation was based on the premise that 
effective conservation required the exclusion of the public.33 Express provision for public 
                                                     
29 See generally: Paterson (2007) SA Public Law 1-33; Paterson (2005) South African Law Journal 182-
216; and Paterson (2005) South African Journal of Environmental Law and Policy 97-121. 
30 Express provision was made for the voluntary incorporation of private land (generally by way of written 
agreement between the landowner and the conservation authorities) within an array of laws including: 
national parks (section 2(B(1)(b) of the National Parks Act - now repealed); special nature reserves 
(section 18(2)(bA) of the Env ronment Conservation Act - now repealed); forest nature reserves and 
wilderness areas (section 8(1)(c) of the National Forests Act); private nature reserves (section 12(1) of 
the Nature Conservation Ordinance (Cape); section 59-66 of the Nature Conservation Ordinance (Natal); 
and section 21 read with section 26 of the Limpopo Environmental Management Act); sites of ecological 
importance and protected environments (section 18 and section 21 read with section 26 of the Limpopo 
Environmental Management Act); and nature reserves and conservancies (section 85 of the Mpumalanga 
Nature Conservation Act). 
31 Under the now largely repealed National Parks Act, no property tax could be levied on land, including 
private land, situated within a national park (section 18). This incentive was, however, largely insignificant 
as the majority of land suitable for incorporation within national parks was not invariably subject to 
property tax. A similar exemption still applies to private land situated within mountain catchment areas, 
declared in terms of the Mountain Catchment Areas Act, and in respect of which a directive has been 
issued to cease farming operations (section 5). This Act does not, however, make provision for individuals 
or communities to voluntarily contract their land into these mountain catchment areas and therefore this 
benefit does not act as an incentive, but rather as a form of compensation for having had one’s land-use 
rights curtailed. 
32 White Paper Biodiversity (1997) Chap 3(D). 
33 Kepe T, Wynberg R & Ellis W “Land Reform and Biodiversity Conservation in South Africa: 












participation in the formation and management of protected areas was largely absent.34 
So too was recognition of the need to ensure equitable access, use and benefit-sharing 
by local communities living within and adjacent to protected areas.35 Protected areas 
were often established on land formerly owned or occupied by local communities who 
were frequently displaced and denied access and use rights.36 This problem was not 
confined, however, to within the borders of protected areas. With the majority of South 
Africa’s territory being privately-owned by the minority white population, the result of 
apartheid land policies, the bulk of the population had no opportunity to access and use 
the nation’s biological resources. Conservation therefore became regarded as an elitist 
concern, the ‘preserve of the privileged members of society’,37 and protected areas, the 
‘playgrounds for the privileged elite’.38 
 
This exclusionary approach was, however, subject to extensive domestic criticism. 
Commentators argued that it was unsustainable especially in a developing economy 
such as South Africa where broad sectors of society were dependant on accessing 
biological resources to sustain their livelihoods.39 Calls were made for the introduction of 
a more human-centred approach to biodiversity regulation with a focus on community-
based natural resource management.40 It was argued that in order for such an approach 
to be successfully implemented in South Africa, both within and outside of protected 
areas, genuine proprietorship, in other words, the right to use resources and determine 
the mode of usage, distribution of such benefits and rules of access had to be granted 
                                                     
34 Paterson (2007) SA Public Law 9-11. 
35 Paterson (2007) SA Public Law 5-6. 
36
 Kumleben Board of Investigation Report (1998) 42. See further: Summers R “Legal and Institutional 
Aspects of Community-Based Wildlife Conservation in South Africa, Zimbabwe and Namibia’ (1999) Acta 
Juridica 188; and Magome H “Land Use Conflicts and Wildlife Management in Southern Africa” in 
Hirschoff P, Metcalfe S & Rihoy L (eds) Rural Development and Conservation in Africa: Studies in 
Community Resource Management (1996) Africa Resources Trust Zimbabwe 10-14. 
37 Kumleben Board of Investigation Report (1998) 42. 
38 White Paper on Biodiversity (1997) 33; and De Villiers B People and Parks - Sharing the Benefits 
(2008) KAS Johannesburg 4. 
39 Summers (1999) Acta Juridica 189. See further Bothma J & Glavovic B “Wild Animals” in Fuggle et al 
Environmental Management in South Africa (1992) 251 & 258. 
40 Mandondo A Dialogue of Theory and Empirical Evidence: A Weighted Decision and Tenurial Niche 
Approach to Reviewing the Operation of Natural Resource Policy in Rural Southern Africa’ (2005) 
Commons Southern Africa: Occasional Paper Series No.10, CASS/PLAAS Harare/Bellville 11; and 












to local communities.41 In the context of protected areas, critics argued that public 
participation needed to extend to determining reserve boundaries, preparing 
management plans and sharing in the economic benefits derived from their 
establishment.42 Although various initiatives were undertaken in the pre-2005 era to 
facilitate local community access to natural resources situated within various protected 
areas, these were few and far between.43 Accordingly, there were calls for local 
community participation to be prescribed as a matter of law, rather than retained as a 
discretionary administrative policy.44 Taking heed of this domestic concern and the shift 
in the international conservation discourse towards a more inclusive, participatory and 
human-centred approach, the Government acknowledged the need to divert from its 
wholesale reliance on the outdated state-centred exclusionary approach.45  
 
3. THE POST-2005 REGIME 
 
Precipitated by its ratification of the Convention on Biological Diversity in 1995,46 the 
Government initiated a comprehensive reform process to bring its domestic 
conservation regime in line with its international obligations. Informing this process were 
various policy papers and reports published in the late 1990’s, the most notable of 
which were the White Paper on the Conservation and Sustainable Use of South Africa’s 
Biological Diversity47 and the Report of the Board of Investigation into the Institutional 
Arrangements for Nature Conservation in South Africa.48 These documents reflected 
many of the criticisms of the pre-2005 regime discussed above, and advocated a 
                                                     
41 Murphree M Communities as Resource Management Institutions (1992) Gatekeeper Series No.36, IIED 
London 11. 
42 Bothma et al “Wild Animals” in Fuggle et al Environmental Management in South Africa (1992) 258. 
43 See generally the examples cited in: Kumleben Board of Investigation Report (1998) 44-47; and 
Department of Environmental Affairs and Tourism People, Parks and Transformation in South Africa: A 
Century of Conservation, A Decade of Democracy (2003) 48-52. 
44 Bothma et al “Wild Animals” in Fuggle et al Environmental Management in South Africa (1992) 258. 
45 National Biodiversity Strategy and Action Plan (2005) 62-67; and Kumleben Board of Investigation 
Report (1998) 66. 
46 South Africa ratified the Convention on Biological Diversity on 2 November 1995.  
47 White Paper on Biodiversity (1997). 
48 The Kumleben Board of Investigation Report (1998) was commissioned by the Minister of 
Environmental Affairs and Tourism to investigate and make recommendations on certain practical 
aspects relating to South Africa’s protected areas regime such as: institutional arrangements; 
classification of protected areas; declaration and management regimes; financing protected areas; and 












fundamental shift in approach to conservation regulation from ‘… preservation to 
conservation and sustainable use; from exclusivity to participation and sharing; … from 
fences and fines to incentives and individual responsibility’.49 
 
Drawing on the goals and objectives set out in these documents, the Government 
grappled for a further seven years to design its contemporary conservation regime. This 
process culminated in the promulgation of the Biodiversity Act, which regulates a broad 
range of issues such as biodiversity planning, threatened and protected ecosystems 
and species, alien invasive species, bio-prospecting, access and benefit-sharing; and 
the Protected Areas Act, which prescribes the country’s contemporary protected areas 
regime. 
 
3.1 THE LAWS 
 
Inherent in this post-2005 conservation regime, and in line with the general objectives of 
the Convention on Biological Diversity,50 is a clear acknowledgement by the 
Government that it cannot alone halt the rapid demise of the nation’s biodiversity. 
People are recognised as indispensable allies in this process. So too is the need to 
move away from the traditional state-centred exclusionary approach towards an 
inclusive, participatory and human-centred approach which recognises that one cannot 
divorce people from conservation and protection from sustainable use. Both the 
Biodiversity Act and the Protected Areas Act contain an array of novel statutory 
mechanisms for implementing this approach, several of which provide opportunities for 





                                                     
49 10 Year Review (2005) 44. 
50 The three main objectives of the Convention on Biological Diversity are: to conserve biological diversity; 
provide for the sustainable use of its components; and ensure the fair and equitable sharing of the 












3.1.1 National Environmental Management: Biodiversity Act 
 
The Biodiversity Act is the Government’s first attempt to regulate the nation’s biological 
resources in a holistic manner. The Government is appointed as the trustee of South 
Africa’s biological diversity.51 Central to the Act’s implementation is a three-tier planning 
framework to manage biodiversity, an element that was amiss under previous 
conservation legislation.52 
 
Against this planning framework, the Biodiversity Act regulates a broad range of issues 
relevant to biodiversity conservation. First, it provides for the declaration of threatened 
and protected ecosystems and species.53 Once so declared, activities that may threaten 
or impact on these ecosystems or species are restricted in various ways.54 Secondly, it 
regulates species and organisms posing potential threats to biodiversity such as alien 
species,55 invasive species56 and genetically modified organisms.57 The Act lists a 
range of restricted activities58 relating to these species that cannot be undertaken 
without permission and imposes a broad duty of care on persons who are so 
permitted.59 Thirdly, it seeks to regulate the vexed issues of bio-prospecting,60 access 
                                                     
51 Section 3. 
52 Chapter 3. This planning framework, discussed in detail hereunder, consists of a national biodiversity 
framework, bioregional plans and biodiversity management plans. 
53 Chapter 4. These provisions are complemented by the Threatened or Protected Species Regulations 
(GNR 151-152 GG No. 29657 dated 23 February 2007) which came into force on 1 July 2007. They will 
be further complemented by the Convention on International Trade in Endangered Species of Wild Fauna 
and Flora Regulations (GNR 173 GG No. 33002 dated 5 March 2010). The latter Regulations are yet to 
commence.   
54 Persons seeking to undertake listed activities impacting on a threatened ecosystem are required to 
undertake an EIA (section 53); while those seeking to undertake restricted activities impacting on a 
threatened or protected species require a permit to do so (section 57). Provision is also made for 
regulating the trade in these threatened and protected species (sections 59-62).  
55 ‘Alien species’ are defined as ‘…(a) a species that is not an indigenous species; or (b) an indigenous 
species translocated…to a place outside its natural distribution range in nature, but not an indigenous 
species which has extended its natural distribution range by means of migration or dispersal without 
human intervention’ (section 1). 
56 ‘Invasive species’ are defined as ‘…those whose establishment and spread outside of its natural 
distribution range - (a) threaten ecosystems, habitats or other species or have demonstrable potential to 
threaten ecosystems, habitats or other species; and (b) may result in economic or environmental harm or 
harm to human health’ (section 1). 
57 Chapter 5. These provisions will be complemented by the Draft Alien and Invasive Species Regulations 
(GNR 347-350 GG No. 32090 dated 3 April 2009) when they are finalised. 
58 These include activities such as importing, growing, transporting and selling alien species. 












and benefit-sharing.61 This is principally achieved through permitting schemes,62 which 
must be preceded by benefit-sharing agreements63 or material transfer agreements;64 
and the establishment of a Bio-prospecting Trust Fund to hold and distribute all money 
generated from such agreements.65 Finally, the Biodiversity Act provides for the 
establishment and functions of the South African National Biodiversity Institute that 
assists the Government in biodiversity conservation.66 
 
In acknowledging the failings of the previous regime, the Biodiversity Act provides two 
key opportunities for local communities to become active participants in its 
implementation. The first relates to the implementation of the Act’s biodiversity planning 
framework; and the second, bio-prospecting. It is the former that warrants further 
attention in that it provides a viable platform for implementing CCAs. 
 
As alluded to above, one of the most significant improvements introduced by the 
Biodiversity Act is the prescription of a three-tier domestic biodiversity planning 
framework at national, regional and local level. First, the Minister of Environmental 
Affairs and Tourism is required to prescribe a National Biodiversity Framework.67 This 
National Biodiversity Framework, complemented by a National Spatial Biodiversity 
                                                                                                                                                                           
available control measures. 
60 Bio-prospecting is defined, in relation to indigenous biological resources, as ‘any research on, or 
development or application of, indigenous biological resources for commercial or industrial exploitation, 
and includes - (a) the systematic search, collection or gathering of such resources or making extractions 
from such resources for purposes of such research, development or application; (b) the utilization for 
purposes of such research or development of any information regarding any traditional uses of 
indigenous biological resources by indigenous communities; or (c) research on, or the application, 
development or modification of, any traditional uses, for commercial or industrial exploitation’ (section 1). 
61 Chapter 6. These provisions are complemented by the Regulations on Bio-Prospecting, Access and 
Benefit-Sharing (GNR 138 GG No. 30739 dated 8 February 2009). These Regulations came into force on 
1 April 2008. 
62 Section 81. 
63 Section 83. The purpose of these agreements is to regulate the sharing of benefits derived from the 
biospropecting. 
64 Section 84. The purpose of these agreements is to regulate the transfer of any indigenous biological 
resources for bio-prospecting purposes. 
65 Section 85. 
66 Chapter 2. 
67 Section 38. The purpose of this national framework is to: provide an integrated, co-ordinated and 
uniform approach to biodiversity management by all spheres of government, communities, the private 
sector and the public; identify priority areas for conservation and the establishment of protected areas; 
and reflect regional co-operation on issues concerning biodiversity management in Southern Africa 












Assessment68 and National Biodiversity Strategy and Action Plan,69 has recently been 
published.70 Secondly, the Minister or relevant member of the provincial Executive 
Council (MEC)71 may determine certain geographical regions as bioregions and publish 
bioregional plans for the management of the biodiversity in the region.72 No such plans 
have been formally declared to date. 
 
Although the above provide a vital planning context and contain references to the role of 
local communities in conserving South Africa’s natural resources,73 it is the third tier of 
the planning framework, namely biodiversity management plans, which hold real 
potential for implementing CCAs. Any person, organisation or organ of state wishing to 
contribute to biodiversity management may submit to the Minister, for her approval, a 
biodiversity management plan for an ecosystem,74 indigenous species75 or migratory 
species76 in need of protection. The biodiversity management plan must be aimed at 
ensuring the long-term survival in nature of the species or ecosystem to which the plan 
relates and must be consistent with the National Biodiversity Framework and any 
                                                     
68 Driver A, Maze K, Rouget M, Lombard A, Nel J, Turpie J, Cowling R, Desmet P, Goodman P, Harris L, 
Jonas Z, Reyers B, Sink K & Strauss T National Spatial Biodiversity Assessment 2004: Priorities for 
Biodiversity Conservation in South Africa (2005) Strelitzia 17, South African National Biodiversity Institute 
Pretoria. The National Spatial Biodiversity Assessment, commissioned by the erstwhile Department of 
Environmental Affairs and Tourism, contains an assessment of South Africa’s biodiversity, socio-
economic and political context and provides an overview of key issues, constraints and opportunities 
identified in this assessment. 
69 Department of Environmental Affairs and Tourism South Africa’s National Biodiversity Strategy and 
Action Plan (2005). The National Biodiversity Strategy and Action Plan was commissioned by the 
erstwhile Department of Environmental Affairs and Tourism. It aims to establish a framework and plan of 
action for the conservation and sustainable use of South Africa’s biodiversity and the equitable sharing of 
benefits derived from this use. 
70 GN 813 GG No. 32474 dated 3 August 2009. 
71 The Member of the Executive Council (MEC) of a province who is responsible for the conservation of 
biodiversity. 
72 Bioregions and associated bioregional plans can be declared if a region contains whole or several 
nested ecosystems and is characterised by its landforms, vegetation cover, human culture and history 
(section 40(1)). Bioregional plans must contain measures for the effective management of biodiversity 
within a given region, provide for monitoring of the plan and be consistent with the national biodiversity 
framework (section 41). Guidelines Regarding the Determination of Bioregions and the Preparation of and 
Publication of Bioregional Plans have been published (in GN 291 GG No. 32006 dated 16 March 2009). 
73 National Biodiversity Framework (GN 813 GG No. 32474 dated 3 August 2009) 30, 60, 79 & 87; and 
National Biodiversity Strategy and Action Plan (2005) 10, 18, 27, 29, 57, 62-63, 69, 71 & 73. 
74 These ecosystems may be those formally listed in terms of section 52 of the Act or which are not listed 
but which do warrant special conservation attention (section 43(1)(a)). 
75 These species may be those formally listed in terms of section 56 of the Act or which are not listed but 
which do warrant special conservation attention (section 43(1)(b)). 












applicable bioregional plan.77 Norms and Standards for Biodiversity Management Plans 
for Species78 have been prescribed to inform the content of these plans and the 
procedures for their adoption. The Minister must identify a suitable person, organisation 
or organ of state that will be responsible for implementing the plan,79 must assign 
responsibility to it for doing so,80 and may enter into a biodiversity management 
agreement with it to regulate its practical implementation.81  
 
It is these biodiversity management agreements that provide a potentially valuable tool 
for implementing CCAs. The scope of these agreements is currently vaguely prescribed 
and accordingly potentially vast with regard to: the nature and number of the contracting 
parties;82 their geographical ambit;83 the objectives sought to be achieved;84 the 
respective roles of the contracting parties;85 and the tenurial relationship of the 
contracting parties to the land in question.86 Local communities could accordingly 
feasibly conclude such agreements with conservation authorities in respect of natural 
resources situated both within and outside the borders of formally proclaimed areas. 
Given the above flexibility, these agreements could be specifically tailored to suit the 
nature of the natural resources in question and the comparative needs of the 
conservation authorities and the local communities. 
 
Notwithstanding their potential, no agreements of this nature have been concluded to 
date. There are several potential reasons for this: general public ignorance of the new 
                                                     
77 Section 45. 
78 GN 214 GG No. 31968 dated 2 March 2009. 
79 Section 43(2). 
80 Section 43(2)(c). 
81 Section 44. 
82 The parties could include one or more individuals, government authorities, conservation organisations 
and communal property associations. 
83 The agreement could relate to a single property or many properties, situated adjacent to or at a 
distance from one another. 
84 The agreements’ objectives could relate to formally listed threatened and protected species and 
ecosystems, and unlisted species and ecosystems deemed warranting special conservation attention. 
85 The roles of the parties could include undertaking tangible management actions and providing funding 
and/or technical support. 
86 The parties could own the land or not; or have some other form of tenurial relationship to it such a 












biodiversity regime; the absence of certain planning preconditions;87 uncertainty 
regarding the nature, format and procedural formalities for concluding such agreements; 
and the absence of incentives encouraging their conclusion and rewarding their 
implementation.88 
 
3.1.2 National Environmental Management: Protected Areas Act 
 
The second component of the nation’s new conservation regime is the Protected Areas 
Act. It introduces a fundamental shift in approach to establishing and managing 
protected areas, as is evident from the express objectives of the Act.89 
 
As in the regulation of biodiversity generally, the Government is appointed as the 
trustee of South Africa’s protected areas.90 While preserving the validity of various forms 
of current protected areas,91 the Protected Areas Act provides for the declaration of four 
additional types of protected areas, namely: special nature reserves;92 national parks;93 
                                                     
87 The Minister/MEC is yet to declare any bioregions or approve any bioregional plans. Until such time as 
the latter are approved, no biodiversity management agreements can be implemented. 
88 See further: Paterson A “A Legal Critique of Recent Contractual Tools Aimed at Facilitating the 
Domestic Implementation of the Convention on Biological Diversity: A South African Perspective” (2007) 
Unpublished paper presented at the 5th Worldwide Colloquium of the IUCN Academy of Environmental 
Law, Paraty, June 2007, 12-15. 
89 The objectives include: creating a national system of protected areas as part of a broader strategy to 
manage and conserve the nation’s biodiversity; establishing a representative network of protected areas 
on state, private and communal land; promoting the sustainable utilisation of protected areas for the 
benefit of the people; and promoting the participation of local communities in the management of 
protected areas (section 2). 
90 Section 3(a). 
91 These include: provincial protected areas declared in terms of the provincial conservation ordinances 
and Acts (section 12); world heritage sites declared and regulated under the World Heritage Convention 
Act (section 13); marine protected areas declared and regulated under the Marine Living Resources Act 
(section 14); forest nature reserves and forest wilderness areas declared and regulated under the 
National Forests Act (section 15); and mountain catchment areas declared and regulated under the 
Mountain Catchment Areas Act (section 16). 
92 These may be declared by the Government: to protect highly sensitive areas, outstanding ecosystems, 
species, geological or physical features; or to make the area available primarily for scientific research 
(section 18(2)). 
93 These may be declared by the Government: to protect an area of national or international biodiversity 
importance; to prevent exploitation or occupation inconsistent with the protection of the ecological 
integrity of the area; to provide spiritual, scientific, educational, recreational and tourism opportunities 













nature reserves;94 and protected environments.95 Protected areas can generally be 
declared in respect of private and communal land if the owner/s has/have consented to 
the declaration by way of written agreement.96 Provision is made for these agreements 
to be registered against the title deeds of the land concerned and they are therefore 
binding on successive owners.97 
 
The authorities are required to assign the management of the protected area to a 
management authority98 that must prepare and submit a management plan for 
approval.99 The content of the management plan will effectively identify the 
conservation-related activities to be undertaken by the management authority. Provision 
is made for monitoring compliance with these plans and restricting various activities in 
these areas.100 Finally, the Protected Areas Act sets out the powers and functions of 
South African National Parks (SANParks), the authority responsible for managing the 
nation’s national parks.101 
 
The Protected Areas Act specifically directs that its implementation must take place in 
partnership with the people.102 To facilitate the practical realisation of this ideal, the Act 
prescribes a range of mechanisms that feasibly provide for the implementation of CCAs. 
These, which are discussed in turn below, include provision for: the incorporation of 
communal land within protected areas; the communal management of protected areas; 
                                                     
94 These may be declared by the Government for a number of purposes, including: to supplement the 
system of national parks in South Africa; to protect areas which have significant natural features or 
biodiversity, are of scientific, cultural, historical or archaeological interest; to protect areas which are in 
need of long-term protection; and to provide for a sustainable flow of natural products and services to 
meet the needs of a local community (section 23(2)). 
95 These may be declared by the Government for a number of purposes, including: to regulate the area as 
a buffer zone for the protection of other forms of protected areas; to enable owners to take collective 
action to conserve biodiversity on their land and to seek legal recognition for this; to protect the area if it is 
sensitive to development; and to protect a specific ecosystem outside a special nature reserve, national 
park, world heritage site or nature reserve (section 28(2)). 
96 See: section 18(3) (special nature reserves); section 20(3) (national parks); and section 23(3) (nature 
reserves). No formal written agreement is required in respect of private land declared as a protected 
environment although the consent of the landowner is required (section 28(3)). 
97 See section 35(3) and section 36. 
98 Section 38. 
99 Section 39. 
100 Chapter 4 (Parts 2-4) of the Protected Areas Act. 
101 The powers and functions of SANParks are prescribed in Chapter 5 of the Act. 












communal access and use rights in respect of biological resources situated within 
protected areas; and the equitable sharing of benefits derived from such use. 
 
Prior to the implementation of the Protected Areas Act, it was predominantly state land 
that was incorporated within protected areas. However, as has been mentioned 
above,103 the Government has been compelled to turn to private and communal 
landowners to reach its international targets owing to the unavailability of suitable state 
land.  
 
Express provision is made for the incorporation of private land and communal land 
within all four types of protected areas prescribed under the Protected Areas Act. The 
mechanism regulating this process is generally a written agreement entered into 
between the landowner/s and the Government.104 The initiation of this process is 
fortunately not the preserve of the Government and can be initiated by landowners 
acting individually or collectively.105 These agreements are recorded in a notarial deed 
and registered against the title deed of the property.106 This effectively constitutes the 
Government’s first attempt to recognise the notion of conservation servitudes in South 
Africa. 
 
The second manner in which the Government has sought to enter into partnerships with 
the public relates to managing protected areas. Once established, the Government 
must in writing assign the management of the protected area to a management 
authority.107 Such assignment can only take place with the concurrence of the 
prospective management authority.108 The range of persons or institutions to which this 
                                                     
103 See Chapter 5 (Part 2). 
104 Agreements for incorporating private land within special nature reserves must be concluded with the 
Minister (section 18(3)). Agreements for incorporating private land within national parks must be 
concluded with the Minister or SANParks (section 20(3). Agreements for incorporating private land within 
nature reserves must be concluded with the Minister of relevant provincial MEC (section 23(3)). In respect 
of protected environments, no formal written agreement is required but the mere oral consent of the 
private landowner (section 28(3)). 
105 Section 35(1) and (2). 
106 Section 35 read with section 36. 
107 Section 38. 












function can be assigned includes suitable persons, organisations and organs of state. 
This feasibly enables the Government to devolve the management of protected areas to 
local communities. Where the local community owns the land in question and agreed to 
have it incorporated within a protected area, the local community would presumably be 
operating through a communal property institution. However, nothing precludes the 
devolution of management authority to other forms of community organisations that 
have no tenurial relationship to the land situated in the protected areas. 
 
Once appointed, a management authority must prepare and submit a comprehensive 
management plan to the Government for approval.109 The protected area must be 
managed in accordance with the management plan and mandatory content includes: 
planning measures, controls and performance criteria; programmes for the 
implementation of the plan and its costing; procedures for public participation; and the 
implementation of community-based natural resource management where 
appropriate.110 Discretionary content includes: provisions aimed at developing economic 
opportunities within and adjacent to the protected area; the development of local 
management capacity; and financial and other support necessary to ensure the 
effective administration and implementation of the management plan.111 Additional 
issues that must be considered in preparing these management plans are prescribed by 
way of regulation.112 
 
Although the Protected Areas Act does not provide for the conclusion of a formal 
contract between the Government and the management authority, if one considers the 
management regime holistically, it effectively constitutes a form of contractual 
relationship, a ‘management agreement’, in that: the management authority must agree 
to its appointment;113 the management plan sets out the reciprocal obligations of the 
state and the management authority; the content of the management plan needs to be 
                                                     
109 Section 39. 
110 Section 41(1) and (2). 
111 Section 41(3). 
112 Regulation 57(2) of the Regulations for the Proper Administration of Special Nature Reserves, National 
Parks and World Heritage Sites (GNR 1061 GG No. 28181 dated 28 October 2005). 












approved by both parties; and provision is made for the termination of the management 
relationship if the appointed management authority fails to comply with the terms 
thereof.114 These management agreements provide an important mechanism for the 
Government to share the responsibility and cost of managing South Africa’s protected 
areas, which in the past largely fell within its exclusive purview, with local communities. 
 
Finally, in line with the shift in the Protected Areas Act toward a more human-centred 
approach to conservation, the Act expressly recognises the need to enable the public to 
access, use and share any benefits derived from the use of natural resources situated 
within protected areas.115 One of the key mechanisms for facilitating the practical 
implementation of this approach is once again an array of agreements, the availability 
and applicability of which is dependent on a community’s relationship to the land. 
 
Where a community owns the land, it will be the agreement providing for the 
incorporation of communal land within the protected area that will regulate access, use 
and benefit-sharing. Where a community has been appointed to manage the area, it will 
be the management agreement that regulates such issues. The Protected Areas Act 
even caters for those situations where a community is neither the landowner nor the 
management authority. First, the mandatory content for all management plans includes: 
procedures for public participation by local communities and interested parties; and, 
where appropriate, the implementation of community-based natural resource 
management (CBNRM).116 The management agreements could therefore potentially 
regulate access, use and benefit-sharing issues although no guidance is unfortunately 
provided as to what these ‘procedures’ relate to and when it would be ‘appropriate’ to 
provide for CBNRM. Secondly, the Protected Areas Act provides for the conclusion of a 
co-management agreement between a management authority and relevant local 
communities to regulate issues of access, use and benefit-sharing.117 Thirdly, even in 
                                                     
114 Section 44. 
115 This is reflected in the Protected Areas Act’s objectives (s 2(e)-(f)) and the purposes for which 
protected areas can be declared (section 17(h)-(k)). 
116 S 41(2)(e)-(f). 
117 S 42. The provisions regulating co-management agreement appear to anticipate such a scenario as 












the absence of these management agreements and co-management agreements, the 
Act affords management authorities of certain protected areas discretion to enter into 
written agreements with local communities residing within or adjacent to a protected 
area, to regulate access and use issues specifically.118  
 
Relatively detailed formalities have been prescribed by way of regulation to govern 
these latter agreements concluded with local communities in relation to special nature 
reserves, national parks and world heritage sites.119 A management authority can grant 
access and use rights by way of a license, permit or agreement.120 Furthermore, the 
rights so granted must comply with any relevant management plan or co-management 
agreement,121 the management authority must keep a register of all such rights 
granted,122 and report annually thereon to the Minister.123 These requirements will be 
mimicked in the context of nature reserves when the applicable regulations are 
finalised.124  
 
The use of the above mechanisms for facilitating the practical implementation of CCAs 
in South Africa has been sporadic, to say the least. While numerous land incorporation 
agreements have been concluded between the Government and private landowners in 
the past three years, no such agreements have been concluded in respect of communal 
land. No community has been formally appointed as the management authority either in 
respect of land it owns, or in respect of land owned by another. Furthermore, no 
                                                                                                                                                                           
human activities that affect it. They can provide for: the apportionment of income generated from the 
management of the area or benefit-sharing between the parties; the use of biological resources; access; 
occupation; and the development of economic opportunities within and adjacent to the area (section 
42(2)). 
118These are national parks, special nature reserves, nature reserves and world heritage sites (s 50(1) of 
the Protected Areas Act read together with the Regulations for the Proper Administration of Special 
Nature Reserves, National Parks and World Heritage Sites (2005). 
119The Regulations for the Proper Administration of Special Nature Reserves, National Parks and World 
Heritage Sites (2005) specifically empower a management authority to grant access by way of a license, 
permit or agreement  
120 Regulation 5 read with regulation 31.  
121 Regulation 32. 
122 Regulation 33. 
123 Regulation 7(1)(a). 
124 Draft Regulations for the Proper Administration of Nature Reserves (published for comment in GN 
1029 GG No. 32472 dated 3 August 2009). See regulations 19-22 (the use of biological resources in 












agreements regulating access to and the use of biological resources situated within 
protected areas have been concluded to date. The reasons for this are not well 
documented and may stem from: a lack of capacity and awareness owing to the novelty 
of the statutory framework; a lack of clarity regarding the form, content and procedures 
for concluding many of these agreements; a failure to effectively ‘market’ these 
agreements through provision of associated incentives; entrenched scepticism among 
existing conservation and management authorities towards granting access and use 
rights to local communities; and historic distrust on the part of communal land reform 
beneficiaries of the benefits of venturing into the realm of conservation.125 The validity of 
each of the above is considered in the context of the case studies discussed in Chapter 
8. 
 
3.2 POLICIES, PLANS AND PROGRAMMES 
 
Complementing the above array of statutory mechanisms of relevance to the practical 
implementation of CCAs in South Africa, are several initiatives introduced by national 
and provincial authorities in the past five years. The most important of these are in 
chronological order: Guidelines for the Implementation of CBNRM in South Africa; 126 
Stewardship Programmes; the People and Parks Programme; the National Protected 
Areas Expansion Strategy;127 the National Spatial Biodiversity Assessment;128 the 
National Biodiversity Strategy and Action Plan;129 and the National Biodiversity 
Framework.130 
 
                                                     
125 For a discussion of these mechanisms and the necessary prerequisites for their implementation, see: 
Paterson “A Legal Critique of Recent Contractual Tools Aimed at Facilitating the Domestic 
Implementation of the Convention on Biological Diversity” (2007) 21-33. 
126 Department of Environmental Affairs and Tourism Guidelines for the Implementation of Community-
Based Natural Resource Management (CBNRM) in South Africa (2003). 
127Government of South Africa National Protected Areas Expansion Strategy for South Africa 2008 
(2009). 
128 Driver A, Maze K, Rouget M, Lombard A, Nel J, Turpie J, Cowling R, Desmet P, Goodman P, Harris L, 
Jonas Z, Reyers B, Sink K & Strauss T National Spatial Biodiversity Assessment 2004: Priorities for 
Biodiversity Conservation in South Africa (2005) Strelitzia 17, South African National Biodiversity Institute. 
129 Department of Environmental Affairs and Tourism South Africa’s National Biodiversity Strategy and 
Action Plan (2005). 












3.2.1 Guidelines for Implementation of CBNRM in South Africa 
 
The first comprehensive attempt by the Government to integrate the concerns of 
conservation and people was the publication of the Guidelines for the Implementation of 
Community Based Natural Resource Management (CBNRM) in South Africa (the 
Guidelines) in 2003. The objectives of the Guidelines are to promote a shared 
understanding of what is CBNRM; improve co-operation between all relevant 
stakeholders; and clarify the respective roles and responsibilities of these stakeholders. 
Highlighting the need to adopt an adaptive management approach to implementing 
CBNRM, the key value of the Guidelines appears to lie in the distillation of seven key 
principles necessary for implementing CBNRM.131 The document identifies a series of 
guidelines for implementing each of these principles132 and for: all parties involved in a 
CBNRM projects;133 communities;134 third parties assisting with the implementation of 
CBNRM projects;135 and policy-makers.136 The guidelines for policy-makers are 
particularly noteworthy.137 They should have informed the decisions and actions of 
Government in developing and implementing its legislative framework of relevance to 
CCAs during the course of the past half-decade. However, if one considers the 
concerns emanating from local communities attending the three previous People and 
                                                     
131 These principles are: communities must maintain a variety of different ways of earning a living; the 
natural resource base must be maintained, and even improved, to ensure that it can continue to support 
current and future livelihoods; local organisations, working in partnership with government and community 
organisations, must actively manage local resources for the benefit of local people and the environment; 
people must receive real benefits (economic, social, cultural and spiritual) for managing the natural 
resources wisely; there must be effective policies and laws and these must be implemented, wherever 
possible, in partnership with local peoples legitimate and representative organisations; outside assistance 
must be provided to support local projects and local people’s knowledge and experience must be 
respected; local leadership structures must be identified, understood and involved in the CBNRM projects 
(Guidelines for Community-Based Natural Resource Management in South Africa (2003) 21).  
132 Guidelines for Community-Based Natural Resource Management in South Africa (2003) 22-42. 
133 Guidelines for Community-Based Natural Resource Management in South Africa (2003) 45-48. 
134 Guidelines for Community-Based Natural Resource Management in South Africa (2003) 49-52. 
135 Guidelines for Community-Based Natural Resource Management in South Africa (2003) 53-56. 
136 Guidelines for Community-Based Natural Resource Management in South Africa (2003) 57-60.  
137 These guidelines include: involving communities and being open to new approaches; policy papers 
must be easy to understand and easy to get hold off; national and provincial policies should provide the 
basis for local rules; the aim should be to eventually hand authority to the resource users themselves and 
clear conditions need to be set for handing over such authority; everyone affected by the project should 
be included; provision must be made for building capacity, barriers between departments and agencies 
must be broken down; all relevant information must be sourced and disclosed prior to implementing the 












Parks Conferences, discussed below,138 there appears to be a clear disjuncture 
between theory and practice. 
 
3.2.2 Stewardship Programmes 
 
National and provincial conservation authorities have implemented various stewardship 
programmes aimed at promoting the wise use and management of natural resources 
situated on private and communal land in South Africa. The two most well established 
provincial programmes are CapeNature’s Stewardship Programme139 and Ezemvelo 
KZN Wildlife’s Biodiversity Stewardship Programme.140 In recognition of the success of 
these programmes and to facilitate the development of similar initiatives in all provinces, 
the Department of Environmental Affairs recently established Biodiversity Stewardship 
South Africa.141 
 
These programmes generally aim to: create innovative alternative mechanisms for 
securing private and communal land for conservation; create a network of diverse 
conservation areas in the landscape; provide landowners who commit their property to 
conservation tangible rewards for doing so; and to expand conservation by encouraging 
commitment to, and the implementation of good biodiversity management practices on 
private and communal land.142 To do so, they promote four main stewardship options 
that vary with respect to the degree of formal protection, the duration of protection and 
the level of potential benefits accruing to landowners who enter the programme. These 
are: contract nature reserves;143 biodiversity agreements;144 protected environments;145 
                                                     
138 See Part 3.2.3 below. 
139 For further information on the CapeNature Stewardship Programme see: 
http://www.capenature.org.za/ and www.capestewardship.co.za/. 
140 For further information on Ezemvelo KZN Wildlife’s Biodiversity Stewardship Programme see: 
http://www.kznwildlife.com/index.php?/Stewardship.html.  
141 For further information on Biodiversity Stewardship South Africa, see: http://www.stewardship.co.za/. 
142 See further: Ezemvelo KZN Wildlife KZN Biodiversity Stewardship: Conservation in Landowner’s 
Hands (available at www.kznwildlife.com); and CapeNature Conservation in Landowners Hands 
(available at www.capenature.co.za).  
143 Nature reserves are constituted by way of a written agreement entered into between the conservation 
authorities and the landowner in terms of section 23 of the Protected Areas Act. The formalities relating to 
their establishment and management are formal and their duration long term. 












and conservation areas.146 The relationship between these four stewardship options is 
depicted in the Figure 3 below. 
 
 
FIGURE 3: Stewardship Options147 
 
The diverse array of stewardship options affords conservation authorities and 
landowners alike a great degree of flexibility to tailor conservation solutions to suit a 
specific context.  While extensively implemented on private land, the successful 
implementation with respect to communal land is yet to be fully realised.148 It is 
                                                                                                                                                                           
conservation authority and the landowner. The formalities relating to their establishment and 
management are less formal and their duration medium term (not less than 10 years). While not expressly 
stating so, these would appear to mimic the biodiversity management agreements prescribed in section 
44 of the Biodiversity Act. 
145 Protected environments are constituted by way of a written agreement entered into between the 
conservation authority and the landowner in terms of section 28 of the Protected Areas Act. The 
formalities relating to their establishment and management are similarly less formal and their duration is 
not prescribed. 
146 No statutory formalities are prescribed for the establishment and management of conservation areas. 
They are accordingly the most flexible option with no defined period of commitment. They are generally 
constituted by registering the area with the relevant provincial conservation authority. 
147 CapeNature Conservation in Landowners Hands (available at www.capenature.co.za). 
148 In the Western Cape, for example, CapeNature has successfully established thirty-three nature 
reserves, seventeen biodiversity agreement and twenty one conservation areas on private land since the 
establishment of the programme in 2003 (Cape Nature Quantified Report 2008/2009 (2009) 58; 
CapeNature Annual Report 2008/2009 (2009) 12-13).  However, no similar successes have been 












interesting to note in this regard, that the Department of Land Affairs in partnership with 
the South African National Biodiversity Institute, plan to implement the National Land 
Reform Biodiversity Stewardship Initiative shortly, which aims to extend the application 
of the stewardship model to land subject to land reform areas with high biodiversity 
value.149 
 
3.2.3 People and Parks Programme 
 
Initiated by the former Department of Environmental Affairs and Tourism in 2003, this 
programme seeks to expand community involvement in the management and use of 
protected areas, and to build improved stakeholder liaison structures between 
conservation authorities and local communities. The key impetus for this programme 
has been built around a series of biennial People and Parks Conferences.150 If one 
surveys the proceedings of the three conferences which have been held to date, the 
common issues subject to debate are how to: build government and local community 
capacity; promote greater access, use and benefit-sharing within protected areas; 
reconcile the objectives and procedures of South Africa’s land reform and conservation 
agendas; create a better post-settlement support framework for successful land 
claimants; clarify the practical implementation of the co-management governance 
model; build effective community public private partnerships on land restored to local 
communities; and strengthen and extend South Africa’s protected areas network in a 
manner that does not undermine local communities.151 The Government has 
undertaken several measures in the past few years to address these issues, including: 
the publication of biennial Peoples and Park Action Plans which effectively constitute 
                                                     
149 See further: CAPE, CEPF, South African National Biodiversity Institute & Wilderness Foundation 
Biodiversity Briefing Series No.2 (2010). 
150 Department of Environmental Affairs and Tourism Outcomes of the 2004 People and Parks Workshop 
(2004); Department of Environmental Affairs and Tourism 2nd People and Parks Conference Report 
(2006); and Department of Environmental Affairs and Tourism 3rd People and Parks Conference Report 
(2008). 
151 These sentiments are clearly reflected in the Swadini Statement (attached to Outcomes of the 2004 
People and Parks Workshop (2004) 6-7); Beaufort West Declaration and Community Statement (attached 
2nd People and Parks Conference Report (2006) 14-17) and the Mafikeng Declaration (3rd People and 












two-year implementation programmes;152 the signing of a Memorandum of Agreement 
between the erstwhile Minister of Agriculture and Land Affairs and Minister of 
Environmental Affairs and Tourism to expedite the resolution of land claims situated 
within protected areas;153 the development of a National Co-Management Framework to 
guide the settlement of these claims;154 the publication of a National Protected Areas 
Expansion Strategy;155 and the establishment of a People and Parks Steering 
Committee156 and national park forums.157 
 
However, notwithstanding these very tangible measures emanating from the People 
and Parks Programme in the past few years, it appears that the objectives of the 
Programme are far from being realised. As reflected in the proceedings of the 3rd 
People and Parks Conference held in 2008, the success of this programme is 
somewhat chequered. Communities remain troubled by the bulk of issues raised at the 
first two conferences and have grave concerns about the utility of the measures 
implemented by the Government in the past two years to resolve them.158 These 
concerns have been complemented by additional emerging issues such as: lack of 
political buy-in by national, provincial and municipal authorities; lack of accountability 
from some conservation authorities and government departments; protracted land claim 
                                                     
152 These bi-annual Action Plans are contained within the Conference Proceedings (see note 150 above). 
See for example: 2nd People and Parks Conference Report (2006) 20-41; and 3rd People and Parks 
Conference Report (2008) 29-37. 
153 Minister of Agriculture and Land Affairs and Minister of Environmental Affairs and Tourism 
Memorandum of Agreement, dated 2 May 2007. The agreement sets out the respective roles and 
responsibilities of these departments when dealing with land claims within protected areas. This 
agreement is discussed more fully in Chapter 7 (Part 2.1) below). 
154 Department of Environmental Affairs National Co-Management Framework (2010). This National Co-
Management Framework is discussed more fully in Chapter 7 (Part 2.2). 
155Government of South Africa National Protected Areas Expansion Strategy for South Africa 2008 
(2009). The objective of the Strategy is to achieve cost effective protected area expansion for ecological 
sustainability and increased resilience to climate change. The Strategy prescribes targets for protected 
area expansion, contains maps of the most important areas for protected area expansion, and makes 
recommendations on mechanisms for protected area expansion. This Strategy is discussed more fully in 
Chapter 5 (Part 3.2.6). 
156 The People and Parks Steering Committee, established in 2007, comprises of representatives from 
national and provincial government, conservation authorities and local communities. Its purpose is to 
guide the implementation of the People and Parks Programme. The role of the Steering Committee is 
discussed more fully in Chapter 5 (Part 3.3.3). 
157The aim of this initiative is to establish a park forum for each national park. These forums include 
representatives from SANParks, surrounding communities, local stakeholders and other interested and 
affected parties. The role of these Park Forums is discussed more fully in Chapter 5 (Part 3.3.3). 












processes; lack of post-settlement support; and insufficient information sharing, 
awareness and communication strategies at the local level.159 The relationship between 
people and parks, and conservation and land reform is clearly far from settled. 
 
3.2.4 National Spatial Biodiversity Assessment 
 
The National Spatial Biodiversity Assessment (NSBA), commissioned by the 
Department of Environmental Affairs and Tourism and published in 2005, primarily 
contains a spatial assessment of South Africa’s biodiversity and an overview of key 
issues, constraints and opportunities for conserving it. The three key strategies for 
conserving South Africa’s biodiversity emerging from this assessment are: focussing 
emergency action on threatened ecosystems; expanding the formal protected areas 
framework; and pursuing options for linking biodiversity and socio-economic 
development. The latter two priorities are of specific relevance to CCAs given their 
potential to expand the protected areas network and the need for them to contribute to 
local economic development to ensure their viability and sustainability.160 The NSBA 
furthermore notes the vital role played by municipalities in this regard and recommends 
building their capacity to include biodiversity opportunities and constraints in their 
integrated development planning.161 
 
3.2.5 National Biodiversity Strategy and Action Plan & National Biodiversity Framework 
 
The National Biodiversity Strategy and Action Plan (NBSAP) was launched by the 
former Department of Environmental Affairs and Tourism in 2006 and is informed by the 
NSBA. The NBSAP highlights five primary strategic objectives, specifies a range of 
activities to realise each of these objectives, and sets short-term (5-year) and long-term 
(15-year) targets and outcomes for each of these objectives.162 References to 
                                                     
159 Mafikeng Declaration and Community Statement contained within the 3rd People and Parks 
Conference Report (2008) at 15 and 38 respectively. 
160 National Spatial Biodiversity Assessment (2005) x. 
161 Ibid. 
162 The five strategic objectives are: enhanced institutional effectiveness and efficiency ensuring good 












communities and communal landowners are littered throughout the document. 
Communal landowners are expressly acknowledged as important stakeholders in the 
implementation of the NBSAP.163 Owing to the extensive communal use of natural 
resources situated within and outside of protected areas, the NBSAP identifies the need 
to encourage communal landowners to conserve the natural resources on their land 
voluntarily through the provision of appropriate incentives and support,164 and to expand 
the protected areas system to include additional communal land.165 To overcome the 
historical inequitable access to and use of natural resources, the NBSAP further 
promotes the forging of partnerships between Government, communities and the private 
sector, granting increased communal access and use rights in protected areas, 
promoting access to information and ensuring informed community participation in 
decision-making.166  
 
The National Biodiversity Framework (NBF), published by the erstwhile Department of 
Environmental Affairs and Tourism in 2005, identifies 33 priority actions to be 
undertaken in the next five years to give effect to the strategic objectives highlighted in 
the NBSAP. In doing so it seeks to provide a framework to co-ordinate and align the 
short-term efforts of the many organisations and individuals involved in conserving and 
managing South Africa's biodiversity. Given that the NBSAP specifically informed the 
NBF, it is not surprising to find the above sentiments of relevance to CCAs mimicked 




                                                                                                                                                                           
management objectives into the economy; integrated terrestrial and aquatic management across the 
country minimizing the impact of threatening processes on biodiversity, enhancing ecosystem services 
and improving social and economic security; human development and well-being enhanced through the 
sustainable use of biological resources and the equitable sharing of benefits; and a network of 
conservation areas conserving a representative sample of biodiversity and maintaining key ecological 
processes across the landscape and seascape. 
163 National Biodiversity Strategy and Action Plan (2005) 10, 71 & 73. 
164 National Biodiversity Strategy and Action Plan (2005) 27, 29, 57 & 71. 
165 National Biodiversity Strategy and Action Plan (2005) 18 & 69. 
166 National Biodiversity Strategy and Action Plan (2005) 62-63. 












3.2.6 National Protected Areas Expansion Strategy 
 
The National Protected Areas Expansion Strategy (NPEAS), published in 2009, 
acknowledges that South Africa’s protected areas network is currently inadequate168 
and aims to provide a strategy for promoting ‘cost effective protected areas expansion 
for ecological sustainability and increased resilience to climate change’.169 In order to do 
so, the NPEAS prescribes an array of targets for ensuring that a representative sample 
of South Africa’s crucial ecosystems are conserved170 and identifies forty-two large, 
intact and unfragmented areas of high conservation value deemed suitable for inclusion 
in large protected areas.171 These areas crucially include those under communal 
ownership and it is therefore not surprising that the NPEAS expressly acknowledges the 
relationship between land reform and protected areas.172  
 
The key legal mechanism that the NPEAS promotes for including additional communal 
land within the protected areas network is the contract agreements prescribed in the 
Protected Areas Act.173 The nuanced options that have been implemented in the 
various provincial stewardship programmes174 are identified as a model for tailor-making 
these contracts to suit the specificity of the particular area.175 While it is hoped that the 
current array of fiscal incentives176 will be sufficient to encourage communal landowners 
to enter into such contracts, it is acknowledged that further research is required into new 
instruments such as revolving trusts and payments for ecosystem services.177  
 
                                                     
168 National Protected Areas Expansion Strategy (2009) 7. 
169 National Protected Areas Expansion Strategy (2009) 1. 
170 National Protected Areas Expansion Strategy (2009) 15-23. 
171 National Protected Areas Expansion Strategy (2009) 24-31. 
172 National Protected Areas Expansion Strategy (2009) 11-12. 
173 National Protected Areas Expansion Strategy (2009) 32-34. For a discussion of the contract 
agreements prescribed in the Protected Areas Act, see: Chapter 5 (Part 3.1.2). 
174 For a discussion of provincial stewardship programmes, see: Chapter 5 (Part 3.2.2). 
175 Ibid. 
176 A full discussion of these economic incentives unfortunately falls outside the purview of this 
dissertation. For further information, see: Paterson A “Considering Recent Developments in 
Environmental Fiscal Reform in South Africa” (2009) 16(1) South African Journal of Environmental Law & 
Policy 29-34; Paterson (2005) South African Journal of Environmental Law & Policy 97-121; and Paterson 
(2005) South African Law Journal 182-216. 












Importantly, the NPEAS highlights the potential scope of protected areas to facilitate 
local economic development and to promote the diversification of rural livelihoods in 
those areas where other forms of land use are not viable.178 In order to realise this 
potential, it advocates that communal landowners should be afforded full access to the 
economic opportunities associated with eco-tourism in protected areas.179 No mention is 
made however of providing such landowners with rights of access, use and residence. 
Furthermore, placing the responsibility to implement the NPEAS under the exclusive 
preserve of national conservation authorities180 may frustrate its realisation given the 
potential key role played by provincial conservation authorities, land reform authorities, 
traditional leadership institutions, park forums, communal property institutions and 
municipalities in the context CCAs.181 
 
3.3 KEY INSTITUTIONS 
 
South Africa clearly has a comprehensive statutory and policy framework for 
implementing CCAs. Equally comprehensive is the array of institutions responsible for 
its implementation.182 These institutions span different national ministries, national 
departments and statutory authorities housed in all three spheres of government. It is 
the somewhat convoluted allocation of mandates between and across these institutions 






                                                     
178 National Protected Areas Expansion Strategy (2009) 12-13. 
179 National Protected Areas Expansion Strategy (2009) 12. 
180 The NPEAS provides that the primary implementers for the policy shall be: the Department of 
Environmental Affairs (including its Marine and Coastal Management Branch), South African National 
Parks; South African National Biodiversity Institute; and World Heritage Site Authorities. It is proposed to 
create a Protected Areas CEOs Forum (comprising of representatives from the above institutions) to 
coordinate the Strategy’s implementation (National Protected Areas Expansion Strategy (2009) 37-38). 
181 For a discussion of the potential role played by these institutions, see: provincial conservation 
authorities and park forums (Chapter 5 (Part 3.3)); land reform authorities (Chapter 6 (Part 5.1)); 
communal property institutions (Chapter 6 (Part 5.2)); traditional leadership institutions (Chapter 6 (Part 
5.3)); and municipalities (Chapter 9 (Part 7.1)). 
182 For a comprehensive overview of these institutions, see: Department of Environmental Affairs Review 












3.3.1 Ministries, Departments and Statutory Authorities 
 
Following the restructuring of the South African Cabinet by President Zuma in 2009, the 
administration of the bulk of national laws of relevance to conservation generally, and 
terrestrial protected areas in particular, were entrusted to the Minister of Water and 
Environmental Affairs. 183 The Department of Environmental Affairs (DEA)184 and the 
Department of Water Affairs support the Minister in the administration of this 
mandate.185 These Departments are in turn assisted in the administration of the national 
parks and biodiversity portfolios by two key statutory authorities, namely South African 
National Parks (SANParks) and the South African National Biodiversity Institute 
(SANBI). The former is generally responsible for administering the country’s national 
parks and has a dedicated Directorate: People and Conservation.186 The latter is 
generally responsible for more scientific enterprises such as biodiversity planning and 
monitoring.187 
                                                     
183 GN 40 GG No. 32367 dated 1 July 2009.  
184 The relevant laws administered by the Department of Environmental Affairs are: Biodiversity Act; 
Environment Conservation Act; Marine Living Resources Act; National Environmental Management: 
Integrated Costal Management Act; National Parks Act; Protected Areas Act; Sea-Shore Act; and World 
Heritage Convention Act. In the context of protected areas, DEA has a dedicated Chief Directorate: 
Transfrontier Conservation and Protected Areas and three supporting Directorates: Transfrontier and 
Conservation Areas; Protected Areas and Development; and Protected Areas, Legislation and 
Compliance. In the context of conservation generally, DEA has a dedicated Chief Directorate: Biodiversity 
and Heritage and various supporting Directorates including: Biodiversity Conservation; Resource Use; 
and Regulation and Monitoring Services. For further information on DEA see its website 
(http://www.environment.gov.za/). 
185 The relevant law administered by the DWA is the Mountain Catchment Areas Act. For further 
information on DWA see its website (http://www.dwa.gov.za/). 
186 The powers and functions of SANParks are prescribed in Chapter 5 of the Protected Areas Act and 
include: managing national parks and other protected areas assigned to it in terms of the Act; protecting, 
conserving and controlling these national parks and the activities taking place within them; undertaking 
and promoting research within national parks; and, on the Minister’s request, providing advice on any 
matter concerning the conservation and management of biodiversity generally, the proposed 
establishment or extension of a national park, or the exclusion of land from an existing national park 
(section 55). SANParks currently administers twenty-one national parks in South Africa. 
187 The powers and functions of SANBI are prescribed in Chapter 2 of the Biodiversity Act. While its 
primary functions do not encompass the day-to-day regulation of protected areas, many of them are of 
relevance to the planning and administration of these areas and include: monitoring and regularly 
reporting to the Minister on the status of the country’s biodiversity, the conservation status of all listed 
threatened or protected species and the status of all listed invasive species; acting as an advisory and 
consultative body on biodiversity-related matters to organs of state and other biodiversity stakeholders; 
managing South Africa’s national botanical gardens; establishing facilities for environmental education, 
visitor amenities and research; establishing collections of animals and micro-organisms in appropriate 
enclosures; collecting, generating, processing, coordinating and disseminating information about 













These are not however the only national institutions of relevance to administering 
protected areas in South Africa. The administration of the National Forests Act, which 
provides for the designation of forest reserves and wilderness areas has been entrusted 
to the Minister of Agriculture, Forestry and Fisheries,188 supported by the Department 
Agriculture, Forestry and Fisheries (DAFF).189 The administration of the majority of 
these areas has been, or is in the process of being, delegated to relevant provincial 
authorities.190 The role of DAFF in the regulation of protected areas is therefore 
decreasing rapidly. 
 
Owing to the fact that the environment and nature conservation are concurrent 
provincial constitutional competences, relevant ministerial and departmental structures 
are duplicated at the provincial level. These vary somewhat according to the provincial 
clustering of functions but all provinces have a relevant MEC, supported by an 
associated Department responsible, for environmental affairs, including conservation. 
Several of these Departments play a key role in the establishment, regulation and 
management of various forms of protected areas declared under both national and 
provincial legislation, including: world heritage sites; provincial nature reserves; 
protected environments; mountain catchment areas.191 Other provinces have assigned 
this entire function, or a portion of it, to provincial conservation authorities such as: 
Cape Nature;192 Eastern Cape Parks and Tourism Agency;193 Ezemvelo KZN Wildlife;194 
                                                                                                                                                                           
indigenous biodiversity and the sustainable use of indigenous biological resources; coordinating 
programmes for the rehabilitation of ecosystems and the prevention, control or eradication of listed 
invasive species; and assisting the Minister in the exercise of their powers, including providing advice on 
listed ecosystems, the implementation of the Act and any international agreements, the identification of 
bioregions and the contents of any bioregional plans, other aspects of biodiversity planning, the 
management and conservation of biological diversity, the sustainable use of indigenous biological 
resources, and the management of, and development in, national protected areas (section 11). 
188 GN 40 GG No. 32367 dated 1 July 2009. 
189 For further information on DAFF see its website (http://www.nda.agric.za/). 
190 National Protected Areas Expansion Strategy (2009) 35. 
191 These Departments are: Eastern Cape Department of Economic Development & Environmental 
Affairs; Free State Department of Tourism, Economic & Environmental Affairs; Gauteng Department of 
Agriculture, Conservation & Environment; Limpopo Department of Economic Development, Environment 
and Tourism; and Northern Cape Department of Tourism, Environment & Conservation. 
192 In the Western Cape, special nature reserves, provincial nature reserves, world heritage sites, 
protected environments and mountain catchment areas are administered by CapeNature, regulated under 












Mpumalanga Tourism and Parks Agency;195 and the North West Parks and Tourism 
Board.196 
 
The role of the local sphere of Government in the administration of protected areas is 
far more sporadic. Although conservation is not a local constitutional competence, 
several well-resourced metropolitan, district and local municipalities continue to 
administer local nature reserves.197 Their role is, however, on the decrease as less 
resourced district and local municipalities seek to shed this unfunded mandate.198 
 
3.3.2 Management Authorities 
 
As has been highlighted above, the Protected Areas Act compels the Minister to assign 
the management of all ‘protected areas’199 to a management authority, which can be a 
suitable person, organisation or organ of state.200 The management of national parks 
must, however, be assigned to SANParks.201 While the management of the bulk of the 
country’s national parks, special nature reserves, provincial and local nature reserves 
                                                                                                                                                                           
193 In the Eastern Cape, provincial nature reserves are administered by the Eastern Cape Parks and 
Tourism Agency, established in terms of the Eastern Cape Parks and Tourism Act (2 of 2010). Protected 
environments and mountain catchment areas remain under the administration of the Eastern Cape 
Department of Economic Development & Environmental Affairs.  
194 In KwaZulu-Natal, provincial nature reserves, marine protected areas and world heritage sites are 
administered by Ezemvelo KZN Wildlife, established in terms of the KwaZulu-Natal Nature Conservation 
Management Act (9 of 1997).  
195 In Mpumalanga, provincial nature reserves are administered by the Mpumalanga Tourism and Parks 
Authority, established in terms of the Mpumalanga Tourism and Parks Agency Act (5 of 2005). 
196 In North West, provincial nature reserves and world heritage sites are administered by North West 
Parks and Tourism Board, originally established in terms of the (Bophuthatswana) National Parks Act (24 
of 1987). 
197 These local nature reserves were proclaimed under the Environment Conservation Act and/or 
provincial conservation Ordinances and Acts. Examples of municipal authorities that continue to 
administer local nature reserves include: Buffalo City Metropolitan Municipality; City of Cape Town 
Metropolitan Municipality; City of eThekwini Metropolitan Municipality; and Overstrand Local Municipality. 
198 National Protected Areas Expansion Strategy (2009) 37-38. 
199 The term ‘protected area’ is defined as ‘any of the protected areas referred to in section 9’ (section 1).  
The kinds of protected areas listed in section 9 include: special nature reserves; national parks; nature 
reserves; wilderness areas; protected environments; world heritage sites; marine protected areas; 
specially protected forest areas; forest nature reserves; forest wilderness areas; and mountain catchment 
areas.  
200 Section 38 read with section 37. 












has been assigned to government authorities,202 the management of many local and 
private nature reserves has been assigned to private and communal landowners. The 
array of authorities appointed to manage South Africa’s natural world heritage sites 
under the World Heritage Convention Act is equally diverse and includes specially 
constituted statutory authorities,203 provincial Ministers204 and provincial conservation 
agencies.205 Given the broad powers afforded to these management authorities, they 
have a key role to play in both managing CCAs, and promoting access to and the use of 
such areas by communities living in close proximity to them. 
 
While the above mêlée of institutions manage statutorily prescribed areas, it would be 
amiss not to mention the role of private and communal landowners in managing non-
statutory protected areas. These predominantly take the form of conservancies and 
game farms that at the last available estimate spanned some 13 % of private and 
communally owned land in South Africa.206 
 
3.3.3 Advisory Institutions  
 
Several statutory and non-statutory advisory forums, of key relevance to facilitating 
CCAs in South Africa, have arisen during the course of the past decade. 
 
The most important of these from a national perspective is the People and Parks Forum 
initiated in 2004. It comprises of representatives from relevant government departments, 
conservation authorities, tribal authorities, communities and non-government 
organisations who meet on a biennial basis to discuss the implementation of the People 
                                                     
202 These include the array of authorities discussed in Chapter 5 (Part 3.3.1). 
203 For example: ISimangaliso Wetland Park Authority, a statutory authority constituted under the World 
Heritage Convention Act, is the appointed management authority for the ISimangaliso Wetland Park 
World Heritage Site (previously known as the Greater St Lucia Wetland Park).  
204 For example: the MEC for Sports, Arts and Culture in the Northern Cape Province is the appointed 
management authority for the Richtersveld Cultural and Botanical Landscape World Heritage Site. 
205 For example: Ezemvelo UKZN Wildlife is the appointed management authority for the UKhahlamba 
Drakensberg Park World Heritage Site. 
206 Department of Environmental Affairs and Tourism People, Parks and Transformation in South Africa: A 












and Parks Programme.207 The management of the People and Parks Forum is 
overseen by the National People and Parks Steering Committee established in 2004. Its 
membership, which initially comprised of government representatives, was expanded to 
include members of the Community Task Team established in 2006. The Community 
Task Team comprises of community representatives from each of the nine provinces, 
and was specifically established to allay concerns over the lack of community 
participation in the decision-making of the National People and Parks Steering 
Committee.208  
 
To facilitate the implementation of the People and Parks Programme at the provincial 
level, various Provinces have established, or are in the process of establishing, People 
and Parks Steering Committees (in some Provinces referred to as People and Parks 
Forums), comprising of relevant provincial conservation authorities and community 
representatives.209 In the context of national parks, SANParks has over the past six 
years undertaken a similar initiative at the local level by establishing individual park 
forums in the majority of national parks in South Africa.210 These park forums include 
representatives from SANParks, surrounding communities, local stakeholders and other 
interested and affected parties. Their purpose is to encourage active participation in the 
management of the national park, and to act as a discussion forum for issues affecting 
the park and its surrounding communities. The ambit of this initiative unfortunately does 
not extend to the many other forms of protected areas prevalent in South Africa.  
 
The Protected Areas Act, however, provides for the establishment of advisory 
committees for various other forms of protected areas, the membership and mandate of 
which is sufficiently broadly defined to include community representation and the 
facilitation of community-based natural resource management.211 Provision is also 
                                                     
207 For a discussion on the People and Parks Programme, see Chapter 5 (Part 3.2.3). 
208 2nd People and Parks Conference Report (2006) 12-13. 
209 Provinces to have established Provincial People and Parks Steering Committees/Forums include: 
North-West; Kwazulu-Natal; Limpopo; and Western Cape (3rd People and Parks Conference Report 
(2008) 79, 83, 85 & 98). The Eastern Cape is in the process of establishing a Provincial Steering 
Committee (3rd People and Parks Conference Report (2008) 90). 
210 SANParks Annual Report (2008/2009) (2009) 7. 












made in contemporary provincial conservation legislation for establishing local 
conservation boards, the express purpose of which is to ‘promote local decision-making 
regarding the management of nature conservation and heritage resources within 
protected areas’.212 These advisory committees and local conservation boards clearly 
provide opportunities for establishing the equivalent of ‘park forums’ in many other 




Within this chapter I traversed South Africa’s extensive conservation regime of 
relevance to CCAs. I discussed the significant reforms of the past five years that 
promote a far more inclusive, participatory and human-centred approach to 
conservation. I highlighted the number of mechanisms inherent in these reforms for 
implementing CCAs in South Africa. These include provision for local communities to 
enter into biodiversity management agreements with government authorities under the 
Biodiversity Act; and the ability of local communities to contract their communal land 
into protected areas, to be appointed as management authorities, to enter into co-
management agreements with existing management authorities, and to enter into 
access and use arrangements with existing management authorities under the 
Protected Areas Act. I finally considered several recent policies and programmes which 
have sought to facilitate the implementation of these mechanisms and the exceedingly 
diverse array of institutions tasked with doing so. 
 
                                                                                                                                                                           
Parks and World Heritage Sites (2005). Provision for the establishment of advisory committees for nature 
reserves is made in Regulations 12-17 of the Draft Regulations for the Proper Administration of Nature 
Reserves (2009). The membership of these advisory committees can include ‘community organisations, 
non-governmental organisations, residents of and neighbouring communities to’ the protected area (see 
Regulation 51(a)) Regulations for the Proper Administration of Special Nature Reserves, National Parks 
and World Heritage Sites (2005) and Regulation 13(a) of the Draft Regulations for the Proper 
Administration of Nature Reserves (2009)). 
212 See section 25-39 of the Kwazulu-Natal Nature Conservation Management Act (9 of 1997). The 
potential membership of any local conservation board is diverse but must ‘ensure a balance between 
tribal authorities, regional councils and other municipalities, community-based organisations, the business 
sector, environmental groups, farming associations and other interested parties’ (section 25(4)(c)). Pilot 
projects are underway to establish local conservation boards in several protected areas in Kwazulu-Natal 












All told, South Africa’s contemporary conservation regime holds great potential for 
implementing CCAs. Notwithstanding its promulgation over five years ago, the use of 
the mechanisms inherent in it for doing so has been disconcertingly sporadic. What is 
furthermore disconcerting is that the majority of these mechanisms were absent during 
the first decade of South Africa’s land reform programme. In their absence, the 
country’s land reform authorities were compelled to fashion their own mechanisms 
when restoring communal land situated within protected areas. These mechanisms, the 
majority of which are still prevalent today, effectively constituted South Africa’s first 
efforts to introduce CCAs. 
 
It is therefore not surprising that the country’s legal framework of relevance to CCAs sits 
somewhat uncomfortably between the conservation domain and the land reform 
domain. One cannot read the one without the other and it is accordingly to an analysis 
















SOUTH AFRICA’S LAND REFORM REGIME OF RELEVANCE 





South Africa’s pre-constitutional land regime embedded a ruthless system of racially-
based dispossession and forced removals. This system was founded on a diverse array 
of laws including the Native Land Act,1 Black Administration Act,2 Development Trust 
and Land Act,3 Group Areas Act,4 Prevention of Illegal Squatting Act,5 Black Authorities 
Act6 and Blacks Resettlement Act.7 The implementation of these laws led to the 
relocation of approximately 3.5 million Black South Africans, and their descendants, 
from rural and urban areas into homelands, reserves and townships; the decay of 
traditional communal tenure regimes; the entrenchment of a ‘double-standard system’ of 
land rights under which white South Africans enjoyed strong civil law land rights and 
                                                     
1 Act 27 of 1913. The Act precluded black South Africans purchasing, hiring or otherwise acquiring land 
outside of ‘scheduled native areas’ - effectively native reserves. 
2 Act 38 of 1927. The Act precluded black South Africans owning land in scheduled native areas. It further 
granted authority over land administration in these native reserves to government-appointed tribal 
authorities. These tribal authorities allocated land rights to individuals in the form of permission to occupy 
certificates. The Act was recently repealed by the Repeal of the Black Administration Act and Amendment 
of Certain Laws Amendment (7 of 2008), which commenced on 30 December 2010. 
3 Act 18 of 1936. The Act enabled the Government to eliminate black-owned land situated outside of 
scheduled native areas. It furthermore provided for the establishment of the South African Development 
Trust which was empowered to acquire land for inclusion in native reserves. This land was effectively held 
in trust by the Government, but the administration of it was delegated to tribal authorities. 
4 Act 41 of 1950 and Act 36 of 1966. These Acts provided for the designation of different residential areas 
for different races and the forced removal of people into these areas. 
5 Act 52 of 1951. The Act empowered the Government to remove black South African’s residing on public 
and privately-owned land and to establish resettlement camps to house these people. 
6 Act 68 of 1951. The Act provided for the establishment of black homelands and regional authorities to 
administer these homelands. 
7 Act 19 of 1954. The Act provided for the removal of Black South Africans residing in and around 












Black South African’s weak permit-based rights of occupation; and the creation of a 
chaotic matrix of institutions responsible for land administration.8 
 
Following South Africa’s transition to a constitutional democracy, the Government 
recognised that a key mechanism for facilitating both political and socio-economic 
transformation was land reform.9 In an effort to reverse the historic disenfranchisement, 
disentitlement and resultant poverty caused by the apartheid land regime, the 
Government initiated a comprehensive land reform programme in the 1990s. 
 
Finding its origins in the African National Congress’s Reconstruction and Development 
Programme: A Policy Framework,10 and informed by the property clause enshrined in 
the Constitution, South Africa’s land reform programme is comprehensively 
encapsulated in the White Paper on South African Land Policy.11 Published in 1997, the 
White Paper recognised that ‘current landownership and land development patterns 
strongly reflect political and economic conditions of the apartheid era’ and that ‘racially-
based land policies were a cause of insecurity, landlessness and poverty among black 
people’.12 It identified the following aspects as requiring urgent attention: ‘injustices of 
                                                     
8 Hall R “Reconciling the Past, Present, and Future - The Parameters and Practices of Land Restitution in 
South Africa” in Walker C, Bohlin A, Hall R & Kepe T Land, Memory, Reconstruction and Justice - 
Perspectives on Land Claims in South Africa (2010) Ohio University Press Ohio 18-21; Mostert H “Land 
Restitution, Social Justice and Development” (2002) 119 South African Law Journal 401-402. See further: 
Claassens A & Cousins B “Communal Land Tenure from Above and Below. Land Rights, Authority and 
Livelihoods in Southern Africa” in Evers S, Spierenburg M & Wels H (eds) Competing Jurisdictions - 
Settling Land Claims in Africa (2005) Martinus Nijhoff Publishers Netherlands 31-34; Cousins B & 
Claassens A “Communal Land Rights, Democracy and Traditional Leaders in Post-Post-Apartheid South 
Africa” in Saruchera M (ed) Securing Land and Resources in Africa: Pan-African Perspectives (2004) 
PLAAS Bellville 140-144; and Department of Land Affairs White Paper on South African Land Policy 
(1997) 11. 
9 Mostert H (2002) South African Law Journal 402 & 419. 
10 African National Congress Reconstruction and Development Programme: A Policy Framework (1994). 
This Policy Framework recognised ‘(l)and is the most basic need for rural dwellers. Apartheid policies 
pushed millions of black South Africans into overcrowded and impoverished reserves, homelands and 
townships’ and that a ‘national land reform programme is the central and driving force of a programme for 
rural development. Such a programme aims to redress effectively the injustices of forced removals and 
the historical denial of access to land. It aims to ensure security of tenure for rural dwellers’ (19-20). It 
furthermore called for the implementation of a fundamental land reform programme, which ensures 
‘security of tenure for all South Africans, regardless of their system of land holding’ (ibid). 
11 Department of Land Affairs White Paper on South African Land Policy (1997). 












racially-based land dispossession; inequitable distribution of land ownership; and the 
need for security of tenure for all’.13 
 
Inherent in the above are the three main components of South Africa’s land reform 
programme, namely: land restitution; land redistribution; and land tenure reform. The 
land restitution component of the programme seeks to ‘restore land and provide other 
restitutionary remedies to people dispossessed by racially discriminatory legislation’.14 
The land redistribution component aims to provide the ‘landless poor, labour tenants, 
farm workers, women and emergent farmers’ with ‘access to land for residential and 
productive uses, in order to improve their income and quality of life.’15 The land tenure 
component seeks to bring all people occupying land in South Africa ‘under a unitary, 
legally validated system of landholding’.16 The first and third components of the land 
reform programme are of key relevance to the domestic implementation of communally-
conserved areas (CCAs).  
 
Of the 79 696 claims lodged under the restitution component of the land reform 
programme, only 121 relate to land situated within protected areas.17 Of these, 78 
validated claims in protected areas remained unsettled.18 While the overall number of 
claims is small, the area of land subject to such claims is extensive.19 The forms of 
                                                     
13 Ibid. 
14 White Paper on South African Land Policy (1997) 52-60. 
15 White Paper on South African Land Policy (1997) 38-51. The main vehicle for facilitating redistribution 
is the provision of settlement/land acquisition grants and support. 
16 White Paper on South African Land Policy (1997) 60-75. 
17 Commission on Restitution of Land Rights Presentation by Chief Land Claims Commissioner (Mr 
Mphela) at People and Parks Congress, dated August 2008. See further: Department of Environmental 
Affairs Conservation for the People with the People: A Review of the People and Parks Programme 
(2010) 37; Department of Environmental Affairs Status of Land Claims in Protected Areas (2010) 
Unpublished document, dated February 2010; De Koning M “Co-management and its Options in 
Protected Areas of South Africa” (2009) 39(2) Africanus 6; De Koning M & Marais M “Land Restitution 
and Settlement Options in Protected Areas in South Africa” (2009) 39(1) Africanus 67; and Kepe T “Land 
Claims and Comanagement of Protected Areas: Exploring the Challenges” (2008) 41 Environmental 
Management 311. 
18 Commission on Restitution of Land Rights Presentation of Annual Report (2008/2009) by Chief Land 
Claims Commissioner (Mr Mphela) to Portfolio Committee on Land Affairs, dated 8 July 2009. See further: 
Conservation for the People with the People (2010) 37; and Status of Land Claims in Protected Areas 
(2010). 
19 The extent of outstanding claims in the Kruger National Park alone, amount to 1 429 575 hectares 
(Status of Land Claims in Protected Areas (2010)). This is equal to three-quarters of the Park’s total 












protected areas in respect of which these claims have been lodged are diverse and 
include national parks,20 nature reserves,21 wilderness areas22 and world heritage 
sites.23 
 
Interestingly, it would appear that the proponents of the land reform programme did not 
anticipate restitution claims within protected areas as no mention is made of the 
potential conflict between conservation and land reform imperatives in the White Paper. 
Similarly, the Restitution of Land Rights Act,24 which provides the statutory framework 
for implementing the restitution component of the Land Reform Programme, contains no 
distinct mechanisms for dealing with such claims. The Restitution of Land Rights Act is 
nonetheless of key relevance to the current enquiry. Prior to the reform of South Africa’s 
contemporary conservation regime in 2005, the Act provided the main regime through 
which 43 communal land restitution claims within existing protected areas were 
                                                     
20 Restitution claims have been lodged in the following national parks: Addo Elephant National Park; 
Augrabies National Park; Golden Gate Highlands National Park; Kgalagadi National Park; Kruger 
National Park; Mapungubwe National Park; Richtersveld National Park; Tsitsikama National Park; West 
Coast National Park; and Vaalbos National Park (list compiled from Status of Land Claims in Protected 
Areas (2010). 
21 Restitution claims have been lodged in the following nature reserves: Andover Nature Reserve; Andries 
Vosloo Kudu Reserve; Barberton Nature Reserve; Baviaanskloof Nature Reserve; Bellevue Nature 
Reserve; Bewaarskloof Nature Reserve; Blouberg Nature Reserve; Blyde River Canyon Nature Reserve; 
Borakalalo Nature Reserve; Commando Drift Nature Reserve; Double Drift Nature Reserve; Dwesa and 
Cwebe Nature Reserve; East Coast Nature Reserve; East London Coast Nature Reserve; Groot Letaba 
Game Reserve; Happy Rest Nature Reserve; Hluhluwe Imfolozi Park; Hluleka Nature Reserve; Honnet 
Nature Reserve; Impendle Nature Reserve; Ithala Nature Reserve; Lapala Wilderness; Leamington 
Nature Reserve; Lekgalmeetse Nature Reserve; Luchaba Nature Reserve; Loskop Dam Nature Reserve; 
Mabusa Nature Reserve; Madikwe Nature Reserve; Manyeleti Nature Reserve; Maria Moroka Nature 
Reserve; Mdala Nature Reserve; Mfolozi Game Reserve; Mkambati Nature Reserve; Mkhombo Nature 
Reserve; Mkuzi Game Reserve; Moepel Nature Reserve; Mpenjathe Nature Reserve; Mpofu Nature 
Reserve; Mthethomusha Nature Reserve; Mussina Nature Reserve; Nababiep Nature Reserve; Nduli 
Nature Reserve; Ndumo Game Reserve; Nkomazi Wilderness; Nteseki Nature Reserve; Nwanedi Nature 
Reserve; Ongeluksnek Nature Reserve; Phinda Game Reserve; Pilansberg Nature Reserve; QwaQwa 
National Park (officially designated as a nature reserve); Rust De Winter Nature Reserve; Sam Knott 
Nature Reserve; Selati Game Reserve; Silaka Nature Reserve; Soada Forest Nature Reserve; 
Songimvelo Nature Reserve; SS Skosana Nature Reserve; Suikerbosrand Nature Reserve; Tembe 
Elephant Park; ‘The Swamp’ Nature Reserve; Tsolwana Nature Reserve; Ubombo Mountain Nature 
Reserve; Umbumbazi Nature Reserve; Vaalkop Nature Reserve; Vembe Nature Reserve;  Vernon 
Crooks Nature Reserve; Witsand Nature Reserve; Witvinger Nature Reserve; and Wonderkop Nature 
Reserve (list compiled from Status of Land Claims in Protected Areas (2010)). 
22 Restitution Claims have been lodged in the Ntendeka Wilderness Area and Wolkberg Wilderness Area 
(list compiled from Status of Land Claims in Protected Areas (2010)). 
23 Restitution claims have been lodged in the Isimangaliso Wetland Park (Status of Land Claims in 
Protected Areas (2010)). 












settled.25 Following such reform, the Restitution of Land Rights Act remains of key 
relevance in resolving the estimated 78 outstanding claims,26 but its provisions should 
be read and applied in conjunction with South Africa’s contemporary conservation 
regime. 
 
As has been highlighted above, the land redistribution component of the land reform 
programme is principally concerned with providing poor Black South Africans with 
access to land for residential and small-scale farming purposes. The main mechanisms 
for doing so were initially the designation of land for such purposes under the Provision 
of Land and Assistance Act27 and the provision of small grants under the Settlement 
Land Acquisition Grant.28 This grant scheme has been supplemented by several 
additional grant schemes, namely: the Land Redistribution for Agricultural Development 
Grant;29 Settlement Planning Grant;30 Grant for the Acquisition and Development of 
                                                     
25 Restitution claims have been settled in the following protected areas: Addo Elephant National Park; 
Augrabies National Park; Bellevue Nature Reserve; Borakalalo Nature Reserve Dwesa and Cwebe 
Nature Reserve; Hluhluwe Imfolozi Park; Hluleka Nature Reserve; Isimangaliso Wetland Park; Ithala 
Nature Reserve; Kgalagadi National Park; Kruger National Park; Lekgalmeetse Nature Reserve; Madikwe 
Nature Reserve; Matshakatini Private Nature Reserve; Mdala Nature Reserve; Mfolozi Game Reserve; 
Mkambati Nature Reserve; Mkuzi Game Reserve; Moepel Nature Reserve; Ndumo Game Reserve; 
Phinda Game Reserve; Pilansberg Nature Reserve; Richtersveld National Park; Rust De Winter Nature 
Reserve; Silaka Nature Reserve; Tembe Elephant Park; Tsitsikama National Park; Ubombo Mountain 
Nature Reserve; Wonderkop Nature Reserve; Vaalbos National Park; West Coast National Park; Weenen 
Nature Reserve; and Witvinger Nature Reserve (list compiled from Status of Land Claims in Protected 
Areas (2010). See further: Conservation for the People with the People (2010) 37. 
26 The Department of Environmental Affairs estimate the number of outstanding land claims in protected 
areas to be 78 (Conservation for the People with the People (2010) 37). 
27 Act 126 of 1993. The Act provides for the designation and subdivision of land for the purpose of 
settlement, and the rendering of financial assistance to persons to acquire the land and secure tenure 
rights therein. 
28 The objective of the Settlement Land Acquisition Grant is to improve land tenure security and to extend 
property ownership and/or access to land to the historically disadvantaged and the poor. The Grant was 
capped at R16 000 per application. For more information on the nature of the grant and its eligibility 
criteria, see: Department of Land Affairs Grants and Service Policy of the Department of Land Affairs 
(2001) 8-12; and White Paper on South African Land Policy (1997) 43-45. 
29 The objective of the Land Redistribution for Agricultural Development Grant is to provide assistance to 
Black South Africans to cover the transaction costs associated with projects falling under the Integrated 
Land Redistribution and Agricultural Development Programme. For more information on the nature of the 
grant and its eligibility criteria, see: Grants and Service Policy of the Department of Land Affairs (2001) 8-
12. 
30 The objective of the Settlement Planning Grant is to assist poor communities to plan for the acquisition, 
settlement on, use and development of land. It also aims to assist such communities to clarify and record 
their land rights where their occupation of land is insecure. For more information on the nature of the 













Land for Municipal Commonage;31 and the Settlement Production and Land Acquisition 
Grant.32 Predominantly focusing on facilitating the acquisition and development of land 
for agriculture, an activity generally precluded within protected areas, the broader 
programme, together with its three grant schemes, is of little relevance to CCAs and 
shall accordingly not be the subject of further discussion.33 
 
In contrast, the third component of the land reform programme, namely land tenure 
reform, does warrant much consideration. Perhaps the most complex component of the 
land reform programme, it seeks to overcome the following challenges: ‘how to upgrade 
the variety of colonial land tenure arrangements currently restricting the tenure security 
and investment opportunities of Black South Africa’s; how to resolve the overlapping 
and competing tenure rights of people forcibly removed and resettled on land to which 
others had prior rights; and how to strengthen the beneficial aspects of communal 
tenure systems and at the same time bring about changes in practices which have 
resulted in the erosion of tenure rights and the degradation of nature resources’.34  
 
The past twenty years has seen the proliferation of laws seeking to address these land 
tenure challenges. One could theoretically group these laws into two categories. The 
first category seeks to provide greater security of tenure to the previously 
disenfranchised and disentitled majority of Black South Africans. These laws include the 
Upgrading of Land Tenure Rights Act;35 Provision of Land and Assistance Act;36 Land 
                                                     
31 The objective of the Commonage Grant is to assist municipal authorities to acquire land to extend or 
create a commonage and to provide infrastructure on such land for the benefit of poor and disadvantaged 
residents. For more information on the nature of the grant and its eligibility criteria, see Grants and 
Service Policy of the Department of Land Affairs (2001) 15-16. 
32 The objective of the Settlement Production and Land Acquisition Grant, introduced in 2008, is to extend 
secure property ownership and access to land for settlement by poor, landless and historically 
disadvantaged South Africans. The quantum of the Grant is currently set at R111 152 per household. For 
more information on the nature of the grant and its eligibility criteria, see: Benjamin M, Naidu B & Yabel M 
Understanding Land Tenure Law: Commentary and Legislation (2008) Juta & Co Ltd Cape Town 21-23. 
33 For a comprehensive discussion of the land redistribution programme see: Ntsebeza L & Hall R (eds) 
The Land Question in South Africa: The Challenge of Transformation and Redistribution (2007) HSRC 
Press Cape Town. 
34 White Paper on South African Land Policy (1997) viii. 
35 Act 112 of 1991. The Act provides for the upgrading of various forms of land tenure which were 
prevalent under South Africa’s apartheid land legislation, including: leaseholds, deeds of grant, quitrents; 
and permissions to occupy (Chapter 1). It furthermore provides for the capacity of tribes to acquire and 












Administration Act,37 Interim Protection of Informal Land Rights Act,38 Land Reform 
(Labour Tenants) Act,39 Extension of Security of Tenure Act40 and the Transformation of 
Certain Rural Areas Act.41 Whilst of key relevance to the broader realm of land reform, 
these laws and their associated policy documents are not of direct relevance to the 
domestic implementation of CCAs and accordingly fall outside the ambit of this enquiry. 
 
The second category, which includes the Communal Property Associations Act42 and 
the Communal Land Rights Act,43 seeks to regulate communal land rights. These laws 
are of central relevance to the domestic implementation of CCAs in South Africa. The 
former prescribes procedures for establishing communal institutions to hold such rights. 
The latter, whilst having been declared unconstitutional by the Constitutional Court in 
2010,44 remains relevant in that it provides an important reference point against which to 
critique the Government’s initial attempt to afford statutory recognition to communal land 
rights and to identify key components for inclusion in any future regime. Both Acts 
accordingly fall squarely within the ambit of this enquiry. 
 
It is to an analysis of the relevant legal regimes for implementing the land restitution and 




                                                                                                                                                                           
36 Act 126 of 1993. The Act provides for the designation of land for settlement purposes under the land 
reform programme, and the provision of financial assistance and support for people acquiring such land. 
37 Act 2 of 1995. The Act provides for the delegation of powers and the assignment of the administration 
of laws regarding land matters applicable in the homelands and to provincial authorities. 
38 Act 31 of 1996. The Act affords interim protection to people with informal rights to, and interest in, land 
pending the finalisation of long-term reform measures. 
39 Act 3 of 1996. The Act provides for the acquisition of land and rights in land by labour tenants and the 
security of tenure for these labour tenants. 
40 Act 62 of 1997. The Act prescribes an array of measures to facilitate the long-term security of land 
tenure. It specifically regulates the conditions on which certain people can occupy land, the 
circumstances in which their right of occupation can be terminated and the procedures for evicting them. 
41 Act 94 of 1998. The Act provides for the transfer of the administration of ‘coloured reserves’ declared 
under the Rural Areas Act (House of Representatives) (9 of 1987) to CPAs declared under the Communal 
Property Association Act (28 of 1996). 
42 Act 28 of 1996. 
43 Act 1 of 2004. 












2. LAND RESTITUTION LAWS 
 
2.1 OVERVIEW OF THE REGIME 
 
As acknowledged in the White Paper on South African Land Policy, ‘forced removals in 
support of racial segregation have caused enormous suffering and hardship in South 
Africa and no settlement of land issues can be reached without addressing such 
historical imbalance’.45 The main law that enables the Government to rectify these 
imbalances through the restoration of land rights is the Restitution of Land Rights Act.46 
The Act governs the following main aspects of relevance to CCAs: who may lodge land 
restitution claims; the procedure for lodging and settling these claims; and the forms of 
restitution that can be granted. It further provides for the establishment, powers and 
function of two key land restitution institutions, the Commission on the Restitution of 
Land Rights (the CRLR) and the Land Claims Court (LCC). The former administers the 
land restitution process. It is headed up by the Chief Land Claims Commissioner who 
has appointed several regional land claims commissioners (regional commissioners) to 
assist in the administration of land restitution claims lodged in several of the provinces.47 
The LCC adjudicates disputes that arise during the land restitution process.48 
 
The Restitution of Land Rights Act entitles a ‘person’,49 their ‘direct descendant’,50 and a 
‘community’51 dispossessed of a ‘right in land’52 after 13 June 1913 as a result of past 
                                                     
45 White Paper on South African Land Policy (1997) 29. 
46 For a basic discussion of the Act and its implementation see: Hall “Reconciling the Past, Present, and 
Future” in Walker et al Land, Memory, Reconstruction and Justice (2010) 21-40; Van der Merwe C 
“Restitution of Land Rights Act 22 of 1994” (1994) 36(5) Annual Survey of South African Law 303-308; 
and Jaichand V The Restitution of Land Rights: A Workbook (1997) Lex Patria Johannesburg. 
47 The composition, powers and functions of the CRLR, the Chief Land Claims Commissioner and the 
regional commissioners are prescribed in Chapter II of the Act. 
48 The composition, powers, functions and procedures governing the operation of the LCC are prescribed 
in Chapter III of the Act. 
49 ‘Person’ is defined to include ‘a community or part thereof’ (section 1). 
50 ‘Direct descendant’ of a person is defined to include ‘the spouse or partner in a customary union of 
such a person whether or not such customary union has been registered’ (section 1). 
51 ‘Community’ is defined as ‘any group of persons who rights in land are derived from shared rules 
determining access to land held in common by such a group, and includes part of any such group’ 
(section 1). 
52 ‘Right in land’ is defined as ‘any right in land whether registered or unregistered, and may include the 












‘racially discriminatory laws or practices’,53 to ‘restitution of a right in land’,54 provided 
that no just and equitable compensation was received in respect of such 
dispossession55 and that the claim was submitted not later than 31 December 1998.56 
Several of these ‘qualification criteria’ have been subject of judicial scrutiny and 
academic debate, namely: the difficulties of proving the existence of a ‘community’;57 
the potential inequities associated with compelling often disparate groups to join 
together under the label of a single community for the purpose of submitting a land 
restitution claim;58 what amounts to being ‘dispossessed’ of a ‘right in land’ ‘as a result 
of racially discriminatory laws or practices’;59 the choice of 13 June 1913 as the cut-off 
date for land restitution claims;60 and the ambit of the Act, specifically whether it extends 
                                                                                                                                                                           
a trust arrangement and beneficial occupation for a continuous period of not less than 10 years prior to 
the dispossession in question’ (section 1). 
53
‘Racially discriminatory laws’ are defined to include ‘laws made by any sphere of government and 
subordinate legislation’ (section 1). ‘Racially discriminatory practices’ are defined as meaning ‘racially 
discriminatory practices, acts or omissions, direct or indirect, by - (a) any department of state or 
administration in the national, provincial or local sphere of government; (b) any other functionary or 
institution which exercised a public power or performed a public function in terms of any legislation’ 
(section 1).  
54 ‘Restitution of a right in land’ is defined as including ‘(a) the restoration of a right in land; or (b) equitable 
redress’ (section 1). ‘Restoration of a right in land’ is in turn defined as the ‘return of a right in land or a 
portion of land’; and ‘equitable redress’ as ‘any equitable redress, other than the restoration of a right in 
land ... including (a) the granting of an appropriate right in alternative state-owned land; (b) the payment 
of compensation’ (section 1). 
55 Section 2(1) and section 2(2). 
56 Section 2(1)(e). 
57 Recent cases to have considered what constitutes a ‘community’ include: Department of Land Affairs v 
Goedgelegen Tropical Fruits (Pty) Ltd 2007 (6) SA 199 (CC); Alexkor Ltd v Richtersveld Community 2003 
(12) BCLR 1301 (CC), and Richtersveld Community v Alexkor Ltd 2003 (6) BCLR 583 (SCA). For a 
discussion of these cases see: Mostert H “Change Through Jurisprudence - The Role of the Courts in 
Broadening the Scope of Restitution” in Walker et al Land, Memory, Reconstruction and Justice (2010) 
64-68; Du Plessis W, Olivier N & Pienaar J “Land Matters: 2007(2)” (2007) 22 SA Public Law 551-553; 
and Mostert H & Fitzpatrick P “Living in the Margins of History on the Edge of the Country: Legal 
Foundation and the Richtersveld Community’s Title to Land (Part 1)” (2004) 37(2) Tydskrif vir die Suid-
Afrikaanse Reg 309-322. For a general discussion on this requirement see: Pienaar G “The Inclusivity of 
Communal Land Tenure: A Redefinition of Ownership in Canada and South Africa” (2008) 2 Stellenbosch 
Law Review 263-264 & 269-273; Pienaar G “The Meaning of the Concept of Community in South African 
Land Tenure Legislation” (2005) 1 Stellenbosch Law Review 60-76; Van Der Walt A Constitutional 
Property Law (2005) Juta & Co Ltd Cape Town 291; and Mostert (2002) South African Law Journal 406-
407. 
58 Kepe T “The Problem of Defining ‘Community’: Challenges for the Land Reform Programme in rural 
South Africa” (1999) 16(3) Development Southern Africa 415-433. 
59 The most recent case to consider these requirements was Department of Land Affairs v Goedgelegen 
Tropical Fruits (Pty) Ltd 2007 (6) SA 199 (CC). For a discussion of this cases see: Du Plessis et al (2007) 
SA Public Law 551-556. See generally on these requirements: Mostert “Change Through Jurisprudence” 
in Walker et al Land, Memory, Reconstruction and Justice (2010) 71-76; Van Der Walt Constitutional 
Property Law (2005) 291-293 & 295-297; and Mostert (2002) South African Law Journal 407-410. 












to include claims of aboriginal title.61 Given that the 78 outstanding restitution claims in 
protected areas have been validated, in other words they are deemed by the CRLR to 
satisfy the Act’s substantive qualification criteria prescribed in section 2(1), the above 
debates do not warrant further attention. 
 
The second main aspect regulated by the Restitution of Land Rights Act, is the 
procedure for lodging and settling claims.62 This procedure generally comprises of six 
main phases, namely: lodgement and registration; validation; gazetting; negotiation; 
                                                                                                                                                                           
1913) which is regarded as heralding ‘the formal adoption of territorial segregation as the leading principle 
of post-Union land Policy’ (White Paper on South African Land Policy (1997) 54). While it is 
acknowledged that dispossession did take place in the colonial era preceding 1913, the Government did 
not deem it appropriate and reasonable for these injustices to be dealt with under the Restitution of Land 
Rights Act (White Paper on South African Land Policy (1997) 54). For a historical overview of 
dispossession which occurred prior to 1913 see: Cousins “More than Socially Embedded: The Distinctive 
Character of ‘Communal Tenure’ Regimes in South Africa and its Implications for Land Policy” (2007) 7(3) 
Journal of Agrarian Change 296-300; Cousins et al “Communal Land Rights, Democracy and Traditional 
Leaders” in Saruchera Securing Land and Resources in Africa (2004) 140-142; Mostert (2002) South 
African Law Journal 407-408; and Bennett T “African Land - A History of Dispossession” in Zimmermann 
R & Visser D (eds) Southern Cross: Civil Law and Common Law in South Africa (1996) Oxford University 
Press 65-78. 
61 According to the White Paper on South African Land Policy (2007), the nature and scope of South 
Africa’s restitution regime does not recognise the doctrine of aboriginal title owing to its potential for it to 
‘create a number of problems and legal-political complexities that would be impossible to unravel’ (55). 
However, the debate about aboriginal title was triggered in a series of cases relating to a claim by the 
Richtersveld Community in the Northern Cape. See: Richtersveld Community v Alexkor Ltd 2003 (6) 
BCLR 583 (SCA) and Alexkor Ltd v Richtersveld Community 2003 (12) BCLR 1301 (CC). For a 
comprehensive discussion of these cases and doctrine of aboriginal title see: Pienaar G “From 
Delgamuukw to Richtersveld - Are Land Claims in Canadian and South African Law Comparable?” (2005) 
3 Stellenbosch Law Review 446-465; Bennett T & Powell C “Restoring Land: The Claims of Aboriginal 
Title, Customary Law and the Right to Culture” (2005) 3 Stellenbosch Law Review 431-445; Brink S 
“Legal Pluralism in South Africa in View of the Richtersveld Case” (2005) 2 Stellenbosch Law Review 
175-193; Barry M “Now Another Thing Must Happen: Richtersveld and the Dilemmas of Land Reform in 
Post-Apartheid South Africa” (2004) 20(3) South African Journal on Human Rights 355-382; Mostert et al 
(2004) Tydskrif vir die Suid-Afrikaanse Reg 498-510; Van Wyk A “The Rocky Road to Restitution for the 
Richtersvelders” (2004) 67(3) Tydskrif vir die Suid-Afrikaanse Reg 479-489; Du Plessis W, Olivier N & 
Pienaar J “Expropriation, Restitution and Land Redistribution: An Answer to Land Problems in South 
Africa?” (2003) 18 SA Public Law 496-498; Mostert H “The Case of the Richtersveld Community: 
Promoting Reconciliation of Effecting Division” (2002) 65 (1) Tydskrif vir die Suid-Afrikaanse Reg 160-
167; and Hoq L “Land Restitution and the Doctrine of Aboriginal Title” (2002) 18(3) South African Journal 
on Human Rights 421-443.  
62 The purpose of the following discussion is not to comprehensively detail the entire restitution process 
as this has been well documented in recent literature. It is rather to focus on those aspects of relevance 
to CCAs - particularly communal claims over land situated in protected areas. For a comprehensive 
discussion of the operation of the restitution process see: Van Der Walt Constitutional Property Law 
(2005) 291-293 & 298-305; Mostert (2002) South African Law Journal 412-418; Carey-Miller D & Pope A 
Land Title in South Africa (2000) Juta & Co Ltd Cape Town 240-341. For a comprehensive description of 
how the restitution process plays out in the context of land claims in protected areas see: De Koning et al 












settlement; and the implementation of the settlement. An applicant initiates the land 
restitution process by lodging a claim in the prescribed manner with the CRLR.63 Where 
the claim is lodged on behalf of a community, the application must be accompanied by 
an appropriate resolution or document authorising the representative to submit the claim 
on behalf of the community.64 Perhaps in anticipation of problems associated the 
submission of communal land claims, the Act affords the regional commissioner 
discretion to allow such documents to be submitted at a later stage65 and prescribes a 
procedure for resolving disputes about who legitimately represents a community.66 
Furthermore, no doubt in anticipation of the complexity and sensitivity of such claims, 
the Act empowers the regional commissioner to give priority to communal land claims.67 
 
Once the claim has been lodged, the regional commissioner must investigate the 
application to ensure that: it has been lodged in the prescribed manner; the claim 
satisfies the qualification criteria prescribed in section 2; and that the claim is not 
frivolous and vexatious.68 While not statutorily prescribed, an interim land claims 
committee is usually formed at this stage to present the interests of the land claimants.69 
Following this validation process, the regional commissioner can either dismiss the 
claim, or deem it to be a valid claim. In the latter scenario, he/she must register the 
claim70 and publish a notice in the Government Gazette containing the general details of 
the claim.71 He/she must thereafter notify the owner of the land and any other party that 
may have an interest in the claim.72 While relevant government departments and 
institutions could fall within the ambit of these ‘other parties’, no express provision is 
                                                     
63 Section 10(1). The claim form is contained in Annexure A of the Rules Regarding Procedure of the 
Commission (GNR 703 GG No.16407 dated 12 May 1995). 
64 Section 10(3). 
65 Section 10(3). 
66 Section 10(4). 
67 Section 6(2)(d). 
68 Section 11(1). Additional aspects which require investigation are prescribed in Regulation 5 of the 
Rules Regarding Procedure of the Commission (1995). The regional commissioner is afforded broad 
powers of investigation under the Act (section 12). 
69 De Koning et al (2009) Africanus 70. 
70 Regulation 7 of the Rules Regarding Procedure of the Commission (1995). 
71 Section 11. The details to be included in the notice are: the title deed description of the land; the name 
by which the land is commonly known; particulars of the claimant; and an invitation to any person to 
comment on the claim within a prescribed period (Regulation 13 of the Rules Regarding Procedure of the 
Commission (1995)). 












made in the Act for mandatory consultation with such authorities throughout the 
restitution process. This is particularly pertinent in the context of land claims with 
environmental ramifications, such as communal claims within protected areas, where 
the exclusion or too late inclusion of relevant national, provincial and local 
environmental authorities73 in the restitution process has led to confusion, skewed 
expectation and delay.74 
 
The land claims process then enters the facilitation stage during which the regional 
commissioner, together with the land claimants, explores options for settling the land 
claim. The Act enables the Minister of Rural Development and Land Reform, or his 
delegate, to enter into an agreement with the claimants providing for one or more of the 
following:75 the award to the claimant of land, a portion of land r any other right in land; 
the payment of compensation to the claimant; both an award of land and compensation; 
the manner in which the rights so awarded are to be held or the compensation so paid; 
and any other terms and conditions that the Minister deems appropriate.76 Importantly, 
where the claimant is a community, the agreement must provide for all members of the 
community to have fair and equitable access to the land or compensation, and must 
ensure accountability on the part of the community’s representative who holds the land 
or compensation on their behalf.77 If at any stage during the course of the facilitation 
process, it becomes evident to the regional commissioner that there are two or more 
competing claims in respect of the same land, there are competing groups within a 
claimant community which is making the claim difficult to resolve, or there is any other 
                                                     
73 These authorities may include: Department of Environmental Affairs; Department of Water Affairs; 
Department of Agriculture, Forestry and Fisheries; South African National Parks; South African National 
Botanical Institute; provincial conservation departments and authorities; and local conservation 
authorities. 
74 Du Plessis A “Land Restitution through the Lens of Environmental Law: Some Comments on the South 
African Vista” (2006) 1 Potchefstroom Electronic Law Journal 29; Wynberg R & Sowman M 
“Environmental Sustainability and Land Reform in South Africa: A Neglected Dimension” (2007) 50(6) 
Journal of Environmental Planning and Management 785-793. 
75 The Minister is empowered to delegate this function to the Director General of Land Affairs or to a 
regional land claims commissioners (section 42D(3)-(5)). 
76 Section 42D(1). 












issue that may be usefully resolved by way of mediation or negotiation, he/she can 
direct the parties to attempt to resolve their dispute by way of mediation or negotiation.78 
 
The restitution process then moves to the settlement stage, where the Act provides for 
three separate processes.79 If a settlement agreement has been concluded and the 
regional commissioner is satisfied with it, he/she can certify same in writing, following 
which the agreement becomes effective.80 If a settlement agreement has been 
concluded and the regional commissioner is not satisfied with it, he/she may refer the 
matter to the LCC for determination.81 If no settlement agreement has been concluded, 
the regional commissioner can similarly refer the matter to the LCC for determination. 
Where the matter is referred to the LCC, such referral must be accompanied by: a 
concise summary regarding the background of the claim; information necessary to 
enable the LCC to establish its jurisdiction; the reasons for the referral; and the regional 
commissioner’s recommendations on how the matter should be resolved.82 Land 
claimants can in certain circumstances approach the LCC directly for restitution of land 
rights.83 In the case of a direct referral to the LCC, the regional commissioner previously 
administering the claim can suspend his/her investigation.84 The LCC can at any stage 
order the regional commissioner to transfer any land claims to it for determination.85 It 
can furthermore order an applicant to publish a notice in the Government Gazette 
                                                     
78 Section 13. 
79 Prior to the Land Restitution and Reform Laws Amendment Act (18 of 1999) all settlement agreements 
had to be confirmed by the LCC. The Amendment Act sought to ‘decongest’ the LCC and speed up the 
restitution process by providing for three different options for finalizing/ratifying settlement agreements. 
80 Section 14(3). 
81 Section 14(3A). The regional commissioner can refer the agreement to the LCC for consideration 
where: a question of law arising from the agreement needs to be resolved; there is doubt whether all 
interested parties are subject to the agreement; there is doubt about the agreement’s validity; there is 
doubt about the feasibility of implementing the agreement; in the case of a community claim, the 
agreement does not operate fairly and equitably between all members; the agreement does not comply 
with the provisions of the Act; the agreement is vague and contradictory; the parties agree that it is 
desirable for the court to consider the agreement; and any other good reason. 
82 Section 14(4). 
83 Section 38B. This was enabled following the insertion of Chapter IIIA in terms of the Land Restitution 
and Reform Laws Amendment Act (63 of 1997). 
84 Section 38B(3). 












inviting other potential claimants to join the proceedings where it is of the opinion that 
not all relevant claimants are before it.86 
 
The composition of the LCC and the rules governing its process are comprehensively 
detailed in the Restitution of Land Rights Act.87 These do not justify repeating in their 
entirety here. Three aspects are, however, interesting to note in the context of the 
outstanding communal land restitution claims in protected areas. First, the LCC has the 
power to appoint assessors88 to assist it in its deliberations and refer any matter which 
requires ‘extensive examination of documents or scientific, technical or local 
investigation which cannot be conveniently conducted by the court’ to an independent 
referee for investigation and advice.89 Given the flexible qualification criteria for these 
assessors and referees, it provides a potential yet unutilised avenue for involving 
conservation experts in the resolution of the remaining land restitution claims in 
protected areas, where these come before the court for resolution. Secondly, 
environmental considerations are not expressly included in the array of factors to be 
taken into account by the LCC in resolving matters brought before it.90 The inclusion of 
such considerations could ensure a more balanced enquiry on the part of the LCC when 
called upon to settle the outstanding land restitution claims in protected areas. Thirdly, 
the Act affords the judiciary discretion to blend formal court process with alternative 
dispute resolution procedures in seeking to resolve complex claims. The LCC can at 
any stage during its proceedings order the parties before it to attempt to settle an issue 
through a process of mediation and negotiation.91 These less formal procedures may 
well provide a useful avenue for the LCC to resolve the outstanding restitution claims 
within protected areas given the nature and number of parties involved. 
 
                                                     
86 Section 38D. 
87 The composition, powers and procedures of the LCC are detailed in Chapter III. 
88 Section 27. 
89 Section 28C. 
90 Factors to be taken into account are listed in section 33 of the Act. For further discussion of these 
factors see: Du Plessis (2006) Potchefstroom Electronic Law Journal 21. 
91 Section 35A. In the event of such an order, the main proceedings are stayed pending the outcome of 












When called upon to settle a land restitution claim, the LCC has broad discretion to 
order: the restoration of land, a portion of land or any right in land in full or partial 
settlement of the claim; the Government to grant to claimant an appropriate right in 
alternative government-owned land; the Government to pay the claimant compensation; 
the Government to include the claimant as a beneficiary under an appropriate 
government housing or rural development programme; and to grant the claimant 
alternative relief.92 The Court is further empowered to issue an array of ancillary orders 
including: determining conditions that must be fulfilled before a right in land can be 
restored; directing how its orders are to be carried out, including the prescription of time 
limits for implementing its orders; and where the claimant is a community, determining 
the manner in which the rights and/or compensation are to be held.93 The purpose of 
the last of these ancillary orders is to ensure that all members of the dispossessed 
community have fair and equitable access to the land or compensation in question.94 
Furthermore, the Court even has the power to adjust the nature of property rights 
previously held by the claimant and to determine the form of title under which the right 
may be held in the future.95 
 
The CRLR and the LCC accordingly have broad discretion regarding the procedures 
they adopt to settle claims, and the forms of redress they negotiate or order. The LCC 
has confirmed that whilst the restoration of land is the starting point, the CRLR and the 
LCC have discretion and cannot be compelled to restore the land where it is not 
possible due to competing public interest considerations.96 What is interesting to note 
about the land restitution claims settled to date within protected areas, is that despite 
this broad discretion, the majority appear to have been settled in a similar manner. This 
generally takes the form of the grant of full title back to the claimant community subject 
to the condition that: the community do not reside on the land; the community agree to 
                                                     
92 Section 35(1). 
93 Section 35(2). 
94 Section 35(3). 
95 Section 35(4). 
96 Recent cases to have considered this issue include: MM Phela v Haakdoornbult Boerdery CC 2008 (4) 
SA 488 (CC); and Concerned Land Claimants' Organisation of Port Elizabeth v Port Elizabeth Land and 
Community Restoration Association 2007 (2) SA 531 (CC). For further discussion of these cases see: Du 
Plessis W, Olivier N & Pienaar J “Land Matters: 2008(2)” (2008) 23 SA Public Law 106-108; and Du 












conserve the land in perpetuity, and the community lease the land back to the 
conservation agency for a defined period of time. This trend is considered in detail in 
Chapter 9 (Part 4) and does not accordingly bare full discussion here. At this stage it is 
simply questioned whether the election to grant full title back to the communities on 
each and every occasion has not led to skewed expectations on the part of these 
communities. It is furthermore questioned why the authorities have not availed 
themselves of the full suite of restitution options at their disposal to tailor unique land 
tenure solutions to suit the specificities of each claimant community and protected area. 
 
The final stage of the land restitution process involves the implementation of the 
settlement agreement. As frequently acknowledged by the Government, it is this stage 
where significant cracks appear in the restitution process.97 With the exception of rules 
governing review and appeal, 98 and those affording discretion to the Minister of Rural 
Development and Land Reform to provide financial aid to successful claimants,99 the 
Restitution of Land Rights Act is largely silent on: which authorities are responsible for 
the post-settlement process; how they should coordinate their efforts; what should be 
done by these authorities to facilitate the implementation of restitution settlements and 
orders; and who should fund these endeavours. As a result, the Department of Rural 
Development and Land Reform (DRD&LR) and the CRLR have historically withdrawn 
from the post-settlement process leaving the claimant communities floundering in a 
virtual vacuum.100 This uncertainty has historically been compounded by a lack of post-
settlement support and resources.101 While successful claimant communities feasibly 
                                                     
97 See the following Government reports and documents which refer to the need for improved post-
settlement support: Commission on Restitution of Land Rights Presentation of Annual Report (2008/2009) 
by Chief Land Claims Commissioner (Mr Mphela) to the Select Committee on Land and Environmental 
Affairs, dated 11 August 2009; Commission on Restitution of Land Rights Presentation of Annual Report 
(2008/2009) by Chief Land Claims Commissioner (Mr Mphela) to the Portfolio Committee on Land Affairs, 
dated 8 July 2009; Commission on Restitution of Land Rights Annual Report 2007/2008 (2008) 22 & 28; 
Sustainable Development Consortium Settlement and Implementation Support Strategy for Land and 
Agrarian Reform in South Africa: A Synthesis Report (2007) Commission on Restitution of Land Rights 
55-125 & 158-164; Commission on Restitution of Land Rights Annual Report 2006/2007 (2007) 28 & 43; 
and Commission on Restitution of Land Rights Annual Report 2005/2006 (2006) 27, 32, 37 & 42-43. 
98 Section 36 and section 37. 
99 Section 42C. 
100 See: Du Plessis (2006) Potchefstroom Electronic Law Journal 28-30; and Du Plessis W, Olivier N & 
Pienaar J “Land Matters: 2006(2)” (2006) 21 SA Public Law 417. 












had access to the Restitution Discretionary Grant102 and the Settlement Land 
Acquisition Grant,103 the trivial quantum of these grants and the timing of their allocation 
rendered them largely ineffective in the context of communal land claims in protected 
areas.104 Although the array and quantum of potential post-settlement government 
grants has increased, their scope has simultaneously been generally narrowed to small-
scale agriculture.105 The problem has not gone unnoticed and the former Department of 
Land Affairs commissioned the development of a Settlement and Implementation 
Support Strategy for Land and Agrarian Reform in South Africa106 (SIS Strategy) in 
2006. Formally launched by the Minister of Land Affairs and Agriculture in 2008, the 
mission underlying the SIS Strategy is the ‘delivery of effective settlement and 
implementation support which contributes to successful land and agrarian reform to 
reduce poverty, enhances livelihood security, boosts economic growth, enables security 
of tenure and sustainable land use’.107 The relevance of the SIS Strategy to CCAs is 




                                                                                                                                                                           
Restitution of Land Rights Presentation of Annual Report (2008/2009) (11 August 2009); Commission on 
Restitution of Land Rights Presentation of Annual Report (2008/2009) (8 July 2009); The Presidency: 
Republic of South Africa Towards a Fifteen Year Review (2008) 29; Commission on Restitution of Land 
Rights Annual Report 2007/2008 (2008) 22 & 28; and Commission on Restitution of Land Rights Annual 
Report 2006/2007 (2007) 28 & 43. For a comprehensive discussion on the problems associated with 
post-implementation support, see: Settlement and Implementation Support Strategy (2007) 55-125 & 158-
164. 
102 The objective of the Restitution Discretionary Grant is to assist beneficiaries of negotiated restitution 
settlement agreements and to manage, secure or relocate to their restored/compensatory land. The 
quantum of the Grant is limited to R3000 per qualifying person. For more information on the nature of the 
Grant and its eligibility criteria, see: Department of Land Affairs Grants and Service Policy of the 
Department of Land Affairs (2001) 17-18. 
103 See note 28 above. 
104 See: Du Plessis (2006) Potchefstroom Electronic Law Journal 34. 
105 See: Chapter 6 (Part 1). 
106 Sustainable Development Consortium Settlement and Implementation Support Strategy for Land and 
Agrarian Reform in South Africa: Synthesis Report (2007) Commission on Restitution of Land Rights 
Pretoria. The SIS Strategy will be implemented as part of the Land and Agrarian Reform Programme, 
which is spearheaded by the Department of Agriculture and the Department of Rural Development and 
Land Reform. These Departments are currently working on an implementation plan for the SIS Strategy 
that seeks to place the mandate for post-settlement support in the hands of provincial and local 
government (Commission on Restitution of Land Rights Annual Report 2007/2008 (2008) 11). Whilst lofty 
in its aims, evidence of its implementation is difficult to source. See further Du Plessis et al (2007) SA 
Public Law 549. 












2.2 PRACTICAL CHALLENGES FACING THE REGIME 
 
With the initial108 and subsequent revised deadline109 for settling all land restitution 
claims having passed, approximately 96 % of the 79 696 claims lodged under the 
Restitution of Land Rights Act have been finalised.110 On the face of it, this would 
appear commendable. However, if one dissects these statistics, most notably the nature 
and extent of the claims settled to date, they are less commendable. This is especially 
evident in the slow settlement of rural claims, which from a geographical and fiscal 
perspective, as opposed to a purely numerical perspective, comprise the bulk of 
restitution claims. 
 
As at 31 March 2010, all 3852 outstanding restitution claims were situated in rural 
areas.111 The estimated hectarage associated with these outstanding rural claims is in 
the region of 17 208 871,112 a telling statistic if one considers that the total hectarage of 
all claims settled as at 31 March 2010 amounted to just 2 624 641.113 An estimated 
R65.3 billion is required to settle these outstanding rural claims, similarly telling 
considering that it is threefold the amount spent on settling all claims to date.114 The 
track record of the CRLR in settling restitution claims within protected areas is similarly 
problematic. At last count, only a third of the 121 restitution claims in protected areas 
have been settled in the past fifteen years.115 It is also interesting to note that an 
                                                     
108 The initial deadline set by the CRLR for settling all land restitution claims was 31 December 2005. 
109 The deadline for settling all land restitution claims was extended by President Mbeki in his State of the 
Nation Address (2005) to 31 March 2008 (Mbeki T “2005 State of the Nation Address” (available at 
http://www.info.gov.za/speeches/2005/05021110501001.htm)). 
110 Commission on Restitution of Land Rights Presentation at People and Parks Congress (2008). See 
further: De Koning (2009) Africanus 6; De Koning et al (2009) 67; and Kepe (2008) Environmental 
Management 311. 
111 Commission on Restitution of Land Rights Presentation of Annual Report (2009-2010) by Acting Chief 
Land Claims Commissioner (Mr Gamede) to the Portfolio Committee on Land Affairs, dated 14 October 
2010. 
112 Settlement and Implementation Support Strategy (2007) 17. 
113 Commission on Restitution of Land Rights Presentation of Annual Report (2009-2010) (14 October 
2010). 
114 An estimated R21.65 billion has been spent on settling claims in the period 1995 to 31 March 2010 
(Commission on Restitution of Land Rights Presentation of Annual Report (2009-2010) (14 October 
2010)). 
115 Commission on Restitution of Land Rights Presentation of Annual Report (2008-2009) (11 August 
2009). Interestingly, no mention is made of such claims in the Commission on Restitution of Land Rights 












estimated R20 billion, almost equal to the entire budget spent on settling all claims to 
date, is required to settle just the outstanding claims in the Kruger National Park.116 
 
Many reasons have been identified as contributing to the delay in the settlement of rural 
claims.117 These can be divided into five main groups for the purpose of analysis. The 
first group relates to the nature of the claimants and includes: problems associated with 
locating claimants;118 community in-fighting and inter-tribal disputes;119 the lack of 
understanding, capacity and impatience on the part of claimant communities;120 and the 
lack of cooperation of communities and local traditional leaders in providing adequate 
information to the restitution authorities.121 The second group relates to the nature of the 
claims and includes: overlapping and counter claims in respect of the same land;122 
rural claimants predominantly wanting restoration of land as opposed to equitable 
redress;123 the high cost of purchasing land in rural areas;124 and the prevalence of 
fraudulent claims.125 The third group relates to issues of process such as: the overly 
                                                     
116 Commission on Restitution of Land Rights Presentation of Annual Report (2008-2009) (11 August 
2009). 
117 These reasons are distilled from the past four Annual Reports of the CRLR. Interestingly, these 
reasons were similarly highlighted by several commentators in the early years of the land restitution 
process. See for example: Howard G “Righting the Wrongs of the Past: A Review of the Land Restitution 
Programme” (1999) 7(3) Butterworths Property Law Digest 15-20; and Marchant T “The Commission on 
the Restitution of Land Rights” (2001) 5(3) Butterworths Property Law Digest 15-20. See further: Pienaar 
G “Aspects of Land Administration in the Context of Good Governance” (2009) 12(2) Potchefstroom 
Electronic Law Journal 20-22. 
118 See: Commission on Restitution of Land Rights Annual Report 2007/2008 (2008) 28; Commission on 
Restitution of Land Rights Annual Report 2006/2007 (2007) 17, 38 & 43; and Commission on Restitution 
of Land Rights Annual Report 2004/2005 (2005) 42. 
119 Commission on Restitution of Land Rights Annual Report 2007/2008 (2008) 22 & 38; Commission on 
Restitution of Land Rights Annual Report 2006/2007 (2007) 3, 22, 34, 38 & 43; and Commission on 
Restitution of Land Rights Annual Report 2004/2005 (2005) 19. 
120 Commission on Restitution of Land Rights Annual Report 2006/2007 (2007) 17, 22, 28 & 43; and 
Commission on Restitution of Land Rights Annual Report 2004/2005 (2005) 32 & 37. 
121 Commission on Restitution of Land Rights Annual Report 2005/2006 (2006) 42-43; and Commission 
on Restitution of Land Rights Annual Report 2004/2005 (2005) 19. 
122 See: Commission on Restitution of Land Rights Annual Report 2005/2006 (2006) 32; and Commission 
on Restitution of Land Rights Annual Report 2004/2005 (2005) 37. 
123 Commission on Restitution of Land Rights Annual Report 2004/2005 (2005) 8. 
124 Commission on Restitution of Land Rights Presentation of Annual Report (2008-2009) (11 August 
2009; Commission on Restitution of Land Rights Annual Report 2007/2008 (2008) 10 & 22; Commission 
on Restitution of Land Rights Annual Report 2006/2007 (2007) 3, 17 & 43; Commission on Restitution of 
Land Rights Annual Report 2005/2006 (2006) 3 & 37; and Commission on Restitution of Land Rights 
Annual Report 2004/2005 (2005) 8, 23 & 58. 












bureaucratic and cumbersome restitution process;126 the unregistered and unsurveyed 
nature of land in rural areas;127 the challenge of simultaneously seeking to upgrade 
security of tenure and implement communal tenure regimes in rural areas;128 and the 
pro-longed nature of negotiations owing to the high sentimental value attached to rural 
land.129 The fourth relates to issues of capacity and resources namely: confusion 
regarding the mandate of relevant national, provincial and municipal authorities in the 
restitution process;130 the lack of capacity and high turnover of staff within the CRLR;131 
and the lack of resources and infrastructure to fund the research and negotiation stages 
of the restitution process.132 The final group of reasons relates to the overlapping and 
often competing interests of third parties and includes: the uncooperative attitude of 
existing landowners whose land is subject to restitution claims;133 internal factionalism 
between communal property associations and local traditional authorities;134 local 
traditional leaders seeking to use the land restitution process to resolve personal, 
chieftaincy and border disputes;135 and unscrupulous third parties seeking to take 
                                                     
126 Turner S & Ibsen H Land and Agrarian Reform in South Arica: A Status Report (2000) Research 
Report No.6, PLAAS Bellville 11. See further: Commission on Restitution of Land Rights Presentation of 
Annual Report (2008-2009) (11 August 2009); and Commission on Restitution of Land Rights Annual 
Report 2004/2005 (2005) 23. 
127 Commission on Restitution of Land Rights Annual Report 2006/2007 (2007) 3. 
128 Commission on Restitution of Land Rights Annual Report 2005/2006 (2006) 21. 
129 Commission on Restitution of Land Rights Annual Report 2007/2008 (2008) 38; Commission on 
Restitution of Land Rights Annual Report 2006/2007 (2007) 3, 17 & 43; Commission on Restitution of 
Land Rights Annual Report 2005/2006 (2006) 42-43; and Commission on Restitution of Land Rights 
Annual Report 2004/2005 (2005) 8 & 37. 
130 Commission on Restitution of Land Rights Presentation of Annual Report (2008-2009) (11 August 
2009); Commission on Restitution of Land Rights Annual Report 2005/2006 (2006) 32; and De Villiers B 
Land Reform: Issues and Challenges: A Comparative Overview of Experiences in Zimbabwe, Namibia, 
South Africa and Australia (2003) Occasional Paper Series, KAS Johannesburg 59 
131 Commission on Restitution of Land Rights Annual Report 2007/2008 (2008) 28; Commission on 
Restitution of Land Rights Annual Report 2006/2007 (2007) 38; and Commission on Restitution of Land 
Rights Annual Report 2005/2006 (2006) 21 & 42-42. 
132 Commission on Restitution of Land Rights Presentation of Annual Report (2008-2009) (11 August 
2009); and Commission on Restitution of Land Rights Annual Report 2004/2005 (2005) 42. 
133 Commission on Restitution of Land Rights Annual Report 2007/2008 (2008) 38; Commission on 
Restitution of Land Rights Annual Report 2006/2007 (2007) 17, 34, 38 & 43; Commission on Restitution 
of Land Rights Annual Report 2005/2006 (2006) 27 & 32; and Commission on Restitution of Land Rights 
Annual Report 2004/2005 (2005) 42 & 58. 
134 Commission on Restitution of Land Rights Presentation of Annual Report (2008-2009) (11 August 
2009); Commission on Restitution of Land Rights Annual Report 2007/2008 (2008) 22; and Commission 
on Restitution of Land Rights Annual Report 2006/2007 (2007) 17. 
135 Commission on Restitution of Land Rights Annual Report 2007/2008 (2008) 10 & 30; Commission on 
Restitution of Land Rights Annual Report 2006/2007 (2007) 17 & 31; and Commission on Restitution of 












advantage of successful claimant communities during post-settlement commercial 
transactions.136 
 
Several amendments to the Restitution of Land Rights Act have sought to remedy some 
of these challenges.137 However, most of the above practical challenges remain. Given 
that the majority of South Africa’s protected areas are situated in rural environs, these 
challenges impact on the resolution of the remaining restitution claims within protected 
areas. These challenges have been further confounded by the announcement of 
Cabinet in January 2009, that equitable redress, and not restoration, is the only option 
for settling the remaining 14 restitution claims in the Kruger National Park.138 It is 
uncertain how ‘contagious’ this decision not to restore land rights will be in respect of 
the other outstanding claims in protected areas. It is furthermore uncertain to what 
extent this decision, which could be deemed by communities to constitute a ‘second 
dispossession’ of their land rights, will further undermine the faith of claimant 
communities in the restitution process. 
 
The Government clearly faces many practical challenges in finalising the restitution 
component of the land reform programme. The manner in which these challenges have 
manifested in the settlement of restitution claims in several of South Africa’s protected 
areas is considered in detail in Chapter 9 below.  These challenges must be considered 
in the context of other relevant components of South Africa’s land reform programme, 
most notably that of land tenure reform. As highlighted above, specific elements of the 
land tenure reform programme itself, and the intersection between the tenure reform 
and restitution components of the land reform programme, have been acknowledged as 
frustrating the finalisation of outstanding restitution claims. It is accordingly to a 
                                                     
136 Commission on Restitution of Land Rights Annual Report 2006/2007 (2007) 34. 
137 These include: provision for the CRLR to finalise settlement agreements without having to refer them 
to the LCC for approval (section 14(3) substituted by the Land Restitution and Reform Laws Amendment 
Act (18 of 1999); and provision for the Minister to acquire, purchase and expropriate land with or without a 
court order for any land reform purposes (section 42D amended by the Restitution of Land Rights 
Amendment Act (48 of 2003). 
138 Government Communication Information System “State Announces Decision on Kruger National Park 
Land Claims” Joint Statement issued by the Department of Environmental Affairs and Tourism and the 












consideration of the tenure reform component of the land reform programme that the 
enquiry now turns. 
 
3. LAND TENURE REFORM LAWS 
 
The land tenure challenges that greeted those tasked with overseeing South Africa’s 
transformation to a democracy are well documented in the White Paper on South 
African Land Policy.139 First, how to reverse the regime which prevented ownership of 
land by Black South Africans? Secondly, how to secure and uplift the status of the 
various forms of land tenure which did exist in designated townships, native reserves 
and homelands, but which were largely ‘subservient, permit-based or “held in trust”’ by 
the Government?140 Thirdly, how to transform the institutions responsible for 
administering these forms of tenure, which were historically controlled by government- 
appointed tribal authorities that frequently operated in a corrupt and undemocratic 
manner? Fourthly, how to provide recognition to previously ignored de facto and/or 
traditional communal tenure rights which were historically regarded of second class 
status and which the Government had sought to ‘privatise and convert ... into individual 
ownership’?141 
 
Many laws have been implemented during the past two decades to provide first, greater 
security of tenure to the previously disenfranchised and disentitled majority of Black 
South Africans;142 and secondly, to afford greater recognition to communal land 
rights.143 As has been highlighted above, while the former category of laws is of key 
relevance to the broader realm of land tenure reform, they are not of direct relevance to 
the domestic implementation of CCAs. They accordingly fall outside the ambit of this 
enquiry. In contrast, the latter category, comprising of the Communal Property 
                                                     
139 White Paper on South African Land Policy (1997) 30-32. 
140 Ibid 30. 
141 Ibid 31. 
142 These laws include: Transformation of Certain Rural Areas Act (94 of 1998); Extension of Security of 
Tenure Act (62 of 1997); Interim Protection of Informal Land Rights Act (31 of 1996); Land Reform 
(Labour Tenants) Act (3 of 1996); Land Administration Act (2 of 1995); Provision of Certain Land for 
Settlement Act (126 of 1993); and Upgrading of Land Tenure Rights Act (112 of 1991). 
143 These laws include: Communal Land Rights Act (1 of 2004); and Communal Property Associations Act 












Associations Act144 and the Communal Land Rights Act,145 are of key relevance. These 
laws are of central importance to the domestic implementation of CCAs in South Africa. 
The former prescribes procedures for establishing communal property associations 
which have frequently been the institutions to which land in protected areas has been 
restored under the Restitution of Land Rights Act. The latter, whilst having been 
declared unconstitutional by the Constitutional Court in 2010,146 remains relevant as this 
law, and the extensive academic commentary on it, provides an important reference 
point for identifying key components for inclusion in any future communal property 
regime. 
 
3.1 COMMUNAL PROPERTY ASSOCIATIONS ACT 
 
The main object of the Communal Property Associations Act is to ‘form juristic persons, 
to be known as communal property associations in order to acquire, hold and manage 
property on a basis agreed to by members of a community in terms of a written 
constitution’.147 It is specifically acknowledged in the Act’s Preamble that ‘it is necessary 
to ensure that such institutions are established and managed in a manner which is non-
discriminatory, equitable and democratic’, and that such institutions are ‘accountable to 
their members’ and ‘are protected against abuse’ by members. 
 
The Act applies to ‘communities’148 who either voluntarily, or are compelled by the LCC 
to, form a communal property association (CPA) to hold land rights, including those 
restored under the Restitution of Land Rights Act.149 Provision is made in the Act for the 
establishment of provisional associations (effectively provisional CPAs) and CPAs. In 
respect of the former, the community must apply to the Director-General of the 
                                                     
144 Act 28 of 1996. 
145 Act 1 of 2004. 
146 Tongoane v Minister for Agriculture and Land Affairs 2010 (6) SA 214 CC. 
147 Long Title of the Act. 
148 ‘Community’ is defined as ‘a group of persons, which wishes to have its rights to or in particular 
property determined by shared rules under a written constitution and which wishes or is required to form 
an association as contemplated in section 2’ (section 1). 












DRD&LR.150 The application must contain: the intended name of provisional 
association; information demonstrating that the community is a ‘community’; a clear 
indication of the land or right in land which may be acquired; a list of the names of the 
members of the provisional association, or where this is not feasible, a set of principles 
and procedures for identifying prospective members; a list of names of the interim 
committee democratically elected to represent the provisional association; information 
reasonably required by the Director-General relating to the right of the community to 
occupy, use and/or settle on the land; and finally a written undertaking by the interim 
committee that pending the adoption of the CPA’s constitution, it will adhere to the 
principles prescribed in section 9 of the Act.151 These principles, which must underpin 
the constitution of the resultant CPA, include: fair and inclusive decision-making; 
equality of membership; democratic process; fair access to the CPA’s property; and 
accountability and transparency.152 If satisfied, the Director-General can consent to the 
registration of the provisional association.153 Once so registered, the provisional 
association constitutes a juristic person and is empowered to acquire a right to use or 
occupy land for twelve months during which time it is expected that the ‘final’ CPA will 
be registered.154 The provisional association is not empowered to alienate its rights in 
any manner.155 
 
The registration of a provisional association is not a necessary precondition for 
establishing a ‘final’ CPA. The key difference regarding the registration of a ‘final’ CPA 
relates to the drafting and adoption of a constitution by the community. Detailed 
provisions are prescribed in the Act regarding the content of the constitution 156 and the 
                                                     
150 Section 5(1). 
151 Section 5(2). 
152 Section 9(1). 
153 The actual registration is undertaken by the Registration Officer, an officer within the DRD&LR, who 
registers the provisional association and allocates a registration number and certificate to it (section 9(3)). 
The procedures for registration and the information to be kept in the CPA Register are prescribed in 
Regulation 2 and 3 of the Regulations in Terms of the Communal Property Association Act (GNR 1908 
GG No. 17620 dated 22 November 1996). 
154 Section 9(4)(a) and (c) and section 9(5). Provision is made to enable the Director-General to extend 
the duration of the initial 12 month period on good cause shown. 
155 Section 9(4)(b). 
156 The constitution must be consistent with the principles espoused in section 9 (section 8(2)(c)). It must 












process for drafting and adopting it.157 These are largely intended to ensure that the 
content of the constitution, and the process leading up to its adoption, are based on the 
principles of fairness, equity, accountability and transparency. Where a dispute arises 
regarding the preparation or adoption of the constitution, provision is made for the 
Director-General on his own accord, or on request of the community, to appoint a 
conciliator to assist in resolving the dispute.158 Once the community has adopted its 
constitution, it can apply to the Director-General to register the CPA. If the Director-
General is satisfied that the community qualifies for registration,159 he/she can consent 
to the registration.160 In recognition of the fact that prior to the introduction of the 
Communal Property Associations Act ‘similar entities’161 had been formed to hold land 
rights restored to communities under the Restitution of Land Rights Act, the Act 
provides a fast-track procedure for effectively transforming these similar entities into 
CPAs.162 
 
                                                                                                                                                                           
include: the name, address and objects of the CPA; the land to be owned by the CPA; membership 
criteria; a list of members or the principles and procedures for determining membership; classes of 
membership and rights of members; the rights of members to use the CPA’s property; grounds for 
terminating membership; the committee responsible for administering the CPA (including how it is elected 
and run); the powers of the CPA; how the constitution can be altered; disciplinary matters; and the 
dissolution of the CPA. 
157 Provision is made for securing assistance from the DRD&LR and the discretionary submission of a 
draft constitution to the Director-General for comment (section 6). Prior to adopting its constitution, the 
community must notify the Director-General, convene a meeting to adopt the constitution, and invite an 
authorised officer from the DRD&LR to attend the meeting (section 7 read with Regulation 5 of the 
Regulations in Terms of the Communal Property Association Act (1996)). The authorised officer is 
required to prepare detailed minutes of the meeting for submission to the Director-General (section 7(2)).  
158 Section 10(2). 
159 An association qualifies for registration if: the provisions of the Act apply to it; the main objective of the 
association is to hold property; its constitution complies with the principles prescribed in section 9; the 
constitution addressed the matters set out in Schedule 1; the association have followed the prescribed 
procedures in adopting the constitution; and the resolution to adopt the constitution was supported by the 
majority of members of the community present or represented at the meeting convened to adopt it 
(section 8(2)). 
160 As with provisional associations, the actual registration is undertaken by the Registration Officer, an 
officer of the DRD&LR, who registers the CPA and allocates a registration number and certificate to it 
(section 8(3)). 
161 ‘Similar entity’ is defined as a ‘trust, associations of persons or company registered in terms of section 
21 of the Companies Act, 1973 (Act 61 of 1973)’ (section 1). 
162 Where a community has previously established such a similar entity through a democratic process, the 
Director-General may, if such a community wishes to transform it into a CPA, exempt the community from 












Once registered, the CPA is a juristic person and can acquire rights and secure 
obligations in its own name.163 It can furthermore, subject to its constitution, acquire, 
dispose and/or encumber immovable property or real rights therein.164 The latter 
transactions must, however, be approved by the majority of CPA members.165 The 
Director-General may assist any member seeking to challenge the validity of 
transactions undertaken without such approval.166 No amendments can be made to the 
constitution of a CPA, unless the Director-General has consented thereto in writing.167 
Furthermore, the Director-General must be notified of any alterations to the membership 
of a provisional association and a CPA.168 
 
The CPA is theoretically administered by a democratically elected committee, the 
members of which stand in a fiduciary duty to the broader membership of the CPA.169 
Any person who breaches this fiduciary duty, breaches a provision of the constitution, 
abuses any power or authority vested in him/her and/or incites or attempts to incite a 
person to do the above, is guilty of an offence.170 Where disputes arise between a 
provisional association or CPA and its members, the Director-General has discretion to 
appoint a facilitator to assist in resolving the dispute.171 The Act also provides for the 
submission of annual reports by the CPA to the Director-General containing a broad 
range of information.172 The Director-General is in turn required to submit an annual 
report to the Minister of Rural Development and Land Reform on existing provisional 
                                                     
163 Section 8(6). 
164 Ibid. 
165 Section 12(1). 
166 Section 12(4)-(6). 
167 Section 8(10). In addition, the CPA must generally comply with the procedures set out in section 6 and 
section 7 of the Act prior to affecting such an amendment (section 8(11)). 
168 Section 11(9) read with Regulation 11 of the Regulations in Terms of the Communal Property 
Association Act (1996). 
169 Section 8(7). 
170 Section 14. 
171 Section 10(2). 
172 Section 11 read with Regulation 8 and 9 of the Regulations in Terms of the Communal Property 
Association Act (1996). The array of information includes: the names and details of committee members 
and new CPA members; copies of the CPA’s financial statements; and a list of all dealings in land and 












associations and CPAs, and the extent to which the objects of the Act are being 
achieved.173 
 
Notwithstanding this relatively comprehensive regime providing for the establishment of 
institutions to hold communal land rights restored to communities under the Restitution 
of Land Rights Act, the practical operation of the approximately 952 CPAs and similar 
entities (namely approximately 700 trusts) has been far from successful.174 Specific 
concerns highlighted by commentators as contributing to their failure include: the ‘too 
sophisticated’ and cumbersome procedures governing the establishment and operation 
of CPAs; the fact that communal customs and practices are frequently not taken into 
account by those tasked with assisting communities in drafting their constitutions; the 
attempt to compel often fragmented and multi-layered community structures to form a 
single CPA; and the failure of the Government to provide adequate support during the 
pre- and post-establishment phase.175 In its Review of Communal Property 
Institutions176 undertaken in 2005, the Centre for Scientific and Industrial Research 
concluded that: 
 
‘...the majority of CPIs are partly functional from an institutional perspective but are 
largely or totally dysfunctional in terms of allocation of individual resources and the 
defining of clear usage rights, responsibilities, powers and procedures for members and 
the decision making body. Transparency and accountability is also often below what is 
required.’ 
                                                     
173 Section 17. 
174 Settlement and Implementation Support Strategy (2007) 160-162; and De Villiers A Comparative 
Overview of Experiences in Zimbabwe, Namibia, South Africa and Australia (2003) 70-71. 
175 See: Pienaar (2009) 12(2) Potchefstroom Electronic Law Journal 23-24; Pienaar G “The Land Titling 
Debate in South Africa” (2006) 3 Tydskrif vir die Suid-Afrikaanse Reg 435; Pienaar (2005) Stellenbosch 
Law Review 65; Cousins et al “Communal Land Rights, Democracy and Traditional Leaders” in 
Saruchera Securing Land and Resources in Africa (2004) 145; De Villiers A Comparative Overview of 
Experiences in Zimbabwe, Namibia, South Africa and Australia (2003) 70-71; Cousins B “Reforming 
Communal Land Tenure in South Africa - Why the draft Communal Land Rights Bill is not the Answer” 
(2002) 3(3) ESR Review 8; and Pienaar G “Communal Property Arrangements: A Second Bite” in 
Cousins B (ed) At the Crossroads: Land and Agrarian Reform into the 21st Century (2000) PLAAS/NLC 
Bellville/Braamfontein 322-323 & 325-330. 
176 Council for Industrial and Scientific Research Review of Communal Property Institutions (2005) CSIR, 
Pretoria, quoted in Lahiff E “‘Capitalist Collectivism’? How Inappropriate Models of Common Property are 
Hampering South Africa’s Land Reform” Unpublished paper presented at the International Association for 














Several additional and interrelated problems relating to the formation and operation of 
CPAs, and the role of the Government in supporting and monitoring their operation, are 
highlighted in the SIS Strategy.177 Regarding their formation, there is a tendency to 
unduly expedite the establishment process due to budgetary constraints. As a result, 
the procedures for establishing CPAs are frequently ‘reduced to steps in the project 
cycle that enable the transfer of land’ as opposed to a process for ‘claimants and 
participants to clarify their rights and obligations and put in place effective institutions to 
manage these’.178 Regarding their operation, CPA committees frequently fail to govern 
the institution in accordance with the substantive rules and procedures prescribed in 
their founding documents.179 This is on occasion due to capacity constraints and in 
other contexts due to wilful default.180 Regarding post-establishment support, the 
Government lacks capacity to monitor the extent to which CPAs are fulfilling their 
functions or complying with their reporting obligations.181 This is no doubt compounded 
by the fact that the Government has apparently lost its initial register of the first 450 
CPAs, is yet to establish an electronic register for CPAs, and has failed to record any 
‘similar entities’ (such as trusts) to which land rights have been restored under the 
Restitution of Land Rights Act.182 It is accordingly not surprising that many CPAs are 
characterised by ‘self-help, elite capture, uncontrolled use of the resources and internal 
conflict’.183 This is a somewhat damning and concerning assessment of the institutions 
principally tasked with holding communal land rights restored in terms of the land 
restitution regime; institutions, which as has been mentioned above, are supposed to be 
founded on democratic principles such as fairness, equity, accountability and 
transparency. The manner in which these problems have manifest in the settled land 
claims in protected areas is considered in Chapter 9 (Part 7) below. 
 
 
                                                     
177 Settlement and Implementation Support Strategy (2007) 94 & 160-162. 
178 Settlement and Implementation Support Strategy (2007) 160-161. 
179 Settlement and Implementation Support Strategy (2007) 161-162. 
180 Ibid. 
181 Settlement and Implementation Support Strategy (2007) 24. 
182 Ibid. 












3.2 COMMUNAL LAND RIGHTS ACT 
 
The Communal Land Rights Act, promulgated some six years ago,184 was to provide for 
the recognition and regulation of communal land rights regime in South Africa. Prior to it 
coming into force, the Constitutional Court held in Tongoane v Minister for Agriculture 
and Land Affairs185 that the entire Act was unconstitutional and invalid for ‘want of 
compliance’ with the procedures set out in the Constitution for enacting legislation.186 
Nonetheless, a brief discussion of its provisions is relevant in that it highlights the 
anticipated approach of the Government to recognise, upgrade and administer 
communal land rights in South Africa.187 
 
The ambit of the Communal Land Rights Act was to have been far broader than its 
counterpart, the Communal Property Associations Act. As highlighted above, the latter 
provides for the establishment of institutions to hold rights restored to communities 
under the Restitution of Land Rights Act.188 As will be illustrated below, the former 
sought to upgrade and secure the previous forms of subservient and permit-based 
communal tenure prevalent in South Africa. It further sought to reform the frequently 
undemocratic institutions responsible for administering land held under such forms of 
tenure. 
                                                     
184 The Act was assented to on 14 July 2004. 
185 2010 (6) SA 214 CC. 
186 Ngcobo CJ deemed the Act to be one that substantially affects the interests of the Provinces (para. 
97). Owing to Government’s non-compliance with section 76 of the Constitution, which compels a Bill to 
be referred to the National Council of Provinces for consideration and approval, the entire Act was held to 
be unconstitutional (para. 112). The Constitutional Court did not accordingly deem it necessary to confirm 
the decision of the court a quo in the Tongoane v Minister for Agriculture and Land Affairs (Unreported 
judgment of Ledwaba J in the High Court (North Gauteng Division) under Case No. 11678/2006, dated 30 
October 2009) which declared sections 21 and 22 of the Act to be unconstitutional on substantive 
grounds (para. 116). These sections provide for the establishment and composition of the land 
administration committees, the anticipated principal institutions for administering communal land in rural 
areas. See further on the Constitutional Court judgment: Khunou F “Judgment Takes Out the Heart of 
CLARA on Procedural Grounds: the Constitutional Court approach in Tongoane and Others v National 
Minister for Agriculture and Land Affairs and Others (CCT100/09) [2010] ZACC 10” (2010) 503 De Rebus 
26-29. 
187 For an overview of the Act, see: Smith H “An Overview of the Communal Land Rights Act 11 of 2004” 
in Claassens A & Cousins B (eds) Land, Power and Custom: Controversies Generated by South Africa’s 
Communal Land Rights Act (2008) University of Cape Town Press Cape Town 35-71. For a 
comprehensive critique of the substantive content of the Act and the procedures leading to its 
promulgation, see generally: Claassens et al Land, Power and Custom (2008). 













The Communal Land Rights Act would have applied to ‘communal land’ which the law 
defined to include: state land held under ‘beneficial occupation’;189 state land in respect 
of which several forms of subservient and permit-based tenure were granted to Black 
communities under apartheid land legislation;190 land held by the KwaZulu-Natal 
Ingonyama Trust;191 and land acquired by communities in terms of South Africa’s 
restitution and redistribution programme.192 
 
The Act specifically recognised the institution of a community,193 defined as ‘a group of 
persons whose rights to land are derived from shared rules determining access to land 
held in common by such a group’.194 In order to be so recognised, a community would 
have had to make, adopt and register, with the Director-General of the DRD&LR, a set 
of community rules to regulate the administration and use of communal land by the 
community.195 Once the community rules had been duly registered, the community 
would have acquired juristic personality and would have been empowered to: acquire 
and hold rights and incur obligations; and own, encumber and dispose of movable and 
immovable property.196 Each community would have been required to establish a land 
administration committee (LAC), which would have been the principal institution for 
representing the community in its land dealings.197 The composition, tenure and 
procedures for electing members of a LAC were prescribed in the Act in an effort to 
                                                     
189 ‘Beneficial occupation’ was defined as ‘occupation of land by a person for a continuous period of not 
less than five years prior to 31 December 1997 as if that person was the owner, without force, openly and 
without the permission of the owner’ (section 1). 
190 These laws include: Self-Governing Territories Constitution Act (21 of 1971); Development Trust and 
Land Act (18 of 1936); and the Black Land Administration Act (27 of 1913). 
191 The KwaZulu-Natal Ingonyama Trust Act (3 of 1994) effectively transferred the ownership and 
administration of some 2.8 million hectares of rural land in the KwaZulu-Natal Province to the KwaZulu-
Natal Ingonyama Trust. The Trust was, and still is, responsible for administering this land for the material 
benefit and social wellbeing of the individual members of the communities residing on the land.  
192 Section 1 read with section 2. 
193 Section 3. 
194 Section 1. 
195 Section 19. The prescribed content and process for making and registering these community rules 
were contained in Chapter 3 of the Draft Regulations under the Communal Land Rights Act (GN 199 GG 
No. 30736 dated 6 February 2008). 
196 Section 3. 
197 Section 21 read with section 24. The procedures for establishing a LAC, its composition and powers 
and functions were prescribed in detail in Chapter 4 of the Draft Regulations under the Communal Land 












ensure that the interests of all government authorities and community members were 
safeguarded.198 However, the above provisions were potentially circumvented as the 
Act provided that where the community had a recognised traditional council, the council 
could have performed the powers and functions of the LAC.199 While an obligation was 
imposed on such traditional councils to ensure that their membership satisfied that 
prescribed for LACs when operating in the land administration domain,200 several 
commentators were of the opinion that the nature of the traditional councils held 
potential for undermining the tenor of the Act to entrench a more democratic and 
equitable communal land administration regime.201 Whilst not confirmed by the 
Constitutional Court, this was the reason for the High Court declaring section 21 and 
section 22 of the Communal Land Rights Act unconstitutional and invalid.202 
 
A range of obligations would have been imposed on LACs, including the administration 
of communal land.203 Importantly, any decision made by a LAC that would have had the 
‘effect of disposing of communal land or a right in communal land to any person, 
including a community member’, would have had to be ratified in writing by a Land 
                                                     
198 The members of a LAC would not have been able to hold any traditional leadership position (section 
22(2)). At least one third of the total membership of a LAC would have had to be women and one member 
would have had to represent the interests of ‘vulnerable community members, including women, children 
and the youth, the elderly and the disabled’ (section 22(4)). Each of the following authorities would also 
have had discretion to designate one non-voting member of a LAC: Minister of Rural Development ad 
Land Affairs; Chairperson of relevant Land Rights Board; relevant provincial MEC for agriculture; relevant 
provincial MEC for land affairs; and every municipal authority in whose area the LAC functions (section 
22(5)). The term of office of LAC members may not exceed 5 years (section 22(5). 
199 Section 21(2). These traditional councils are established and regulated in terms of the Traditional 
Leadership and Governance Framework Act (41 of 2003). For a discussion of these traditional councils, 
see: Chapter 6 (Part 5.3). 
200 Section 21(3) and (4). 
201 See generally: Claassens A “Customary Law and Zones of Chiefly Sovereignty: The Impact of 
Government Policy on Whose Voice Prevails in the Making and Changing of Customary Law” in 
Claassens et al Land, Power and Custom (2008) 371-377; Pienaar (2006) Tydskrif vir die Suid-Afrikaanse 
Reg 454; Ntsebeza L Democracy Compromised: Chiefs and the Politics of Land in South Africa (2005) 
Brill Leiden; Cousins et al “Communal Land Rights, Democracy and Traditional Leaders” in Saruchera 
Securing Land and Resources in Africa (2004) 139-158; Cousins (2004) ESR Review 8; Ntsebeza L 
“Democratic Decentralisation and Traditional Authority: Dilemmas of Land Administration in Rural South 
Africa” (2004) 16(1) European Journal of Development Research 71-89; Meer T & Campell C “Traditional 
Leadership in Democratic South Africa” (2007); and Ntsebeza L Land Tenure Reform, Traditional 
Authorities and Rural Local Government in Post-Apartheid South Africa: Case Studies from the Eastern 
Cape (1999) Research Report No.3, PLAAS Bellville. 
202 Tongoane v The National Minister for Agriculture and Land Affairs (2009). 
203 These included: the allocation of new order rights; the establishment and maintenance of registers of 
land transactions; the promotion and safeguarding of the interest of the community and its members in 












Rights Board.204 The Minister would have had the power to establish these Land Rights 
Boards.205 In order to ensure that their membership would have had the requisite 
diversity, skills, independence and objectivity, the Act: prescribed their composition;206 
provided for the appointment of members by the Minister and not the community;207 
limited the tenure of membership;208 and precluded the selection of political 
representatives in the national, provincial and local sphere of government as 
members.209  
 
In an effort to upgrade and secure the various forms of communal tenure prevalent in 
South Africa, the Communal Land Rights Act would have entitled a community or 
person to ‘tenure which is legally secure or to comparable redress’ if their tenure of land 
‘is legally insecure as a result of past racially discriminatory laws or practices’.210 To do 
so, the Act recognised both ‘old order rights’211 and ‘new order rights’.212 The former 
comprised of the subservient and permit-based forms of communal tenure that existed, 
and continue to exist, in many rural areas in South Africa. The latter constituted new 
forms of communal and individual tenure determined by the Minister. The procedure for 
upgrading and securing old order communal rights and that for validating new order 
                                                     
204 Section 24(2). 
205 The Minister would have been able,, by notice in the Government Gazette, to establish one of more 
Land Rights Boards (section 25). Their additional functions would have included: providing impartial 
advice to the Minister and any community on matters concerning sustainable land ownership and use, the 
development of land and the provision of access to land on an equitable basis; liason with all sphere of 
government and other relevant institutions; and monitoring community compliance with the Act (section 
28(1)). The procedures for establishing a Land Rights Board, its composition; code of conduct and 
powers and functions are prescribed in detail in Chapter 1 of the Draft Regulations under the Communal 
Land Rights Act (2008). 
206 Section 26(2). The membership of each Land Rights Board would have had to comprise of the 
following: representatives from relevant organs of state; two members nominated by the relevant 
Provincial House of Traditional Leaders; one member nominated by the commercial or industrial sector; 
seven members from the relevant community; and one member representing each of the following 
vulnerable groups - child-headed households, persons with disabilities, the youth and female-headed 
households. 
207 Section 26(1). 
208 Section 26(4). Membership was generally limited to five years. 
209 Section 27(1)(g). 
210 Section 4(1). 
211 ‘Old order right’ was defined as ‘a tenure or other right in or to communal land which ‘- (a) is formal or 
informal; is registered or unregistered; derives from or is recognised by law, including customary law, 
practice or usage; and exists immediately prior to a determination by the Minister in terms of section 18...’ 
(section 1).  
212 ‘New order right’ was defined as ‘a tenure or other right in communal or other land which has been 












rights was to be very similar.213 Both would have generally involved the designation of a 
land rights enquirer,214 the institution of a land rights enquiry215 and the submission of a 
land rights enquiry report to the Minister.216 Having considered the latter report prepared 
by the land rights enquirer, the Minister would have had to determine the ‘location and 
extent of the land to be transferred to the community or person’.217 The Minister would 
have also had to determine whether the land should: be registered in the name of one 
community; be subdivided and held by different persons; be partly held by the 
community with the remainder subdivided and held by different persons; or be reserved 
as State land.218 In respect of an old order right, the Minister would have had to either: 
confirm the right; convert it into ownership or a comparable new order right (and 
determine the nature of such a right); or cancel it whereupon comparable redress would 
have been due.219 The Minister would have been empowered, in consultation with the 
relevant municipal authority, to impose land-use and other conditions on any such 
determination.220 Where any dispute arose following a land rights enquiry, the Minister 
would have been precluded from making any determination until the dispute had been 
                                                     
213 See generally Chapter 5 of the Communal Land Rights Act. The procedures for appointing a land 
rights enquirer, instituting and conducting a land rights enquiry, preparing a land rights enquiry report and 
making a Ministerial determination are prescribed in detail in Chapter 2 of the Draft Regulations under the 
Communal Land Rights Act (2008). 
214 The Minister could have designated an officer from within the DRD&LR, or another suitable person, to 
conduct the land rights enquiry (section 15).  
215 The Minister would have been able to institute a land rights enquiry prior to securing an old order 
rights, transferring communal land to a community or person, or determining comparable redress (section 
14(1)). A land rights enquiry would have had to traverse several issues including: the nature and extent of 
all rights, interests and tenure of land which were or could have been affected by the enquiry; the 
interests of the State; the options for legally securing insecure rights; provision for equitable access to the 
land; spatial planning and land-use management issues; and the need and options for comparable 
redress (section 14(2)). Provision was made for public notification of the holding of a land rights enquiry 
(section 16) and the manner in which the enquiry would have had to be held (section 17).   
216 On completion of the land rights enquiry, the enquirer would have had to prepare a report and publish 
it for public comment (section 17(3)(a) and (b)). The report and any comments received thereon would 
thereafter have had to be submitted to the Minister for consideration (section 17(3)(c)). 
217 Section 18(2). 
218 Section 18(3). 
219 Section 18(3)(d). The Minister had discretion, on application of a holder of an older order right which 
cannot be legally secured, to award the holder comparable redress (section 12(1)). Such redress could 
have taken the form of a grant of alternative land, monetary compensation, or a combination of both 
(section 12(2)). 












resolved by ‘mediation, other alternative traditional or non-traditional dispute resolution 
mechanisms or by a court’.221 
 
Following a determination, the Minister would have had to register the old order or new 
order rights in the name of the community or person.222 The Minister would have had to 
also take the necessary steps to transfer the land to the community or person.223 
Provision was made for the registration of subsequent transactions in respect of 
communal land224 and the conversion of registered new order rights into freehold 
ownership.225 
 
Having invalidated the Act, the Constitutional Court urged Parliament to enact revised 
communal land tenure legislation with ‘a sense of urgency and diligence’.226 The 
process of drafting such legislation is far from complete. Those tasked with it will no 
doubt take heed of the substantial constitutional problems inherent in the current 
version of the Act, particularly those relating to the establishment and composition of the 
institutions tasked with communal land administration in rural areas. They will hopefully 
also take heed of the extensive academic criticism that was levelled at draft versions of 
the Bill and the Act following its formal promulgation.227  
 
The bulk of the criticism levelled against the Communal Land Rights Act related to the 
nature and form of the communal land rights which were to be recognised and created 
                                                     
221 Section 18(5). 
222 Section 5(1). Where the determination related to communal land which was not State land, the 
ownership of such land would have vested in the community even where it was registered in the name of 
a person, traditional leader, community property association, trust or other entity (section 5(2)(a)). Such 
communal ownership would similarly have had to been endorsed on the title deed of the property by the 
Registrar of Deeds (section 5(2)(d)). 
223 Section 6. These steps would have included: having the land surveyed and a communal general plan 
prepared and approved in terms of the Land Survey Act (8 of 1997); having the plan registered in terms of 
the Deeds Registries Act (47 of 1937); and in respect of new order rights, transferring such rights to the 
appropriate recipients in terms of a Deed of Communal Land Right or other suitable deed. 
224 Section 8. 
225 Section 9. 
226 Tongoane v Minister for Agriculture and Land Affairs 2010 (6) SA 214 (CC) para.127. 
227 For a summary of these challenges see: Cousins B “Contextualising the Controversies: Dilemmas of 
Communal Tenure in Post-Apartheid South Africa” in Claassens et al Land, Power and Custom (2008) 
15-27; and Claassens A Community Views on the Land Rights Act (2008) Research Report No.15, 












under it; and the form of the institutions established to hold such rights. In respect of the 
nature and form of communal land rights, key criticisms of the Act included the 
following: its failure to adequately recognise and secure the existing rights to occupation 
and use of land in communal areas;228 the failure to define clearly the nature and 
content of the anticipated ‘new order rights’ provided for in the Act;229 the broad 
discretionary powers afforded to the Minister to determine these rights;230 and the Act’s 
adoption of an inappropriate westernised approach to communal land tenure reform, 
one which sought to generally individualise communal land tenure through land titling,231 
as opposed to one which sought to build on the flexible, inclusive, layered and nested 
nature of communal land tenure regimes through affording statutory recognition to both 
group rights and the myriad forms of fragmented-use rights which are prevalent in rural 
areas of South Africa.232 
 
In respect of the institutions which were to be created to hold such rights, key criticisms 
included the following: the possible overlap between the institutions created under the 
Communal Property Associations Act and those to be created under the Communal 
Land Rights Act;233 the cumbersome and sophisticated procedures for establishing the 
LACs tasked with holding and administering communal land rights;234 the potential for 
the prescribed content to be included in the rules regulating these institutions to clash 
                                                     
228 Cousins B “‘Embeddedness’ Versus Titling: African Land Tenure Systems and the Potential Impacts of 
the Communal Land Rights Act 11 of 2004” (2005) 3 Stellenbosch Law Review 505-506. 
229 Cousins B (2004) ESR Review 8; and Cousins et al “Communal Land Rights, Democracy and 
Traditional Leaders” in Saruchera Securing Land and Resources in Africa (2004) 149. 
230 Ibid. 
231 See generally on the problems associated with the implementation of this approach in South and 
Southern Africa: Sjaastad E & Cousins B “Formalisation of Land Rights in the South: An Overview” (2009) 
26(1) Land Use Policy 1-9; and Cousins (2007) Journal of Agrarian Change 291. 
232 Pienaar (2006) Tydskrif vir die Suid-Afrikaanse Reg 435; Claassens (2005) Acta Juridica 77-78; 
Claassens et al “Communal Land Tenure from Above and Below” in Evers et al Competing Jurisdictions - 
Settling Land Claims in Africa (2005) 48-51; Cousins (2004) ESR Review 7; Cousins et al “Communal 
Land Rights, Democracy and Traditional Leaders” in Saruchera Securing Land and Resources in Africa 
(2004) 151; and Cousins (2002) ESR Review 8. 
233 Pienaar (2005) Stellenbosch Law Review 67; Cousins B “The Continuing Controversy Over the 
Communal Land Rights Bill of 2002” (2004) 5(4) ESR Review 8; and Cousins et al “Communal Land 
Rights, Democracy and Traditional Leaders” in Saruchera Securing Land and Resources in Africa (2004) 
149. 
234 Pienaar (2005) Stellenbosch Law Review 67; and Pienaar G “Security of Communal Land Tenure” 












with indigenous laws, practices and customs;235 the lack of clarity regarding the role of 
community members in the land rights enquiry process and any subsequent land 
transactions undertaken by LACs;236 the potential lack of capacity and resources to 
enable these institutions to fulfil their statutory mandate;237 the lack of post-
implementation support and monitoring to assist them in doing so;238 the inability of 
these institutions to sustain themselves in the commercial world given their inability to 
generate profit;239 and the potential for the anticipated composition of these institutions 
to perpetuate the precarious status of rural women with regard to holding and 
administering land rights.240  
 
Several commentators were accordingly of the view that the institutions to be created 
under the Act would be plagued by the myriad problems currently undermining the 
functioning of CPAs241 and furthermore held potential for the Act to entrench the 
traditionally undemocratic and patriarchal traditional councils as the key institutions 
responsible for administering communal land tenure under the Act.242 Concerns were 
also raised regarding the feasibility of implementing the Act given the capacity 
requirements and high costs associated with administering its anticipated cadastral 
                                                     
235 Pienaar (2005) Stellenbosch Law Review 67. 
236 Claassens A “Women, Customary Law and Discrimination: The Impact of the Communal Land Rights 
Act” (2005) 42 Acta Juridica 75-77; Cousins (2004) ESR Review 8; Cousins et al “Communal Land 
Rights, Democracy and Traditional Leaders” in Saruchera Securing Land and Resources in Africa (2004) 
149; and Cousins B “Potential and Pitfalls of ‘Communal’ Land Tenure Reform: Experience in Africa and 
Implications for South Africa” Unpublished paper presented at World Bank Conference on Land 




240 Several commentators are of the opinion that the specific provisions in the Act aimed at securing the 
existing land tenure rights of women, providing increased future access to land by women, and reserving 
a role for women in both the LAC and Land Rights Boards (see specifically sections 4(2), 5(1), 14(2)(g); 
18(1)(e); 22(3); 26(2)(d)(iv)) were insufficient to secure the land rights of women and their role in land 
administration and management. See specifically: Claassens A & Mnisi S “Rural Women Redefining Land 
Rights in the Context of Living Customary Law” (2009) 25 South African Journal on Human Rights 491-
516; Claassens A & Ngubane S “Women, Land and Power: The Impact of the Communal Land Rights 
Act” in Claassens et al Land, Power and Custom (2008) 154-183; Cousins (2005) Stellenbosch Law 
Review 507-508; Claassens (2005) Acta Juridica 42-81; and Cousins et al “Communal Land Rights, 
Democracy and Traditional Leaders” in Saruchera Securing Land and Resources in Africa (2004) 149. 
241 Pienaar (2006) Tydskrif vir die Suid-Afrikaanse Reg 451 & 454; and Cousins (2002) ESR Review 8. 












system;243 and the potential for the Act’s cadastral system to compound tribal boundary 
disputes and ethnic differences given its failure to properly account for the nested, 
overlapping and adaptive nature of communal land rights in rural areas.244  
 
4. POLICIES, PLANS AND PROGRAMMES 
 
As in the context of South Africa’s conservation domain, the country’s land authorities 
have introduced several programmes, project and strategies to facilitate the 
implementation of the land reform regime. These include in chronological order, the 
Comprehensive Rural Development Programme (CRDP),245 Settlement and 
Implementation Support Strategy for Land and Agrarian Reform in South Africa (SIS 
Strategy),246 Land and Agrarian Reform Project (LARP)247 and the Proactive Land 
Acquisition Strategy (PLAS).248 The CRDP and SIS Strategy are of direct relevance to 
                                                     
243 These costs were estimated to be in the region of R500 million (Pienaar (2006) Tydskrif vir die Suid-
Afrikaanse Reg 452 & 453). It has furthermore been estimated that it would take some 200 years to 
transfer land to the estimated 20 000 rural communities in terms of the process set out in the Act 
(Cousins (2002) ESR Review 8-9). See generally on challenges facing the implementation of the 
Communal Land Rights Act: Olivier N “Communal Land Rights Act 11 of 2004: Overview, Institutional 
Arrangements and Implementation Guidelines” (2006) Obiter 304-315. 
244 Cousins B “Characterising ‘Communal’ Tenure: Nested Systems and Flexible Boundaries” Claassens 
et al Land, Power and Custom (2008) 109-137; Cousins “Potential and Pitfalls of ‘Communal’ Land 
Tenure Reform” (2009) 14 & 15; Cousins (2007) 7(3) Journal of Agrarian Change 291; Cousins B “No 
Way to Communal Land Rights: Boundary Disputes Will Stall the CLR Act” (2004) 16 New Agenda 18-24; 
and Cousins (2004) ESR Review 7. 
245 Ministry of Rural Development and Land Reform The Comprehensive Rural Development Programme 
Framework (2009). 
246 Sustainable Development Consortium Settlement and Implementation Support Strategy for Land and 
Agrarian Reform in South Africa: A Synthesis Report (2007) Commission on Restitution of Land Rights 
Pretoria. 
247 Government of the Republic of South Africa The Land and Agrarian Reform Project: The Concept 
Document (2008) (Version 5(2)), dated February 2008. The LARP seeks to create a new framework ‘for 
delivery and collaboration on land reform and agricultural support to accelerate the rate and sustainability 
of transformation’ in the agriculture sector. A joint initiate of the erstwhile Department of Land Affairs and 
Department of Agriculture, it specifically aims to: redistribute 5 million hectares of white-owned agricultural 
land to 10 000 new agricultural producers; increase Black entrepreneurs in the agribusiness industry by 
10 %; provide universal access to agricultural support services to specific target groups including farm 
dwellers, communal farmers and new and/or existing Black agribusiness entrepreneurs; and increase 
agricultural production by these groups by 10-15 %. See further: Lahiff E Land Reform in South Africa: A 
Status Report (2008) Research Report No.38, PLAAS Bellville 27-31. 
248 Department of Land Affairs Implementation Plan for the Proactive Land Acquisition Strategy (2006) 
(Version 1), dated May 2006. Originating in 2003, the PLAS provides the policy framework for guiding the 
proactive acquisition of land by the Government for targeted groups in South Africa through the Provision 












the domestic implementation of CCAs and their content is accordingly considered in 
detail below. The LARP and PLAS, while relevant to the broad context of rural 
development and land reform, are not directly relevant to this enquiry owing to their 
focus on agriculture and not conservation. They do not accordingly warrant further 
consideration. 
 
4.1 COMPREHENSIVE RURAL DEVELOPMENT PROGRAMME 
 
The vision of the CRDP, introduced by the Ministry of Rural Development and Land 
Reform in 2009, is to create ‘vibrant, equitable and sustainable rural communities’.249 
Building on the Integrated Sustainable Rural Development Strategy250 published in 
2000, the CRDP adopts a three-pronged approach focusing on coordinating and 
integrating broad-based agrarian transformation,251 strategically increasing rural 
development,252 and improving the land reform programme in rural areas.253 The CRDP 
is principally implemented by the Department of Rural Development and Land Reform 
and is funded through R500m of the land reform budget allocated for rural development. 
                                                                                                                                                                           
Land Acquisition Strategy published in 2006, the express purpose of the PLAS is to promote growth, 
employment and equity in land ownership in particularly the rural areas of South Africa by 2014. 
249 Ministry of Rural Development and Land Reform The Comprehensive Rural Development Programme 
Framework (2009) 3-4. 
250 The Presidency Integrated Sustainable Rural Development Strategy (2000). 
251 This prong of the CRDP focuses on: the ‘establishment of rural business initiatives, agro-industries, 
co-operatives, cultural initiatives and vibrant local markets’ in rural areas; and the revitalization of 
‘communication infrastructure, public amenities and facilities in villages and small rural towns’ (The 
Comprehensive Rural Development Programme Framework (2009) 3-4). Objectives include: facilitating 
livestock farming, crop farming and related value chain processing; promoting the use of appropriate 
technologies; recognizing indigenous knowledge systems; promoting food security; strengthening rural 
livelihoods; and facilitating sustainable natural resource management (Ibid 4 & 13-14). 
252 This prong of the CRDP focuses on enabling rural communities to ‘take control of their destiny’ and 
deal with rural poverty through the ‘optimal use and management of natural resources’ (The 
Comprehensive Rural Development Programme Framework (2009) 4). Objectives include: facilitating 
social mobilisation within rural communities; establishing savings clubs and cooperatives to promote 
economic activities; undertaking leadership training and social facilitation to promote economic 
independence; promoting democratisation, coordination and cooperative governance within and between 
relevant institutions; and increasing the role of non-governmental and community based organisations 
(Ibid 4 & 14-15). 
253 This prong of the CRDP focuses on expediting the settlement of outstanding rural land restitution 
claims and developing ‘less costly alternative models of land redistribution while reviewing legislation and 
policies that apply to both programmes’ (The Comprehensive Rural Development Programme Framework 
(2009) 4). Objectives include: reviewing land reform products and processes; increasing the pace of land 
redistribution, land tenure reform and land restitution in rural areas; providing effective support to all land 












It is guided by a National Action Plan that prescribes an array of short, medium and 
long-term goals.254 Initially piloted at two sites,255 the ambit of the programme has been 
extended to other rural sites.256 With the ambit of the CRDP extending to rural 
development generally, and not specifically to rural agriculture, it is of relevance to the 
current enquiry as it provides a feasible source of funding for promoting rural 
development through the vehicle of CCAs. This issue is explored in more detail in 
Chapter 9 (Part 10) below.  
 
4.2 SETTLEMENT AND IMPLEMENTATION SUPPORT STRATEGY FOR LAND 
AND AGRARIAN REFORM IN SOUTH AFRICA 
 
The SIS Strategy, commissioned by the erstwhile Department of Land Affairs, was 
formally launched in February 2008. It comprises of both an extensive analysis of the 
challenges associated with post-settlement support in relation to South Africa’s Land 
Reform Programme, and a comprehensive series of recommendations regarding how to 
overcome them.  
 
As is comprehensively canvassed in Chapter 9 below, many of the challenges identified 
in the SIS Strategy are prevalent in South Africa’s CCAs. This is especially the case in 
those established by restoring land situated in existing protected areas to communal 
property institutions. Relevant challenges identified in the SIS Strategy as cross-cutting 
all components of the land reform programme include: uncertainty about which 
government authorities have the mandate for post-settlement support; poor 
intergovernmental relations between all spheres of government; inadequate post-
settlement support planning; a lack of clarity regarding the nature of rights and benefits 
allocated to land reform beneficiaries; the failure of communal property institutions to 
promote open, accountable and equitable decision-making; capacity and resource 
constraints among all stakeholders; the absence of effective information management, 
                                                     
254 The Comprehensive Rural Development Programme Framework (2009) 30-32. 
255 The two pilot sites were Riemvasmaak (Northern Cape) and Muyexe Village (Limpopo Province). 
256 For an overview of these other pilot sites see: Department of Rural Development and Land Reform, 
Comprehensive Rural Development Programme - Presentation to the Select Committee on Land and 












monitoring and evaluation; a lack of communication between all relevant stakeholders; 
and the land reform programme being driven by quantitative targets as opposed to 
qualitative results.257  
 
These diverse challenges are complemented in the land restitution context, by the 
following additional problems: the complexity of the settlement process; the continued 
disagreement between authorities regarding who is responsible for post-settlement 
support; the absence of tangible benefits for the majority of claimant communities; the 
adoption of a ‘one-size-fits-all’ approach to resolving the majority of land claims; the 
high levels of social risk associated with compelling often disparate claimant 
communities to lodge their land claims under the ‘rubric of a community claim’; the 
failure of the authorities to implement development plans and provide basic support; 
and the trend for strategic post-settlement partnerships with third parties to entrench 
previous inequalities.258 
 
It is acknowledged in the SIS Strategy that ‘... without urgent and significant investment 
in settlement and implementation support services, existing post-settlement support 
capacity will be overwhelmed, which could place the entire land reform programme at 
risk.’259 A range of mechanisms and institutional arrangements are accordingly 
proposed to overcome these challenges.260 Those of direct relevance to CCAs include: 
adapting existing land reform policies and guidelines to include environmental planning; 
establishing institutional arrangements to enable ecosystem’s approaches to integrated 
environmental management; ensuring land restitution claims in protected areas that 
result in co-management agreements are adequately supported by a dedicated 
intergovernmental task team; guaranteeing the transfer of meaningful benefits to 
claimant communities; developing a programme to inform claimant communities of their 
                                                     
257 Settlement and Implementation Support Strategy (2007) 158-164. 
258 Settlement and Implementation Support Strategy (2007) 56-125. 
259 Settlement and Implementation Support Strategy (2007) xv. 
260 These mechanims aim to: achieve functional and spatial integration; secure rights, strengthen 
institutions and promote social development; build livelihood security, develop enterprises and provide 
technical support; and ensure sustainable human settlements and integrated natural resource 













environmental rights, responsibilities and liabilities; developing protocols for mapping 
environmental opportunities and constraints in protected areas; and reviewing the 
extent to which natural resource management and resource tenure rules are clearly 
defined as part of the business planning and legal entity formation process.261 The SIS 
Strategy recommends a complex array of institutional options for implementing these 
proposals at the national, provincial, district, local and ward level.262 It furthermore 
provides guidance on how to roll out the Strategy.263 
 
Whilst the evaluation of existing challenges facing post-settlement support and the 
proposals for overcoming these challenges are theoretically sound, one must question 
the ability of the relevant authorities to roll out the latter. Considering that the settlement 
of the remainder of the 4296 restitution claims are alone estimated to require an 
additional 65.3 billion budget to settle by 2014,264 the potential to leverage sufficient 
additional resources to fund the post-settlement support proposals contained in the SIS 
Strategy must be questioned. These proposals, in so far as they relate to the domestic 
implementation of CCAs, are critically considered in Chapter 9 below. 
 
5. KEY INSTITUTIONS 
 
With the exception of a clear statutory framework for dealing with communal land 
tenure, South Africa has a comprehensive statutory and policy framework for 
implementing the three components of its land reform programme. Equally 
comprehensive, is the array of institutions tasked with doing so. These institutions span 
different national ministries and department structures, and traverse all three spheres of 
government. Added to the above is a diverse array of traditional authorities and new 
communal property institutions. This web of institutions, particularly those with a 
potential role to play in implementing and administering CCAs, is highlighted below.  
                                                     
261 Settlement and Implementation Support Strategy (2007) 47-48. 
262 Settlement and Implementation Support Strategy (2007) 55-61. 
263 Settlement and Implementation Support Strategy (2007) 442-456. 
264 Commission on Restitution of Land Rights Presentation of Annual Report (2008-2009) (11 August 
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5.1 MINISTRIES, DEPARTMENTS AND STATUTORY AUTHORITIES 
 
Prior to the revision of South Africa’s National Cabinet portfolios in early 2009, national 
oversight of South Africa’s land reform regime fell to the Minister of Land Affairs and 
Agriculture.265 Since May 2009, this mandate has been allocated to the Minister of Rural 
Development and Land Reform,266 and the administration of all land reform legislation to 
the DRD&LR.267 The DRD&LR is divided into various branches, several of which 
administer different components of relevance to the country’s land reform programme. 
The Land and Tenure Reform Branch is responsible for administering the land 
redistribution and tenure reform components of the programme.268 The Restitution 
Branch is responsible for administering the land restitution component of the 
programme, a function that is practically undertaken by the CRLR. The CRLR, which 
comprises of a Chief Land Claims Commissioner, Deputy Land Claims Commissioner 
and seven regional land claims commissioners, is directly accountable to the Restitution 
Branch of the DRD&LR. The powers and functions of the CRLR and its commissioners 
are prescribed in the Restitution of Land Rights Act.269 So too are the powers of the 
LCC, tasked with adjudicating disputes which arise during the land restitution 
                                                     
265 The administration of the land reform regime during this era was largely undertaken by the Department 
of Land Affairs, duly assisted in the Department of Agriculture where issues of land reform intersected 
with those of agriculture. 
266 See GN 44 GG No. 32367 dated 1 July 2009. Key land reform laws transferred to the Department of 
Rural Development and Land Reform include: Deed Registries Act (47 of 1937); Black Authorities Act (68 
of 1951); Abolition of Racially Based Land Measures Act (108 of 1991); Upgrading of Land Tenure Rights 
Act (112 of 1991); Land Title Adjustment Act (111 of 1993); Provision of Land and Assistance Act (126 of 
1993); KwaZulu-Natal Ingonyama Trust Act (3 of 1994); Restitution of Land Rights Act (22 of 1994); Land 
Administration Act (2 of 1995); Land Reform (Labour Tenants) Act (3 of 1996); Communal Property 
Associations Act (28 of 1996); Interim Protection of Informal Land Rights Act (31 of 1996); Extension of 
Security of Tenure Act (62 of 1997); Transformation of Certain Rural Areas Act (94 of 1998); and the 
Communal Land Rights Act (11 of 2004). 
267 For an overview of the structure of the DRD&LR, see: http://www.ruraldevelopment.gov.za/. 
268 This Branch is in turn divided into: the Chief Directorate of Land Reform Implementation Management 
and Coordination (whose function it is to provide general management support to provincial offices of the 
Department); and the Chief Directorate of Strategic Management and Technical Support Services (whose 
function it is to administer the land tenure reform and land redistribution components of the land reform 
programme). 
269 Chapter II of the Act read together with the Rules Regarding the Procedure of the Commission (1995). 
The composition, powers, functions and procedures governing the operation of the CRLR are discussed 












process.270 The Land Planning and Information Branch is responsible for deeds 
registration, cadastral surveys, mapping and spatial planning.271 
 
Owing to the fact that land affairs falls within the exclusive competence of national 
government, one does not find ministries and departments expressly mandated to deal 
with land reform issues duplicated within provincial and local government structures. 
The DRD&LR has established Provincial and District Land Reform Offices in all nine 
provinces to facilitate the administration of the land tenure reform and redistribution 
process at the provincial and local level.272  
 
However, land reform issues do not in reality fall under the exclusive purview of the 
DRD&LR and its associated institutions. Several additional national and provincial 
agencies are of relevance where land reform issues intersect with their conservation 
counterparts. These could include: the Department of Environmental Affairs, SANParks, 
provincial environmental departments and conservation agencies, municipal authorities, 
environmental departments and protected areas management authorities;273 the 
National Treasury;274 the Department of Agriculture, Fisheries and Forestry, Department 
of Mineral Resources and Department of Water Affairs;275 the Department of Public 
Works;276 and the Department of Cooperative Governance and Traditional Affairs.277 
Several additional national, provincial and local government authorities are frequently 
compelled to enter the fray during the land reform post-settlement implementation and 
                                                     
270 Chapter III of the Act. The composition, powers, functions and procedures governing the operation of 
the LCC are similarly discussed fully in Chapter 6 (Part 2.1). 
271 This Branch is in turn divided into: the Chief Registrar of Deeds (who is responsible for overseeing 
deeds registration, legal support, deeds training and the functioning of the Deeds Offices); the Chief 
Directorate of Surveys and Mapping; and the Chief Directorate of Spatial Planning and Information. 
272 These provincial and district offices are directly accountable to the Chief Directorate of Land Reform 
Implementation Management and Coordination.  
273 Where, for example, a land restitution claim relates to land situated within a protected area. 
274 Where, for example, a land restitution claim triggers financial implications for the Government, such as 
the conclusion of a lease between a successful claimant community and the conservation authority. 
275 Where, for example, the land subject to land redistribution, restitution or tenure reform is also of 
relevance for agriculture, fishing, forestry, mining and fresh-water conservation. 
276 Where, for example, the land subject to land redistribution, restitution or tenure reform is owned by the 
Government. 
277 Where, for example, issue of cooperative governance of traditional affairs are triggered by the 












support phase owing to the limited assistance currently provided by the DRD&LR once 
the claim has been settled.278 
 
5.2 COMMUNAL PROPERTY INSTITUTIONS 
 
As has been highlighted above,279 South Africa’s land reform regime generally requires 
claimant communities to hold land restored to them in terms of the land restitution 
programme in a communal property institution. Initially comprising of land trusts280 and 
associations not for gain,281 they have since the promulgation of the Communal 
Property Associations Act predominantly taken the form of communal property 
associations. These communal property institutions, and their temporary forerunners 
such as ‘provisional CPAs’ and ‘interim land claims committees’, play a key role in the 
negotiation, settlement and implementation of successful restitution claims in protected 
areas. If the Communal Land Rights Act had come into force, the above communal 
property institutions would have been complemented by land rights boards and LACs. 
 
5.3 INSTITUTIONS OF TRADITIONAL AUTHORITY 
 
Finding their origins in South Africa’s constitutional dispensation, an array of institutions 
of traditional authority relevant to the administration of land in rural areas have been 
                                                     
278 This assistance could include: providing grants or small-scale financing; facilitating local economic 
development initiatives (including spatial development initiatives); installing infrastructure and services, 
and providing skills, resources, training and capacity building. At the national level relevant departments 
could include: Department of Economic Development; Department of Human Settlements; Department of 
Public Works; Department of Social Development; Department of Tourism; Department of Trade and 
Industry; and Department of Water Affairs. At the provincial level relevant departments could include 
those dealing with: economic development; education; finance; public works; rural development; roads; 
transport; social development; and tourism. At the local level relevant departments could include those 
dealing with: community development; development planning; urban management; economic 
development; housing; infrastructure; municipal services; and transportation. 
279 See: Chapter 6 (Part 2). 
280 Regulated under the Trust Property Control Act (57 of 1988). Such trusts are created by way of 
agreement, testament or court order. Once so established the Act regulates the identification, registration 
and administration of trust property (which is defined as property which is held in a trust and which is 
administered by a trustee/s). 
281 Regulated under the Companies Act (61 of 1973). The Companies Act is generally concerned with the 
regulation of commercial companies. It however also makes provision for ‘associations not for gain’ 
(otherwise known as section 21 companies). The Act regulates all aspects relating to formation, operation 












either reconstituted or newly established during the course of the past decade.282 These 
include traditional councils and national, provincial and local houses of traditional 
authorities. Several of these institutions potentially have a role to play in the context of 
CCAs.  
 
Traditional councils are largely a remnant of South Africa’s apartheid regime under 
which government-sanctioned tribal authorities, recognised under the Black Authorities 
Act,283 controlled the administration of land within many rural areas.284 These tribal 
authorities have in many cases been transformed into traditional councils under the 
Traditional Leadership and Governance Framework Act (TL&GFA).285 The TL&GFA 
expressly recognises traditional communities that are ‘subject to a system of traditional 
leadership’ and observe ‘a system of customary law’.286 It further provides for the 
establishment of traditional councils to ‘administer the affairs of the traditional 
community in accordance with customs and tradition’.287 Their composition, functions 
and relationship to local government structures are clearly detailed in the Act.288 If one 
surveys the array of powers afforded to the traditional councils, it would appear that 
unlike the tribal authorities, their role is one of advice, support and coordination (within 
the community and between the community and local government), and not one of land 
administration.289  
 
Interestingly, the TL&GFA introduces an element of democracy into the traditional 
councils. At least 40 % of their membership must comprise of democratically elected 
members of the traditional community.290 Several critics view this percentage as 
                                                     
282 For a historic overview of the role traditional authorities have played in land administration in South 
Africa, see: Delius P “Contested Terrain: Land Rights and Chiefly Power in Historical Perspective” in 
Claassens et al Land, Power and Custom (2008) 211-237. 
283 Act 68 of 1951. 
284 Ntsebeza (2004) European Journal of Development Research 72-76. 
285 Act 41 of 2003. 
286 Section 2. 
287 Section 4(1)(a). 
288 Sections 3-7. 
289 The functions afforded to traditional councils are set out in section 4. 












insufficient in circumventing the autocracy, nepotism and corruption that plagued tribal 
authorities.291 
 
A further concern relates to their ambivalent future role in the context of rural communal 
land administration. As highlighted previously, whilst the Communal Land Rights Act 
anticipated the establishment of democratically elected LACs as the future institutions 
responsible for managing communal land, it provided for the allocation of this function to 
existing traditional councils. The potential this held for an ‘abuse of power and 
mismanagement’ of communal land has been noted,292 especially owing to the fact that 
under customary law, land tenure and administration is frequently ‘nested or “layered” in 
character’.293 Accordingly, centralising authority in a single and often undemocratic 
institution, such a traditional council, may cause substantial confusion and unduly 
prejudice ‘smaller’ traditional ‘groupings’ previously granted tenure under South Africa’s 
suite of post constitutional land legislation. The decision in Tongoane v Minister for 
Agriculture and Land Affairs294 in which the Constitutional Court held that the entire Act 
to be unconstitutional and invalid is therefore to be welcomed. It seems likely that 
traditional councils will be removed from the realm of communal land administration in 
the near future. However, they may nonetheless play an important advisory, supportive 
and co-ordinating role within the community in the context of establishing and managing 
CCAs. This latter coordination role is further facilitated by recent amendments to the 
TL&GFA.295  
 
                                                     
291 Claassens (2005) Acta Juridica 70-71; Ntsebeza (2004) European Journal of Development Research 
72; Ntsebeza Land Tenure Reform, Traditional Authorities and Rural Local Government (1999); and Meer 
et al “Traditional Leadership in Democratic South Africa” (2007) 4. See generally on the problems 
associated with the role of tribal authorities in the management of common natural resources: Ainslie A 
“When ‘Community’ is not Enough: Managing Common Property Natural Resources” (1999) 16(3) 
Development Southern Africa 386-392. 
292 Meer et al T “Traditional Leadership in Democratic South Africa” (2007) 6. 
293 Cousins B “Key Provisions of the Communal Land Rights Act are Declared Unconstitutional” (2009) 
Another Countryside, Weblog of the Institute for Poverty Land and Agrarian Studies (available at 
http://anothercountryside.wordpress.com), dated 10 November 2009. 
294 2010 (6) SA 214 CC. 












The TL&GFA provides for the recognition of an array of additional traditional leadership 
positions296 and local, provincial and national houses traditional leaders.297 The role and 
functions ascribed to these leaders and institutions are vaguely framed and include: 
performing the ‘functions provided for in terms of customary law and customs of the 
traditional community concerned’; and undertaking any additional function or role 
specifically allocated to them by the Government through legislative and other 
measures.298 Local houses of traditional leaders are expressly tasked with advising 
municipal authorities on: matters pertaining to customary law, customs and traditional 
communities; and the development of planning frameworks and by-laws that impact of 
traditional communities.299 The national house of traditional leaders is tasked with a 
similar function at the national level.300 Where disputes arise in the exercise of their 
functions, provision is made for the Commission on Traditional Leadership Disputes and 
Claims to resolve such disputes.301 
 
As should be evident from the above, the vast array of traditional leaders and their 
houses of traditional leadership have effectively been relegated to an advisory 
function.302 Nonetheless, in so far as any current or prospective CCA, or associated 
future legislation or planning, impacts on customary law, customs and traditional 
communities, these traditional leaders and institutions provide an important forum for 
consultation, and potentially the resolution of disputes between rival communities, 
including those relating to tribal boundary disputes. 
                                                     
296 These include: kings; queens; principal traditional leaders; senior traditional leaders; headman; 
headwomen; and kingship and queenship councils (Chapter 2 and 3). 
297 Chapter 4. The Act effectively provides for the retrospective statutory recognition of the National 
House of Traditional Leaders established under the National House of Traditional Leaders Act (10 of 
1997). It furthermore provides for the recognition of Provincial Houses of Traditional Authority established 
in subsequent years in several provinces (KwaZulu-Natal; Eastern Cape; North West Province, Limpopo, 
Mpumalanga and Free State) in terms of a plethora of provincial laws including: Traditional Leadership 
and Governance Act (Mpumalanga) 3 of 2005; Traditional Leadership and Governance Act (Eastern 
Cape) 4 of 2005; Traditional Leadership and Governance Act (Kwazulu-Natal) 5 of 2005; and Traditional 
Leadership and Institutions Act (Limpopo) 6 of 2005. See generally section 28 (transitional provisions) of 
the Act. 
298 Section 19 read with section 20. 
299 Section 17(3). 
300 Section 18(1). 
301 Chapter 6 of the Act provides for the establishment and functions of the Commission. 
















Within this chapter I considered those elements of South Africa’s land reform 
programme of relevance to CCAs, specifically those relating to land restitution and land 
tenure reform. I discussed how in the absence of South Africa’s contemporary 
conservation regime, the land reform authorities were required to use the Restitution of 
Land Rights Act to fashion their own procedures and mechanisms for restoring 
communal land located within protected areas. I emphasised how these authorities 
largely imposed one form of governance to resolve all land claims in protected areas, 
rather than tailoring different land tenure and management options to suit the specificity 
of each. I furthermore highlighted the practical problems inherent in the existing land 
restitution regime that hold potential for complicating the resolution of the extensive 
outstanding restitution claims in respect of land situated in protected areas. 
 
With regard to land tenure reform, I considered those laws of relevance to communal 
land tenure, specifically the Communal Property Associations Act and the Communal 
Land Rights Act. In respect of the former, I highlighted the problems inherent in its 
application which currently undermine, and will continue to undermine, the communal 
property institutions tasked with holding restored land situated within protected areas. In 
respect of the latter, I considered the extent to which its anticipated procedures, tenure 
options and institutions held potential for overcoming the historic problems associated 
with communal land administration. Acknowledging that the Communal Land Rights Act 
will not commence in its current form having been declared unconstitutional in 2009, I 
nonetheless deemed such an analysis of relevance to the current enquiry for two main 
reasons. Firstly, I argued that the current text of the Act provides some idea of the 
anticipated approach of the Government to recognise, upgrade and administer 
communal land rights. Secondly, I argued that the extensive domestic criticism which 
has been levelled against the Act provides valuable insights for those tasked with 













Having critically analysed the relevant statutory framework, I sought to highlight the 
policies and programmes which inform its implementation. I emphasised that while the 
majority of these policies and programmes are tied to rural development and agricultural 
reform, several of them are of potential relevance to facilitating and supporting CCAs. I 
concluded the chapter by discussing the diverse array of institutions tasked with 
administering the components of South Africa’s land reform regime. I stressed the 
potential role of each in the context of CCAs. 
 
What should be evident from the above analysis is that South Africa’s land reform 
regime has been, and remains, of critical relevance to the domestic implementation of 
CCAs. What should also be evident is that the land reform regime has for the bulk of the 
past two decades been operating in isolation from its conservation counterpart. Several 
recent Government initiatives have sought to traverse this artificial divide. It is towards 






















South Africa’s legal and institutional framework of relevance to the introduction of 
communally-conserved areas (CCAs) is clearly very complex. This legal and 
institutional framework traverses two main domains, namely conservation and land 
reform, which have historically operated in isolation from one another. The challenges 
associated with the above are compounded by the fact that these domains are 
themselves each beset by legal and institutional fragmentation.1 The origins of this 
fragmentation clearly lie in the negotiated political compromise that shaped the 
constitutional allocation of legislative and executive competences between the national, 
provincial and local spheres of government.2 
 
Calls have emanated from particularly the environmental quarter for authorities to 
adhere to the dictates of cooperative governance enshrined in Chapter 3 of the 
Constitution of the Republic of South Africa.3 These calls continue to resound within the 
conservation sector.4 However, notwithstanding the existence of an array of statutory 
                                                     
1 Department of Environmental Affairs Status of Land Claims in Protected Areas (2010) Unpublished 
document, dated February 2010. 
2 For a discussion of the allocation of these constitutional competences, see: Chapter 4 (Part 4). 
3 Constitution of the Republic of South Africa, 1996. See most recently: Paterson A “Seeking to 
Undermine Cooperative Governance and Land-Use Planning” (2010) 25(2) SA Public Law 1-7; Muller K 
“Environmental Governance in South Africa” in Strydom H & King N (eds) Environmental Management in 
South Africa (2nd Ed) (2009) Juta & Co Ltd Cape Town 68-96; Kotze L “Environmental Governance 
Perspective on Compliance and Enforcement in South Africa” in Paterson A & Kotze L (eds) 
Environmental Compliance and Enforcement in South Africa: Legal Perspectives (2009) Juta & Co Ltd 
Cape Town103-125; and Du Plessis W “Legal Mechanisms for Cooperative Governance in South Africa: 
Successes and Failures” (2008) 23 SA Public Law 87-110. 













mechanisms,5 non-statutory initiatives6 and policy documents7 for the past decade, it is 
only in the past four years that the Government has taken tangible steps to permeate 
the apparent barrier between the conservation and land reform domains. The first part 
of this chapter seeks to reflect critically on these initiatives.  As will be highlighted in this 
                                                     
5 Statutory mechanisms expressly aimed at facilitating cooperative governance are numerous. A full 
discussion falls outside the purview of this dissertation. In summary, they are principally enshrined in the 
Intergovernmental Relations Framework Act (13 of 2005) and the National Environmental Management 
Act (107 of 1998). The former Act, which is administered by the Department of Cooperative Governance 
and Traditional Affairs, provides for: the establishment of an array of intergovernmental structures such as 
the President’s Co-ordinating Council and national, provincial and municipal intergovernmental forums 
(Chapter 2); the prescription of protocols for conducting intergovernmental relations (Chapter 3); and 
procedures for the settlement of intergovernmental disputes (Chapter 4). The latter Act, which is 
administered by the DEA, provides for: a series of national environmental management principles with 
which all organs of state whose actions may significantly affect the environment must comply (chapter 1); 
the establishment of a national environmental management advisory forum (Chapter 2); provision for the 
preparation, publication and implementation of environmental management and implementation plans by 
government authorities exercising powers which impact on or affect the environment (Chapter 3); 
procedures for fair decision-making and conflict resolution (Chapter 4); and procedures for integrated 
environmental management (Chapter 5). For a full discussion on the above statutory mechanisms, see: 
Baatjies R “The Evolution of Intergovernmental Relations and the Promise of Cooperative Governance” 
(2009) 11(4) Local Government Bulletin 11-14; Kotze “Environmental Governance” in Paterson et al 
Environmental Compliance and Enforcement in South Africa (2009) 103-125; Du Plessis (2008) SA 
Public Law 87-110; Edwards T “Cooperative Governance in South Africa, with Specific Reference to the 
Challenges of Intergovernmental Relations” (2008) 27(1) Politeia 65-85; Department of Provincial and 
Local Government Practitioners Guide to Intergovernmental Relations in South Africa (2007) 51-78; 
Community Law Centre A Preliminary Assessment of Institutional Compliance with the Intergovernmental 
Relations Framework Act (2006) University of Western Cape Bellville; and Malan L “Intergovernmental 
Relations and Co-operative Government in South Africa: The Ten-Year Review” (2005) 24(1) Politeia 
226-243. 
6 Non-statutory initiatives include the establishment of MINMEC structures and MINTECH structures and 
the signing of service delivery agreements between various national and provincial authorities. The 
MINMEC structures are ‘political committees’ generally comprising of the national line function Minister, 
Deputy Minister, nine provincial MECs in the same functional area and local government representatives. 
Their function is to achieve ‘political harmony’ through coordinated national, provincial and local decision-
making. The MINTECH structures are ‘technical committees’ comprising of the national line function 
Director-General and his/her respective provincial Head of Departments. Their function is generally to 
achieve ‘administrative or technical harmony’ within the different spheres of government. For further 
information on these structures, see: Practitioners Guide to Intergovernmental Relations in South Africa 
(2007) 66-67; and Malan (2005) Politeia 233-234. These initiatives have recently been complemented by 
the signing of service delivery agreements between national and provincial authorities to improve the 
coordination of the functions and responsibilities. Take for instance the recent Service Delivery 
Agreement (dated 30 September 2010) signed between the Department of Environmental Affairs and the 
Provincial Environmental Departments and Conservation Agencies to aid the attainment of Outcome 10 
(Environmental Assets and Natural Resources that are Valued, Protected and Continually Enhanced) of 
the Government’s 12 Performance Outcomes identified by the Minister of Performance and Monitoring 
Evaluation in February 2010. 
7 Perhaps the most relevant of these was the following report commissioned by the Government over a 
decade ago: Wynberg R & Kepe T Land Reform and Conservation Areas in South Africa. Towards a 
Mutually Beneficial Approach (1999) IUCN-ROSA Harare. It proposed the development of a common 
framework, underpinned by a range of principles aimed at fostering cooperation between land reform 












analysis, the focus of both of these initiatives is exceedingly narrow and they are beset 
by theoretical and practical problems. They consequently operate in a manner that I will 
argue shrouds an array of governance options present in South Africa’s domestic legal 
framework for implementing CCAs. The second part of the chapter focuses on these 
apparently misunderstood governance options which theoretically provide domestic 
stakeholders with a far more diverse and nuanced array of tools for balancing the 
country’s conservation and land reform agendas. In order to highlight these governance 
options, I briefly return to the issue of protected areas governance. I do so with a view to 
objectively clarifying the potential role communities can play in protected areas and 
extracting an array of potential governance options to enable them to do so. I then 
consider South Africa’s current legal landscape, discussed in detail in Chapter 5 and 
Chapter 6, to illustrate the extent to which it caters for the implementation of these 
governance options. 
 
2. RECENT GOVERNMENT INITIATIVES TO LINK CONSERVATION AND LAND 
REFORM 
 
Two tangible steps have been taken by the Government specifically to permeate the 
apparent barrier between the conservation and land reform domains: first, the 
conclusion of a Memorandum of Agreement8 between the land reform and conservation 
authorities in 2007 to clarify their roles regarding the settlement of land restitution claims 
in protected areas; and secondly, the publication of a National Co-Management 
Framework9 in 2010, aimed at guiding the settlement of such claims. 
 
2.1 MEMORANDUM OF AGREEMENT 
 
The first tangible step to bridge the conservation and land reform domains was the 
conclusion of a Memorandum of Agreement between the former Minister of Agriculture 
                                                     
8 Minister of Agriculture and Land Affairs & Minister of Environmental Affairs and Tourism Memorandum 
of Agreement (2007) dated 2 May 2007. 












and Land Affairs and the Minister of Environmental Affairs and Tourism in 2007.10 Its 
preamble expressly recognises the legitimate right of several claimants to land situated 
in protected areas and the need for the Department of Land Affairs (now the DRD&LR) 
and the Department of Environmental Affairs and Tourism (now the DEA) to cooperate 
in their resolution.11 The parties agreed on a series of fundamental principles to guide 
the settlement of these claims, which crucially include:12  
 
 The roles and responsibilities of the DRD&LR and the DEA in resolving such 
claims must be clearly defined. 
 Close cooperation between these two departments must be fostered.  
 Protected areas are assets of national and international importance and their 
perpetual conservation is a non-negotiable imperative.  
 Ownership of land by claimants without physical occupation does not necessarily 
compromise conservation. 
 Co-management must take place in a manner that is sustainable, effective and 
compatible with relevant conservation and development mandates. 
 Restitution settlements must uphold the principles of economic viability, financial 
sustainability and holistic management. 
 Restitution settlements should further uphold the principles of economic viability 
and result in tangible and realistic direct and indirect benefits for land claimants. 
 Restoration should be equitable and should not place land claimants in a less 
advantageous position. 
 The award of access rights must be clearly defined. 
 Post-settlement land-use must be compatible with biodiversity conservation. 
 Claimants must be prohibited from alienating land restored to them other than to 
the Government. 
                                                     
10 For a full discussion of the Memorandum of Agreement and its attached Operational Protocol, see: De 
Koning M & Marais M “Land Restitution and Settlement Options in Protected Areas in South Africa” 
(2009) 39(1) Africanus 66-79. 
11 Memorandum of Agreement (2007) 4. 












 Communities with land claims in protected areas should be given preference in 
respect of any land tenure upgrading and development projects undertaken on 
land situated adjacent to the protected area. 
 A clear communication strategy is essential for implementing the framework. 
 
The remainder of the agreement simply repeats these principles in various forms with 
the only real additions being that: title in land shall be granted to communities where 
feasible and applicable; co-management is the chosen form of governance for resolving 
the land reform and conservation interface; management responsibility is left to existing 
management authorities unless the environmental authorities choose to review it; and a 
phased Operational Protocol13 for settling such land claims must be adopted. 
 
The Memorandum of Agreement, together with its Operational Protocol, must be 
commended for its distillation of a clear procedural framework for ensuring cooperation 
between the DRD&LR and DEA in resolving land restitution claims situated in protected 
areas. As highlighted above, however, there is a far broader range of government 
authorities and institutions that have a role to play or stake in the process.14 The most 
notable of these would be the traditional leadership institutions (which continue to play a 
significant role in rural land administration) and the district and local municipalities 
(whose mandate it is to promote regional and local planning and development). The 
failure of the Memorandum of Agreement to acknowledge these other government 
authorities and institutions may well undermine its utility. 
 
Furthermore, certain substantive aspects regarding the approach to settling the land 
claims are potentially problematic. The first is the apparent aversion to the option of 
physical occupation, which in certain contexts may be a viable and desirable option. 
                                                     
13 The Operational Protocol envisages the following six stages and identifies which institution is 
responsible for each: lodgement and registration of the land claim (DRD&LR); screening and 
categorisation of the land claim (DRD&LR); determination of the validity of the claim and establishment of  
communal legal body (DRD&LR, Commission on the Restitution of Land Rights (CRLR) and DEA); 
negotiation of the settlement of the claim (CRLR, DRD&LR and DEA); signing of the settlement 
agreement (Minister of Rural Development and Land Reform); implementation of the settlement 
agreement (DRD&LR and DEA).  
14 For a full discussion of these government authorities and institutions, see: Chapter 5 (Part 3.3) and 












The second is the default allocation of management to existing authorities, which while 
desirable from a continuity perspective, may preclude the potential valuable role 
communities can play in managing the area. The third is the apparent adoption of an all 
or nothing approach to the issue of tenure (the grant of full title or no title) 
notwithstanding the land reform regime recognising a diverse array of land tenure 
options. The fourth is the reliance placed on one model of governance, namely co-
management, to the exclusion of other viable models such as joint management and 
communal management. The fifth is the lack of clarity regarding what exactly constitutes 
co-management. The final problem is the continued ambiguity as to the role played by 
the many additional ministries, departments and institutions, other than DRD&LR and 
DEA, in the land restitution process. 
 
2.2 NATIONAL CO-MANAGEMENT FRAMEWORK 
 
In an effort to provide further clarity on the chosen form of governance for resolving the 
conservation and land reform interface, the Government recently published a National 
Co-Management Framework.15 Prepared by a task team comprising of members from 
relevant national and provincial land and conservation authorities16 and officially 
launched at the fourth People and Parks Conference convened in August 2010, the 
stated purpose of the document is to provide ‘a broad framework of the principles to be 
implemented for the establishment of co-management arrangements on protected 
areas’.17 
 
2.2.1 The ‘Co-Management Models’ 
 
Not surprisingly based on the fundamental principles highlighted in the above 
Memorandum of Agreement, the National Co-management Framework identifies three 
                                                     
15 For a comprehensive discussion of the background to and content of the National Co-management 
Framework see: De Koning M “Co-Management and Its Options in Protected Areas in South Africa” 
(2009) 39 (2) Africanus 5-17. 
16 The task team comprised of representatives from: DEA; DRD&LR; Chief Land Claims Commissioner; 
Isimangaliso Wetland Park Authority; South African National Parks; Ezemvelo KZN Wildlife; Mpumalanga 
Tourism and Parks Authority; and the erstwhile Eastern Cape Parks Board. 












models of co-management, namely: full co-management; full lease; and part lease and 
part co-management. It furthermore identifies the forms of ‘beneficiation’18 associated 
with each model. These include: revenue sharing; rental income; capacity building; 
development rights; mandatory partner status in management and development 
opportunities; equity partnerships in private sector tourism concession enterprises; 
access rights; natural resource use; and participation in management through 
representation on the management authority, employment and contractual delegation of 
certain management functions to community enterprises.19  
 
Under the ‘full co-management model’, claimant communities are allowed to participate 
actively in the management and tourism development of the protected area.20 Whilst 
final decision-making power would appear to remain vested in the existing management 
authority, this model anticipates community representation on this authority and 
consultation with the claimant community on the management of, and tourism 
development within, the area. Beneficiation options under this model include: ensuring 
communal access to the protected area for cultural reasons and the use of natural 
resources situated within its borders; identifying specific tourism development sites 
within the protected areas and affording the claimant community development rights in 
respect of these sites; allocating a share of revenue derived from the protected area to 
the claimant community; and employing community members in tourism and 
conservation activities within the protected area.21 Notwithstanding the extensive forms 
of beneficiation associated with this model, the National Co-Management Framework 
highlights several potential disadvantages associated with its implementation. These 
include the: often protracted negotiation process preceding the finalisation of the co-
management agreements; the slow transfer of visible benefits to the claimant 
communities; the management complexities associated with including community 
members in the management structures; and the imposition of management 
                                                     
18 ‘Beneficiation’ is defined to mean ‘the acquisition of direct and indirect benefits derived by the claimants 
from activities to be conducted and operated from the protected area’ (National Co-Management 
Framework (2010) 2). 
19 National Co-Management Framework (2010) 10-13. 
20 National Co-Management Framework (2009) 7-8. 












responsibilities and costs on communities lacking the necessary capacity and resources 
to service them.22 Its applicability is furthermore only really feasible in the minority of 
protected areas that generate a profit and/or in those where future tourism development 
opportunities are viable.23 
 
As its name suggests, the ‘full lease model’ envisages the conclusion of a lease 
between the claimant community and the Government. Various types of leases are 
proposed, the selection of which is dependent on the nature of the protected area, the 
extent and variability of any income derived by it, and the level of associated financial 
administration that the management authority wishes to undertake.24 Owing to the 
financial implications of this model for Government expenditure, National Treasury 
approval is a necessary prerequisite.25 This model is prom ted for those protected 
areas where no viable socio-economic opportunities exist for providing viable 
beneficiation to the claimant community.26 The existing management authority retains 
sole responsibility for managing the protected area, and the claimant community has no 
access rights, equity rights or development rights.27 Anticipated benefits associated with 
this model include: the immediate allocation of guaranteed income to claimant 
communities; the retention of the management authority as the sole management 
agency; and the shorter process for concluding the settlement agreement as no co-
management agreement need be concluded. Anticipated disadvantages include that the 
model’s feasibility is dependent on National Treasury funding; it excludes the claimant 
community from participating in the management of the protected area; and it precludes 
any form of community access, use and development rights over the natural resources 
                                                     
22 National Co-Management Framework (2010) 8. 
23 De Koning M “Returning Manyaleti Game Reserve to its Rightful Owners: Land Restitution in Protected 
Areas in Mpumalanga, South Africa” (2010) 236 (61) Unasylva 41-42. 
24 The forms of lease agreements include: a fixed cash lease (based on the market value and not 
production value of the land); a flexible cash lease (the quantum of which is based on the income 
generated by the protected area); a share of income lease (where the income generated by the protected 
area is divided between the claimant community and the management authority in proportion to their 
contribution to the costs of managing the protected area); and a percentage share lease (where the 
claimant community does not contribute to the costs of managing the area but nonetheless receives a 
percentage of the income). See further: National Co-Management Framework (2010) 7-10. 
25 National Co-Management Framework (2010) 8. 
26 National Co-Management Framework (2010) 7. 












situated within it.28 These latter two traits raise significant questions about the suitability 
of including this model under the rubric of a National Co-Management Framework. 
 
The National Co-management Framework expressly acknowledges that these models 
should be viewed as situated on a continuum rather than as discreet models.29 Sitting 
between the above two models on the co-management continuum is the ‘part lease and 
part co-management model’ which effectively comprises of a blend of aspects of the 
above two models.30 The precise nature of this model is not clearly defined in the 
National Co-Management Framework. It would appear that the actual nature of the 
blend will depend on the socio-economic opportunities provided by the protected area, 
with existing management authority dictating the level of community participation in its 
management, and the degree of community access, use and development rights within 
it.31 
 
It is anticipated that the choice of the most appropriate co-management model must be 
informed by the protected area’s existing management plan and a feasibility study 
undertaken by the management authority to determine the ‘sustainable and compatible 
economic utilization’ of the restored land situated in the protected area.32  Regarding 
institutional arrangements, the National Co-management Framework envisages that the 
relevant management authority and community property institution to which the land has 
been restored, establish a co-management committee (CMC) to act as the forum for 
consulting over, preparing and implementing the relevant co-management option.33 The 
CMC is required to meet at least twice a year and only decisions that are duly minuted 
and agreed to in writing are binding on the parties.34 The existing management authority 
is required to provide secretarial support to the co-management committee while each 
party is required to fund the costs of their representatives participating in it.35  
                                                     
28 Ibid. 
29 National Co-Management Framework (2010) 7. 
30 Ibid. 
31 National Co-Management Framework (2010) 7-8. 
32 National Co-Management Framework (2010) 6 & 10. 















2.2.2 Assessment of the National Co-Management Framework  
 
The theoretical merits of the co-management model of governance have been well 
noted by several international and domestic scholars.36 The National Co-Management 
Framework provides much needed clarity on what the Government views as ‘co-
management’ in the context of protected areas. It clearly spells out the anticipated forms 
of beneficiation associated with it, the procedures for implementing it and the institutions 
tasked with such implementation. Furthermore, it provides evidence of improved 
cooperative governance between the country’s land authorities and conservation 
authorities. However, the National Co-Management Framework also raises several 
theoretical and practical concerns. 
 
From a theoretical perspective, it is uncertain why the Government has chosen 
exclusively to focus on one component of the protected areas governance continuum, 
namely that of co-management. The Government appears to have chosen co-
management as its model ‘irrespective of the history, rationale, and type of land reform’, 
a model which ‘may be too weak or inadequate a tool for the challenging land reform 
process in South Africa’.37 Why other feasible protected areas governance options 
attracting increasing international support, such as joint management and community 
management, are ignored is unclear. This is particularly problematic if one considers 
that the co-management governance model arose to deal with an entirely distinct 
context38 and that several of the conditions which have been identified by commentators 
                                                     
36 De Koning (2009) Africanus 6-7; Borrini-Feyerabend G, Farvar M, Nguinguiri J & Ndangang V Co-
Management of Natural Resources: Organising, Negotiating and Learning-by-Doing (2007) GTZ & IUCN, 
Kasparek Verlag Heidelberg 3-4; Hauck & Sowman M Guidelines for Implementing Coastal and Fisheries 
Co-Management in South Africa (2005) Subsistence Fishing Co-Management and Capacity Building 
Programme, University of Cape Town, Cape Town, 2 & 7; Isaacs M & Mohammed N Co-Managing the 
Commons in the ‘New’ South Africa: Room to Manoeuvre (2000) Commons Southern Africa: Occasional 
Paper No.5, CASS/PLAAS Harare/Bellville 2; and Berkes F & Henley T “Co-Management and Traditional 
Knowledge: Threat or Opportunity?” (1997) 18 Policy Options 31. 
37 Kepe T “Land Claims and Co-Management of Protected Areas in South Africa’ (2008) 41 
Environmental Management 311-312. 
38 As concisely summarised by Kepe, the co-management model arose: to conserve scarce resources 
and not to deal with land reform issues; as a method for governments to co-opt support and improve their 
legitimacy rather than seeking to provide for meaningful public participation; and as a government-led 












as necessary prerequisites for its successful implementation39 are currently absent in 
South Africa.40 Furthermore, having opted for co-management, it is surprising that the 
National Co-Management Framework fails to consider the full spectrum of co-
management options as identified by the likes of Berkes,41 Sen and Raajear-Nielson,42 
Tipa and Welch,43 Dudley44 and most recently by De Koning.45 It furthermore has a very 
strong orientation towards the lease model,46 a model whose form effectively precludes 
                                                                                                                                                                           
communally-owned land (Kepe (2008) Environmental Management 314-315). See further: Tipa G & 
Welch R “Co-Management of Natural Resources: Issues of Definition from an Indigenous Community 
Perspective” (2006) 42(3) Journal of Applied Behavioural Research 373-391; Jentoft S “The Way 
Forward” in Wilson D, Nielsen J & Degnbol P (eds) The Fisheries Co-Management Experience: 
Accomplishments, Challenges and Prospects (2003) Kluwer Academic Dordrecht 2; M Hara and J 
Nielsen, ‘Experiences with Fisheries Co-Management in Africa’ in Wilson D, Nielsen J & Degnbol P (eds) 
The Fisheries Co-Management Experience: Accomplishments, Challenges and Prospects (2003) Kluwer 
Academic Dordrecht 81-95; Hauck M & Sowman M “Coastal and Fisheries Co-Management in South 
Africa: An Overview and Analysis” (2001) 25 Marine Policy 171-185; and Pomeroy R & Berkes F “Two 
Can Tango: The Role of Government in Fisheries Co-Management” (1997) 21 (5) Marine Policy 465-480. 
39 Berkes identified the following as necessary preconditions for the successful implementation of co-
management: the presence of appropriate institutions; trust between partners; legal protection of local 
rights; and economic incentives for local people (Berkes F “New and Not-So-New Directions in the Use of 
the Commons: Co-Management” (1997) 42 The Common Property Resource Digest 6). 
40 Kepe (2008) 41 Environmental Management 314-318. See further: Magome H & Murombedzi J 
“Sharing South African National Parks: Community Land and Conservation in a Democratic South Africa” 
in Adams W & Mulligan M (eds) Decolonizing Nature: Strategies for Conservation in a Post-Colonial Era 
(2003) Earthscan London 108-134; and Kepe T, Wynberg R & Ellis W “Land Reform and Biodiversity 
Conservation in South Africa: Complementary or in Conflict?’ (2005) 1 International Journal of Biodiversity 
Science and Management 13. 
41 Berkes draws a distinction between the following levels of co-management: informing; consultation; 
cooperation; communication; advisory committees; management boards; and partnerships/community 
control. See further: Berkes F “Co-Managing: Bridging the Two Solitudes” (1994) 22 (2-3) Northern 
Perspectives 19. 
42 Sen and Raajear-Nielsen draw a distinction between the following five types of co-management: 
instructive, consultative; cooperative; advisory and Informative. See further: Sen S & Raakjaer-Nielson J 
“Fisheries Co-Management: A Comparative Analysis (1996) 20 Marine Policy 406-407. 
43 Tipa and Welch draw a distinction between three types of ‘real comanagement’, namely: cooperative 
management; community-based management; and collaborative management. See further: Tipa et al 
(2006) Journal of Applied Behavioral Science 381-387. 
44 Dudley refers to co-management under the rubric of shared governance and draws a distinction 
between: transboundary management; collaborative management; and joint management. See further: 
Dudley N (ed) Guidelines for Applying Protected Area Management Categories (2008) IUCN Gland 26-
27.  
45 De Koning draws a distinction between eight different types of co-management: ad hoc benefit-sharing; 
consultation benefit-sharing; lease; part lease/part co-management; co-operative co-management; part 
co-management/part delegated management; delegated management; and privately managed. See 
further: De Koning (2009) Africanus 8-12; and De Koning M “Co-Management in Protected Areas - 
Presentation & Document prepared for the People & Parks Steering Committee’ (dated 12 December 
2012) 15-26. 
46 This is reflected, for example, in the skewed attention afforded to the lease option and the unduly 
positive outlook afforded to it in contrast to the co-management option in both the draft and final National 












co-management and whose feasibility is dependent on yet to be secured funding from 
the National Treasury. As recently highlighted by one member of the Task Team 
appointed to develop the National Co-Management Framework, the underlying reason 
for this was disagreement amongst Task Team members on the meaning of co-
management and the misconception of government authorities that the enabling 
legislative framework does not provide for shared decision-making.47 
 
From a practical perspective, various additional concerns to those raised in the context 
of the Memorandum of Agreement above, are of relevance. Firstly, it is uncertain why 
the ambit of the National Co-Management Framework is limited to agreements 
concluded under section 42 of the National Environmental Management: Protected 
Areas Act48 (Protected Areas Act) when there are several other governance options 
available in South Africa’s statutory framework for promoting a balance between the 
Government’s land reform and conservation agendas.49 Secondly, the proposed 
establishment of co-management committees to act as the institutions through which 
claimant communities and conservation authorities’ interests are discussed and 
negotiated is a welcome addition. However, the absence of mandatory government 
support to enable claimant community representatives to participate effectively in these 
meetings may nullify the utility of these institutions. 
 
3. LEGAL OPTIONS FOR LINKING THE CONSERVATION AND LAND REFORM 
REGIMES 
 
Recent government initiatives to link South Africa’s conservation and land reform 
regimes are to be welcomed. However, as highlighted above, their focus is very narrow 
and they are fraught with theoretical and practical problems. As a result, they appear to 
operate in a manner that shrouds an array of governance options present in South 
Africa’s legal framework for implementing CCAs. To extract these governance options 
                                                                                                                                                                           
Department of Environmental Affairs and Tourism, Department of Land Affairs, SANParks, Ezemvelo 
Wildlife & Eastern Cape Parks Draft National Co-Management Framework (2009) 3-7. 
47 De Koning (2009) Africanus 7-8. 
48 Act 57 of 2003. 












‘hidden’ within South Africa’s legal framework, it is necessary to return briefly to the 
issue of protected areas governance for two reasons. The first reason is to clarify 
objectively the potential role communities can play in protected areas. The second 
reason is to distil an array of governance options to enable them to do so. Having 
highlighted these options, I will be in a position to consider the domestic legal 
framework and assess the extent to which it provides for these governance options. 
 
3.1 UNDERSTANDING THE ROLE OF COMMUNITIES IN PROTECTED AREAS 
 
As advocated above, the source of authority within a protected area (embodied in the 
notion of protected areas governance) is determined by three key components - land 
tenure, management and beneficiation.50 If one dissects these three components, it 
appears that a community can theoretically play four main roles in a protected area - 
that of owner, manager, developer and beneficiary. Prior to describing each of these 
roles, it is important to note the following in respect of each of them. First, the nature of 
the protected area will influence the nature of the role. Secondly, the community can 
take on one or more of these roles in a protected area. Thirdly, the community can take 
on these roles independently or in partnership with others.51 Finally, the role of the 





A community can own land situated in a protected area (full title) or hold certain rights 
over the land or natural resources located in it (rights holder). Where it holds full title, 
the community will probably be required to enter into an agreement with the 
Government which: regulates the incorporation of its land into the protected area; 
imposes certain restrictions on the use of the property; sets out who is responsible for 
                                                     
50 For a comprehensive discussion of these components of protected areas governance, see: Chapter 2 
(Part 3.3.5). 
51 Such partnerships could be entered into with government authorities, other community institutions, 












managing the protected area; clarifies the forms of beneficiation in the protected area; 
and prescribes the duration of the agreement. Where the community is a rights holder, it 
will probably also be required to enter into an agreement with the government authority, 
institution or person responsible for managing the protected area. The agreement will 
probably: set out who is entitled to exercise these rights; define the nature of the rights; 
may impose conditions/restrictions on the exercise of these rights; clarify the 
rights/benefits accruing to each party; spell out the obligations/costs ascribed to each 




The second main role a community can play in a protected area is that of manager. This 
role envisages a community actively managing the land and natural resources located 
in a protected area. This management can be undertaken individually or in partnership 
with other persons or institutions. The responsibility for managing a protected area will 
probably be prescribed by statute providing for: the formal appointment of a 
management authority; the preparation and implementation of a management plan; and 
monitoring and reporting on such implementation. Where the responsibility to manage 
the protected area is shared between two or more entities, provision will probably be 
made for the conclusion of a co-management agreement between these entities which 
sets out the parties’ reciprocal rights/benefits and obligations/costs associated with 




A community can also seek to undertake a commercial development or activity in a 
protected area. The community may seek to undertake such a development or activity 
individually or in partnership with others. The nature and form of the development and 
activity will generally be regulated strictly by statute providing for: the type of 
development and activity which may be undertaken in the protected area; the 












authorisation processes which should precede its implementation; the people and 
institutions which must be consulted prior to doing so; and potentially the conclusion of 
a commercial agreement between relevant stakeholders.52 The latter commercial 
agreement will generally set out the nature of the development or activity; the parties’ 
reciprocal rights, benefits, responsibilities and costs associated with it; and the duration 




A community may benefit from the establishment of a protected area. The community 
will generally accrue such benefits through its role as owner, manager and/or developer. 
A community who operates in none of these capacities may also potentially accrue 
benefits owing to its historic or current association with the land situated in or adjacent 
to a protected area.53 The relationship of the community to a protected area will 
influence the form of beneficiation54 and whether it is regulated by statute, agreement, 
or by a mixture of the two. Where the community is the owner, the form of beneficiation 
will probably be regulated by the agreement in terms of which the land is contracted into 
the protected area. Where the community is the manager, the form of beneficiation will 
probably be regulated by the terms of its designation as the management authority and 
the terms of the approved management plan for the protected area. Where the 
community operates as a developer, the form of beneficiation will probably be regulated 
by a commercial agreement entered into with the protected area’s management 
authority. Where the beneficiary is a third party (in other words does not operate in any 
of the above capacities), the form of beneficiation will probably either be regulated by: 
                                                     
52 These stakeholders could include: government authorities; the management authority; the owners of 
the protected area; people who hold rights in the protected area where the development or activity will 
take place; and neighbouring landowners and communities. 
53 A typical example of this would be a community who successfully asserts its rights to land situated in a 
protected area but by way of agreement forgoes these rights in favour of compensation or other forms of 
benefits. These forms of benefits could include: training; employment; access to facilities located in the 
protected area; the supply of basic goods, services and products to the protected areas and those visiting 
it; the allocation of government grants and/or a share of proceeds generated by the protected area to 
develop/uplift those areas adjacent to it. 












an agreement between the community and the management authority, developer, 
government authority and/or non-profit organisation; or by way of statute. 
 
3.2 CURRENT LEGAL OPTIONS FOR FACILITATING THE ROLE OF 
COMMUNITIES IN PROTECTED AREAS 
 
Communities can clearly play many different roles in protected areas. The nature of 
these roles will vary considerably in each case but can theoretically be grouped under 
the following six main governance options: owner/manager; owner/co-manager; 
owner/beneficiary; non-owner/manager; non-owner/co-manager; and non-owner/non-
manager/beneficiary. As mentioned above, these governance options are not cast in 
stone and a community may shift between them over time. For instance, a community 
may wish to commence its relationship to the protected area under the 
owner/beneficiary option. As its management skills, capacity and resources increase the 
community may then wish to migrate to the owner/co-manager option, sharing the 
management authority with another person or institution. Finally, as the community’s 
skills, capacity and resources increase further, it may wish to take over the 
management of the protected area single-handedly thereby entering the 
owner/manager option. 
 
If one surveys South Africa’s current legal landscape, it becomes apparent that it 
contains the requisite legal tools for implementing each of these six governance options 
to bridge the conservation and land reform interface. The nature of these options and 
the legal process for implementing each of them is discussed below. The legal process 
is distilled from the comprehensive analysis of South Africa’s conservation and land 
reform regimes contained in Chapter 5 and Chapter 6 respectively. It is accordingly 
discussed in a very precursory manner to avoid unnecessary duplication.55 It is 
furthermore discussed from a national perspective as it is predominantly under the 
                                                     
55 Cross-references are included here to those sections of Chapter 5 and Chapter 6 where the detailed 












national conservation and land reform regime that CCAs have been, and will continue to 
be, regulated.56 
 
3.2.1 Owner/Manager Option 
 
Under this option the community owns, or will own, the land already located, or to be 
located, in the protected area. The community also currently manages, or wish to 
manage, the protected area. It would therefore take on the role of owner and manager. 
The legal process to be followed in implementing this option, detailed in Figure 4 below, 
will depend on whether one is dealing with an existing protected area or the desire to 
create a new protected area. 
 
Where one is dealing with an existing protected area, two separate yet related legal 
processes will need to be followed: those relating to ownership; and those relating to 
management. Regarding ownership, the community would need to establish an 
appropriate institution to hold ownership.57 It would thereafter have to comply with the 
land restitution process as prescribed in the Restitution of Land Rights Act.58 Regarding 
management, the community would need to comply with the management regime set 
out in the Protected Areas Act.59 Where one is dealing with a new protected area, the 
above two legal procedures would be intersected by a third, that relating to 
establishment. Here the community would in addition need to comply with the 
procedures set out in the Protected Areas Act for establishing the protected area.60 
 
                                                     
56 The legal procedures may vary in the provincial context where provincial conservation laws are used to 
establish and regulate the management of the protected area. A discussion of the nuanced provincial 
procedures unfortunately falls outside the purview of this dissertation. 
57 The array of possible institutions (and the laws regulating their formation and management) include: 
communal property association (Communal Property Association Act (28 of 1996)); Trust (Trust Property 
Control Act (57 of 1998)); Section 21 Company (Companies Act (61 of 1973)); Private Company 
(Companies Act (61 of 1973)); and a Closed Corporation (Closed Corporations Act (69 of 1984)). 
58 Act 22 of 1994. For a detailed discussion of this process, see Chapter 6 (Part 2.1). 
59 For a detailed discussion of this regime, see Chapter 5 (Part 3.1.2). 













FIGURE 4: Owner/Manager Option 
 
3.2.2 Owner/Co-Manager Option 
 
Under this option the community similarly owns, or will own, the land already located, or 
to be located, in the protected area. The community wishes to share the current or 
future responsibility to manage the protected area with another person or institution. It 
would therefore take on the role of owner and co-manager. This option is facilitated by 
the fact that the Protected Areas Act provides for the conclusion of co-management 
agreements between the management authority for the protected area and a third 
parties.61 It mimics the co-management option set out in the National Co-Management 
                                                     
61 For a detailed discussion of the nature, form and process, which must precede the conclusion of a co-
management agreement, see Chapter 5 (Part 3.1.2). 
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Framework.62 The legal process that would need to be followed to implement this option 
is detailed in the Figure 5 below. It will similarly depend on whether one is dealing with 
an existing protected area or the desire to create a new protected area. 
 
 
FIGURE 5: Owner/Co-Manager Option 
 
Where one is dealing with an existing protected area, the same two separate yet related 
legal processes to that described above under the owner/manager option need to be 
                                                     
62 For a discussion of this co-management option under the National Co-Management Framework, see 
Chapter 7 (Part 2.2). 
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followed. Regarding ownership, the community would need to establish an appropriate 
institution to hold ownership63 and thereafter comply with the land restitution process as 
prescribed in the Restitution of Land Rights Act.64 Regarding management, the 
community would need to comply with the management regime set out in the Protected 
Areas Act with the added requirement of concluding a co-management agreement to 
regulate the co-management relationship.65 Where one is dealing with a new protected 
area, the above two legal procedures would be intersected by a third, that relating to 
establishment. The community would in addition need to comply with the procedures set 
out in the Protected Areas Act for establishing the protected area.66 
 
3.2.3 Owner/Beneficiary Option 
 
Under this option the community owns, or will own, the land already located, or to be 
located in a protected area. It does not wish to take on the role of manager, which task 
is assigned to another person or institution. As a result of its ownership, the community 
accrues certain rights or benefits associated with the protected area. The community 
therefore takes on the role of owner and beneficiary. 
 
The nature of the legal process regulating ownership of the protected area and the 
nature of the community’s rights or benefits associated with it will differ significantly. A 
broad distinction needs generally to be drawn between the restitution context (where the 
issue of beneficiation is, or was, addressed in the agreements underpinning the 
settlement of the claim) and the general context (where the issue of beneficiation was 
not addressed). The legal process that would need to be followed in implementing this 
option is detailed in Figure 6 below. 
 
                                                     
63 For a list of these potential institutions (and the laws that regulate them), see note 57 above. 
64 For a detailed discussion of this process, see Chapter 6 (Part 2.1). 
65 For a detailed discussion of this regime, see Chapter 5 (Part 3.1.2). 













FIGURE 6: Owner/Beneficiary Option 
 
In the restitution context, the community would firstly need to establish an appropriate 
institution to hold ownership67 and thereafter select and implement the appropriate legal 
scheme to regulate the rights or benefits accruing to it. The two available legal schemes 
are the settlement agreement concluded under the Restitution of Land Rights Act,68 or 
an agreement concluded under the Protected Areas Act69 in terms of which the 
community agree to contract their land into the protected area.70 In the general context 
the community would similarly need to establish an appropriate institution to hold any 
                                                     
67 For a list of these potential institutions (and the laws that regulate them), see note 57 above. 
68 For a detailed discussion of the nature, form and process, which must precede the conclusion of a 
settlement agreement, see Chapter 6 (Part 2.1). 
69 For a detailed discussion of the nature, form and process that must precede the conclusion of a 
protected areas agreement, see Chapter 5 (Part 3.1.2). 
70 These two agreements will generally set out the rights and benefits of the successful land claimant 
community in respect of the protected area. These could include: decision-making rights; access rights; 
occupation rights; resource use rights; commercial rights; equity rights; lease benefits; employment 
benefits; and grant benefits. For a full description of these rights and benefits, see Chapter 2 (Part 3.3.5). 
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rights/benefits accruing from the protected area.71 Thereafter, it would similarly need to 
select and implement the appropriate legal scheme to regulate their rights or benefits. 
Here the available legal schemes are more diverse and include: concession 
agreements;72 access, use and lease agreements;73 permits and licenses;74 and co-
management agreements.75 
 
3.2.4 Non-Owner/Manager Option 
 
Under this option a community that does not own the land located in a protected area, 
wishes to take on the management of the protected area or some of the resources 
situated within it. The community would therefore take on the role of non-owner and 
manager. This option is based on the presumption that all issues regarding ownership 
and the establishment of the protected area have been resolved. One is therefore 
dealing here solely with the issue of management. The legal process that would need to 
be followed in implementing this option is detailed in Figure 7 below. 
 
                                                     
71 For a list of these potential institutions (and the laws that regulate them), see note 57 above. 
72 The Protected Areas Act allows management authorities of certain protected areas to conclude 
commercial/concession agreements with communities to undertake commercial developments and 
activities in the protected area. For further discussion on the nature, form and process that must be 
precede the conclusion of these concession agreements, see Chapter 5 (Part 3.1.2). 
73 The Protected Areas Act allows management authorities of certain protected areas to conclude 
agreements and leases with communities to use in a sustainable manner of biological resources located 
in the protected area. For further discussion on the nature, form and process that must be precede the 
conclusion of these lease agreements, see Chapter 5 (Part 3.1.2). 
74 The Protected Areas Act allows management authorities of certain protected areas to grant 
permits/licenses to communities to use in a sustainable manner of biological resources located in the 
protected area. For further discussion on the nature, form and process that must be precede the issue of 
these licenses or permits, see Chapter 5 (Part 3.1.2). 
75 The Protected Areas Act allows management authorities to conclude co-management agreements with 
people to regulate human activities that affect the environment in the protected area. These agreements 
do not only relate to co-management of the protected area, but can also include: the apportionment of 
any income generated from the management of the protected area or any other form of benefit-sharing 
between the parties; the use of biological resources in the protected area; access to and occupation of 
the protected area; the development of economic opportunities within and adjacent to the protected area; 
the development of local management capacity and knowledge exchange; and the offering of financial 
and other support. For further discussion on the nature, form and process that must be precede the 













FIGURE 7: Non-Owner/Manager Option 
 
This option is enabled by the country’s conservation regime allowing a community to 
manage a protected area or the biological resources situated within it, even where it 
does not own the land or resources situated within it. This is provided for in two main 
ways: their designation as the management authority for the area;76 or the conclusion of 
a biodiversity management agreement between them and the designated management 
                                                     
76 For a detailed discussion on the process prescribed in the Protected Areas Act for being appointed as a 
management authority for a protected area, see Chapter 5 (Part 3.1.2). 
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authority.77 Prior to entering into either of the above management arrangements, the 
community would need to establish the appropriate institution to enable them to do so.78 
 
3.2.5 Non-Owner/Co-Manager Option 
 
Under this option a community that does not own the land located in a protected area, 
wishes to participate in the management of the protected area, but wishes to do so in 
partnership with one or more persons or institutions. They would therefore take on the 
role of non-owner and co-manager. A distinction needs to be drawn between where the 
community has been appointed as the designated management authority for a 
protected area and wishes to share the management responsibility with another person 
or institution; and where the community is this latter institution within whom the 
designated management authority wishes to share such management. The legal 
process that would need to be followed to implement this option is detailed in Figure 8 
below. 
 
This option is, as in the owner/co-manager model, enabled by the country’s 
conservation regime allowing a management authority to enter a co-management 
agreement with another person or institution.79  Where the community is the designated 
management authority it would need to identify a prospective co-manager and comply 
with the procedures set out in the Protected Areas Act for concluding a co-management 
agreement with this person or institution. Where the community is not the designated 
management authority, it would firstly need to form an appropriate institution and 
thereafter conclude a co-management agreement with the designated management 
authority. 
 
                                                     
77 For a detailed discussion on the nature, form and process prescribed in the Biodiversity Act for 
concluding biodiversity management agreements, see Chapter 5 (Part 3.1.1). 
78 For a list of these potential institutions (and the laws that regulate them), see note 57 above. 
79 For a detailed discussion on the nature, form and process that must be precede the conclusion of these 













FIGURE 8: Non-Owner/Co-Manager Option 
 
3.2.6 Non-Owner/Non-Manager/Beneficiary Option 
 
Under this final option, the community neither owns nor manages the land located in the 
protected area. They accordingly accrue no rights or benefits associated with these 
roles. Any rights or benefits accruing to the community from the protected area arise 
through an array of external legal transactions. One is therefore dealing here solely with 
the issue of beneficiation. The nature of the legal process regulating forms of 
beneficiation associated with the protected area will differ significantly. The legal 
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FIGURE 9: Non-Owner/Non-Manager/Beneficiary Option 
 
A general distinction needs to be drawn between two main legal processes: the 
formation of the appropriate institution to accrue the rights or benefits where no such 
institution exists;80 and the selection and implementation of an appropriate legal scheme 
to regulate the nature of these rights or benefits. Here the available legal schemes are 
diverse and include: concession agreements; access, use and lease agreements; 
permits and licenses; and co-management agreements.81 
                                                     
80 For a list of these potential institutions (and the laws that regulate them), see note 57 above. 
81 The Protected Areas Act allows management authorities to conclude an array of agreements with a 
community, and issue permits/licenses to it, to enable it to: undertake commercial developments/activities 
in the protected area; access, use and share natural resources situated in the protected area; and share 
in the benefits derived from such activities. For a detailed discussion on the nature, form and process 
which must precede the agreements and permitting schemes, see Chapter 5 (Part 3.1.2). 
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In this, the concluding Chapter of Part II of the dissertation, I considered two main 
aspects relevant to linking South Africa’s disparate conservation and land reform 
regimes. The first part of the Chapter considered recent Government initiatives 
specifically aimed at facilitating improved cooperative governance between these two 
regimes, namely the Memorandum of Understanding and the National Co-Management 
Framework. While clearly providing valuable guidance to administrators tasked with 
settling the outstanding communal land restitution claims in protected areas, I sought to 
illustrate through my critical appraisal of the content of these two documents, their 
inherent theoretical and practical frailties. Perhaps the most significant of these frailties 
is the entrenchment of co-management, and an exceptionally narrow formulation of it, 
as the favoured governance option for perpetuating CCAs in South Africa. I argued that 
the narrow vision espoused in these documents shrouds several other governance 
options provided for within South Africa’s domestic legal framework for implementing 
CCAs. I suggested further that this might in turn undermine the role of CCAs as tools for 
bridging South Africa’s conservation and land reform regimes. 
 
In the second part of this Chapter, I focused on these apparently misunderstood 
governance options that theoretically provide domestic stakeholders with a far more 
diverse and nuanced array of tools for linking the country’s conservation and land 
reform regimes. In order to unpack these governance options, I briefly returned to the 
issue of protected areas governance and identified an array of governance options 
which underpin the implementation of CCAs, namely: owner/manager; owner/co-
manager; owner/beneficiary; non-owner/manager; non-owner/co-manager; and non-
owner/non-manager/beneficiary. I thereafter illustrated how South Africa’s current 
relevant legal framework caters for the implementation of each of these governance 
options. 
 













This brings me to the end of Part II of the dissertation in which I have critically 
considered the complex web of domestic laws, policies, programmes and institutions of 
potential relevance to CCAs. South Africa appears on paper to have a comprehensive 
legal framework for establishing and managing such areas. However, as I have 
highlighted in the above analysis of its various components, the regime is beset by 
several inherent problems. To better illustrate these problems, and the various 
opportunities which exist for resolving them, one must critically reflect on the manner in 
which the Government has implemented the various components of this regime to fulfil 
its conservation and land reform agendas. This forms the focus of Part III of the 
dissertation, which critically considers the functioning of four domestic CCAs 
















Having canvassed South Africa’s legal framework of relevance to communally-conserved areas 
in Part II of this dissertation, Part III evaluates the manner in which domestic administrators 
have sought to implement it. This evaluation is undertaken through two distinct yet related 
enquiries: first, through the consideration of four domestic case studies; and secondly, by way of 
an assessment of the extent to which these case studies reflect the presence or absence of the 
essential elements underlying communally-conserved areas highlighted in Chapter 3. Part III is 
accordingly divided into two chapters. Chapter 8 (titled South Africa’s Experimentation with 
Communally-Conserved Areas) considers four South African case studies in which domestic 
administrators have sought to use the legal framework discussed in Part II to bridge the 
country’s conservation and land reform mandates. The case studies are: the Richtersveld 
National Park; the Pafuri Region of the Kruger National Park; the Dwesa-Cwebe Nature 
Reserve; and the Eastern Shores Region of the Isimangaliso Wetland Park. These case studies 
are the best documented in South Africa and have been central in shaping the country’s 
contemporary legal regime of relevance to communally-conserved areas. Within this chapter, I 
briefly set out the history of each communally-conserved area and detail the different 
governance options and elements that underpin them. Chapter 9 (titled Evaluating South 
Africa’s Experimentation with Communally-Conserved Areas) critically assesses the extent to 
which the case studies reflect adherence to the essential elements that theoretically underlie 
successful communally-conserved areas. This chapter does not provide an exhaustive analysis 
of the extent to which each case study reflects the presence or absence of each of these 
elements. It rather seeks to draw pertinent examples from the four case studies which: illustrate 
the challenges faced by domestic policy-makers in giving domestic effect to these elements; 
highlight inherent strengths and frailties of the existing legal framework; and hold lessons for 






















South Africa’s policy-makers have been experimenting with introducing communally-
conserved areas (CCAs) for the past two decades. Using elements of the domestic 
conservation and land reform regimes discussed in Part II of this dissertation, some 43 
communal land restitution claims in protected areas have been settled to date.1 The 
practical outcome of these settlements effectively constitutes South Africa’s 
experimentation with CCAs. While it would be desirable to consider all communal land 
restitution settlements in protected areas in order to evaluate the merits of the domestic 
regime, it is simply unfeasible to do so within the scope of this dissertation. 
Furthermore, selecting but one example would preclude a critical comparison of the 
diverse governance options that underpin them. I have accordingly selected four case 
studies, namely: Richtersveld National Park (Richtersveld case study); the Pafuri 
Region of the Kruger National Park (Makuleke case study);2 the Dwesa-Cwebe Nature 
Reserve (Dwesa-Cwebe case study); and the Eastern Shores Region of the 
Isimangaliso Wetland Park (the Bhangazi case study).3  
 
The purpose of this chapter is briefly to describe the history of each of the case studies 
and detail the governance options that underpin them. It draws from the comprehensive 
research undertaken by several anthropologists, sociologists, ecologists and 
                                                     
1 Department of Environmental Affairs Conservation for the People with the People: A Review of the 
People and Parks Programme (2010) 37; Department of Environmental Affairs Status of Land Claims in 
Protected Areas (2010) Unpublished document, dated February 2010. 
2 The Makuleke community lodged the land claim to the Pafuri Region of the Kruger National Park. This 
case study will therefore be referred to as the Makuleke case study. 
3 The Bhangazi (sometimes referred to as the Mbangweni) community lodged the land claim to the 
Eastern Shores Region of Lake St Lucia situated in the Isimangaliso Wetland Park. This case study will 












economists working in each of the four CCAs in the past two decades. It effectively 
provides the context for the subsequent chapter in which I critically analyse the extent to 
which the case studies reflect general adherence to the essential elements theoretically 
underlying successful CCAs.4 
 
2. THE CASE STUDIES 
 
A range of perspectives informed the selection of the four case studies. From a 
geographical perspective, these case studies are scattered across South Africa and 
therefore reflect areas subject to varying political, social, economic and cultural realities. 
From a governance perspective, these case studies represent a range of forms of 
protected areas; planning frameworks; land tenure schemes; institutional and decision-
making structures; management regimes; access, use and benefit-sharing schemes; 
and financing and support options. From a temporal perspective, these case studies 
represent CCAs established5 both prior to and post South Africa’s contemporary land 
reform regime. The case studies do not represent CCAs established under South 
Africa’s post-2005 conservation regime.6 The reason for this is threefold: first, only a few 
CCAs have been established since the commencement of this regime; secondly, it was 
not possible to obtain access to the full suite of legal documents underlying the 
formation of these areas from relevant government authorities; and thirdly, available and 
reliable information on the functioning of these recent CCAs is absent owing to their 
contemporary nature. This renders any critical and comparative commentary on them 
very difficult and rather premature.  
 
The four selected case studies are the best documented in South Africa and have 
shaped the country’s contemporary legal framework governing the settlement of 
communal land restitution claims in protected areas. The four case studies are also 
                                                     
4 For a detailed discussion of these elements, see: Chapter 3 (Part 4). 
5 I use the term ‘established’ in a rather broad sense throughout the remainder of this dissertation to refer 
to: the establishment of a CCA ab initio (such as the Richtersveld case study); and the conversion of 
existing state-managed protected areas to CCAs (such as the Makuleke case study; the Dwesa-Cwebe 
case study; and the Bhangazi case study). 












currently regulated under the contemporary land reform and conservation regime. 
Therefore, the absence of a case study emanating from the post-2005 conservation era 
would not appear to render the lessons provided by a critical analysis of the selected 
case studies not valuable and irrelevant. 
 
2.1 RICHTERSVELD CASE STUDY 
 
The Richtersveld National Park (RNP), situated in the north-western corner of South 
Africa, was established in 1991. It is 162 445 hectares in extent and is home to unique 
arid mountain and desert landscapes and the succulent Karoo biome which is endemic 
to the area.7 The RNP is bounded in the north and east by the Orange River, South 
Africa’s boundary with Namibia; and in the south by the Richtersveld Community 
Conservancy.8 In 2003, the RNP was amalgamated with the /Ai-!Ais and Fish River 
Canyon Park to form the /Ai-!Ais-Richtersveld Transfrontier Park. In 2007, it was 
included as a buffer zone to the Richtersveld Cultural and Botanical Landscape, South 
Africa’s eighth World Heritage Site.9 
 
The pastoral-nomadic Richtersveld community has for approximately 2000 years 
occupied the land falling within the RNP.10 The land formerly constituted the 
                                                     
7 For a detailed description of the location, topography, geology, climate, vegetation and wildlife situated 
in the RNP, see: South African National Parks Richtersveld National Park Management and Development 
Plan (Undated) 4-19. 
8 The Richtersveld Community Conservancy was established in 2004 with its Management Committee 
situated in Eksteenfontein. There is no generally applicable national legislation governing the 
establishment of conservancies in South Africa. They effectively amount to contractual agreements 
between adjoining landowners to cooperatively manage an area in the interests of conservation. 
Provincial nature conservation authorities have afforded them limited recognition by allowing for their 
registration. The Richtersveld Community Conservancy has subsequently been declared a world heritage 
site (Richtersveld Cultural and Botanical Landscape). For further information on the Richtersveld 
Community Conservancy see: http://www.richtersveld-conservancy.org/. 
9 The area was proclaimed as such under the World Heritage Convention Act (49 of 1999) (GN 563 GG 
No. 30043 dated 4 July 2007). The provincial MEC for Sports, Arts and Culture in the Northern Cape is 
the duly appointed management authority (GN 739 GG No. 31220 dated 11 July 2008). 
10 For a detailed overview of the history of the area and the RNP, see: Odendaal F & Suich H 
Richtersveld: The Land and its People (2007) Struik Cape Town; Hendricks H, Bond W, Midgley J & 
Novellie P “Biodiversity Conservation and Pastoralism - Reducing Herd Size in a Communal Livestock 
Production System in Richtersveld National Park” (2007) 70 Journal of Arid Environments 719; 
Everingham M & Jannecke C “Land Restitution and Democratic Citizenship in South Africa” (2006) 32(3) 
Journal of Southern African Studies 557; and Magome H & Murombedzi J “Sharing South African 












Richtersveld ’coloured reserve’, in which the Richtersveld community was allowed to 
continue to reside following the introduction of Apartheid in South Africa.11 At the time 
the conservation authorities sought to establish RNP, the land was formally held in trust 
by the erstwhile Minister of Land Affairs on the Richtersveld community’s behalf.12  
 
The process leading to the establishment of the RNP was drawn out and fraught with 
conflict.13 In 1975, the National Parks Board (NPB)14 initiated negotiations with relevant 
national, provincial and municipal authorities.15 They concluded an agreement in 1988 
in terms of which the land would be contracted to the NPB to administer in the interests 
of conservation. One of the key government authorities party to these initial negotiations 
was the former Minister of Minerals and Energy owing to the existence of prospecting 
and mining operations in the proposed park. The Minister agreed to the formation of the 
RNP on condition that the existing prospecting and mining rights would be unaffected by 
                                                                                                                                                                           
M (eds) Decolonizing Nature: Strategies for Conservation in a Post-colonial Era (2003) Earthscan London 
112. 
11 ‘Coloured reserves’ were declared under the Coloured Persons Communal Reserves Act (3 of 1961); 
read together with the Preservation of Coloured Areas Act (31 of 1961) and Rural Coloured Areas Act (24 
of 1963). For an account of the Richtersveld coloured reserve and the land tenure systems operating in 
the area, see: May H & Lahiff E “Land Reform in Namaqualand, 1994-2005: A Review” (2007) 70 Journal 
of Arid Environments 782-798; Boonzaier E “Local Responses to Conservation in the Richtersveld 
National Park, South Africa” (1996) 5 Biodiversity & Conservation 308; and Boonzaier E “Negotiating the 
Development of Tourism in the Richtersveld, South Africa” in Price M (ed) People and Tourism in Fragile 
Environments (1996) John Wiley & Sons Limited Chichester 123-126. 
12 The laws providing for the formation of ‘coloured reserves’ were repealed by the Abolition of Racially 
Based Land Measures Act (108 0f 1991). Following their repeal, the land was, in terms of the Rural Areas 
Act (9 of 1987), held in trust for the community by the erstwhile Minister of Local Government and 
Agricultural in the House of Representatives. Title to the land was subsequently transferred to the 
Richtersveld Sida!Hub Communal Property Association in 2002, in terms of the Transformation of Certain 
Rural Areas Act (94 of 1998). 
13 For a comprehensive discussion of this process, see: Robinson R “Community Partnership in the 
Richtersveld National Park” (1998) Unpublished paper presented at Scandinavian Seminar College 
Workshop on African Experiences of Policies and Practices Supporting Sustainable Development, 
Abidjan, November 1998, 4-8; Boonzaier “Negotiating the Development of Tourism in the Richtersveld” in 
Price People and Tourism in Fragile Environments (1996) 126-131; Glavovic B “Resolving People-Park 
Conflicts Through Negotiation: Reflections on the Richtersveld Experience” (1996) 39(4) Journal of 
Environmental Planning & Management 488-495; and Boonzaier (1996) Biodiversity & Conservation 307-
314. 
14 The National Parks Board was the forerunner to SANParks. Its powers and functions were regulated by 
the National Parks Act (57 of 1976). 
15 For a description of the steps taken by the NPB to establish the RNP between 1975 and 1988, see: 












the creation of the RNP and that future rights could be considered on a case-by-case 
basis.16 
 
The Richtersveld community, deeply aggrieved that they - the apparent owners of the 
land - had not been consulted during these discussions, lodged interdict proceedings in 
the Cape High Court in 1989.17 The community asserted that they were the rightful 
owners of the land and should accordingly have been party to the negotiations 
regarding the Park’s establishment. With litigation pending, the NPB was compelled to 
renegotiate the terms of the agreement with the Richtersveld community.18 Having 
successfully asserted their title over the land, the Richtersveld community managed to 
significantly alter the terms of the original agreement in their favour.19 The final Contract 
Park Agreement20 providing for the established of the RNP was concluded in 1991.21 
The RNP constituted the first protected area in South Africa to include communally-
owned land within its borders with its establishment preceding the introduction of South 
Africa’s contemporary land reform and conservation regimes. 
 
                                                     
16 This consultation and agreement took place in terms of section 2B(1)(a) of the then applicable National 
Parks Act (57 of 1976). 
17 Filed in the High Court (Cape Provincial Division) under Case No. 3024/89. 
18 For a description of this negotiation process see: Glavovic (1996) Journal of Environmental Planning & 
Management 491-494. 
19 The concessions included: the granting of grazing rights within the borders of the RNP; the reduction of 
the original size of the RNP from approximately 250 000 to 160 000 hectares, thereby securing additional 
grazing land for the community; the reduction in the duration of the agreement from 99 years to 24 years; 
the shifting of management from SANParks to a Management Planning Committee comprising of 
representatives from the community and conservation authorities; the payment of an annual sum of R80 
000 by the NPB into a community trust to be used for local development; and provision for the 
renegotiation of the annual rental every 5 years. See further: Magome et al “Sharing South African 
National Parks” in Adams et al Decolonizing Nature (2003) 112-113; Boonzaier “Negotiating the 
Development of Tourism in the Richtersveld” in Price People and Tourism in Fragile Environments (1996) 
127-129; Glavovic “Resolving People-Park Conflicts Through Negotiation” (1996) Journal of 
Environmental Planning & Management 494; and Boonzaier E “People, Parks and Politics’ in Ramphele 
M, McDowelland C & Cock J (eds) Restoring the Land: Environment and Change in Post-Apartheid South 
Africa (1992) Pathos London 162. 
20 National Parks Board, Minister of Environmental Affairs, Minister of Local Government and Agricultural 
in the House of Representatives & Mr De Wet, Richtersveld National Park Agreement, dated 20 July 1991 
(Contract Park Agreement). 
21 It must be noted that while the Richtersveld community successfully secured the restitution of 85 000 
hectares of land (situated on the West Coast between the mouth of the Orange River to Port Nolloth) in 
2003 in terms of the Restitution of Land Rights Act (the claim was finally settled in Alexkor Ltd v 
Richtersveld Community 2003 (12) BCLR 1301 (CC)), this portion of land falls outside the boundaries of 
the RNP and is accordingly not directly relevant to this enquiry. For further information on the resolution of 












In terms of the Contract Park Agreement, the Richtersveld community contracted 162 
445 hectares of their land into the RNP.22 In return, an annual rental of some R80 00023 
is paid to the Richtersveld Community Trust (RCT).24 The RCT, established in 1993, is 
responsible for administering these funds for the purpose of ‘liefdadigheids’ and 
‘opvoedkundige van ’n openbare aard’.25 The Contract Park Agreement also provided 
for the establishment of a Management Planning Committee (MPC)26 whose primary 
function it was to draw up a management plan for the RNP.27 The MPC theoretically 
exercises authority over the management of, and land-use undertaken within, the 
RNP.28 In reality, however, the day-to-day management of the RNP falls to South 
African National Parks (SANParks), the successor to the NPB.29 SANParks is legally 
responsible for all operational costs associated with managing the RNP and must 
manage it in accordance with the Park’s management plan.30 It took ten years however 
to finalise this plan.31 The resultant Management and Development Plan32 sets out the 
vision for the RNP; contains a range of management objectives, programmes and a 
conservation development framework; and details the composition, powers and 
                                                     
22 Clause 1.1 & clause 2. The Contract Park Agreement (1991) was concluded in terms of section 
2B(1)(b) of the National Parks Act, which provided that a private landowner could agree to have its land 
incorporated within a national park by agreement with the National Parks Board. 
23 Clause 5.2. This sum, subject to a five-year inflationary increase, was initially quantified at R 
0.5/hectare and is mandated for use for community development projects. The quantum of this income is 
not linked to management expenses or profits accrued from eco-tourism ventures undertaken in the RNP. 
24 Clause 12. The Contract Park Agreement (1991) provides for the creation of the Richtersveld 
Community Trust. The draft Trust Deed was attached to the agreement (annexure “C”).  
25 Clause 4 (Richtersveld Community Trust Deed, dated 20 July 1991). The initial trustees were identified 
as the NPB and the Minister of Local Government and Agriculture in the House of Representatives 
(acting as trustee of the land for the community under the Rural Areas Act). Three community members 
were subsequently elected as trustees following the communities discontent that they had no 
representation on the Trust (Boonzaier “Negotiating the Development of Tourism in the Richtersveld” in 
Price People and Tourism in Fragile Environments (1996) 130. 
26 Clause 4. The MPC comprises of nine members: four SANParks officials; four elected community 
members from the villages of Sandrif, Kuboes, Lekkersing and Eksteensfontein; and one community 
member representing pastoralists. The community representatives are elected on a bi-annual basis. 
27 Clause 4.  
28 Clause 5. 
29 Grossman D & Holden P “Towards Transformation: Contract Parks in South Africa” in Suich H, Child B 
& Spenceley A (eds) Evolution and Innovation in Wildlife Conservation (2009) Earthscan London 359-
360. 
30 Clause 5. 
31 The Management Plan for the RNP was eventually finalized in 2002 (SANParks Richtersveld National 
Park Management and Development Plan (undated). 
32 Richtersveld National Park Management and Development Plan (undated). See generally: Grossman 
et al “Towards Transformation: Contract Parks in South Africa” in Suich et al Evolution and Innovation in 












functions of the Joint Management Committee (which replaced the MPC in form but not 
composition in 2002). 
 
Regarding occupation and use rights, the Contract Park Agreement allows the 
community to continue to reside, graze a total of 6600 livestock and harvest natural 
resources situated in the RNP.33 Further benefits accruing to the Richtersveld 
community include: an undertaking by the NPB to employ community members where 
jobs become available;34 the establishment of a succulent nursery by the NPB within the 
RNP, with any sale proceeds accruing to the Richtersveld Community Trust;35 and the 
Government making available three state-owned farms to the Richtersveld Community 
with an associated undertaking to assist the community to develop these farms for stock 
farming.36 The Contract Park Agreement does not provide any guidance on the 
community’s commercial development rights within the RNP or the sharing of benefits 
derived from the exercise of such rights. Rights of this nature were eventually detailed in 
the Park’s Management and Development Plan. Current tourism infrastructure is very 
limited but will be expanded in the near future to include a 28-bed rest camp and two 
wilderness camps.37 As it currently stands, the only substantial income accruing to the 
community is the annual rental that the Government pays to it. 
 
The Contract Park Agreement has an initial duration of 24 years, following which it can 
be terminated on six years notice by either party.38 Predominantly as a result of their 
frustrations regarding the limited role they currently play on the Joint Management 
Committee and the few benefits which have accrued to the community since the 
establishment of the RNP over twenty years ago, the community gave notice in 2006 of 
its intentions to withdraw from the Contract Park Agreement unless it is renegotiated on 
more favourable terms for the community.39 
                                                     
33 Clause 4. 
34 Clause 5. 
35 Clause 5.3. 
36 This amounted to approximately 66 000 hectares. The Government assistance comprised of the 
installation of boreholes to water the stock and the erection of fencing. 
37 Ibid 32. 
38 Clause 1. 












2.2 MAKULEKE CASE STUDY 
 
The Kruger National Park (KNP), situated in the north-eastern corner of South Africa, is 
approximately 2 million hectares in extent. It is the country’s largest, premier and 
economically lucrative national park. The KNP was established in 192640 and comprises 
of predominantly government-owned land.41 It is bounded on the west by several private 
nature reserves.42 These nature reserves de facto form part of the KNP as the fences 
between them and the Park have been removed. The KNP also forms part of the Great 
Limpopo Transfrontier Park that straddles the South African border and includes the 
Limpopo National Park (Mozambique) and the Gonarezho National Park (Zimbabwe).43 
The majority of the KNP is managed by SANParks.44 
 
In 1995, the Makuleke community lodged a land claim under the Restitution of Land 
Rights Act45 in respect of the northern Pafuri Region of the KNP.46 This region is of key 
                                                                                                                                                                           
Innovation in Wildlife Conservation (2009) 361. For further information on the reasons for the anticipated 
withdraw, see: Turner S, Collins S & Baumgart J Community-Based Natural Resource Management: 
Experiences and Lessons in Linking Communities to Sustainable Resource Use in Different Social, 
Economic and Ecological Conditions in South Africa (2002) Research Report No.11, PLAAS Bellville 45; 
and Kepe T, Wynberg R & Ellis W “Land Reform and Biodiversity Conservation in South Africa: 
Complementary or in Conflict” (2005) 1 International Journal of Biodiversity Science & Management 13. 
40 The KNP was formally proclaimed under the National Parks Act (56 of 1926) when two previously 
proclaimed game reserves, the Sabie Game Reserve and the Shingwedzi Game Reserve, were 
consolidated into one national park. 
41 For a comprehensive discussion of the history of the KNP, see: Carruthers J The Kruger National Park: 
A Social and Political History (1995) University of Natal Press Pietermaritzburg. 
42 These private and communally-owned nature reserves include: Umbabat Private Nature Reserve; 
Klaserie Private Game Reserve; Timbavati Private Game Reserve; Manyeleti Game Reserve; and Sabi 
Sand Game Reserve. These nature reserves are managed by the landowners themselves and/or 
privately appointed and funded conservation agencies. 
43 The Great Limpopo Transfrontier Park is regulated in terms of a Memorandum of Understanding 
entered into between South Africa, Mozambique and Zimbabwe in November 2001. For further 
information on this initiative, see: http://www.peaceparks.org/. For a discussion on the process leading up 
to its establishment, see: Whande W & Suich H “Transfrontier Conservation Initiatives in Southern Africa: 
Observations from Great Limpopo Transfrontier Conservation Area” in Suich et al Evolution and 
Innovation in Wildlife Conservation (2009) 375-391; Spierenburg M, Steenkamp C & Wels H “Enclosing 
the Local for the Global Commons: Community Land Rights in the Great Limpopo Transfrontier 
Conservation Area” (2008) 6(1) Conservation & Society 89-90; and Whande W Trans-boundary Natural 
Resource Management in Southern Africa: Local Historical and Livelihood Realities within the Great 
Limpopo Trans-frontier Conservation Area (2007) Research Report No.25, PLAAS Bellville, 14-47. 
44 Those areas not exclusively managed by SANParks are: the privately-owned nature reserves situated 
on its western border which are managed by the landowners themselves and/or privately appointed and 
funded conservation agencies; and the Pafuri Region which is theoretically co-managed by SANParks 
and the Makuleke Community. 












importance to the KNP as it holds 75 % of the Park’s biodiversity and is also at the heart 
of the transfrontier park initiative.47 The claim, one of approximately forty such claims 
lodged in respect of the KNP,48 was resolved in 1998 by way of agreement.49 In terms 
of the Settlement Agreement, ownership of some 19 000 hectares situated in the Pafuri 
Region was restored to the community.50 The land was formally transferred to the 
Makuleke Communal Property Association (MCPA)51 subject to the following conditions: 
no mining or prospecting may be undertaken on the land; no part of the land may be 
                                                                                                                                                                           
46 For a detailed discussion of the history of the area, the land claim and the settlement process, see: 
Robins S & Van Der Waal K “‘Model Tribes’ and Iconic Conservationists? - Tracking the Makuleke 
Restitution Case in Kruger National Park” in Walker C, Bohlin A, Hall R & Kepe T Land, Memory, 
Reconstruction and Justice - Perspectives on Land Claims in South Africa (2010) Ohio University Press 
Ohio 163-180; Amend T, Ruth P, Eissing S & Amend S Land Rights Are Human Rights: Win-Win 
Strategies in Sustainable Nature Conservation - Contributions from South Africa (2008) Sustainability Has 
Many Faces No.4, GTZ Eschborn 19-24; De Villiers B Land Claims and National Parks: The Makuleke 
Experience (1998) HSRC Press Pretoria 45-57; Friedman J “Winning Isn’t Everything: What the Makuleke 
Lost in the Process of Land Restitution” (2005) BA Thesis (Environmental Studies) University of Chicago 
5-28; Ramutsindela M “The Perfect Way to Ending a Painful Past? Makuleke Land Deal in South Africa” 
(2002) 33 GeoForum 16-22; and Steenkamp C & Uhr J The Makul ke Land Claim: Power Relations and 
Community-Based Natural Resource Management (2000) Evaluating Eden Series Discussion Paper 
No.18, IIED London 11-20. 
47 Steenkamp et al The Makuleke Land Claim (2000) 2. 
48 With the exception of the Makuleke claim, all remaining claims in the KNP remaining outstanding, with 
a moratorium having been placed on land restoration as an option for the settlement of these claims 
(Government Communication Information System “State Announces Decision on Kruger National Park 
Land Claims” Joint Statement issued by the Department of Environmental Affairs and Tourism and 
Department of Land Affairs, dated 28 January 2009). 
49 SANParks, Makuleke Community; Minister of Environmental Affairs and Tourism; Minister of Public 
Works; Minister of Land Affairs; Minister of Minerals and Energy; Minister of Agriculture; Minister of 
Defence & Member of the Executive Council for Agriculture, Land and Environment (Northern Province) 
Main Agreement Relating to the Makuleke Land Claim, dated 30 May 1998 (Settlement Agreement). The 
Settlement Agreement (1998) contains three main chapters. Chapter 1 deals with the restoration of land 
rights. Chapter 2 deals with the incorporation of land into the Kruger National Park and sets out the 
parties’ respective rights and obligations relating to this land. Chapter 3 contains a range of standard 
contract terms. 
50 This process involved the formal deproclamation of the Pafuri Region as a Schedule 1 National Park (in 
terms of section 2(3) of the National Parks Act); the transfer of the land to the CPA in terms of a Deed of 
Grant; and the re-incorporation of the land into the KNP (in terms of an agreement concluded under 
section 2B(1)(b) of the National Parks Act). The erstwhile Minister of Land Affairs agreed to waive all 
transfer and stamp duties associated with the transfer of land to the CPA (clause 18).  
51 The MCPA was established in terms of the Communal Property Association Act (28 of 1996) and its 
objects, membership, powers, functions and governance structure are detailed in its Constitution. The 
current chairperson of the CPA is Chief Makuleke, who similarly chairs the relevant tribal authority. There 
are currently 15 000 members of the MCPA, which comprise of persons previously disposed of land in 
1969, their descendants and residents of the Ntlhaveni area to which the Makuleke were relocated. The 
MCPA is headed by a nine-member executive council, employs two full-time staff members, is organised 
into sub-committees and has established three district development forums to facilitate communication 
and consultation between the MCPA and its membership. For more information on the governance 
structure of the MCPA, see: De Villiers B & Van den Berg M Land Reform: Trailblazers: Seven Successful 
Case Studies (2006) KAS Johannesburg 16-17; De Villiers B People and Parks - Sharing the Benefits 












used for residential purposes other than that required for ecotourism purposes; no part 
of the land may be used for agriculture; the land must be used and maintained solely for 
the purpose of conservation and associated commercial activities; no development may 
take place on the land prior to an environmental assessment being considered and 
approved by the competent authority; and SANParks has a pre-emptive right to 
purchase the land should the MCPA wish to sell it.52 The community agreed to have 
these conditions registered against the Deed of Grant thereby ensuring their 
perpetuity.53 Underpinning the entire agreement is a commitment by the parties of 
mutual support.54 
 
In terms of the Settlement Agreement, the MCPA agreed to contract the Pafuri Region 
back to SANParks for a period of 50 years.55 The duration of this arrangement is flexible 
however. The MCPA or SANParks may, on five years notice, terminate the arrangement 
after 20 years.56 Should this occur, the Pafuri Region would be excluded from the 
KNP.57 The MCPA and SANParks may also by agreement, at least two years prior to 
the termination of the initial 50-year period, extend the duration of this arrangement for a 
further period of fifty years.58 
 
For the duration of the above arrangement, the land contracted into the KNP is 
theoretically managed by a Joint Management Board (JMB) comprising of three 
members from each of the MCPA and SANParks.59 Each entity is responsible for 
covering the participation costs of its members on the JMB.60 Additional members from 
each of these institutions may participate in the meetings of the JMB in an advisory 
                                                     
52 Clauses 11 and 12. 
53 Clause 11(2) and clause 22, read with Schedule 3. 
54 Article 48. 
55 Clause 24(1). 
56 Clause 24(1). 
57 Clause 23(1)(2) read with clause 24(1) and clause 40. Such an event would not appear to impact on 
the conditions registered against the Deed of Grant in terms of the Settlement Agreement (1998) and 
SANParks may elect to serve in an advisory capacity to the MPCA regarding the future use of the land. 
58 Clause 24(2). 
59 For a discussion on the functioning of the JMB, see: De Villiers et al Land Reform: Trailblazers (2006) 
18-20. 












capacity.61 Decision-making is generally by way of consensus,62 with provision being 
made for a range of deadlock breaking mechanisms.63 A streamlined joint management 
committee, comprising of two representatives from each constituency, has also been 
set up to facilitate more frequent interaction.64 Express recognition is made in the 
Settlement Agreement of the need to provide employment opportunities and to transfer 
skills to the community.65 The tangible realisation of these opportunities has been very 
limited to date.66 
 
The function of the JMB is to undertake the ‘day-to-day management and operations’ 
and regulate ‘all conservation management related activities undertaken within’ the 
Pafuri Region of the KNP.67 In doing so, the JMB is compelled to comply with the terms 
laid out in the Settlement Agreement, the relevant statut ry framework, its own 
resolutions and decisions, and the Master Plan68 it developed in 2000.69 The Settlement 
Agreement mandates SANParks to ‘do all such things which are necessary for or 
incidental to or connected with the day-to-day conservation management of the 
business and affairs’ of the Pafuri Region, without however, detracting from the powers 
of the JMB.70 This creates some ambiguity regarding who is in fact responsible for the 
day-to-day management of the Pafuri Region. SANParks appears to retain its overall 
management responsibilities in the Pafuri Region but operates in the capacity as the 
agent of the JMB.71 However, the JMB has no authority over the budget for the area and 
is therefore largely toothless. 
                                                     
61 Clause 25(14). 
62 Clauses 25. 
63 Clause 38. 
64 Turner et al Community-Based Natural Resource Management (2002) 46. 
65 Clause 29 and clause 30 respectively.  
66 For a summary of the limited skills transfer programmes and employment opportunities provided in the 
Pafuri Region, see: De Villiers People and Parks - Sharing the Benefits (2008) 80-81. 
67 Clause 26(2) read with clause 27(3). 
68 Joint Management Board, Master Plan for the Conservation and Sustainable Development of the 
Makuleke Region Kruger National Park (2000) First Edition, Undated (Master Plan). The Master Plan 
provides: a historic overview and social background to the area; a general description of the area 
(location, climate, geology; hydrology; soils; biology, landscape types; infrastructure); a vision for the 
area; and a series of principles and objectives to guide the management of, and development within, the 
area. Provision is made for the amendment of the Master Plan where necessary (clause 27(2)). 
69 Clause 26(1). 
70 Clause 28. 













In respect of commercial activities undertaken in the Pafuri Region, the MCPA 
theoretically retains exclusive authority.72 There are, however, several proviso’s 
attached to this exclusivity: it must consult SANParks prior to undertaking or authorising 
such activities73 or granting tenders to developers/operators;74 such activities must 
comply with the principles set out in the Master Plan;75 and such activities must be 
preceded by an environmental impact assessment approved by the competent 
authority.76 The expectation of significant employment opportunities and financial return 
offered by eco-tourism was one of the principal reasons for the community agreeing to 
contract the land back to the KNP.77 Some commentators warned of the somewhat 
inflated nature of these expectations given several challenges to developing eco-
tourism in the area.78 Notwithstanding these challenges, the MCPA have successfully 
concluded three commercial concessions in the area: an annually renewable hunting 
concession with Wayne Wagner Safaris;79 and two luxury accommodation concessions 
with Matswana Safaris (Pty) Ltd80 and Wilderness Safaris (Pty) Ltd.81 The proceeds 
                                                     
72 Clause 27(3) and clause 27(4). 
73 Clause 27(5). 
74 Clause 32(2). 
75 Clause 31(2)(1)-(2). SANParks representatives on the JMB are afforded a right to: determine that any 
proposed commercial activities comply with the Master Plan (undated) (clause 31(3)(1)); participate in the 
EIA process (clause 31(3)(2)); and ensure that the tender processes are fair (clause 31(3)(4)). 
76 Clause 31(2)(7). 
77 De Villiers Land Claims and National Parks: The Makuleke Experience (1998) 65. 
78 De Villiers et al Land Reform: Trailblazers (2006) 22; and De Villiers Land Claims and National Parks: 
The Makuleke Experience (1998) 65. These challenges include: the area’s extremely hot climate; the 
prevalence of malaria; the low rate of game spotting in the area; underdeveloped tourism infrastructure; 
and the area’s isolated location. 
79 For further information on the nature of the hunting concession, see: Spenceley A Tourism Investment 
in the Great Limpopo Transfrontier Conservation Area: Scoping Report (2005) 15-16. 
80 Matswana Safari’s was awarded a 45-year concession to build and operate The Outpost, a 36 bed 
lodge. In terms of the concession agreement, 10 % of the lodge’s gross turnover is paid to the Makuleke 
Community Development Trust. At the end of the concession agreement, which is reviewable after 15 
years, ownership of the lodge reverts to the MCPA. The lodge is currently staffed by members from the 
Makuleke community. This concession was sold to another operator in 2008. For more information on the 
lodge, see: www.theoutpost.co.za.  
81 Wilderness Safaris was awarded a concession to build and operate an 18 bed lodge and a 44 bed 
luxury lodge in the Pafuri Area (phase 1), with the option to build a further 18 bed lodge in the future 
(phase 2). To date, it has built the Pafuri Camp, a luxury 20-bed Camp and operates the Pafuri Walking 
Trail. An upfront sum of R150 000 was paid for the concession, with an additional 8 % of Wilderness 
Safari’s gross profit generated in the Pafuri Region paid to the Makuleke Community Development Trust. 
In terms of the concession agreement, the MCPA agreed not to grant any further concessions in the 
Pafuri Region, unless Wilderness Safaris failed to undertake phase 2 of its proposed development. 












generated from these concessions are paid to the Makuleke Community Development 
Trust.82 
 
The community have the following additional rights in respect of the Pafuri Region, 
namely: access; the establishment of a research facility, museum and royal kraal for 
future tourist, religious and cultural activities; and the use of the natural resources 
situated in the Pafuri Region.83 The scope of these rights is, however, generally 
determined by the JMB and subject to the Master Plan.84 
 
All income generated from permissible commercial activities in the Pafuri Region, 
excluding gate fees, accrue to the MCPA.85 For an initial period of five years, SANParks 
bore all operational management costs. The MCPA is currently liable for 50 % of these 
costs provided that such an amount does not exceed 50 % of the MCPA’s net profit 
derived from permissible commercial activities undertaken within the Pafuri Region.86 
The MCPA is liable for all costs relating to the establishment and maintenance of 
infrastructure associated with these commercial activities.87 
 
                                                                                                                                                                           
of computers and sports equipment to the school; and the provision of ten bursaries (with a total value of 
R20 000 per annum) to students wishing to undertake further studies in the area of eco-tourism. The 
concession runs for an initial period of 15 years, renewable for a further period of 15 years. At the end of 
the concession agreement, ownership of the lodge reverts to the MCPA. For more information on these 
initiatives, see: www.pafuri.com. 
82 This entity was created to hold the proceeds generated by the concession agreements and grants, on 
behalf of the MCPA. Seven trustees, four from within the community and three from outside the 
community, administer the Trust. For more information on Trust’s management structure, see: Collins S 
“The Makuleke Conservation and Land Reform Project - A Conservation Rather than Community 
Development Success So Far” Unpublished paper dated April 2010, 12-13; and Thornhill C & Mello D 
“Community-Based Natural Resource Management: A Case Study of the Makuleke Community” (2007) 
42(3) Journal of Public Administration 294-295. For a summary of the proceeds generated from the 
concession agreements between 2005-2009, see: Collins “The Makuleke Conservation and Land Reform 
Project” (2010) 9; Spierenburg M, Wels H, van der Waal K & Robins S “Transfrontier Tourism and 
Relations Between Local Communities and the Private Sector in the Great Limpopo Transfrontier Park” in 
Hottola P (ed) Tourism Strategies and Local Responses in Southern Africa (2009) CAB International 
Cambridge 174-176; and Spenceley Tourism Investment in the Great Limpopo Transfrontier 
Conservation Area (2005) 15-17. 
83 Clause 33. 
84 Ibid. 
85 Clause 34(1). The gate fees accrue to SANParks but provision is made in the agreement for this aspect 
to be renegotiated at any time (clause 34(2)). 
86 Clause 34(3). 












In addition to the land situated in Pafuri Region of the KNP, the MCPA were also 
granted title to land situated in two adjacent conservation areas, the Matshakatini 
Nature Reserve and the Makuya Park Game Reserve.88 Whilst these areas were not 
formally incorporated within the KNP and therefore subject to the Contract Park 
Agreement, the community agreed to the remove the fences between these areas and 
the Pafuri Region, and for them to be managed as an open ecological system.89 
 
2.3 DWESA-CWEBE CASE STUDY 
 
The Dwesa and Cwebe Nature Reserves, which largely comprise of indigenous coastal 
forests and grasslands, are jointly 5278 hectares in extent and situated adjacent to one 
another on the east coast of South Africa.90 Their history is turmoiled and complex and 
has been comprehensively canvassed by several scholars.91 In summary, the Reserves 
initially comprised of two demarcated forest reserves declared in the 1890s.92 Local 
resident communities were forcibly removed over a period of approximately 50 years 
                                                     
88 Clauses 6 and 9. 
89 Clause 16-17. These areas officially fall outside the bounds of the Pafuri Region and accordingly the 
ambit of this dissertation. For further information on the status of the restoration of this land, and the 
challenges that have plagued it, see: Whande W “Windows of Opportunity or Exclusion? Local 
Communities in the Great Limpopo Transfrontier Conservation Areas, South Africa” in Nelson F (ed) 
Community Rights, Conservation and Contested Land - The Politics of Natural Resource Governance in 
Africa (2010) Earthscan London 147-173. 
90 For a comprehensive description of the location, topography, geology, climate, vegetation and wildlife 
situated in the reserves see: Eastern Cape Parks Board Draft Integrated Reserve Management Plan: 
Strategic Management Plan: Dwesa-Cwebe Nature Reserve (dated 6 December 2006) 9-16; and 
Timmermans H & Naicker K “The Land” in Palmer R, Timmermans H & Fay D (eds) From Conflict to 
Negotiation - Nature-Based Development on South Africa’s Wild Coast (2002) HSRC Press Pretoria 2-14. 
91 See generally: Palmer R, Kingwill R, Coleman M & Hamer N The Dwesa-Cwebe Restitution Claim: A 
Case Study as Preparation for a Field Based Learning Programme (2006) Phuhlisani Solutions CC Cape 
Town; Palmer R From Title to Entitlement: The Struggle Continues at Dwesa-Cwebe (2003) Fort Hare 
Institute of Social and Economic Research Working Paper No. 46, University of For Hare Alice; Palmer et 
al From Conflict to Negotiation (2002); Fay D & Palmer R “Prospects for the Redistribution of Wealth 
Through Land Reform in Dwesa-Cwebe” Cousins B (ed) At the Crossroads: Land and Agrarian Reform 
into the 21st Century (2000) PLAAS/NLC Bellville/Braamfontein 194-210; Palmer R & Timmermans H 
(eds) Indigenous Knowledge, Conservation Reform, Natural Resource Management and Rural 
Development in the Dwesa and Cwebe Nature Reserves and Neighbouring Village Settlements (1997) 
Report, Institute of Social and Economic Research, Rhodes University Grahamstown; and Kepe T 
“Communities, Entitlements and Nature Reserves: The Case of the Wild Coast” (1997) South Africa IDS 
Bulletin No. 28, 47-58. 
92 In terms of the Forests Act (1888), all indigenous forests over five hectares were vested in the 
Government and while not formally proclaimed as a protected area, the adjacent Dwesa and Cwebe 












but were initially granted servitudes to access and extract various natural resources in 
the Reserves.93 
 
Following the creation of ‘independent homelands’ (effectively native reserves) in South 
Africa in the 1970’s, the demarcated forest reserves were in 1975 formally proclaimed 
as the Dwesa and Cwebe Nature Reserves under the Transkei Nature Conservation 
Act.94 While legally constituting two reserves, they have practically been managed as a 
single reserve since then and shall accordingly be referred to jointly as the Dwesa-
Cwebe Nature Reserve (DCNR) for the remainder of this dissertation. Portions of the 
DCNR were fenced off and residents living adjacent to it were precluded access.95 In 
1992, the Dwesa-Cwebe Marine Protected Area was proclaimed adjacent to the DCNR, 
thereby precluding community access to the coastal resources situated on its seaward 
boundary.96 In 1994, following the reincorporation of the homelands into South Africa, 
the DCNR retained its status and name as the Dwesa-Cwebe Nature Reserve.97 It 
however simultaneously regained its status as a demarcated state forest98 and the 
responsibility for managing it was transferred from the erstwhile Department of Water 
Affairs and Forestry (DWAF) to the Eastern Cape Department of Economic Affairs, 
Environment and Tourism (DEAET).99 No formal agreement was however ever 
concluded between these authorities regulating the transfer of such authority.100 
 
                                                     
93 Palmer et al The Dwesa-Cwebe Restitution Claim (2006) 27. See further: Fay D, Timmermans H & 
Naicker R “Closing the Forests - Segregation, Exclusion and their Consequences from 1936 to 1994” in 
Palmer et al From Conflict to Negotiation (2002) 78-110. 
94 Act 6 of 1971. The management of the reserves was transferred to the Transkei Nature Conservation 
Department and they strangely simultaneously retained their status as demarcated forest reserves. In 
1992, they were renamed as national wildlife reserves under the Transkei Environmental Conservation 
Decree (9 of 1992) in 1992. See generally: Eastern Cape Parks Board Draft Integrated Reserve 
Management Plan: Strategic Management Plan: Dwesa-Cwebe Nature Reserve, dated 6 December 
2006, 8. 
95 Palmer et al The Dwesa-Cwebe Restitution Claim (2006) 25. 
96 The marine protected area was initially proclaimed under the Transkei Environmental Conservation 
Decree (9 of 1992) and thereafter reconstituted in 2000 under the Marine Living Resources Act (18 of 
1998) in GNR 1429 GG No. 21948 dated 29 December 2000. 
97 As proclaimed under the Transkei Nature Conservation Act (6 of 1971). 
98 Recognised and regulated under the National Forests Act (84 of 1998). 
99 Draft Integrated Reserve Management Plan (2006) 6. The management of the reserves was 
subsequently transferred to the Eastern Cape Parks Board in 2006 and then onto the Eastern Cape 
Parks and Tourism Agency in 2010. 












A decade of drought coupled with growing political mobilisation resulted in the 
community invading the DCNR in 1994.101 The army forcibly removed the community 
but the invasion prompted the new democratically elected government to enter into 
negotiations with it.102 This process culminated in the community lodging a land claim 
under the Restitution of Land Rights Act in 1996. After five years of protracted 
negotiations,103 the parties concluded a Settlement Agreement104 in June 2001. The 
complexity of stakeholders with an interest in the settlement is reflected in the broad 
array of parties that are signatories to it.105 Furthermore, the complexity of the 
settlement is reflected in a convoluted array of additional agreements and documents 
that have to be read in conjunction with the main Settlement Agreement to make sense 
of it. These include the Community Agreement,106 Management Planning Framework107 
and a draft Business Plan.108 
                                                     
101 Palmer et al The Dwesa-Cwebe Restitution Claim (2006) 26-27 & 31-32. 
102 For a detailed overview of these initial negotiations and the factors that impacted on them, see: Fay D 
“Mutual Gains and Distributive Ideologies in South Africa: Theorizing Negotiations Between Communities 
and Protected Areas” (2007) 35 Human Ecology 87-91; and Palmer R, Fay D, Timmermans H, Lewis F & 
Viljoen J “Regaining the Forests - Reform and Development from 1994 to 2001” in Palmer et al From 
Conflict to Negotiation (2002) 111-143. 
103 For a detailed overview of the land negotiation and settlement process in DCNR, see: Palmer et al The 
Dwesa-Cwebe Restitution Claim (2006) 28-31. 
104 Dwesa-Cwebe Community Associations, Minister of Agriculture and Land Affairs, Minister of Water 
Affairs and Forestry, Minister of Environmental Affairs and Tourism, MEC for Economic Affairs, 
Environment and Tourism (Eastern Cape), Transdev (Pty) Ltd, Trustees of the Dwesa-Cwebe Land Trust 
and Occupiers of the Cottages on Claimed Land, Settlement Agreement in Terms of Section 42D of the 
Restitution of Land Rights Act: The Dwesa-Cwebe Community Land Restitution Claim, dated 17 June 
2001 (Settlement Agreement). 
105 For a list of these parties, see note 104 above. 
106 Minister of Water Affairs & Forestry, MEC for Economic Affairs, Environment and Tourism (Eastern 
Cape) & the Trustees of the Dwesa-Cwebe Land Trust Community Agreement, dated 17 June 2001 
(Community Agreement). The Community Agreement was concluded in terms of section 30 of the 
National Forests Act (84 of 1998) and was necessary owing to the fact that the nature reserves 
comprised demarcated state forests falling under the competence of the erstwhile Department of Water 
Affairs and Forestry (such competence having being delegated to the Department of Economic Affairs, 
Environment and Tourism (Eastern Cape)). 
107 Management Planning Framework for the Dwesa-Cwebe Reserve, unauthored and undated 
(Management Planning Framework). The Management Planning Framework, which was annexed to the 
Settlement Agreement (2001), purports to set out ‘the framework criteria for the development of detailed 
and issue-focussed subsidiary management plans, which will guide and facilitate the efficient and 
effective management of the Reserve’ (at 1). In the continued absence of such ‘detailed and issue-
focussed subsidiary management plans’, it continues to guide the management of the DCNR. 
108 Department of Economic Affairs, Environment and Tourism (Eastern Cape) Draft Business Plan for the 
Conservation Management of the Dwesa and Cwebe Nature Reserve, dated August 2000 (draft Business 
Plan). The draft Business Plan, which does not appear to have been finalised, contains: a five year 
strategy to address the management challenges in the DCNR; a broad action plan for the DCNR; the 













The Settlement Agreement deals with three distinct assets situated in the DCNR, 
namely: the land; the Haven Hotel; and an array of privately owned coastal cottages. 
Ownership of the land was transferred to the Dwesa-Cwebe Land Trust109 (DCLT).110 
The transfer is, however, subject to several conditions: the land must be reserved for 
conservation purposes in perpetuity; no part of the DCNR can be used for ‘residential, 
agricultural or other development purposes, save for low-density nature-based tourism 
development as ... approved by the competent authority’; and the DCLT may not sell the 
land other than to the Government.111 The Settlement Agreement furthermore 
compelled the DCLT to lease the land back to the former DWAF for a period of 21 
years.112 
 
The Settlement Agreement recognises DEAET as the formal management authority.113 
However, the Settlement Agreement specifically incorporates the terms of the 
Community Agreement,114 which provides for the co-management of the DCNR by the 
DCLT and DEAET for a period of 21 years.115 The nature of this co-operative 
                                                                                                                                                                           
opportunities; and the anticipated role to be played by the government authorities, community and the 
private sector. The draft Business Plan is probably yet to be finalised as no formal agreement has been 
reached between the relevant authorities for the transfer of management authority for the DCNR to the 
Department of Economic Affairs, Environment and Tourism (Eastern Cape) or the Eastern Cape Parks 
and Tourism Agency (Draft Integrated Reserve Management Plan (2006) 6). 
109 For the purpose of the settlement, the 2382 claimant households were structured into seven CPAs 
representing the interests of the seven major villages in the area (Hobeni; Mendwane; Ntlangano; 
Mpume; Ngoma; Ntubeni; Cwebe). The DCLT was then created and its membership comprises of: one 
representative from each of the seven CPAs and seven government officials drawn from the erstwhile 
Department of Water Affairs and Forestry, the erstwhile Department the Land Affairs, Eastern Cape Parks 
Board, the Amathole District Municipality and the Mbashe Municipality. The express purpose of the DCLT 
is to: act on behalf of the communities; ensure the effective use of the allocated restitution funds; and 
form a link between the community, Mbashe Municipality, Amathole District Municipality and other 
institutions (Draft Integrated Reserve Management Plan (2006) 5). 
110 Clauses 4 and 5. 
111 Clauses 6 and 7. 
112 Clause 9. 
113 Clause 11. This function is de facto undertaken by the Eastern Cape Parks and Tourism Agency. 
114 Clause 8. 
115 Clause 4.1 read with clause 5. It is interesting to note is that the Community Agreement (2001) 
specifically records that the Minister of Water Affairs and Forestry has delegated the management of the 
nature reserves to DEAET in terms of section 48 of the National Forest Act (84 of 1998), while the Draft 













arrangement is detailed in both the Community Agreement116 and the Management 
Planning Framework,117 which provide for the establishment of a Co-Management 
Committee (CMC) comprising of equal community and government representation. 
While both of these documents seek to outline the respective roles and responsibilities 
of all parties,118 they fail to define the role of the CMC and its relationship to the 
management authority clearly. This may be the reason why, notwithstanding the 
establishment of the CMC in 2002, its role and function has been minimal to date.119 
The Settlement Agreement compels the parties to renegotiate the terms of the 
Community Agreement, and hence their co-management arrangement, within one year 
of its termination.120 Should they fail to reach agreement on a revised management 
regime, the authority to manage the DCNR will revert solely to the relevant competent 
government conservation authority.121 
 
The co-management of the DCNR must take place in accordance with a management 
plan developed by the CMC, which must in turn comply with the contents of the 
Management Planning Framework.122 No such management plan is formally in place.123 
                                                     
116 Clause 6. 
117 At 4. 
118 Management Planning Framework (undated) 3-4; and Community Agreement (2001) clauses 12-14. 
Those ascribed to DWAF include: monitor the performance of the management authority; retain the 
power to intervene should the management authority not perform its functions; support the management 
authority; and provide assistance to the management authority and the community to undertake approved 
projects. Those ascribed to DEAET include: manage the nature reserves; promote the principle of co-
management within the nature serves; provide the financing to manage the nature reserves; and provide 
resource and capacity to assist the DCLT and Co-Management Committee in the exercise of their 
function. Those ascribed to the DCLT include: participate in planning for and managing the nature 
reserves; ensure community support for the relevant agreements; promote a safe and tourist friendly 
environment; contribute to the costs of managing the nature reserves; and accrue a share of the revenue 
derived from the nature reserves.  
119 Palmer et al The Dwesa-Cwebe Restitution Claim (2006) 49-50. In 2008, the Eastern Cape Parks 
Board expressly recognised the need to reactivate the function of the Co-Management Committee in 
2009 (Eastern Cape Parks Board Annual Report 2008/2009 (2008) 19). 
120 Clause 8(1), 8(2) and 8(4) of the Settlement Agreement (2001) read together with clause 5 of the 
Community Agreement (2001). 
121 Ibid. 
122 Clause 4.4. The vision of the Management Planning Framework (undated) is that ‘owners of the land 
and the State will jointly manage the area in a manner that conserves the biodiversity, while seeking to 
provide equitable benefits to the owners of the land based on the principles of sustainable utilization’ (at 
1). The Management Planning Framework contains a range of guiding principles, sets out the 
administrative and management responsibilities of the parties to the Settlement Agreement, and provides 
for the creation of a co-management committee.  












It would therefore appear that in its absence, the management of the DCNR is simply 
guided by the management principles prescribed in the Management Planning 
Framework.124 
 
In terms of the Settlement Agreement, read together with the Community Agreement, 
the primary responsibility for financing the management of the DCNR falls upon the 
erstwhile DWAF and DEAET.125 Furthermore, all revenue generated by the Reserve, 
excluding certain predefined categories of income,126 must be held in a separate 
account administered by the CMC.127 This revenue can be used to fund the operational 
costs associated with the DCNR, provided that where such income exceeds in any year 
50 % of the operational costs for that year, such excess shall accrue to the DCLT.128 
The parties to the Settlement Agreement undertake to obtain the written approval of one 
another prior to entering into any ‘private partnerships or commercial ventures’ with third 
parties to generate revenue through the development or exploitation of resources within 
the DCNR.129  
 
The remaining two assets falling within the DCNR are dealt with separately in the 
Settlement Agreement. Ownership of the Haven Hotel is transferred to the DCLT.130 As 
provided for in the Settlement Agreement, the land on which it is situated has been 
surveyed and deproclaimed and the Hotel is currently separately owned and managed 
                                                     
124 These management principles include: the community will have managed access to some natural 
resources situated in the nature reserves on an ecologically sustainable basis; the community will enjoy 
preferential status in terms of eco-tourism employment opportunities, resource rights, and input into the 
development of management policies and plans; tourism development will be encouraged in the reserves 
to ensure that the community receives appropriate financial and other benefits from them; the 
communities local custom, traditions and knowledge will be duly respected and used in the management 
of the reserves; the community will share in the costs and responsibilities associated with the 
management and development of the reserves on an equal basis (Management Planning Framework 
(undated) 2). 
125 Settlement Agreement (2001) (clause 12) and Community Agreement (2001) (clause 7.3). 
126 These categories of income include: revenue generated from the Haven Hotel; income derived from 
community levies charged for entry or undertaking recreational activities in the nature reserve; the lease 
and the interest thereon; the restitution, settlement and planning grants; and donor funding (clause 7.5). 
127 Clause 7.4. 
128 Ibid. 
129 Clause 12.5 and clause 12.6. 












by the DCLT.131 The DCLT has subsequently entered into a lease with a private 
operator to run the hotel on its behalf.132 Ownership of the 39 privately-owned coastal 
cottages is similarly restored to the DCLT that is in turn compelled to conclude long-
term leases which each of the owners.133 These cottages are managed as if they fall 
within the DCNR and are accordingly subject to the jurisdiction of the CMC and the 
Management Planning Framework.134  
 
In addition to the return of the land and fixed assets thereon, the DCLT received a total 
of R14m comprising of: R2.1m as consideration for leasing the land to the former 
DWAF; R1.6m as compensation under the Restitution of Land Rights Act for forgoing 
certain use rights in respect of the land situated in the DCNR; R7.146m in discretionary 
restitution grants; and R3.430m in settlement planning grants.135 Regarding the 
consideration received under the lease, the Settlement Agreement specifically provides 
that it must be invested by the DCLT and the capital cannot be used for ten years 
unless in ‘accordance with a development plan duly approved by the relevant Minister 
or MEC’.136 Regarding the remaining funds, the Amatole District Municipality, and not 
the DCLT, was appointed as the implementing agent for the settlement and accordingly 
the administration of these funds was transferred to it.137 The principal purpose for these 
funds is to facilitate agricultural, educational and infrastructure development projects 
within and adjacent to the DCNR.138 A multi-stakeholder Project Steering Committee 
                                                     
131 Clause 15 and clause 19. The Haven Bashe Hotel Executive Board, comprising of community 
members from the DCLT, was established to oversee the management of the Haven Hotel. 
132 Haven Bashe Hotel Executive Board & South Ambition 859 CC Lease Agreement in Respect of Haven 
Hotel, dated 7 February 2006. The lessee currently rents the Haven Hotel for a sum of approximately R10 
000 per month. In addition, the lessee charges and pays over to the lessor a R10/night/person levy; and 
undertakes to maintain and renovate several portions of the hotel’s accommodation. The lease, which 
originally ran for a 3.5 year period, has recently been extended for 15 years. 
133 Clauses 21-23. 
134 Clauses 24-25. 
135 Clauses 9-10. 
136 Ibid. A plan of this nature was finalised in 2003. See: Dwesa-Cwebe Development Plan Report, 
unauthored and dated August 2003. It contains the following content: a detailed background to the 
DCNR; a development plan which sets out the development vision for the DCNR and an array of 
programmes to facilitate its attainment; and the role of the DCLT and other institutions for implementing 
the plan. 
137 Palmer et al The Dwesa-Cwebe Restitution Claim (2006) 6. An agreement was apparently concluded 
between the Amathole District Municipality and the DCLT in 2009 regarding the implementation of these 
development grants (Eastern Cape Parks Board Annual Report 2008/2009 (2008) 22). 












was established in 2002 to facilitate the implementation of these projects but its role has 
been chequered to date.139 As a result, the range of development projects undertaken 
within and adjacent to the DCNR has been very limited.140  
 
The communities surrounding the DCNR have for the past ten years witnessed very 
little tangible benefit with the exception of limited employment opportunities, a small 
rental and bed levy accruing to the DTLT in terms of the Haven Hotel Lease Agreement, 
and small rentals accruing from the lease of the privately-owned cottages. The situation 
is also unlikely to improve in the future with the recent recall by the national government 
of the unspent settlement planning grants.141 The situation is compounded by the fact 
that the DCNR currently operates at a significant loss and as stipulated in the draft 
Business Plan will probably continue to do so until private partners can be found to 
establish additional tourism concessions in the nature reserve.142 
 
2.4 BHANGAZI CASE STUDY  
 
The Isimangaliso Wetland Park (IWP) is situated on the north-eastern coast of South 
Africa. It spans some 220 km of coastline, including a 190 kilometre marine reserve, 
and is 358 000 hectares in extent.143 It is an area of both great biological and cultural 
importance.144 The origins of the IWP date back to 1895 when the area around Lake St 
                                                     
139 The Project Steering Committee comprises of representatives from the: DCLT; Amathole District 
Municipality; Mbashe Local Municipality; Regional Land Claims Commissioner; ECPB (now ECP&TA); 
and DEAET. Its core function is to implement the Settlement Agreement (2001). See further: Palmer et al 
The Dwesa-Cwebe Restitution Claim (2006) 45-46. 
140 Palmer et al The Dwesa-Cwebe Restitution Claim (2006) 6 & 53-54. 
141 R5m of the R10.5m in discretionary restitution grants and settlement planning grants were recalled by 
the National Treasury in early 2010 (Unknown author Summary Status Report: Dwesa-Cwebe Post 
Settlement Implementation, dated 19 July 2010, 2). 
142 See generally the draft Business Plan (2000). 
143 For a detailed description of the history, location, topography, geology, climate, vegetation, wildlife and 
infrastructure situated in the IWP, see: Isimangaliso Wetland Park Authority Isimangaliso Wetland Park 
Integrated Management Plan (2008) 20-46. 
144 The IWP contains: three major lake systems; eight interlinking ecosystems; most of South Africa’s 
remaining swamp forests; Africa’s largest estuarine system; 526 bird species; and 25 000 year-old 
coastal dunes. It is furthermore home to a diverse range of species including: black rhino; oribi; wild dog; 
elephant; cheetah; whales and coelacanths. From a cultural perspective, there is evidence of 700 year 
old fishing traditions and human occupation in the Park dating back to the early stone-age. See further: 












Lucia was declared as the St Lucia Game Reserve.145 In 1999, this Reserve was 
consolidated with thirteen other protected areas146 and formally declared as the Greater 
St Lucia Wetlands Park under the World Heritage Convention Act.147 The management 
of the Greater St Lucia Wetland Park, which includes four sites designated as Ramsar 
wetlands of international importance,148 is predominantly undertaken by the Greater St 
Lucia Wetland Park Authority.149 The name of the Park and the Management Authority 
were changed in 2007 to the Isimangaliso Wetland Park and Isimangaliso Wetland Park 
Authority respectively.150 There are current proposals to incorporate the IWP within the 
Ponta do Ouro-Kosi Bay Transfrontier Conservation Area, which is in turn planned to 
become a part of the greater Greater Lubombo Transfrontier Conservation and 
Resource Area.151 
 
All land situated in the IWP has been subject to land restitution claims, with nine of the 
fourteen claims having been settled to date.152 This case study is confined to the 
Bhangazi community’s claim. This community previously resided on the Eastern Shores 
                                                     
145 Walker C “Land of Dreams: Land Restitution on the Eastern Shores of Lake St Lucia” (2005) 59 
Transformation: Critical Perspectives on Southern Africa 5. 
146 These protected areas (and the dates on which they were established) are: St Lucia Park (1939); 
False Bay Park (1944); Sodwana Bay National Park (1950); Kosi Bay Nature Reserve (1950); Sodwana 
State Forest (1956); Eastern Shores State Forest (1956); Cape Vidal State Forest (1956); Nyalazi State 
Forest (1956); Maphelane Nature Reserve (1986); Coastal Forest Reserve (1992); Lake Sibaya Fresh 
Water Reserve (1994); St Lucia Marine Protected Area (2000); and Maputaland Marine Protected Area 
(2000). 
147 Establishment of the Greater St Lucia Wetland Park and Authority (GN 635 GG No. 21304 dated 23 
June 2000) published under the World Heritage Convention Act (49 of 1999).  
148 These wetlands recognised under the Convention on Wetlands of International Importance Especially 
as Waterfowl Habitats (1983) 22 ILM 698, are: St Lucia System (1986); Turtle Beaches/Coral Reefs of 
Tongaland (1986); Kosi Bay (1991); and Lake Sibaya (1991). 
149 The Isimangaliso Wetland Park Authority was appointed as the management authority for the Park 
under the World Heritage Convention Act (49 of 1999) (section 9). Its structure, powers and functions are 
prescribed in the following regulations published under the Act: Establishment of the Greater Lucia 
Wetland Park and Authority (GN 635 GG No. 21304 dated 23 June 2000); and Regulations in Connection 
with the Greater St Lucia Wetlands Park (2000). It entered into a cooperative management agreement 
with the provincial conservation agency (Ezemvelo KZN Wildife) in 2001 to enable the latter to 
undertaken compliance, monitoring and enforcement operations within the IWP (Isimangaliso Wetland 
Park Integrated Management Plan (2008) 14). 
150 These changes were made with affect from 1 November 2007 (GN 438 GG No. 29887 dated 11 May 
2007).  
151 For further information on these transboundary initiatives, see: http://www.peaceparks.org/. 
152 The land claims which have been settled to date are: Mbila; Mabaso; Bhangazi; Mdletshe; Makhasa; 
Umngobokazi; Jobe; Nsinde; and Sokhulu. The outstanding claims are: Dukuduku; Western Shores; 
Nqwenya; Triangle; and Coastal Forest Reserve. See further: Conservation for the People with the 












Region153 of Lake St Lucia situated in the southern section of the IWP.154 Commencing 
with the declaration of the area as state land in the early 1900s and perpetuated by its 
subsequent declaration as the Eastern Shores State Forest and Cape Vidal State 
Forest in 1956,155 the community was systematically and forcibly removed from the area 
by 1976.156 In 1995 the community lodged a land claim under the Restitution of Land 
Rights Act for some 26 360 hectares of the Eastern Shores Region.157 This process 
culminated in the resolution of the land claim by way of two agreements concluded in 
1999: the Settlement of Agreement158 and the Memorandum of Understanding.159 
 
In terms of the Settlement Agreement, the Bhangazi community forfeited the restoration 
of their land in favour of financial compensation.160 Compensation in the amount of 
R16.68m was divided between 556 households.161 The identification of these qualifying 
households was determined partly through a scientific mapping process of historic 
settlements and partly by way of a politically negotiated compromise.162 Compensation 
                                                     
153 This region generally comprises of the strip of land situated between Lake St Lucia and the sea, 
located south of Cape Vidal and north of St Lucia. The claim to the Eastern Shores Region of Lake St 
Lucia predominantly concerned the land situated in the Cape Vidal State Forest and Eastern Shores 
State Forest. 
154 For a summary of the Bhangazi Community’s historic occupation of the area, see: Walker C Land-
Marked (2008) Jacana Media (Pty) Ltd Auckland Park 112-116; Isimangaliso Wetland Park Integrated 
Management Plan (2008) 20-23; Walker C “Land of Dreams” (2005) Transformation: Critical Perspectives 
on Southern Africa 3-7; and Thompson G “The Dynamics of Ecological Change in an Era of Political 
Transformations: An Environmental History of the Eastern Shores of Lake St Lucia” in Dovers S, 
Edgecombe R & Guest B (eds) South Africa’s Environmental History: Cases and Comparisons (2002) 
David Phillip Publishers Claremont 191-212. 
155 The land was declared as state forests under the Forest Act (13 of 1941). 
156 For a discussion of the factors contributing to the community’s removal from the Eastern Shores 
Region, see: Walker “Land of Dreams” (2005) Transformation: Critical Perspectives on Southern Africa 7-
9; Walker Land-Marked (2008) 116-119; and Skelcher B “Apartheid and the Removal of Black Spots from 
Lake Bhangazi in Kwazulu-Natal, South Africa” (2003) 33 Journal of Black Studies 766-777. 
157 For a detailed discussion of the process that culminated in the lodging and settlement of the land 
restitution claim, see: Walker “Land of Dreams” (2005) Transformation: Critical Perspectives on Southern 
Africa 9-18; and Walker Land-Marked (2008) 119-133. 
158 Department of Land Affairs and the Community of the Former St Lucia Eastern Shores/Bhangazi 
Beneficial Occupants and Their District Descendants Deed of Settlement in terms of Section 14(3) read 
with Section 42D of the Restitution of Land Rights Act No.22 of 1994, dated 24 September 1999 
(Settlement Agreement).  
159 Kwazulu-Natal Nature Conservation Board & Claimant Community Memorandum of Understanding, 
dated 5 October 1999 (Memorandum of Understanding). 
160 Clause 4.2. 
161 Clause 4.2.3. The list of qualifying households was annexed to the Settlement Agreement (1999) 
(Annexure C1, C2 and D). 
162 Walker “Land of Dreams” (2005) Transformation: Critical Perspectives on Southern Africa 18. 481 












amounted to approximately R30 000 per household.163 The Settlement Agreement also 
provided for the formation of a trust to administer the funds accruing to the claimant 
community under the Memorandum of Understanding.164 The erstwhile Department of 
Land Affairs undertook to assist, ‘as far as possible’, those beneficiary households who 
wished to purchase alternative land with their compensation.165 
 
In terms of the Memorandum of Understanding, concluded between the Bhangazi 
community and the Kwazulu-Natal Nature Conservation Board,166 the then applicable 
management authority for the area, the community is afforded an array of tangible and 
intangible benefits associated with the Eastern Shores Region of the IWP. These 
include: a share of the proceeds accruing from a community levy charged on all tourists 
visiting the Region;167 the establishment by the conservation authorities of a 4.6 hectare 
heritage site for the community at Lake Bhangazi;168 the protection of community grave 
sites by the conservation authorities;169 free but regulated community access to the 
heritage site and the grave sites;170 priority access, use and harvesting rights to seeds, 
cuttings and culled animals;171 and consideration for preferred employment where such 
                                                                                                                                                                           
and representatives from seventeen registered claimant households could not be found to receive the 
compensation (Larsson-Lidén L “For Whom is the Isimangaliso World Heritage Site” (2007) Africa on the 
Global Agenda - Annual Report 2007 The Nordic Africa Institute 11. 
163 Clause 4.2.3. 
164 Clause 4.3. 
165 Clause 4.9. 
166 The rights and responsibilities under this agreement have subsequently been ceded to the 
Isimangaliso Wetland Park Authority. 
167 Clause 12. The Memorandum of Understanding (1999) provides that these funds are to be used for 
the purpose of education and the benefit of the community of beneficiaries. The funds generated through 
this levy are split between a range of stakeholders, namely: Bhangazi Community Trust (70 %); 20 % to 
the Mpukonyeni Tribal Authority; and 10 % to a Community Fund currently administered by Isimangaliso 
Wetland Park Authority. 
168 Clauses 3-6. The management authority is responsible for managing the heritage site. It is recognised 
that the community may wish to develop a heritage museum, cultural monument, traditional craft market 
and curio shop at the heritage site, but any plans therefore must be approved by the management 
authority. 
169 Clause 7. 
170 Clause 3 and clause 7. The community is compelled to give notice to the management authority of the 
date on which it wishes to access the Park, the number of people and the reason for access. 
Furthermore, the access has to take place within the Park’s gate hours and in accordance to the route 
prescribed by the management authority.  
171 Clauses 8-9. The exercise of such rights must however be ‘in accordance with Board Policy’ - 
presumably meaning the management plan for the Park. The most contemporary version of the 












opportunities arise in the IWP.172 The majority of these benefits have been realised, 
including: the annual grant of access to communities to harvest ncema grass in the 
Park;173 the allocation of service contracts to community SMMEs to undertake various 
functions within the Park;174 and the creation of training and capacity-building 
programmes for community members.175 
 
Regarding institutional arrangements, the Memorandum of Understanding reiterates the 
need for the community to form a trust to manage the funds accruing to it in terms of the 
community levy. It furthermore provides that the trust must represent the community in 
its dealings with the Park’s management authority.176 One member of the management 
authority shall be a trustee and one community trustee a member of the management 
authority’s governing board.177 The Bhangazi Community Trust was formed in 1999178 
and it has a representative on the Isimangaliso Wetland Park Authority’s Board. Neither 
the Settlement Agreement nor the Memorandum of Understanding formally provides for 
community participation in the de facto management of the IWP. Nonetheless, the 
Bhangazi Community Trust has been consulted over the development of the Park’s 
Integrated Management Plan179 and relevant local area plans.180  
 
The duration of the Memorandum of Understanding is generally indefinite, save for the 
provisions relating to the payment of the community levy that expire after 75 years.181 A 
revised Memorandum of Understanding was signed in March 2006 partly replacing the 
original agreement.182 The principal change affected by the revised agreement relates 
                                                     
172 Clause 10. 
173 This ncema grass holds great cultural significance to the community as it is used to weave sleeping 
and sitting mats (Conservation for the People with the People (2010) 49). 
174 These functions have included: alien clearing; land rehabilitation; and the construction and 
maintenance of roads, fences and tourism infrastructure (Conservation for the People with the People 
(2010) 48). 
175 For a description of these programmes, see: Conservation for the People with the People (2010) 48. 
176 Clause 13. 
177 Ibid. 
178 Larsson-Lidén “For Whom is the Isimangaliso World Heritage Site” (2007) 11. 
179 Isimangaliso Wetland Park Integrated Management Plan (2008). 
180 These local area plans are developed in consultation with each claimant community (Conservation for 
the People with the People (2010) 47). 
181 Clause 2 read with clause 12. 












to the shifting of the heritage site from the south-western to the eastern side of Lake 
Bhangazi where more substantial infrastructure is available to promote the development 




Within this chapter I have sought to illustrate, through the use of four case studies, the 
manner in which South Africa’s policy-makers have sought to utilise the domestic 
conservation and land-reform regimes to implement CCAs during the past two decades. 
As should be evident from the above synopsis of their respective historical backgrounds 
and governance arrangements, these four case studies reflect a range of forms of 
protected areas; planning frameworks; land tenure schemes; institutional and decision-
making structures; management regimes; access, use and benefit-sharing schemes; 
and financing and support options. I have purposely sought to present this synopsis in 
an objective manner omitting any critical consideration of the respective merits of each 
and challenges and/or successes that have accompanied their implementation. The 
reason for this is that the above synopsis provides the context for the following chapter 
in which I critically consider the extent to which the four case studies reflect adherence 
to the essential elements theoretically underlying successful CCAs. It is to this critical 
analysis that I now turn. 























Having reviewed the historical background and governance arrangements underpinning 
the four case studies in Chapter 8, I am now in a position to critically assess the extent 
to which they reflect adherence to the essential elements identified by international 
scholars as theoretically underpinning successful communally-conserved areas 
(CCAs).1 This assessment forms the focus of this chapter. I wish to highlight at the 
outset that I do not purport to provide an exhaustive analysis of the extent to which each 
case study reflects the presence or absence of each of the essential elements. I rather 
seek to draw pertinent examples from the four case studies which: illustrate the 
challenges faced by domestic policy-makers in giving effect to these elements; highlight 
the inherent strengths and weaknesses of the existing legal framework; and hold 
lessons for future legislative reform to provide for more effective domestic 
implementation of these elements. In the interests of clarity, this critical assessment is 
structured according to the same themes utilised in Chapter 3, namely: types of CCAs; 
planning; consultation and negotiation; land tenure; declaration; institutions; 
management; access, use and benefit-sharing; and financing and support.  
 
2. TYPES OF COMMUNALLY-CONSERVED AREAS 
 
As highlighted in the analysis of the relevant domestic conservation regime,2 and as 
borne out in the case studies, South Africa’s legal framework does not provide 
expressly for CCAs as a designated form of protected area. Domestic policy-makers 
                                                     
1 For a discussion of these essential elements, see Chapter 3 (Part 4). 












have nonetheless used the applicable legal framework effectively to fashion different 
models of CCAs during the course of the past two decades. If one looks through the 
four case studies, three distinct models are apparent. 
 
The first is reflected in the Richtersveld case study. It is underpinned by a contract park 
agreement in terms of which the community agreed to incorporate the land into the 
protected area. In terms of this agreement, the community has retained ownership of 
the land with extensive rights of occupation, access and use. While the agreement 
theoretically provides for the co-management of the protected area and the formation of 
a co-management institution,3 it fails to clarify the nature, functions and powers of this 
institution. De facto management authority over the protected area therefore resides 
with a statutory authority, and the co-management instituti n largely constitutes a 
consultative as opposed to decision-making body. Commercial tourism infrastructure is 
very limited in the protected area and the community therefore receives very few 
economic returns from the area, but for the annual rental paid to it by the Government. 
This model would accordingly appear to reflect the owner/beneficiary governance 
option.4 
 
The Bhangazi case study represents a very different typology. It is underpinned by two 
separate agreements, namely a settlement agreement and a beneficiation agreement.5 
Under the settlement agreement, which resolved the land restitution claim, the 
community received compensation for, as opposed to the restoration of, their land 
situated in the protected area. The community is therefore not the owner of the land and 
does not manage it as this responsibility has been assigned to a statutory authority. 
Under the beneficiation agreement, negotiated between the community and the 
protected area’s management authority, the community accrues several access and use 
                                                     
3 Referred to in the Contract Park Agreement (1991) as the Management Planning Committee. Its name 
was changed to the Joint Management Committee in 2002. 
4 For a discussion of the nature of this owner/beneficiary governance option, see Chapter 7 (Part 3.2.3). 













rights and additional financial benefits from the area. This model would accordingly 
appear to reflect the non-owner/non-manager/beneficiary governance option.6 
 
The approach adopted in both the Makuleke and Dwesa-Cwebe case studies appears 
to reflect a middle ground between the above two options. In both case studies, 
ownership over the land situated in the protected area is restored to the community in 
terms of the settlement agreement. In stark contrast to the Richtersveld case study, 
these ownership rights are severely curtailed with the settlement agreements precluding 
rights of occupation, agriculture and grazing. The settlement agreements do provide, 
however, for a range of benefits for the community including government grants, 
development rights and strictly regulated access and use rights. Management authority 
in these case studies is regulated by a co-management agreement7 The latter 
agreements provide for the co-management of the area by the community and the 
designated management authority, establish a co-management committee8 and detail 
its composition, powers and functions. The model adopted in these two case studies 
would accordingly appear to reflect the owner/co-manager option,9 although some may 
argue it rather reflects the owner/beneficiary option owing to the problems associated 
with the functions of the co-management committees in both protected areas.10 
 
The respective merits of these governance models, and the components which underlie 
them, will be analysed more fully below where I discuss the issues of tenure, 
management and beneficiation. What is important to note at this stage is the narrow 
array of governance options used by the Government to bridge the conservation and 
land reform divide. Notable omissions include the following governance options: 
                                                     
6 For a discussion of the nature of this non-owner/non-manager/beneficiary governance option, see 
Chapter 7 (Part 3.2.6). 
7 In the case of the Makuleke case study, the co-management agreement is incorporated in chapter 2 of 
the main Settlement Agreement (1998). In the case of the Dwesa-Cwebe case study, the co-management 
agreement constitutes a separate agreement, termed the Community Agreement (2001). 
8 Referred to as the Joint Management Board in the Makuleke case study and the Co-Management 
Committee in the Dwesa-Cwebe case study. 
9 For a discussion of the nature of this non-owner/non-manager/beneficiary governance option, see 
Chapter 7 (Part 3.2.6). 
10 For a discussion of the challenges associated with the functioning of the co-management committees, 












owner/manager; non-owner/manager; and non-owner/co-manager.11 The picture 
becomes more skewed if one ‘downgrades’ the categorisation of the Makuleke and 
Dwesa-Cwebe case studies to the owner/beneficiary option as alluded to above. The 
result would be the Government effectively implementing two of the six available 
governance options for facilitating the role of communities in protected areas.12 This 
would in turn reflect a failure on the part of domestic policy-makers to adhere to the call 
of the international community to afford greater recognition to co-managed protected 
areas and indigenous peoples and local community conserved areas, as categorised by 
the IUCN.13 
 
Despite the limited sample of case studies I have used to extrapolate this conclusion, 
the following factors would appear to justify my alarm. The governance model at play in 
the Richtersveld case study has not been replicated and appears to be flailing.14 The 
governance model present in the Makuleke case study has been used as a precedent 
to settle the majority of the land claims in protected areas in the past decade.15 This is 
notwithstanding the word of caution expressed by several commentators that each 
claim is unique and while lessons can be extrapolated from one area to the next, ‘this 
should be done with caution so as not to oversimplify experiences’.16 This is furthermore 
notwithstanding the extensive critique that has been levelled against this specific 
governance model in the past few years,17 with it having been labelled as ‘financially 
                                                     
11 For a discussion of these options, see: Chapter 7 (Parts 3.2.1, 3.2.4 and 3.2.5). 
12 For a discussion of the governance options prevalent in South Africa’s domestic legal framework, see: 
Chapter 7 (Part 3.2). 
13 For a discussion of the international importance ascribed to these forms of governance, see: Chapter 2 
(Part 3.3). 
14 In 2006, the Richtersveld community gave notice of its intention to withdraw from the Contract Park 
Agreement (Grossman D & Holden P “Towards Transformation: Contract Parks in South Africa” in Suich 
H, Child B & Spenceley A (eds) Evolution and Innovation in Wildlife Conservation (2009) Earthscan 
London 360). 
15 Kepe T “Land Claims and Comanagement of Protected Areas: Exploring the Challenges” (2008) 41 
Environmental Management 312. 
16 De Villiers B & Van den Berg M Land Reform: Trailblazers: Seven Successful Case Studies (2006) 
KAS Johannesburg 28. See further: Walker C Land-Marked (2008) Jacana Media (Pty) Ltd Auckland 
Park 140. 
17 See generally: De Koning M “Co-Management and its Options in Protected Areas of South Africa” 
(2009) 39(2) Africanus 7-8; Kepe (2008) Environmental Management 314-318; Kepe T, Wynberg R & 
Ellis W “Land Reform and Biodiversity Conservation in South Africa: Complementary or in Conflict” (2005) 
1 International Journal of Biodiversity Science & Management 13; Reid H “Contractual National Parks and 












unsustainable’18 and leading to a new form of ‘ecological apartheid’ in rural South 
Africa.19 It is highlighted with concern that this very governance model forms the basis 
of the National Co-Management Framework,20 the main policy for settling the extensive 
outstanding land restitution claims in protected areas.21 The National Co-Management 
Framework, with its strong bias towards the lease option, effectively advocates an even 
narrower approach to the owner/co-manager option than that implemented in the 
Makuleke case study.22 Finally, further concern emanates from the Government’s 
moratorium placed on land restoration as an option for settling the outstanding 
extensive land restitution in the Kruger National Park.23 This effectively nullifies the 
implementation of even the narrow formulation of the owner/co-manager option as 
reflected in the National Co-Management Framework in this Park. The potential for this 
moratorium to ‘spread’ to other protected areas of national and international importance 
cannot be discounted. 
 
Therefore, if one objectively considers the case studies together with recent policy 
initiatives to improve cooperative governance between the conservation and land reform 
regimes, it would appear safe to conclude that the scope of governance options being 
advocated by the Government to facilitate the role of communities in protected areas is 
becoming narrower and narrower. This is notwithstanding the prevalence of legal tools 
within South Africa’s contemporary conservation and land reform regimes through which 
a far broader array of governance options could be implemented.24 
 
                                                                                                                                                                           
the Commons in the ‘New’ South Africa: Room to Manoeuvre (2000) Commons Southern Africa 
Occasional Paper No.5 CASS/PLAAS Harare/Bellville 1. 
18 Groenewald Y & Macleod F “Land Claims “Could Kill Kruger”’ (2005) Mail and Guardian (18 February). 
These doubts largely stem from what SANParks officials believe are skewed perceptions on the money to 
accrue from eco-tourism concessions in the Pafuri Region. See further: Reid (2002) Human Ecology 144. 
19 Magome H & Murombedzi J “Sharing South African National Parks: Community Land and Conservation 
in a Democratic South Africa” in Adams W & Mulligan M (eds) Decolonizing Nature: Strategies for 
Conservation in a Post-Colonial Era (2003) Earthscan London 119 & 130. 
20 Department of Environmental Affairs National Co-Management Framework (2010). 
21 For a discussion of the National Co-Management Framework (2010), see Chapter 7 (Part 2.2). 
22 For a detailed discussion of this issue, see Chapter 7 (Part 2.2.2). 
23 The Presidency: Republic of South Africa Cabinet Media Statement “State Announces Decision on 
Kruger National Park Land Claims”, dated 28 January 2009. 
24 For a discussion of these governance options and the manner in which they could be implemented 














The rationale for comprehensive planning preceding the establishment of all forms of 
protected areas, including CCAs, is diverse.25 It identifies land of high conservation 
value worthy of incorporation within formally proclaimed protected areas. It ensures that 
all relevant stakeholders with vested interests in the formation and administration of the 
protected area are identified and drawn into the consultation and negotiation process. It 
guides the selection of an appropriate form of governance for the area. It informs the 
development of a management planning framework tailored to suit the environmental 
priorities of the area. It provides an understanding of the social, economic and 
development priorities of those people living within and adjacent to the area. It highlights 
viable forms of access, use and benefit-sharing schemes that could improve rural 
development and the livelihoods of these people. Finally, it identifies possible viable 
options for financing the formation and administration of the area.  
 
Given the protracted nature of the processes that culminated in the establishment of 
each of the case studies, one would ordinarily presume that they incorporated a 
comprehensive planning process.26 However, if one surveys the array of challenges 
reflected in several of the case studies, it would appear that the planning process that 
preceded their formation was less than ideal. These challenges include: the omission of 
relevant stakeholders from the consultation and negotiation process;27 the selection of 
inappropriate forms of governance;28 the absence or flawed nature of certain of the 
management planning frameworks;29 the prescription of unrealistic and inequitable 
access, use and benefit-sharing schemes;30 the failure to match local developing 
planning frameworks with the management planning frameworks of CCA;31 and the 
                                                     
25 For a discussion of this broad element, see Chapter 3 (Part 4.2). 
26 The duration of the processes which culminated in the formation of the four case studies ranged from 
three to six years.  See further in this regard, Chapter 9 (Part 5.1). 
27 For a discussion of this issue, see Chapter 9 (Part 5). 
28 For a discussion of this issue, see Chapter 9 (Part 2) and Chapter 9 (Part 8.1). 
29 For a discussion of this issue, see Chapter 9 (Part 8.3). 
30 For a discussion of this issue, see Chapter 9 (Part 9). 












failure to canvas the full array of options for financing and supporting the CCA.32  Given 
that these challenges are discussed in the above specific contexts, they do not bare 
repeating here. 
 
4. LAND TENURE 
 
Secure communal tenure and genuine proprietorship of the natural resources situated in 
the area are identified as necessary prerequisites for long enduring common-pool 
natural resource institutions.33 If one synthesizes the essential elements relating this 
component of land tenure, they can effectively be grouped under four main issues: the 
form of land tenure; the clarity of rights underpinning such land tenure; the process 
leading to securing such rights; and the manner in which the land tenure regime 
recognises and provides for the communal nature of such rights. 
 
4.1 FORM OF LAND TENURE 
 
The four case studies appear to adopt an all or nothing approach to the issue of land 
tenure. In the Richtersveld, Makuleke and Dwesa-Cwebe case studies, the founding 
agreements34 expressly recognise the communities’ full title to the land. In contrast, the 
community relinquished their title in the Bhangazi case study. This provides some 
evidence of the domestic legal regime providing for a diversity of tenure options and 
domestic administrators using such diversity to match the appropriate land tenure option 
to the specificities of the particular area. What is disconcerting, however, is that if one 
surveys available Government documents which record the preferred method for 
settling validated land restitution claims in protected areas, almost all favour the 
restoration of full title without clear justification.35 What is furthermore disconcerting is 
                                                     
32 Ibid. 
33 For a discussion of this element, see Chapter 3 (Part 4.4). 
34 This term is used broadly to refer to the array of agreements that underpin the establishment of the 
CCAs, including the settlement agreements, co-management agreements, beneficiation agreements, 
community agreements and lease agreements. 
35 This conclusion is based on the fairly crude statistics contained in the only available document which 
cumulatively captures the nature and status all land restitution claims in protected areas, namely: 












that while the Restitution of Land Rights Act expressly makes provision for the 
restoration of full title and limited title, in the sense of a ‘right in land’,36 the latter option 
is yet to be utilised in the context of settling land restitution claims in protected areas. 
Several commentators have advocated the domestic implementation of a less 
hierarchical and more diversified rural land rights model by way of extending the range 
of land rights capable of formal registration or through affording certain land rights 
statutory protection.37 
 
Some may argue that by returning full title the South African regime affords the 
community the desired ‘genuine proprietorship of the nature resource’ situated in the 
protected area.38 This would not however necessarily appear to be the case. As 
illustrated in all three case studies in which ‘full title’ has been restored to the 
community, their ‘ownership’ of the land is significantly restricted by several conditions 
curtailing their access to, use and development of the land and the natural resources 
located on it. These conditions are furthermore registered against the title deeds of the 
property thereby entrenching their perpetuity. Therefore, while supposedly holding full 
title over the land, the communities in these CCAs are more akin to rights holders, and 
very limited rights holders at that. If this was the intended outcome, it is surprising why 
the grant of access and use rights as opposed to full title was not canvassed as a 
preferred settlement option. As highlighted above, this option is expressly provided for 
in the Restitution of Land Rights Act and would provide a more realistic match to the de 
                                                                                                                                                                           
document (dated February 2010). According to this document, of the 121 land restitution claims lodged in 
protected areas, the preferred method of settlement is as follows: 95 (land restoration); 2 (restoration of 
alternative land); 3 (financial compensation); 2 (part land restoration and part compensation); 19 (not 
recorded and therefore not taken into account for the purpose of the calculation). In summary, 95 of the 
102 claims (96 %) favour the restoration of full title as the preferred method of settlement. 
36 For a detailed discussion of this issue, see: Chapter 6 (Part 2.1). See further: Mostert M “The 
Diversification of Land Rights and its Implications for a New Land Law in South Africa - An Appraisal 
Concentrating on the Transformation of the South African System of Land Registration” in Cooke E (ed) 
Modern Property Law Studies - Volume 2 (2002) 7-9; and Carey-Miller D & Pope A Land Title in South 
Africa (2000) Juta & Co Ltd Cape Town 320-325. 
37 See generally: Sjaastad E & Cousins B “Formalisation of Land Rights in the South: An Overview” 
(2009) 26(1) Land Use Policy 1-9; Pienaar G “The Land Titling Debate in South Africa” (2006) 3 Tydskrif 
vir die Suid-Afrikaanse Reg 435-455; Mostert “The Diversification of Land Rights” in Cooke Modern 
Property Law Studies (2002) 3-25; Pienaar G The Registration of Fragmented Use-Rights as a 
Development Tool in Rural Areas  (2001) Constitution and Law IV, Seminar Report No.6, KAS 
Johannesburg 107-125; and Van der Walt A “Property Rights and Hierarchies of Power: A Critical 
Evaluation of Land Reform Policy in South Africa” (1999) 64(2) Koers 259-294. 












facto land tenure arrangement evident in each of these areas. It may be argued that the 
communities in question would never have agreed to such an arrangement owing to the 
central importance they placed on the return of full title during their pre-settlement 
negotiations. However, effectively clouding the issues regarding land tenure rights for 
the purpose of reaching agreement without clearly enunciating the nature of such rights 
and securing agreement thereon, simply leads to confusion, dissatisfaction and 
ultimately community backlash.39 It furthermore promotes the flawed impression 
amongst rural claimant communities that the restitution of full tenure will alone solve 
their economic and social woes.40 
 
Several commentators have recorded such confusion and dissatisfaction over the land 
tenure arrangements in all four case studies. In the Dwesa-Cwebe case study, it has 
been argued that the return of ownership of the land is on such a conditional basis that 
nothing has changed ‘on the ground’41 and that what has actually been transferred is 
not ownership, but rather a ‘bundle of duties and a handful of rights’.42 The community’s 
frustration at not being treated as ‘landlords’ has been recorded in the Makuleke case 
study.43 So too have concerns that the tenure regime adopted in the Makuleke case 
study fails to address skewed landownership patterns in the region,44 sees the interests 
of conservation trumping those of the community, and has ultimately resulted in the 
                                                     
39 De Villiers et al Land Reform: Trailblazers (2006) 29. 
40 De Villiers et al Land Reform: Trailblazers (2006) 29; De Villiers B Land Reform: Issues and 
Challenges: A Comparative Overview of Experiences in Zimbabwe, Namibia, South Africa and Australia 
(2003) Occasional Paper Series, KAS Johannesburg 57 
41 Fay D “Land Tenure, Land Use and Land Reform at Dwesa-Cwebe, South Africa: Local 
Transformations and the Limits of the State” (2009) 37 (8) World Development 1402-1403. See further: 
Palmer R, Kingwill R, Coleman M & Hamer N The Dwesa-Cwebe Restitution Claim - A Case Study as 
Preparation for a Field Based Learning Programme (2006) Phuhlisani Solutions CC Cape Town 52; and 
Palmer R From Title to Entitlement: The Struggle Continues at Dwesa-Cwebe (2003) Fort Hare Institute 
of Social and Economic Research Working Paper No.46, University of Fort Hare Alice 18. 
42 Fay D “Property, Subjection and Protected Areas - The ‘Restitution’ of Dwesa-Cwebe Nature Reserve, 
South Africa” in Fay D & James D (eds) The Rights and Wrongs of Land Restitution (2009) Routledge-
Cavendish New York 33-34. 
43 Robins S & Van der Waal K “‘Model Tribes’ and Iconic Conservationists? The Makuleke Restitution 
Case in the Kruger National Park” (2008) 39(1) Development & Change 67. 
44 Ramutsindela M “The Perfect Way to Ending a Painful Past? Makuleke Land Deal in South Africa” 












community losing its ‘traditional methods of subsistence, family organisation, political 
structures, economic self-sufficiency, and concept of home’.45  
 
The most extreme dissatisfaction is recorded in the Richtersveld case study where the 
community has issued notice of its intention to withdraw from the original contract park 
agreement in the hope of strengthening their ‘actual’ tenure rights over the land.46 The 
option to withdraw from the founding agreements in the Makuleke and Dwesa-Cwebe 
case studies is yet to accrue. However, when they do so in 2013 and 2021 respectively, 
the Government may well be faced with similar notices given the level of dissatisfaction 
emanating from these areas.  
 
Interestingly, this level of dissatisfaction is not limited to those areas where full title has 
been returned. There is also recorded discontent on the part of the Bhangazi community 
regarding the ‘forfeiture’ of their ownership of the Eastern Shores Region of the 
Isimangaliso Wetland Park.47 This would appear to provide a further illustration of the 
Government’s failure to explain and canvas properly the full array of land tenure options 
with the community in advance of settlement.  
 
Commenting on the merits of the restitution programme in 2002, Kepe and Cousins 
concluded that the restitution process ‘has not contributed much thus far to rectifying the 
extreme imbalance of ownership of productive resources’, has made ‘little difference’ to 
the lives of rural communities, and ’failed’ to bring about true transformation in land 
ownership patterns.48 Judging from the communities’ frustrations emanating from the 
four case studies canvassed above, I would argue that these sentiments continue to 
ring true today. 
 
 
                                                     
45 Friedman J “Winning Isn’t Everything: What the Makuleke Lost in the Process of Land Restitution” 
(2005) BA Thesis (Environmental Studies) University of Chicago 2-3. 
46 Grossman et al “Towards Transformation: Contract Parks in South Africa” Suich et al Evolution and 
Innovation (2009) 360. 
47 Walker Land-Marked (2008) 111. 
48 Kepe T & Cousins B Radical Land Reform is Key to Sustainable Rural Development in South Africa 












4.2 CLARITY OF LAND TENURE RIGHTS 
 
The problem relating to the selection of the appropriate de iure land tenure regime to 
match the de facto land tenure reality is compounded in all four case studies by the 
fuzzy nature of the terms and conditions contained in their founding agreements. The 
terms regulating land tenure, and the restrictive conditions placed on tenure rights, are 
generally vaguely worded, ill-defined and frequently dependent on other documents to 
distil their content.49 Perhaps the most extreme example of this is the Dwesa-Cwebe 
case study, where the communities’ land tenure rights effectively have to be distilled 
from several different documents each containing different terminology.50 Some 
commentators have identified this uncertainty regarding ‘what is being delivered’ as one 
of the key problems underlying the broad restitution programme and have warned that 
‘unless we come to a clear answer on how to implement restitution in a way that is 
consonant with its ends, we might well find we have no restitution programme at all’.51  
 
4.3 LAND TENURE PROCESS 
 
An additional element recognised as underlining successful CCAs is an issue of 
process, specifically the need to align domestic conservation and land reform regimes 
that regulate the formation and management of such areas.52 The South African 
Government has introduced several measures over the past few years to improve such 
alignment, specifically the conclusion of the Memorandum of Understanding between 
the country’s conservation and land reform authorities in 2007 and the publication of the 
National Co-Management Framework in 2010.53 The presence of similar measures 
would no doubt have facilitated the settlement of the four case studies discussed in 
Chapter 8. 
                                                     
49 Kepe (2008) Environmental Management 314-315. 
50 These documents are the: Settlement Agreement (2001); Community Agreement (2001); Management 
Planning Framework (undated); draft Business Plan (2000); and lease agreements concluded with the 
operators of the Haven Hotel (2006) and the private beach cottages (varied). 
51 Du Toit A “The End of Restitution: Getting Real About Land Claims’ (1999) Unpublished paper 
presented at Land and Agrarian Reform Conference, Pretoria, 26-28 July 1999 5, quoted in De Villiers 
Land Reform: Issues and Challenges (2003) 66. 
52 For a discussion of this element, see Chapter 3 (Part 4.4). 













These initiatives are not entirely free from criticism.54 Notwithstanding their existence, 
several procedural aspects associated with particularly the land reform component of 
the regime continue to frustrate the establishment and functioning of domestic CCAs. 
The first relates to the cumbersome procedures associated with the disposal of state 
land, typically the form of land subject to the communal land restitution claim.55 Specific 
procedural obstacles that have been identified in this regard relate to surveying the 
land; valuing the land; securing directives from the relevant authorities; and obtaining 
approval for the disposal of state land from the Minister of Public Works and/or the 
Ingonyama Trust.56 The second relates to the slow transfer of title deeds.57 The delay in 
their transfer is regarded by several claimant communities as a purposeful attempt to 
preclude them negotiating lucrative development partnerships with third parties.58 These 
trust deeds therefore hold not only great symbolic importance for the communities, but 
they are also of great practical importance in the context of beneficiation.59 The reason 
for the delay in the transfer of these title deeds and the land reform process as a whole 
appears largely attributable to what have been damningly described as the ‘slow, lazy, 
corrupt and incompetent officials’ tasked with implementing the land reform component 
of the regime.60 As highlighted by one commentator, the ‘(t)ragedy of the story of land 
reform in South Africa is that the country does not have officials in the DLA (Department 
of Land Affairs) who are capable of turning the legal framework, structures, plans and 
dreams into reality’.61  
 
                                                     
54 For a critique of these two initiatives, see respectively Chapter 7 (Part 2.1) and Chapter 7 (Part 2.2). 
55 These procedures are generally regulated by the State Land Disposal Act (48 of 1961). In KwaZulu-
Natal, where the bulk of land in rural areas is held by the Ingonyama Trust, the disposal procedures are 
regulated by the KwaZulu-Natal Ingonyama Trust Act (3 of 1994). 
56 The above challenges are listed throughout the Status of Land Claims in Protected Areas (2010). 
57 Take for instance the Dwesa-Cwebe case study, where the title deed is yet to be transferred to the 
Dwesa-Cwebe Land Trust some nine years after the conclusion of the settlement (Palmer et al The 
Dwesa-Cwebe Restitution Claim (2006) 43). 
58 Department of Environmental Affairs Conservation for the People with the People - A Review of the 
People and Parks Programme (2010) 36. 
59 For a detailed discussion of this issue, see Chapter 9 (Part 9). 
60 De Jager T “Reflecting the Experiences in Land Reform and Proposals on Alternatives” in Seider T (ed) 
Land Reform in South Africa: Constructive Aims and Positive Outcomes - Reflecting on Experiences on 













4.4 RECOGNITION OF COMMUNAL NATURE OF TENURE 
 
Interestingly, one of the reasons afforded by the land authorities for the delay in the 
transfer of the title deed to the community in the Dwesa-Cwebe case study is the 
continued absence of formal communal land tenure arrangements.62 Some thirteen 
years have passed since the commencement of the land reform programme and the 
finalisation of a legal framework for communal tenure still appears to be some way off, 
given the recent declaration of the Communal Land Rights Act63 as unconstitutional.64 
This is somewhat disconcerting, given that it is communal land tenure that underpins all 
settled and unsettled land restitution claims in protected areas. 
 
As is evident in the three case studies where land tenure rights have been recognised 
or returned to the community, the authorities have been compelled to circumvent the 
absence of the communal land rights regime by transferring these rights to communal 
property associations,65 trusts66 or a mixture of the two.67 While this approach has 
enabled the Government to proceed with the land restitution component of the land 
reform programme, it is fraught with problems. 
 
Firstly, from a theoretical perspective, it perpetuates a westernised approach to 
communal land tenure reform, one that seeks to generally individualise communal land 
tenure through land titling.68 While it may be argued that title in most of the case studies 
is held by institutions which are communal in nature, the legal regime regulating these 
institutions does not recognize the flexible, inclusive, layered and nested nature of 
                                                     
62 Palmer et al The Dwesa-Cwebe Restitution Claim (2006) 6, 11 & 51. 
63 Act 1 of 2004. For a discussion of this Act, see Chapter 6 (Part 3.2). 
64 For a discussion of the successful constitutional challenge brought against this Act, see Chapter 6 (Part 
3.2). 
65 Take for instance the Makuleke case study, where the land was restored to the Makuleke Community 
Property Association. 
66 Take for instance the Richtersveld case study, where the Richtersveld Community Trust holds the 
tenure rights and administers the benefits derived from having contracted the land into the Richtersveld 
National Park. 
67 Take for instance the Dwesa-Cwebe case study, where the land was restored to the Dwesa-Cwebe 
Land Trust that in turn comprises of representatives from seven communal property associations. 













communal land tenure rights and does not afford statutory recognition to both group 
rights and the myriad forms of fragmented-use rights which are prevalent in rural areas 
of South Africa.69 Secondly, the functioning of communal property institutions (CPIs) 
created to hold the land tenure rights has been less than ideal.70 Thirdly, the approach 
fails to clarify the confusion regarding the relationship between the new ‘democratic’ 
CPIs (predominantly the communal property associations) and their traditional 
‘apartheid’ counterparts (the traditional councils and tribal authorities).71 Fourthly, the 
approach does also not provide a workable model for those areas subject to competing 
land claims by one or more communities.72 
 
The absence of the communal land tenure regime has clearly posed, and continues to 
pose, numerous challenges for the implementation of CCAs in South Africa. Any future 
regime will clearly need to address each of these challenges which are not only relevant 
to the context of CCAs, but rural land administration in general. The road towards 
forging this revised regime will no doubt be a rocky one given its potential to undermine 
the historic authority of traditional institutions over rural land administration. 
 
5. CONSULTATION AND NEGOTIATION  
 
The fifth broad element theoretically underpinning successful CCAs relates to 
consultation and negotiation.73 Two main issues are relevant to this element: the 
consultation and negotiation process itself; and the outcome of the process that 
generally comprises of an agreement. 
 
                                                     
69 Ibid. 
70 For a general discussion on the problematic functioning of communal property associations, see 
Chapter 6 (Part 3.1). For a detailed discussion of this issue in the context of the case studies, see 
Chapter 9 (Part 7.2). 
71 Ibid. 
72 Take for instance the Makuleke case study, where the settlement agreement failed to account for the 
competing claim of the Gumbu-Mutele Community, operating through the Vhembe CPA, to certain 
portions of the Matshakatini Nature Reserve. See further: Whande W Trans-boundary Natural Resource 
Management in Southern Africa: Local Historical and Livelihood Realities within the Great Limpopo 
Trans-frontier Conservation Area (2007) Research Report No.25, PLAAS Bellville 26-31. 












5.1 NEGOTIATION PROCESS 
 
A necessary precursor to the creation of a sustainable CCA is a consultation and 
negotiation process based on the principles of equity, inclusivity, mutual respect, trust, 
openness and transparency.74 The first step in realising the above is identifying the 
relevant stakeholders who will be a party to the process. The negotiations that preceded 
the formation of the four case studies clearly involved a diverse array of stakeholders 
including representatives from the community, government, non-government and 
private sectors. This breadth of stakeholder participation is reflected in the broad array 
of parties that were signatory to the founding agreements. 
 
Three specific challenges regarding stakeholder identification can be extracted from the 
case studies. The first relates to determining the scope and nature of the ‘community’ 
that should be party to the negotiations.75 Take for instance the Bhangazi case study, 
where the difficulty in determining who should constitute the claimant community led to 
it becoming a fuzzy part scientific and part political process.76 The Dwesa-Cwebe case 
study provides a further excellent example of this conundrum, where notwithstanding 
the existence of diverse claimant communities residing adjacent to the protected area,77 
these communities were effectively grouped together under an ‘imagined community’ for 
the purpose of the land restitution process.78 This ‘denial of diversity’ led to the 
community being defined and organised ‘around a common goal of access to natural 
resources and the benefits accruing from land ownership.’79 Fay cites this as one of the 
                                                     
74 For a discussion of this issue, see Chapter 3 (Part 4.3). 
75 See further: Matose F, Mandondo A, Mosimane A, Aribeb K, Chikozho C & Jones M The Membership 
Problem in People-Cantered Approaches to Natural Resource Management in Southern Africa (2006) 
Policy Brief No.20, PLAAS Bellville 1-4. 
76 Isimangaliso Wetland Park Authority Isimangaliso Wetland Park Integrated Management Plan (2008) 
63; and Walker C “Land of Dreams: Land Restitution on the Eastern Shores of Lake St Lucia” (2005) 59 
Transformation: Critical Perspectives on Southern Africa 2. 
77 For a comprehensive analysis of the differentiation which existed between the communities residing 
adjacent to the Dwesa-Cwebe Nature Reserve at the time the land restitution settlement was being 
negotiated, see: Fay D & Palmer R “Poverty and Differentiation at Dwesa-Cwebe” in Palmer R, 
Timmermans H & Fay D (eds) From Conflict to Negotiation - Nature-Based Development on South 
Africa’s Wild Coast (2002) HSRC Press Pretoria 146-171. 
78 Palmer et al The Dwesa-Cwebe Restitution Claim (2006) 5; and De Satgé R Learning Programme 
Review: Issues for the Development of Post-Settlement Support Strategy (2006) 45. 












fundamental reasons for the CCA unravelling as when such access rights and benefits 
were not forthcoming, the vision and glue that held the fictional community together 
became unstuck.80 This issue appears to be less problematic where there is a clearly 
defined homogenous community living on or in close proximity to the land to be included 
in the CCA.81 However, care must clearly be exercised not to create a fictional 
community where there is a range of competing, overlapping and exceedingly diverse 
communities residing on or adjacent to the land to be included in the CCA.82 Caution 
must furthermore be exercised where the community to whom land tenure will be 
restored is geographically dispersed with little remaining tangible connection to either 
the land or fellow members of the original community.83  
 
Allied to the above challenge, is that of integrating traditi nal councils and tribal 
authorities into the negotiation process, especially where these institutions assert their 
jurisdiction over the new democratic communal property institutions (CPIs) formed by 
claimant communities.84 The traditional institutions clearly have an ongoing role to play 
in rural land administration and will need to be factored into the consultation and 
negotiation process until such time as South Africa’s communal land tenure regime is 
finalised.85 
 
                                                                                                                                                                           
(2009) 29; and Fay D & Palmer R “Prospects for the Redistribution of Wealth Through Land Reform in 
Dwesa-Cwebe” in Cousins B (ed) At the Crossroads: Land and Agrarian Reform into the 21st Century 
(2000) PLAAS/NLC, Bellville/Braamfontein 196. 
80 Palmer et al The Dwesa-Cwebe Restitution Claim (2006) 5; and De Satgé Issues for the Development 
of Post-Settlement Support Strategy (2006) 45. 
81 Take for instance the Richtersveld case study, where the Richtersveld community, owing to fact that 
they were not removed from their land, retained their identity, social and political structures and traditional 
practices (Magome et al “Sharing South African National Parks” in Adams et al Decolonizing Nature 
(2003) 117-118). 
82 Take for instance the Dwesa-Cwebe case study, where the community surrounding the Reserve is very 
diverse. See further: Palmer et al The Dwesa-Cwebe Restitution Claim (2006) 5; and De Satgé Issues for 
the Development of Post-Settlement Support Strategy (2006) 45. 
83 Take for instance the Makuleke and Bhangazi case studies, where the communities were forcibly 
removed from their land and compelled to adopt new ways of life underpinned by different social 
structures (Magome et al “Sharing South African National Parks” in Adams et al Decolonizing Nature 
(2003) 117-118). 
84 Take for instance the historic tensions in the Makuleke case study between the Makuleke Communal 
Property Association and the Mhinga Tribal Authority. For a detailed discussion of this issue, see Chapter 
9 (Part 7.2). 
85 For a discussion on the role of traditional councils and tribal authorities in rural land administration, see 












The third challenge relates to the failure to identify and involve key government 
stakeholders in the consultation and negotiation process. This is once again illustrated 
by the Dwesa-Cwebe case study where the failure to identify and include various 
environmental authorities and municipal authorities in the initial negotiations, effectively 
nullified the eco-tourism potential of the CCA86 and frustrated the implementation of 
post-settlement development support within and adjacent to it.87 
 
The identification of stakeholders is but one part of the process. Steps simultaneously 
need to be taken to ensure that all relevant stakeholders have the requisite capacity and 
resources to participate in the negotiation process. This is particularly crucial in the 
South African context where typically poorly resourced and capacitated rural land 
claimant communities are compelled to interact with well-capacitated and resourced 
conservation authorities. A failure to provide the former with the skills, capacity and 
resources to participate in the negotiation process may undermine the equity and 
legitimacy of any product emanating from it.88 While there is some evidence of a 
softening in the attitude of conservation authorities toward claimant communities, 
capacity and resource imbalances have historically undermined the latter’s negotiating 
power via-a-vis the former.89  
 
If one surveys the four case studies, several factors appear to have influenced whether 
the community had sufficient capacity to convey, and ‘hardness’ to protect their interests 
in the negotiation process.90 As reflected in both the Richtersveld and Makuleke case 
                                                     
86 The Marine and Coastal Management Directorate of the erstwhile Department of Environmental Affairs 
and Tourism, who were not extensively involved in the negotiation process, declared the coast adjacent 
to the Dwesa-Cwebe Nature Reserve a closed fishing area following the conclusion of the Settlement 
Agreement (2001), thereby significantly undermining the eco-tourism potential of the area. This issue is 
discussed more fully in Chapter 9 (Part 8). 
87 The majority of the settlement grants accruing under the Settlement Agreement (2001) were transferred 
to the Amathole District Municipality that was not extensively involved in the negotiation process and the 
resultant agreement. This issue is discussed more fully in Chapter 9 (Part 10). 
88 Take for instance the Dwesa-Cwebe case study, where the discrepant resources and capacity of the 
government officials and the communities’ representatives contributed to a very conservative value 
(R3.2m) being accorded to the land situated in the Dwesa-Cwebe Nature Reserve for the purpose of 
quantifying the communities’ settlement compensation (De Satgé Issues for the Development of Post-
Settlement Support Strategy (2006) 63). 













studies, the existence of a homogenous community with a clearly defined membership 
minimised potential for intra-community conflict and facilitated the development of a 
strong unified negotiating position. This process was significantly aided by extensive 
external support provided by local and international development agencies and NGOs 
to these communities.91 A further factor that could account for the Richtersveld 
community’s extensive and unique rights of access, use and occupation in the 
Richtersveld National Park, is that it had effectively resolved the issue of land tenure 
prior to entering into negotiations with the conservation authorities to establish the CCA. 
 
Three specific concerns have been raised in relation to the above factors influencing the 
communities’ capacity to engage in the negotiation process. Firstly, some 
commentators have stated that the founding agreements fail to reflect the ‘complexities 
of the preceding negotiations’ and rather illustrate the ability of elite members of the 
community to secure their own personal interests above those of the majority.92 
Secondly, others have alluded to the propensity of development agencies and NGOs to 
prioritise their own agendas in the negotiation process over those of the local 
communities they supposedly sought to support.93 Thirdly, some authors have 
cautioned that notwithstanding the relative bargaining strength of the community, the 
tendency of government authorities to advocate a ‘mutual gains’ approach as opposed 
to a ‘distributive model’ to the negotiations has often weakened the communities’ power 
during the negotiation process.94  
 
                                                     
91 In the context of the Richtersveld case study, see: Glavovic B “Resolving People-Park Conflicts 
Through Negotiation: Reflections on the Richtersveld Experience” (1996) 39(4) Journal of Environmental 
Planning & Management 489-493. In the context of the Makuleke case study, see: Grossman et al 
“Towards Transformation: Contract Parks in South Africa” in Suich et al Evolution and Innovation (2009) 
363; De Villiers B People and Parks - Sharing the Benefits (2008) KAS Johannesburg 78; Robins et al 
“‘Model tribes’ and Iconic Conservationists?” (2008) Development & Change 68; and Steenkamp C & Uhr 
J The Makuleke Land Claim: Power Relations and Community-Based Natural Resource Management 
(2000) Evaluating Eden Series Discussion Paper No.18, IIED London 1. 
92 Kepe (2008) Environmental Management 319. 
93 Friedman “Winning Isn’t Everything: What the Makuleke Lost in the Process of Land Restitution” (2005) 
33. 
94 Fay D “Mutual Gains and Distributive Ideologies in South Africa: Theorizing Negotiations Between 












These problems should be mitigated somewhat by ensuring that the negotiation process 
through which the various stakeholders engage with one another is open, transparent 
and democratic in nature.95 These characteristics should furthermore ensure that it 
provides a forum for existing conflicts of interests between all stakeholders to be openly 
aired and dealt with, ultimately leading to the breakdown of pre-existing power 
imbalances.96 If one surveys the negotiation process which preceded the establishment 
of each of the case studies they were clearly protracted, ranging from between three 
and six years.97 This would appear to provide evidence that the interests of expediency 
did not generally outweigh the value of rigorous consultation and negotiation. However, 
notwithstanding the protracted nature of the negotiations, the content of certain of the 
founding documents has been cited as reflecting significant power inequalities present 
within the negotiation process.98 Furthermore, conflating the land reform process with 
the conservation process has been recorded as weakening the communities’ bargaining 
position relative to the conservation authorities.99 
 
In the absence of the conservation regime that is now in place in South Africa, the 
negotiation process was largely regulated by the Restitution of Land Rights Act and 
driven by the land authorities.100 Housed within the six phases of the Act’s land 
restitution process are numerous mechanisms for promoting public consultation within, 
and the transparency of, the process.101 The case studies do however illustrate certain 
                                                     
95 For a discussion of this element, see Chapter 3 (Part 4.3). 
96 Steenkamp et al The Makuleke Land Claim (2000) 3-4; and De Villiers B Land Claims and National 
Parks: The Makuleke Experience (1998) HSRC Press Pretoria 61. 
97 The duration of the negotiation process which preceded the establishment of each of the case studies 
were: Richtersveld case study - three years (from the filing of the initial interdict in 1989 which precipitated 
consultation with the community to conclusion of the Contract Park Agreement in 1991); Dwesa-Cwebe 
case study - six years (from lodging the land restitution claim in 1996 to conclusion of the Settlement 
Agreement and Community Agreement in 2001); Makuleke case study - four years (from lodging the land 
restitution claim in 1995 to conclusion of the Settlement Agreement in 1998); and Bhangazi case study - 
five years (from lodging the land restitution claim in 1995 to conclusion of the Settlement Agreement in 
1999). 
98 In the context of the Makuleke case study, see: Magome et al “Sharing South African National Parks” in 
Adams et al Decolonizing Nature (2003) 119; and Ramutsindela (2002) GeoForum 21-22. 
99 In the context of the Makuleke case study, see: Steenkamp et al The Makuleke Land Claim (2000) 1. 
100 The only exception to this was the formation of the Richtersveld National Park that preceded the 
promulgation of the Restitution of Land Rights Act. The procedures for establishing the Park were 
prescribed under the National Parks Act. 
101 For a discussion of the six phases of the land restitution process and the manner in which they 












problems associated with the implementation of this process that have on occasion 
undermined both the negotiation process and its resultant product. The exclusion or too 
late inclusion of all relevant national, provincial and local environmental authorities has 
on occasion led to confusion, skewed expectation and delay.102 The land authorities 
also appear to have failed to present the full array of governance options for discussion 
during the land restitution process.103 This has sometimes led to the selection of a 
governance option that does not match the needs of either the claimant community or 
conservation authority.104 This state of affairs cannot simply be attributed to the absence 
of available governance options, as viable alternative options did exist prior to the 
prescription of South Africa’s contemporary conservation regime.105 It rather appears 
attributable to the somewhat blind reliance on precedent governance options (the most 
noteworthy of these being the Makuleke model); the symbolic importance attached to 
ownership by communities; capacity constraints amongst all stakeholders which 
precluded an appreciation of the full array of available options; the lack of coordination 
between the land reform and conservation authorities; and the absence of South 
Africa’s contemporary conservation regime with its express promotion of the role of 
people in protected areas. 
 
                                                                                                                                                                           
settlement of land restitution claims, see Chapter 6 (Part 2). 
102 Take for instance the Dwesa-Cwebe case study, where three key stakeholders relevant to the 
functioning of the CCA were neither integrally involved in the negotiation process, nor party to the 
founding agreements. These stakeholders were the Amathole District Municipality, the Mbashe Local 
Municipality and the erstwhile Department of Environmental Affairs and Tourism (specifically its Marine 
and Coastal Management Branch). See further Wynberg R & Sowman M “Environmental Sustainability 
and Land Reform in South Africa: A Neglected Dimension’ (2007) 50(6) Journal of Environmental 
Planning and Management 785-793. 
103 For a discussion of the Government’s historic failure to present and consider all potential governance 
options, see Chapter 9 (Part 2). 
104 Take for instance the Makuleke case study, where some commentators have argued that the 
community may have been better off receiving alternative land or compensation, rather than seeking to 
obtain return of the land subject to several land-use restrictions that effectively nullify their benefits of 
ownership. See further: De Villiers B “People and Parks: Challenges and Opportunities” in Land Reform 
in South Africa: Constructive Aims and Positive Outcomes - Reflecting on Experiences on the Way to 
2014 (2009) Seminar Report No.20, KAS Johannesburg 89; and Reid (2002) Human Ecology 146. 
105 During this era, the Restitution of Land Rights Act provided four main options in the context of land 
tenure: restoration, alternative land; compensation; or a mixture of the three. In the conservation context, 
the National Parks Act and several conservation Ordinances and Acts, also enabled landowners to 












Given that the communities in the majority of the case studies were compelled to 
comply with the restitution process prescribed in the Restitution of Land Rights Act in 
order to secure their rights, it could be argued that the negotiation process was 
‘imposed rather than invited’ and ‘directive rather than directed’.106 This restitution 
process has also been criticised as being overly bureaucratic and cumbersome.107 This 
latter criticism would appear somewhat harsh taking into account the complexity of 
issues and interests at stake. Numerous of the criticisms levelled against the Act appear 
to be challenges that a rigorous consultation and negotiation process is specifically 
designed to uncover and resolve.108 The bulk of the remainder appear to relate to either 
the resources, capacity and political will of the land authorities to fulfil their mandate109 
or the absence of communal land tenure legislation.110 
 
The case studies therefore illustrate a number of challenges that require future 
resolution so as to ensure that the consultation and negotiation process is inclusive, 
open, transparent and democratic. This should ultimately lead to the conclusion of more 
equitable and sustainable founding agreements. It may also realise certain other 
                                                     
106 For a discussion of this element, see Chapter 3 (Part 4.3). 
107 Commission on Restitution of Land Rights Presentation of Annual Report (2008/2009) by Chief Land 
Claims Commissioner (Mr Mphela) to the Select Committee on Land and Environmental Affairs, dated 11 
August 2009; Commission on Restitution of Land Rights Annual Report 2004/2005 (2005) 23; and Turner 
S & Ibsen H Land and Agrarian Reform in South Arica: A Status Report (2000) Research Report No.6, 
PLAAS Bellville 11. 
108 These problems, which are discussed in Chapter 6 (Part 2.2), include: difficulties locating claimants; 
rural claimants predominantly wanting restoration of land as opposed to equitable redress; overlapping 
and counter claims in respect of the same land; the prevalence of fraudulent claims; the uncooperative 
attitude of existing landowners; the pro-longed nature of negotiations owing to high sentimental value 
attached to rural land; the lack of cooperation of communities and local traditional leaders in providing 
adequate information; community in-fighting and inter-tribal disputes; the lack of understanding, capacity 
and impatience on the part of claimant communities; and unscrupulous third parties seeking to take 
advantage of successful claimant communities during post-settlement commercial transactions. 
109 These problems, which are discussed in Chapter 6 (Part 2.2), include: the lack of capacity and high 
turnover of staff within the Commission on the Restitution of Land Rights; the lack of resources and 
infrastructure to fund the research and negotiation stages of the restitution process; the high cost of 
purchasing land in rural areas; and the unregistered and unsurveyed nature of land in rural areas. 
110 These problems, which are discussed in Chapter 6 (Part 2.2), include: local traditional leaders seeking 
to use the land restitution process to resolve personal, chieftaincy and border disputes; internal 
factionalism between communal property associations and local traditional authorities; and the challenge 













tangible benefits such as the development of an identity for, and unity between, 
disparate sectors of the ‘community’.111  
 
5.2 FOUNDING AGREEMENTS 
 
If one juxtaposes the founding agreements that emanated from the consultation and 
negotiation processes that preceded the formation of the four case studies, a rich 
diversity is evident even in such a small sample. The agreements differ in name,112 the 
range of parties that are signatory to them,113 their form and nature,114 their length and 
detail,115 the range of annexure attached to them116 and the assortment of laws under 
which they were concluded.117 This diversity clearly reflects the stakeholders’ 
endeavours to fashion agreements to suit the specificities of the particular CCA. 
However, this diversity simultaneously creates potential confusion, not only for those 
tasked with implementing the agreements, but also for those consulting them for 
precedents or considering them for academic purposes. A further aspect that 
                                                     
111 Take for instance the Richtersveld case study, where the negotiation process is cited as building unity 
within the Richtersveld community and reinvigorating their cultural identify (Glavovic (1996) Journal of 
Environmental Planning and Management 494). 
112 The names ascribed to the agreements include: settlement agreements; community agreements; co-
management agreements; memoranda of understanding; and contract park agreements. 
113 For a description of the range of parties to each, please refer to the full citations of these agreements 
in Chapter 8. 
114 Some of the agreements deal with land claim settlement issues, management issues and/or 
beneficiation issues in separate agreements (Dwesa-Cwebe Settlement Agreement (2001) and 
Community Agreement (2001); and the Bhangazi Settlement Agreement (1999) and Memorandum of 
Understanding (2001)) and others collapse them all into one (as in the case of the Makuleke Settlement 
Agreement (1998)). 
115 The body of the agreements range from 33 pages in the case of the Makuleke Settlement Agreement 
(1998) to a mere nine pages in the case of the Richtersveld Contract Park Agreement (1991). 
116 These annexure vary widely and include: the description, location, position and survey diagrams of the 
area (Richtersveld Contract Park Agreement (1991); Makuleke Settlement Agreement (1998); and 
Dwesa-Cwebe Settlement Agreement (2001)); a schedule of title deed restrictions (Makuleke Settlement 
Agreement (1998)); communal property association constitutions (Richtersveld Contract Park Agreement 
(1991)); community resolutions (Bhangazi Settlement Agreement (1999) and Memorandum of 
Understanding (1999)); lists of members of the claimant community (Bhangazi Settlement Agreement 
(1999)); master plans and management planning frameworks for the area (Makuleke Settlement 
Agreement (1998) and Dwesa-Cwebe Settlement Agreement (2001) respectively); and community 
agreements (Dwesa-Cwebe Settlement Agreement (2001)). 
117 The laws under which the agreements are concluded include: Restitution of Land Rights Act (in the 
case of the Makuleke Settlement Agreement (1998), Dwesa-Cwebe Settlement Agreement (2001) and 
the Bhangazi Settlement Agreement (1999)); National Parks Act (in the case of the Richtersveld Contract 













perpetuates such confusion is the vague and unrealistic manner in which many of the 
terms and conditions contained in the agreements are phrased.118 
 
The way in which the agreements specifically regulate issues of land tenure have been 
considered above.119 The manner in which they regulate the following issues will be 
considered in turn below: institutions; management; access, use and benefit-sharing; 
and financing and support.120 What falls to be considered here is the extent to which the 
agreements reflect adherence to the following generic aspects. Do the agreements 
satisfactorily set out a common vision and set of objectives for the CCA? Do the 
agreements clearly define the boundaries of the CCA? Do the agreements adequately 
provide for conflict resolution? Are the agreements of a satisfactory duration? Finally, 
are the agreements flexible in nature with provision being made for periodic review and 
amendment? 
 
Agreement on a common vision and set of objectives for establishing the CCA should 
emanate from the negotiation process. Recording this common vision and set of 
objectives at the outset of the written agreement provides not only clarity, but also a 
lens through which to interpret the provisions that follow it.121 What is apparent from an 
analysis of the case studies is that none of the founding agreements do so. While most 
contain a preamble, recordal or introductory section, these are largely dedicated to 
summarising the statutory negotiation process that preceded the settlement. The vision 
and objectives for establishing the CCA therefore have effectively to be gathered from 
the body of the agreement, read together with the often numerous documents annexed 
thereto. This would not appear to be an ideal situation and is perhaps reflective of the 
failure of the parties to clearly define and agree on a common vision and set of 
objectives during the negotiation process. 
 
                                                     
118 This has been highlighted in the discussion on land tenure above (Chapter 9 (Part 4)) and will be 
further illustrated in the discussion of the following substantive aspects of the agreements below: 
institutions; management; access and benefit-sharing; financing and support (Chapter 9 (Parts 7-10)) 
below. 
119 See Chapter 9 (Part 4). 
120 See Chapter 9 (Parts 7-10). 












Given that in the South African context, one is traditionally dealing with land claims 
within established protected areas, the issue of detailing the boundaries of the CCA is 
not generally an issue. In all three case studies in which the community holds title to the 
land, the boundaries of the area are clearly defined by way of reference to existing122 
and newly registered123 survey diagrams annexed to the founding agreements. While 
the case studies illustrate general adherence in this respect, the costs associated with 
surveying and registering new survey diagrams have been highlighted as a challenge 
hampering the finalisation of several current land restitution claims in protected areas.124 
This challenge generally arises where the land restitution claim only covers a portion of 
an existing state-owned protected area; the same protected area is subject to several 
land restitution claims by different communities; or where the land restitution settlement 
agreement specifically excludes certain unsurveyed portions of an existing protected 
area. A typical example of the latter is the Bhangazi case study where notwithstanding 
the conclusion of the founding agreement over a decade ago, the heritage site on the 
shores of Lake Bhangazi is yet to be surveyed and established.125 
 
Conflict regarding the implementation of the founding agreements is highly probable 
given the often highly politicised nature of the negotiation process leading to their 
conclusion and the conflicting agendas of the negotiating parties. This potential is 
exacerbated where the terms of the agreements are vaguely worded and open to 
differing interpretations. Rather than simply brushing such conflicts aside, several 
commentators are of the view that the creation of a true synergy between the competing 
parties requires these conflicts to be aired and dealt with through transparent dispute 
resolution procedures.126 It is therefore essential that the founding agreements make 
provision for procedures of this nature. The agreements underlying the four case 
studies are rather disparate in this regard with some containing comprehensive dispute 
                                                     
122 Take for instance the Dwesa-Cwebe and Richtersveld case studies.  
123 Take for instance the Makuleke case study. 
124 See generally Status of Land Claims in Protected Areas (2010). 
125 This has been recognized as one of the remaining challenges facing the implementation of the 
Bhangazi Settlement Agreement (Status of Land Claims in Protected Areas (2010)). 
126 Fay (2007) Human Ecology 87; and Steenkamp C & Grossman B People and Parks: Cracks in the 












resolution procedures,127 others somewhat vague procedures128 and some others no 
procedures.129 The merits of including such provisions are clearly evidenced by the 
constructive manner in they have been invoked to resolve disputes in certain of the 
case studies.130 Calls have accordingly been made for all founding agreements to 
provide greater clarity on the parties’ functions, detailed timeframes and procedures for 
declaring and mediating disputes.131   
 
A further essential element is that the founding agreements should preferably be of a 
satisfactory duration with provision for periodic review and amendment.132 The duration 
of the case studies’ founding agreements ranges from indefinite periods to 21 years.133 
Provision is generally made for the renewal or termination of the agreement on notice to 
the other parties.134 Some even allow one party to anticipate the termination of the 
agreement on notice to the other parties.135 The above processes provide valuable 
opportunities for the parties to review and re-negotiate their agreements where 
necessary. Such flexibility is complemented in the founding agreements of all but the 
Richtersveld case study, with provision being made for periodic amendment.136 The 
problems associated with omitting such a provision are reflected in the Richtersveld 
                                                     
127 Take for instance the Makuleke Settlement Agreement (1998) (clauses 38-39 read with 43-44). 
128 Take for instance the: Dwesa-Cwebe Settlement Agreement (2001) (clause 13) read with the 
Community Agreement (2001) (clause 10); and the Bhangazi Settlement Agreement (1999) (clause 4.7) 
read with the Memorandum of Understanding (1999) (clause 14). 
129 Take for instance the Richtersveld Contract Park Agreement (1991). 
130 Take for instance the manner in which the dispute resolution mechanisms contained in the Makuleke 
Settlement Agreement (1998) were successfully invoked to resolve a dispute regarding the grant of 
hunting concessions in the Pafuri Region in 2001 (Turner S, Collins S & Baumgart J Community-Based 
Natural Resource Management: Experiences and Lessons in Linking Communities to Sustainable 
Resource Use in Different Social, Economic and Ecological Conditions in South Africa (2002) Research 
Report No.11, PLAAS Bellville 46). 
131 De Satgé Issues for the Development of Post-Settlement Support Strategy (2006) 48-49. 
132 For a discussion of this element, see Chapter 3 (Part 4.3). 
133 The agreements have the following duration: Bhangazi Memorandum of Understanding (1999) - 
indefinite (clause 2); Makuleke Settlement Agreement (1998) - 50 years (clause 24); Richtersveld 
Contract Park Agreement (1991) - 24 years (clause 1); and Dwesa-Cwebe Settlement Agreement (2001) 
and Community Agreement (2001) - 21 years (clause 8 and clause 5 respectively). 
134 The Makuleke Settlement Agreement (1998) allows either party to renew the agreement for a further 
term of 50 years or shorter, on 2 years notice to the other party (clause 24(2)). The Richtersveld Contract 
Park Agreement (1991) allows either party to terminate the agreement following the expiry of the initial 
24-year term, on six years notice to the other party (clause 1). 
135 The Makuleke Settlement Agreement (1998) allows either party after the initial agreement has been 
running for at least twenty years, and on five years notice, to withdraw from the agreement (clause 24(1)). 
136 See for instance the: Makuleke Settlement Agreement (1998) (clause 49); and Dwesa-Cwebe 












case study where the parties were compelled to use the management planning process 
to effectively renegotiate the terms of their founding agreement.137 While the majority of 
the founding agreements would accordingly satisfy this requirement, their formulation is 




The negotiation and conclusion of the above agreements is not the end of the process. 
The establishment of the CCA must generally be formalised. This process should ideally 
comprise of notice and comment procedures, the formal registration or declaration of 
the CCA by way of government notice, and where necessary, the registration of any 
restrictive conditions against the title deed of the property to ensure their perpetuity.139 
 
As has been highlighted throughout this dissertation, CCAs have in the South African 
context historically emerged through the settlement of communal land restitution claims 
in existing protected areas. Accordingly, they generally have not had to be formally 
proclaimed ab initio, but rather mutated from state-owned and managed protected areas 
to CCAs. Such was the case in respect of the Makuleke, Dwesa-Cwebe and Bhangazi 
case studies. The procedures regulating their formation (or perhaps it is more correct to 
refer to it as their transformation) have predominantly been those prescribed in the 
Restitution of Land Rights Act. These procedures do not warrant repeating here but for 
mentioning that they contain an extensive array of statutory mechanisms aimed at 
facilitating public participation in the run up to the conclusion of the settlement 
agreement and its subsequent formal certification by relevant land authorities.140 It is 
                                                     
137 For a discussion of the problems associated with this approach, see Chapter 9 (Part 8.3). 
138 Take for instance the Dwesa-Cwebe Settlement Agreement (2001), which contains no provision 
regulating its duration, termination or renewal. It simply cross refers to the Dwesa-Cwebe Community 
Agreement (2001) and prescribes that at least one year prior to its termination, the parties must 
renegotiate it for a further term of 21 years. A failure to do so would result in the management of the 
Dwesa-Cwebe Nature Reserve returning to the conservation authorities. No clarity is provided regarding 
what happens on the termination of the second period of 21 years, where this is triggered. This is clearly 
not a satisfactory formulation and may well lead to conflict as the expiry of the initial contract period 
approaches. See Dwesa-Cwebe Settlement Agreement (clause 8) read with the Dwesa-Cwebe 
Community Agreement (clause 5). 
139 For a discussion of this element, see Chapter 3 (Part 4.5). 












furthermore interesting to note that some of the provisions in the settlement agreements 
specifically relate to transforming the nature of the existing protected area. Take for 
instance the Makuleke Settlement Agreement that provided for the de-proclamation of 
the Pafuri Region of the Kruger National Park; 141 its re-proclamation as a contract 
national park;142 and the registration of a number of conservation-orientated conditions 
against the title deed of the land.143 Such an approach will no doubt continue to guide 
the resolution of the majority of outstanding communal land claims in protected areas, 
and hence the ‘declaration’ of CCAs through this process. It will however now be 
informed by South Africa’s contemporary conservation regime144 and the recent 
government initiatives aimed at clarifying the roles of domestic land reform and 
conservation authorities.145 
 
The Richtersveld case study is one important exception to the norm in that its formation 
preceded the land restitution regime and was regulated purely under South Africa’s pre-
2005 conservation regime. The then applicable National Parks Act prescribed an array 
of formalities for establishing the national park, including the conclusion of contract park 
agreement with the community and the formal declaration of the area by way of 
publication of a notice in the Government Gazette.146 Notably absent in this regime was 
adequate provision for public participation in the process.147 This absence has been 
more than compensated for in South Africa’s contemporary conservation regime that 
                                                     
141 Clause 5. This process, regulated by section 2(3) of the then applicable National Parks Act (57 of 
1976), was necessary in order to exclude the Pafuri Region from the Kruger National Park so as to 
enable its transfer to the community. 
142 Clause 23. This process, regulated by section 2B(1)(b) of the then applicable National Parks Act (57 of 
1976), was necessary in order to reincorporate the Pafuri Region as a contract national park within the 
Kruger National Park. 
143 Clause 2. This process, regulated by the Deeds Registries Act (47 of 1937), ensures that even on the 
expiry of the contract park agreement concluded under the National Parks Act, the land shall be retained 
for conservation in perpetuity. 
144 For a discussion of this contemporary conservation regime, see Chapter 5 (Part 3.1). 
145 For a discussion of these recent government initiatives to link the conservation and land reform 
regimes, see Chapter 7 (Part 2). 
146 Section 2A read with section 2B of the National Parks Act (57 of 1976). 













provides a more consistent, open and transparent approach to the declaration of 
protected areas.148 
 
It would therefore appear that whether CCAs are in the future created through 
transforming existing protected areas (through the land restitution process) or creating 
new protected areas ab initio (under the contemporary conservation regimes), the South 
African legal regime contains the requisite array of mechanisms for ensuring that the 





Representative, open and transparent institutions and decision-making processes are a 
further essential element identified as underlying successful CCAs.149 Each case study 
has a unique institutional and decision-making structure. The principal institutions that 
play a role in their formation and administration are government authorities and CPIs. 
The structure, nature and role of these institutions are considered in turn below. 
However, before embarking on this analysis, it is important to highlight that provision is 
made in most of the case studies for co-management institutions to regulate the 
relationship between the government authorities and the CPIs. Their role is integrally 
related to the management of the area and is accordingly considered under Part 8 
below. 
 
7.1 GOVERNMENT INSTITUTIONS 
 
Several authorities from different spheres and sectors of Government had a hand in the 
formation, and currently play a role in the administration, of the four case studies. These 
include land authorities,150 environmental authorities151 and municipal authorities.152 
                                                     
148 For a comprehensive discussion of this contemporary conservation regime, see Chapter 5 (Part 3.1). 
See further: Paterson (2007) SA Public Law 14-16. 
149 For a discussion of this element, see Chapter 3 (Part 4.6). 












Their precise role within each of the case studies varies significantly. In summary: the 
land authorities are generally tasked with managing the land restitution process and 
administering post-settlement support; the conservation authorities are generally 
responsible for managing the CCA single-handedly or in partnership with the CPI; and 
the municipal authorities are generally responsible for facilitating rural development in 
and around the CCA, and on occasion administering post-settlement support to it. 
 
The form, nature, powers and functions of these government authorities are clearly 
prescribed in the Constitution and/or their constitutive statutes.153 The manner in which 
they exercise their powers and functions is guided by the Promotion of Administrative 
Justice Act,154 the Promotion of Access to Information Act,155 the Intergovernmental 
Framework Relations Act156 and the Public Finance Management Act.157 Cumulatively, 
the above statutory framework should theoretically ensure that all actions and decisions 
taken by the government authorities relating to the formation and administration of 
CCAs take place in an open, accountable, lawful, reasonable, cooperative, coordinated 
and procedurally fair manner. Several challenges to this theoretical ideal have been 
noted in the case studies, particularly that of the Dwesa-Cwebe Nature Reserve. 
 
The first challenge relates to cooperative governance. Many government authorities 
frequently have overlapping mandates over, and different visions for, one CCA. In the 
Dwesa-Cwebe case study, for example, a diverse range of government authorities 
spread across several government institutions housed in all three spheres of 
                                                                                                                                                                           
CCAs, see Chapter 6 (Part 5.1). 
151 For a discussion of these environmental authorities and the role they play in the formation and 
administration of CCAs, see Chapter 5 (Part 3.3).  
152 These include district and local municipalities whose primary mandate in the context of CCAs is rural 
development, land-use planning and infrastructure and service delivery. 
153 For a discussion of the constitutional legislative and executive competence of the three spheres of 
Government to make and administer laws of relevance to CCAs, see Chapter 4 (Part 4). For information 
on the powers and functions of the relevant land authorities, see Chapter 6 (Part 5.1). For information on 
the powers and functions of the relevant conservation authorities, see Chapter 5 (Part 3.3). 
154 For a discussion of the relevance of this Act to CCAs, see Chapter 4 (Part 2.3). 
155 Ibid. 
156 Act 13 of 2005. The Act provides for structures and institutions to promote intergovernmental relations 
as well as mechanisms and procedures to facilitate the resolution of intergovernmental disputes. 












Government have a role to play in its administration.158 According to several 
commentators, the Dwesa-Cwebe Nature Reserve is ‘caught in many of the symptoms 
of competition rather than co-operation’ between government authorities,159 with the 
resultant disease being a situation where ‘everyone but no one is responsible’.160 This 
has undermined not only the management of the Reserve, but also the transfer of 
development grants and restitution benefits to it.161 These challenges have been further 
compounded by the rapid turnover of staff, inadequate handover procedures and the 
resultant loss of institutional memory and capacity amongst land authorities.162 Capacity 
constraints, particularly amongst provincial conservation authorities and relating to their 
understanding and implementation of the new conservation paradigm promoted under 
South Africa’s contemporary conservation regime, have also been recorded as 
undermining the functioning of the Reserve.163 
 
A second challenge highlighted by the case studies relates to the role of municipal 
authorities within CCAs. The scope and nature of their functions has undergone a 
significant shift in post-Apartheid South Africa.164 Not only has the scope of their 
jurisdiction been extended from small urban precincts to large rural areas,165 but the 
                                                     
158 For a description of the broad array of stakeholders which have vested interests in the Dwesa-Cwebe 
Nature Reserve, see: Palmer et al The Dwesa-Cwebe Restitution Claim (2006) 9-10 & 32-34.  
159 Palmer et al The Dwesa-Cwebe Restitution Claim (2006) 10. 
160 Clarke J “Trends in Forest Ownership, Forest Resources Tenure and Institutional Arrangement: Are 
they Contributing to Better Forest Management and Poverty Reduction? A Case Study from South Africa” 
Undated Research Report Prepared for Food and Agriculture Organisation (Forestry Department) 
(available at www.fao.org/forestry/12503-1-28.pdf) 9. 
161 Take for instance the lack of coordination between the Eastern Cape Parks and Tourism Agency, 
which de facto manages the terrestrial component of the Reserve; and the Department of Environmental 
Affairs: Marine and Coastal Management Directorate, which is supposed to manage the marine protected 
area situated directly adjacent to it. The lack of coordination between these two government authorities 
has frustrated effective compliance and enforcement in the Reserve and the ability of the community to 
generate economic benefits from it. This lack of cooperation is not only present between different 
conservation authorities but also between national and provincial land authorities. Poor relations between 
the national and regional offices of Land Claims Commission, for example, have also been identified as 
frustrating the implementation of post settlement support within and adjacent to the Reserve. See 
generally: Palmer The Dwesa-Cwebe Restitution Claim (2006) 6; and De Satgé Issues for the 
Development of Post-Settlement Support Strategy (2006) 47. 
162 De Satgé Issues for the Development of Post-Settlement Support Strategy (2006) 47. 
163 Fabricius C “Conservation and Communities-Learning from Experience” in Palmer et al From Conflict 
to Negotiation (2002) 261. 
164 Palmer et al The Dwesa-Cwebe Restitution Claim (2006) 11-12. 
165 In terms of the Local Government: Municipal Demarcation Act (27 of 1998) and Local Government: 












nature of their functions has been broadened from urban planning, infrastructure and 
service delivery to regional planning and decentralised land-use management.166 
Municipal authorities have therefore been thrust into the realm of rural land reform and 
development. Furthermore, municipal authorities have on occasion been drawn into the 
direct implementation of land restitution settlements in protected areas in the capacity 
as implementing agents.  
 
Take for instance the Dwesa-Cwebe case study, where the Amathole District 
Municipality was appointed as the implementing agent for the Settlement Agreement. 167 
Significant problems have been identified with this arrangement.168 These problems 
stem from several quarters.169 The municipal authority was not a party to the founding 
agreements and its rights and duties in respect of the protected area are accordingly ill 
defined. Moreover, the municipal authority is geographically removed from the 
community. This hampers communication and consultation. The municipal authority 
also has disparate development priorities to that of the community; and is compelled to 
comply with the stringent provisions of the Public Finance Management Act170 when 
spending the communities’ money. The above problems hold lessons for those 
contemplating implementing similar arrangements in the future. So too do the recent 
steps taken by the parties to resolve them such as: the creation of an overarching 
                                                     
166 In terms of the Local Government: Transition Act (209 of 1993) and Local Government: Municipal 
Systems Act (32 of 2000). The manifestation of these functions is through the integrated development 
plans and spatial development frameworks that each municipal authority is compelled to prepare. 
167 Palmer et al The Dwesa-Cwebe Restitution Claim (2006) 12 & 44-49. 
168 In the context of the Dwesa-Cwebe case study, the following problems have been noted: a lack of 
communication and consultation between the municipal authority and the community; significant delays in 
the allocation of operational funding to enable the Dwesa-Cwebe Land Trust to fulfil its functions; 
expenditure by the municipal authority on what the community do not believe is core business; the failure 
by the municipal authority to timeously allocate the funds leading to the recall of R5m of the R10.5m in 
discretionary restitution grants and settlement planning grants by the National Treasury in early 2010; 
tenuous relations between the community and the municipal authority; and the absence of mechanisms to 
hold the municipal authority to account regarding its role as implementing agent. See: Palmer et al The 
Dwesa-Cwebe Restitution Claim (2006) 44-49; and Summary Status Report - Dwesa-Cwebe Post 
Settlement Implementation (2010) 2. 
169 See generally: Fay “Property, Subjection and Protected Areas” in Fay et al The Rights and Wrongs of 
Land Restitution (2009) 36-38; Fay (2007) Human Ecology 91; and Palmer et al The Dwesa-Cwebe 
Restitution Claim (2006) 9-10 & 44-54. 
170 The stringent centralised and inflexible tendering provisions prescribed by the Public Finance 
Management Act have been cited as precluding the funding of more flexible ‘labour-based practices’ 












structure, representative of all relevant CPIs and government authorities, to coordinate 
post-settlement support to the CCA and improve communication;171 the conclusion of an 
agreement between the municipal authority and the CPI to regulate their relationship;172 
and the appointment of a dedicated project manager within the municipal authority to 
manage its responsibilities relating to the CCA.173 
 
7.2 COMMUNAL PROPERTY INSTITUTIONS 
 
Two forms of CPIs play a significant role in the administration of the four case studies. 
These are land trusts and communal property associations (CPAs) to which title over 
the land was restored, compensation was paid, management responsibilities ascribed 
and/or benefits attributed in terms of the founding agreements. The exact nature of the 
CPIs varies across all four case studies. In the absence of the legal regime providing for 
CPAs, the Richtersveld community had no real alternative but to form a land trust to 
represent them. As evidenced by the remainder of the case studies, the CPA is the 
chosen vehicle for representing and holding the interests of the community since the 
promulgation of the Communal Property Association Act. This is not surprising as this 
legislation was specifically introduced to fill the apparent void created by the absence of 
the country’s communal land tenure regime. The only exception to this rule is the 
Dwesa-Cwebe case study, where owing to the diverse nature of the claimant 
community, a CPA represents each sector of the community, with a land trust formed to 
represent the joint interests of these associations in their dealings with third parties. 
 
The statutory frameworks174 and founding documents175 that regulate the formation and 
administration of the above CPIs specifically seek to ensure that they operate in a 
                                                     
171 A Project Steering Committee, comprising of representatives from the Dwesa-Cwebe Land Trust and 
the relevant municipal authorities was established in 2002. For a discussion of this issue, see: Chapter 8 
(Part 2.3). 
172 Eastern Cape Parks Board Annual Report 2008/2009 (2008) 22. 
173 Palmer et al The Dwesa-Cwebe Restitution Claim (2006) 44. 
174 These are: the Communal Property Association Act (28 of 1998) in the case of CPAs; and the Trust 
Property Control Act (57 of 1988) in the case of land trusts. 












representative, accountable, transparent and democratic manner.176 However, the 
functioning of the CPAs in most of the case studies reflect several challenges that 
preclude the realisation of this ideal.177 These challenges either deal with factors 
inherent to the institution itself, or in relation to its dealings with other relevant 
institutions, particularly traditional authorities. 
 
The first challenge inherent to the functioning of community property institutions relates 
to their composition. The diverse nature of claimant communities has frequently led to 
the creation of ‘fictional communities’ for the purpose of settling land restitution 
claims.178 As illustrated in the Bhangazi case study, this has resulted in significant 
tensions between those who the Government regarded as legitimate claimants and 
other neighbouring communities, who whilst not having direct ancestral ties to the land 
are still dependent on it for their livelihoods.179 Similar intra-group and inter-group 
conflicts have been recorded in the context of the Dwesa-Cwebe and Makuleke case 
studies.180 
 
The second challenge relates to the alleged lack of democratic process characterising 
the functioning of the CPIs, which has led to deep frustration and distrust within and 
between members of the community. Several of the CPIs have been plagued by 
accusations of ‘power mongering, nepotism or corruption’.181 There have accordingly 
                                                     
176 For a discussion in the mechanisms contained in these regimes that seek to promote characteristics of 
this nature, see Chapter 6 (Part 3.1 and Part 5.2). 
177 For a full discussion of the general challenges undermining the functioning of communal property 
institutions, see Chapter 6 (Part 3.1). 
178 For a discussion of this issue, see Chapter 9 (Part 5.1). 
179 Walker Land-Marked (2008) 109. See further: Walker (2005) Transformation: Critical Perspectives on 
Southern Africa 2; and Skelcher B “Apartheid and the Removal of Black Spots from Lake Bhangazi in 
Kwazulu-Natal, South Africa’ (2003) 33 Journal of Black Studies 781. 
180 Clarke “Trends in Forest Ownership, Forest Resources Tenure and Institutional Arrangements” 
(undated) 9. 
181 Fabricius “Conservation and Communities” in Palmer et al From Conflict to Negotiation (2002) 268. 
Take for instance the failure of the Bhangazi Community Trust to hold regular meetings and properly 
account to its constituency regarding the allocation of its share of the community levy; and trustee’s 
commercial interests in eco-tourism operations undertake within the Isimangaliso Wetland Park (Larsson-
Lidén “Research in the Midst of Controversy: ‘You Coming Here is Like a Spear to Me’” (2008) Africa in 
Search of Alternatives - Annual Report 2008, The Nordic Africa Institute, 34-35; and Larsson-Lidén L “For 
Whom is the Isimangaliso World Heritage Site” (2007) Africa on the Global Agenda - Annual Report 2007, 
The Nordic Africa Institute 10 & 12). Furthermore, take for instance the Dwesa-Cwebe case study, where 












been renewed calls for these institutions to be founded on clear objectives and be 
structured in a manner which promotes legitimate, accountable and transparent 
decision-making; with procedures for regular monitoring, reporting and review.182 The 
Makuleke CPA provides a good illustration of recent moves to improve governance and 
facilitate better communication and consultation between it and its membership. These 
measures include: the organisation of the CPA into sub-committees; the establishment 
of three district development forums which comprise of broad membership from all 
relevant constituencies; and the creation of a consultative forum comprising of the 
village development committees in the area.183 
 
The third challenge relates to the constantly evolving nature of the community. New 
conflicts and power struggles often emerge between different factions of a community, 
particularly where it is heterogeneous in nature and constantly evolving.184 This is 
clearly reflected in the Bhangazi case study, where significant differences exist between 
the vision of the traditional elders of the community, with whom the founding 
agreements were negotiated and who administer the Bhangazi Community Trust, and 
the politicised youth who seek to challenge their authority.185 Similar conflicts have been 
recorded in the context of the Makuleke case study.186 It would therefore appear that 
provision should ideally be made for some form of flexibility to account for shifts in 
leadership and vision. However, as is illustrated by the frequent rotation of the 
leadership of the Makuleke CPA, the merits of such flexibility need to be carefully 
                                                                                                                                                                           
seeking to establish a new trust. The new institution lacks formal legitimacy having not been properly 
constituted by all members of the community party to the original Settlement Agreement. Furthermore, it 
does not have signatory power and access to the original trust’s bank which holds R2.1m paid to the 
community in terms of the Dwesa-Cwebe Settlement Agreement (2001). See further: Summary Status 
Report - Dwesa-Cwebe Post Settlement Implementation (2010) 2. 
182 De Villiers People and Parks - Sharing the Benefits (2008) 83. 
183 Collins S “The Makuleke Conservation and Land Reform Project - A Conservation Rather than 
Community Development Success So Far” (2010) Unpublished paper 9-12; De Villiers People and Parks 
- Sharing the Benefits (2008) 74; and De Villiers et al Land Reform: Trailblazers (2006) 16-17. 
184 Fabricius C, Kock D & Magome H “Towards Strengthening Collaborative Ecosystem Management: 
Lessons from Environmental Conflict and Political Change in Southern Africa” (2001) 31(4) Journal of the 
Royal Society of New Zealand 831. 
185 Chellan N & Khan S “Contesting Ecotourism Development in the Isimangaliso Wetland Park in 
Kwazulu-Natal” (2008) 15(1) Alternation 274; Walker Land-Marked (2008) 139; and Walker (2005) 
Transformation: Critical Perspectives on Southern Africa 20. 
186 Carruthers J “‘South Africa: A World in One Country’: Land Restitution in National Parks and Protected 












weighed against the interests of certainty, consistency, productivity, succession 
planning and the retention of institutional memory and capacity.187 
 
The fourth challenge relates to the fact that CPIs frequently lack the standing, capacity 
and resources to manage their dealings with third parties in an equitable, legitimate, 
open, transparent and accountable manner.188 Lack of post-settlement support for 
building and sustaining these institutions has in the words of one commentator, left 
many ‘dangling as discredited and powerless structures’.189 The evidence emerging 
from the case studies is quite discrepant in this regard. The Makuleke CPA is regarded 
as fairly well capacitated and resourced,190 no doubt the result of the substantial support 
it has received from local and international NGOs.191 In stark contrast, the Dwesa-
Cwebe Land Trust and its constituent CPAs, have been cited as lacking in capacity, 
resources and a clear governance structure; with their functioning fraught with conflict 
between the Trust and the CPAs.192 The problems raise questions regarding the viability 
of an institutional model that requires eight different institutions, each requiring 
resourcing and capacity development, to collaboratively administer the community’s 
interests over a single small CCA. 
 
The final challenge inherent to CPIs relates to circumscribing the nature of their core 
function. As is prescribed in the legislation that provides for their formation and their 
constitutive documents, the core function of these institutions is to hold and administer 
communal property.193 However, as is illustrated in by the Dwesa-Cwebe case study, 
these institutions are increasingly allocated land-use management and rural 
                                                     
187 Take for example, the Makuleke CPA’s Constitution that limits the tenure of CPA committee members 
to 3 years. 
188 Collins “The Makuleke Conservation and Land Reform Project” (2010) 17; and Turner et al 
Community-Based Natural Resource Management (2002) 30-35. 
189 De Satgé Issues for the Development of Post-Settlement Support Strategy (2006) 55. See further: 
Palmer From Title to Entitlement: The Struggle Continues at Dwesa-Cwebe (2003) 10; and Andrew M, 
Ainsley A & Shackleton C Evaluating Land and Agrarian Reform in South Africa (2003) Occasional Paper 
Series: Land Use and Livelihoods No.8, PLAAS, Bellville. 
190 De Villiers People and Parks - Sharing the Benefits (2008) 74. 
191 For a discussion of this support, see Chapter 9 (Part 5.1). 
192 Fay “Property, Subjection and Protected Areas” in Fay et al The Rights and Wrongs of Land 
Restitution (2009) 36-37; De Satgé Issues for the Development of Post-Settlement Support Strategy 
(2006) 49-52; and Palmer et al The Dwesa-Cwebe Restitution Claim (2006) 45-50. 












development type functions.194 This becomes problematic given that such functions fall 
outside the anticipated domain of these institutions and they are frequently ill-defined in 
the institution’s constitutive documents. Furthermore, there is little clarity regarding how 
these functions should be coordinated with those undertaken and funded by local 
government. Coupled with the existing capacity and resource constraints discussed 
above, commentators have warned that these CPIs should not contemplate moving 
beyond the core function of communal land administration until such time as they fulfil 
their core function competently.195 
 
It is not only the above challenges relating to the inherent nature and functioning of 
CPIs that are illustrated by the case studies. The second group of challenges facing 
these institutions relates to their dealings with other institutions, particularly institutions 
of traditional authority. These challenges are caused by the profound implications the 
Restitution of Land Rights Act and the Communal Property Association Act have had on 
rural land administration in South Africa.196 In certain circumstances these laws 
undermine the historic powers exercised by traditional authorities, such as traditional 
councils and tribal authorities, over rural land administration.197 This conundrum is 
compounded by the fact that the laws do so without clarifying the relationship between 
the new ‘democratic’ CPIs and their traditional ‘apartheid’ counterparts.198 The resultant 
confusion and conflict generally arises where the land in a protected area that is 
restored to a CPI also falls under the jurisdiction of a tribal authority or traditional 
council.199 Its impact has not only undermined the functioning of the CPIs, but also 
                                                     
194 Hall R The Impact of Land Restitution and Land Reform on Livelihoods (2007) Research Report 
No.32, PLAAS Bellville 17; Palmer et al The Dwesa-Cwebe Restitution Claim (2006) 8-9 & 51; De Satgé 
Issues for the Development of Post-Settlement Support Strategy (2006) 47-48; and Palmer From Title to 
Entitlement: The Struggle Continues at Dwesa-Cwebe (2003) 8-9. 
195 Turner et al Community-Based Natural Resource Management (2002) 35. 
196 Fabricius “Conservation and Communities” in Palmer et al From Conflict to Negotiation (2002) 266. 
197 Whande Trans-boundary Natural Resource Management in Southern Africa (2007) 41. 
198 Palmer et al The Dwesa-Cwebe Restitution Claim (2006) 9 & 51; and De Satgé Issues for the 
Development of Post-Settlement Support Strategy (2006) 52-53. 
199 In the context of the Makuleke case study, see: Robins et al (2008) Development & Change 55. In the 
context of the Dwesa-Cwebe case study, see: Fay “Property, Subjection and Protected Areas” in Fay et al 
The Rights and Wrongs of Land Restitution (2009) 36-37. In the context of the Bhangazi case study, see: 












detrimentally impacted on the functioning of several CCAs and the forging of ‘local 
development plans and livelihood strategies’ in and adjacent to them.200 
 
However, some CCAs in South Africa are rather strangely cited for the high level of 
cohesiveness between the CPIs and the relevant traditional authorities. Take for 
instance the Makuleke case study, where the Chief of the Makuleke tribe was appointed 
and continues to stand as the chairperson of the Makuleke CPA.201 The blurring of 
institutional functions and resultant close working relationship between the Makuleke 
CPA and the Makuleke Tribal Authority has been identified as one of the keys to the 
success of this CCA.202 This apparent cohesiveness must, however, be understood 
within its context – the battle for recognition of the Makuleke chieftaincy and its attempts 
to circumvent the rival claim of the Mhinga chieftaincy to the land currently held by the 
Makuleke CPA.203 This battle even resulted in the Makuleke CPA joining the 
proceedings in Tongoane v Minister for Agriculture and Land Affairs204 in an attempt to 
further secure its tenure rights over the Pafuri Region of the Kruger National Park.205 
 
Whilst lauded as a ‘model tribe’, there is however even evidence that the relationship 
between the Makuleke CPA and the Makuleke Tribal Authority is not entirely free of 
                                                     
200 Whande Trans-boundary Natural Resource Management in Southern Africa (2007) 45. 
201 De Villiers People and Parks - Sharing the Benefits (2008) 74. 
202 Grossman et al “Towards Transformation: Contract Parks in South Africa” in Suich et al Evolution and 
Innovation (2009) 364; and Robins et al (2008) Development & Change 55. 
203 Chief Mhinga, the head of the current recognised traditional council in the area, argued that the 
Makuleke fell under his authority as Chief Makuleke effectively constituted one of his headman since the 
Makuleke’s forced resettlement at Ntlhaveni. Notwithstanding the land having been restored to the 
Makuleke CPA, the Makuleke continue to assert their chieftaincy claim and were party to the challenge to 
the Communal Land Rights Act, given its potential for reverting administration of the land held by the 
Makuleke CPA to the traditional council chaired by Chief Mhinga. For information on the origins and 
nature of this conflict, see: Claassens A & Hathorn M “Stealing Restitution and Selling Land Allocations: 
Dixie, Mayaeyane and Makuleke” in Claassens A & Cousins B (eds) Land, Power and Custom: 
Controversies Generated by South Africa’s Communal Land Rights Act (2008) University of Cape Town 
Press Cape Town 334-349; Robins et (2008) Development & Change 53-65; Spierenburg M, Steenkamp 
C & Wels H “Enclosing the Local for the Global Commons: Community Land Rights in the Great Limpopo 
Transfrontier Conservation Area” (2008) 6(1) Conservation & Society 91-92; and Ramutsindela (2002) 
GeoForum 19-20. 
204 2010 (6) SA 214 CC. For a discussion on this case, see Chapter 6 (Part 3.2). 
205 The primary reason for the Makuleke CPA joining the proceedings was that under the Communal Land 
Rights Act, authority over the Pafuri Region of the Kruger National Park would potentially have returned to 
the Mhinga Tribal Authority owing to the Government failing to recognize the status of the Makuleke Tribal 












tensions. These tensions arise from questions regarding gender representivity, the 
somewhat autocratic nature of the chairperson’s decision-making, and the use of 
resources generated through concession agreements on tribal authority expenses.206 
The Makuleke CPA are seeking to resolve these problems by: allowing others to stand 
as chairperson of the CPA; changing the status of the Chief on the CPA to that of 
advisor; and more clearly delimiting the powers and functions of the Makuleke CPA and 
the Makuleke Tribal Authority. 207 
 
Similar tensions were evident in certain of the other case studies. In the Bhangazi case 
study the tensions between the Bhangazi Land Trust and the Mpukonyeni Tribal 
Authority were mitigated by allocating certain benefits under the Settlement Agreement 
to the Tribal Authority; and by the fact that the settlement comprised of compensation as 
opposed to land restoration.208 Such a state of affairs is not, however, prevalent in the 
Dwesa-Cwebe case study where problems continue to abound between the Dwesa-
Cwebe Land Trust, its constituent CPAs and the tribal authorities over land 
administration.209  
 
The majority of the above problems regarding the relationship between the CPIs and 
the institutions of traditional authority are largely a remnant of the continued absence of 
a revised communal land tenure regime that clearly defines their respective roles with 
regard to rural land administration. The problems will continue to abound unless the 
next iteration of the Communal Land Rights Act adequately delineates their 
relationship.210 
 
                                                     
206 Collins “The Makuleke Conservation and Land Reform Project” (2010) 14-17; Spierenburg M, Wels H, 
Van der Waal K & Robins S “Transfrontier Tourism and Relations Between Local Communities and the 
Private Sector in the Great Limpopo Transfrontier Park” in Hottola P (ed) Tourism Strategies and Local 
Responses in Southern Africa (2009) CAB International Cambridge 176; Robins et al (2008) 
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207 Spierenburg et al “Transfrontier Tourism and Relations between Local Communities and the Private 
Sector” in Hottola Tourism Strategies and Local Responses in Southern Africa (2009) 173; and De Villiers 
People and Parks - Sharing the Benefits (2008) 74. 
208 For a summary of these tensions, see: Walker (2005) Transformation: Critical Perspectives on 
Southern Africa 6-7. 
209 Palmer et al The Dwesa-Cwebe Restitution Claim (2006) 6. 














The prescription of a clear, realistic, workable and flexible management regime tailored 
to suit the specificity of the area and the community living within or adjacent to it is a 
further recognised element of most successful CCAs.211 If one surveys the case studies, 
they provide important lessons regarding the following issues that influence the 
realisation of the above ideal: the type of management regime; the nature of the 
management institutions; the form of management planning; the type of decision-
making processes; and the nature of the de facto management activities undertaken in 
the CCA.  
 
8.1 FORM OF MANAGEMENT 
 
The management model inherent in the majority of case studies appears to be that of 
co-management. This model is reflected in the Richtersveld, Makuleke and Dwesa-
Cwebe case studies, where management authority is apparently shared between the 
relevant government authority and CPI. The only exception to this rule is the Bhangazi 
case study where management authority vests solely in the Isimangaliso Wetland Park 
Authority, a statutory authority.212 
 
The theoretical merits of the co-management model have been acknowledged, 
particularly where the CPI lacks the resources and capacity to manage the area itself.213 
Its domestic implementation, particularly in the Makuleke case study, was initially 
lauded as a great success.214 More recently, the co-management model has been 
advocated by the IUCN as warranting promotion.215 As illustrated by the recent 
domestic publication of the National Co-Management Framework, co-management also 
                                                     
211 For a discussion of this element, see Chapter 3 (Part 4.7). 
212 While one of the members of the Bhangazi Community Trust does sit on the Board of the Isimangaliso 
Wetland Park Authority, this does not constitute co-management.  
213 For a discussion of the prerequisites for successful co-management, see Chapter 3 (Part 4.7). 
214 See generally: Steenkamp et al The Makuleke Land Claim (2000); and De Villiers Land Claims and 
National Parks: The Makuleke Experience (1998) HSRC Press Pretoria. 












appears to be the model favoured by domestic policy-makers for bridging the 
conservation and land reform divide.216  
 
Notwithstanding its international and domestic recognition, local scholars have identified 
several challenges inherent in the domestic implementation of the co-management 
model.217 From a theoretical perspective: the model arose to address specific issues in 
the conservation context and not as a model for bridging the conservation and land 
reform divide; co-management is founded on improving state legitimacy rather than 
promoting actual participation; and the domestic version of the model arose to co-opt 
well capacitated private white landowners to contract their land into protected areas, a 
very different context to that of seeking to co-opt frequently ill-resourced and ill-
capacitated new communal landowners to retain the conservation status of their 
restored land.218 From a practical perspective, many of the factors identified as 
preconditions for successful co-management are notably absent in South Africa, 
including: appropriate communal institutions; trust between role-players; sufficient 
protection of local community rights; and realistic economic incentives.219 The absence 
of these factors is clearly reflected in the case studies.220  
 
It is therefore unclear why the Government continues to advocate co-management as 
the central model for resolving the conservation and land reform interface, unless in the 
words of De Koning, it represents ‘a camouflage for the continuation of state hegemony’ 
over protected areas.221 Three additional aspects heighten this concern. First, the 
continued lack of clarity on the exact nature of the domestic co-management model and 
                                                     
216 For more information on the National Co-Management Framework (2010), see Chapter 7 (Part 2.2). 
217 See generally: De Koning (2009) Africanus 7-8; Kepe (2008) Environmental Management 314-318; 
Kepe et al (2005) International Journal of Biodiversity Science & Management 13; and Isaacs et al Co-
Managing the Commons in the ‘New’ South Africa (2000) 1. 
218 De Koning (2009) Africanus 8; Kepe (2008) Environmental Management 314-315. For a discussion on 
the theoretical frailties of the co-management model, see Chapter 7 (Part 2.2). 
219 Kepe (2008) Environmental Management 311. For further discussion on the practical frailties of the co-
management model, see Chapter 7 (Part 2.2). 
220 For a discussion on the lack of appropriate communal institutions and trust within and between these 
institutions and the conservation authorities, see Chapter 9 (Part 7). For a discussion of the insufficient 
protection afforded to local community rights, see Chapter 9 (Part 4) and Chapter 9 (Part 8.5). For a 
discussion of the lack of realistic economic incentives, see Chapter 9 (Parts 9 and 10). 












whether it amounts to joint management or mere consultation.222 Secondly, the 
unresolved issue of whether the initial co-management arrangements are the first step 
towards self-management by the CPI, or the perpetually entrenched management 
model.223  Thirdly, the desirability of replicating the co-management model throughout 
South Africa, when the example on which it is founded, namely the Makuleke case 
study, is failing to deliver its anticipated benefits to the community224 and has been 
labelled as financially unsustainable.225 Steps clearly need to be taken to move away 
from the blind reliance on the co-management model and to afford greater recognition 
to the broad array of governance options prescribed in the relevant domestic legal 
framework.226  
 
8.2 MANAGEMENT INSTITUTIONS 
 
Given the apparent historical domestic favouritism shown to the co-management model, 
it is not surprising that in all but the Bhangazi case study, provision is made for the 
creation of an institution to regulate the relationship between the relevant conservation 
authority and the CPI.227 The names ascribed to these institutions vary significantly and 
include management planning committees,228 joint management boards229 and co-
management committees.230 Irrespective of their name, they all effectively constitute co-
management institutions and shall accordingly be referred to as such for the remainder 
of this analysis. 
 
                                                     
222 De Villiers “People and Parks: Challenges and Opportunities” in Land Reform in South Africa (2009) 
87-88. 
223 Collins “The Makuleke Conservation and Land Reform Project” (2010) 6; and De Villiers Land Claims 
and National Parks: The Makuleke Experience (1998) 66. 
224 Spierenburg et al (2008) Conservation & Society 87-97; Robins et al (2008) Development & Change 
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228 As in the Richtersveld case study. 
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The form and function of these co-management institutions differ across the case 
studies. Their membership is generally drawn from the relevant conservation authority 
and CPI. Their composition ranges from equal representation231 to community 
majority.232 What is interesting to note is that several stakeholders with potentially key 
roles to play in the CCAs generally have no representation on these institutions. These 
stakeholders include other relevant conservation authorities,233 land reform authorities, 
local government authorities, traditional leadership structures and concessionaires 
operating commercial ventures in the CCAs. Some may argue that including 
representatives from these stakeholders within the co-management institutions would 
complicate their functioning and potentially skew their agenda. However, their omission, 
even as observers or advisers, potentially precludes necessary oversight by 
government authorities, the co-option of traditional leadership structures, and 
coordination of the stakeholders’ respective functions, mandates and agendas. An 
additional concern relates to the frequent turnover of community representatives on the 
CPIs. It has been identified as precluding the development of long-term relations 
between community and conservation representatives and the completion of projects 
undertaken by them.234 Steps clearly need to be taken to ensure that membership 
tenure on these institutions is of a satisfactory duration and that succession planning 
mechanisms are put in place to preclude a loss of institutional memory and strategic 
relations. 
 
The functions ascribed to these co-management institutions are very diverse and range 
from simply drawing up the management plan for the communally-conserved area235 to 
theoretically undertaking the day-to-day management of it.236 Some exercise control 
                                                     
231 As in the case of the Joint Management Board and the Co-Management Committee operating in the 
Pafuri Region of the Kruger National Park and the Dwesa-Cwebe Nature Reserve respectively. 
232 As in the case of the Management Planning Committee, comprising of five community members and 
four SANParks officials, operating in the Richtersveld National Park. 
233 These could include forestry authorities, water authorities, marine and coastal management authorities 
and agriculture authorities. 
234 In the context of the Richtersveld case study, see: Isaacs et al Co-Managing the Commons in the 
‘New’ South Africa (2000) 14. 
235 As in the case of the Management Planning Committee of the Richtersveld National Park. 












over the budget for the area237 while others do not.238 In some instances, the functions 
of these co-management institutions and the rights and duties allocated to their 
constituent members, are well defined.239 In others they are not, which leads to 
confusion and conflict.240 In the majority of case studies, the division of powers and 
responsibilities between the designated management authority and the co-management 
institution is not entirely clear which raises uncertainty about the latter’s legal status.241 
While some of the founding agreements allocate responsibility for day-to-day 
management to the co-management institution, they often have no legal standing to 
make decisions in their own right, no control over the budget and in reality can only 
make recommendations to the designated management authority for implementation.242 
Calls have been made to transform these co-management institutions into decision-
making bodies with clearly defined functions so to improve their credibility and 
functioning.243  
 
Given the potential key role these co-management institutions have to play in 
implementing the new management paradigm, it is somewhat disconcerting to note the 
few initiatives undertaken during the past decade to improve their functioning. The only 
initiatives recorded in the surveyed literature relate to the Makuleke case study where 
the appointment of a full-time operations officer to oversee the functioning of the co-
management institution and the creation of a streamlined four member ‘executive 
committee’ to run it, are recorded as improving its operation.244  Given the apparent 
success of these initiatives, perhaps it would be prudent to replicate them elsewhere. 
                                                     
237 As in the case of the Co-Management Committee of the Dwesa-Cwebe Nature Reserve that 
administers control over certain forms of income derived from activities undertaken in the Reserve. 
238 As in the case of the Joint Management Board of the Pafuri Region of the Kruger National Park. 
239 The Makuleke Settlement Agreement (1998) is well lauded in this regard (Grossman et al “Towards 
Transformation” in Suich et al Evolution and Innovation (2009) 363). 
240 This is perhaps best epitomised by the Dwesa-Cwebe Settlement Agreement (2001) and Community 
Agreement (2001) where neither adequately define the role of the Co-Management Committee and the 
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A final institutional trend reflected in the case studies is the centralisation of control 
within two main institutions: the designated management authority, which generally 
retains control over the area; and the co-management institution, which generally 
constitutes a consultative and advisory forum. This approach starkly contrasts with the 
stated ideal of recognising the nested, overlapping and frequently competing nature of 
communal resource rights; acknowledging issues of scale; decentralising the 
management function to a range of smaller decision-making units; and providing the 
mechanisms to enable them to interact with one another.245 Four main factors would 
appear to preclude the realisation of such an approach in South Africa. The Apartheid 
regime has left a legacy of dispersed communities with little connection to one another 
or the land that they historically occupied. The continued absence of South Africa’s 
communal land tenure regime has compelled communities to divide themselves and 
their tenure rights artificially into CPAs for the purpose of rural land restitution. The 
current conservation regime, which generally precludes residence within protected 
areas, has frustrated the reconnection of communities to their land and their 
neighbouring communities. Finally, a lack of resources or political will has undermined 
the creation of such institutions, the decentralisation of authority to them, and the 
provision of support to build their capacity and foster collaboration between them. 
 
8.3 MANAGEMENT PLANNING 
 
The value inherent in having a comprehensive plan to inform the management of a CCA 
is beyond reproach.246 If one surveys the case studies, their approaches to 
management planning differ somewhat regarding the nature of the management plan 
and the process leading to its adoption. Comprehensive management plans have been 
                                                                                                                                                                           
- Sharing the Benefits (2008) 77; and De Villiers et al Land Reform: Trailblazers (2006) 19. The role of the 
Joint Management Board’s (JMBs) operations manager, who is jointly funded by the CPA and SANParks, 
is to: follow up on the JMB’s decisions; liaise with SANParks and CPA representatives; publicise the 
functions of the JMB; and harmonise the functions of the CPA, JMB and SANParks. 
245 For a discussion of these aspects, see Chapter 3 (Part 4.6). 












developed in both the Makuleke and Richtersveld case studies.247 Their nature is very 
similar, with the only clear distinction being that the latter contains detailed provisions 
regarding the composition, powers and functions of the Joint Management Committee 
and the community’s development rights in the Richtersveld National Park. These 
aspects were clearly included in the management plan owing to their omission from the 
original Richtersveld Contract Park Agreement, and the inability of this agreement to be 
amended until 2014. While the desire to provide clarity on these issues is 
understandable, the use of the management planning process to negotiate them and 
the management plan to record them does not appear ideal.248 
 
In both the above case studies, the management plan was developed by the relevant 
co-management institutions, which ensured a degree of community participation in their 
formulation.249 Some commentators have however argued that provision should also 
have been made for independent oversight of the management planning process given 
the potential inherent power imbalances present at the time the plans were formulated 
and the central role they play in the administration of the areas.250 
 
The nature of the process which led to the adoption of the management plans for the 
Makuleke and Richtersveld case studies appears to have differed substantially, with the 
former taking a mere two years to finalise, and the latter over ten. One of the key factors 
contributing to the protracted negotiation of the management plan in the Richtersveld 
case study was clearly the attempt to use it to remedy the defects of the original 
Contract Park Agreement. Whilst understandable, the desirability of running the 
Richtersveld National Park for over a decade without an agreed management plan has 
                                                     
247 For a discussion of the management plans operating in the Richtersveld case study and the Makuleke 
case study, see respectively: Chapter 8 (Part 2.1) and Chapter 8 (Part 2.2). 
248 The reasons for this are threefold. Firstly, clarity and agreement should ideally be obtained on these 
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management planning framework. 
249 In the Makuleke case study this constituted the Joint Management Board; and in the Richtersveld case 
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been criticised in the past.251 Similar problems continue to undermine the functioning of 
the Dwesa-Cwebe Nature Reserve, where the continued absence of a formal 
management plan has compelled the management authority and co-management 
institution to rely on somewhat nebulous management principles contained in the 
Community Agreement and the Management Planning Framework annexed to it. While 
the inclusion of such management principles in the founding agreement provides an 
important baseline for the subsequent formulation of a management plan for the area, it 
would appear undesirable for it to become a substitute for it. Given the central role 
management plans play in both the management of the CCA and the exercise of access 
and use rights within it, perhaps it would be prudent to ensure that they are finalised and 
agreed upon simultaneously with the founding agreements.    
 
8.4 DECISION-MAKING PROCESS 
 
As has been highlighted in the preceding discussion, the majority of the case studies 
reflect a significant shift in the approach to management, generally from state-centred 
authority to some form of shared authority. This is largely facilitated through establishing 
co-management institutions, detailing the powers and functions of these institutions and 
their constituent members, and prescribing a management-planning framework to guide 
the exercise of such authority. The decision-making processes characterising these co-
management institutions vary from majority vote252 to consensus accompanied by 
deadlock breaking mechanisms.253 This approach is clearly in line with international 
thinking with its promotion of community participation through open and accountable 
shared decision-making structures. However, notwithstanding the prevalence of these 
institutions and mechanisms, de facto management authority in several of the case 
studies does not appear to have changed and reflects the “reformist rhetoric” plaguing 
many community-based conservation initiatives in Africa.254 
                                                     
251 Grossman et al “Towards Transformation” in Suich et al Evolution and Innovation (2009) 360. 
252 As in the case of the Co-Management Committee of the Dwesa-Cwebe Nature Reserve. 
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There is evidence of conservation authorities with superior experience, resources and 
capacity wielding significant power within the co-management institutions, often to the 
exclusion of community representatives.255 Decision-making within several of case 
studies has been recorded as running along ‘highly authoritarian and hierarchical 
lines’256 with the role of the co-management institution remaining largely theoretical.257 
Furthermore, there is evidence of conservation authorities using management plans to 
effectively veto the communities’ rights of access, use and development.258 Some 
commentators argue that this constitutes an unjustified encroachment on the 
communities’ proprietary rights259 and others that the conditionality imposed on their 
rights places them in a situation of dependence as opposed to authority.260 The above 
state of affairs has led to growing tensions between the conservation authorities and 
community representatives on many of the co-management institutions.261 These 
problems are even evident where the community has a majority on the co-management 
institution.262 
 
Several factors identified as contributing to the current problematic state of affairs can 
be elicited from recent research undertaken in the case study areas. The first is the 
apparent fundamental misconception among many conservation authorities that co-
                                                     
255 In the context of the Makuleke case study, see: Friedman “Winning Isn’t Everything” (2005) 48. 
256 In the context of the Dwesa-Cwebe case study, see: Palmer et al The Dwesa-Cwebe Restitution Claim 
(2006) 11; and De Satgé Issues for the Development of Post-Settlement Support Strategy (2006) 49. 
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Based Natural Resource Management (2002) 45.  
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261 See generally: De Koning (2009) Africanus 16. In the context of the Dwesa-Cwebe case study, see: 
Kepe (2008) Environmental Management 317. In the context of the Makuleke case study, see: Robins et 
al (2008) Development & Change 67. 
262 In the context of the Richtersveld case study, see: Grossman et al “Towards Transformation” in Suich 
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management amounts to mere consultation and not joint decision-making.263 The 
second is the failure of the parties to clarify the exact nature of the co-management 
arrangement in the CCA’s founding agreements.264 The third is the hesitancy of 
particularly lower ranked conservation officials to relinquish management authority to 
the co-management institutions owing to perceived doubts about the management 
capabilities of community members.265 The fourth is the failure of relevant government 
authorities to clearly delineate their mandates causing confusion as to who is the 
competent authority for managing the CCA and who should accordingly represent the 
conservation authorities on the co-management institution.266 The fifth is the lack of 
post-settlement support for building and sustaining the capacity of CPIs, which 
undermines both their internal functioning267 and their ability to play a meaningful role in 
the co-management institutions.268 The sixth is the failure to properly take into account 
and adequately compensate community members for the opportunity costs associated 
with their participation in these institutions. This has in certain areas led to their passive 
participation or absence in order to reduce such costs.269  In others, it has led to the 
community overtly frustrating the management of the CCA, through for instance 
delaying the preparation and approval of the area’s management plan.270  
 
Problems have also been recorded regarding the process for selecting which 
community representatives sit on the co-management institutions; and once selected, 
                                                     
263 De Koning (2009) Africanus 16. 
264 In the context of the Dwesa-Cwebe case study, see: De Satgé Issues for the Development of Post-
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the lack of transparency and accountability in the exercise of their duties.271 Their failure 
to communicate and provide feedback to their constituent communities, predominantly 
as a result of resource and capacity constraints, has fuelled distrust between not only 
the community and its representatives on the co-management institution, but on 
occasion the entire co-management institution itself.272 These problems again raise 
questions regarding the ‘simplistic assumptions of “community” as harmonious, 
representative, democratic and equitable institutions’.273 Care therefore clearly has to be 
exercised in selecting appropriate community representatives to sit on these co-
management institutions, and to ensure that mechanisms are put in place to facilitate 
communication between them and their constituencies. 
 
The above discussion predominantly relates to decision-making within the borders of 
CCAs. It must be recognised, however, that the management of these areas 
increasingly involves ‘a clash of local, regional, national and even international 
interests’.274 This is particularly the case where the area is linked to a neighbouring 
protected area or incorporated with a transboundary conservation initiative. This latter 
trait currently characterises the Makuleke and Richtersveld case studies in particular, 
where the areas supposedly co-managed by the community have been incorporated in 
transfrontier parks. What is concerning in this regard is the failure of the conservation 
authorities to engage the communities on the establishment of these transfrontier parks 
and to include community representation on the management institutions responsible 
for their administration, notwithstanding the fact that the communities ‘own’ significant 
portions of land incorporated within them.275 Concerns have also been raised about the 
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failure of conservation authorities to consult CPIs over the sourcing and allocation of 
financial grants for these transfrontier parks.276 This selective engagement of 
communities on key issues impacting on the CCAs has led some commentators to view 
these transfrontier park initiatives as deliberate attempts to circumvent local community 
participation in conservation.277  
 
There are clearly significant challenges facing the realisation of the objects of South 
Africa’s contemporary conservation regime that seeks to promote greater community 
participation in the decision-making structures and processes governing CCAs. Whilst 
the case studies illustrate recognition by conservation authorities of the need to 
transform their outdated approach to conservation and improve their communication 
with communities,278 the practical realisation of this transformation remains 
superficial.279 If one considers the cumulative experience reflected in the case studies, it 
appears to mimic Murphree’s identified frailties inherent in many ‘people and parks’ type 
programmes where the government authorities refuse to ‘surrender the power and 
control of access to resources essential for robust devolution’.280 It has been recognised 
that the implementation of a collaborative and participatory form of management is a 
                                                                                                                                                                           
Evolution and Innovation (2009) 364; Robins et al (2008) Development & Change 67; Spierenburg et al 
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Natural Resource Management in Southern Africa (2001) Series on Transboundary Natural Resource 
Management Paper No.1, IUCN-ROSA Harare. In the case of the Richtersveld case study, see: Magome 
et al “Sharing South African National Parks” in Adams et al Decolonizing Nature (2003) 124-125 & 126-
127. 
276 Take for instance the Makuleke case study, where SANParks failed to discuss the use of the R40m 
grant allocated to the Kruger National Park to development of the Great Limpopo Transfrontier 
Conservation Area (Grossman et al “Towards Transformation” in Suich et al Evolution and Innovation 
(2009) 364. 
277 Spierenburg et al (2008) Conservation & Society 89-90; Ramutsindela M Transfrontier Conservation in 
Africa: At the Confluence of Capital, Politics and Nature (2007) CAB International Wallingford 105-113; 
Chapin M “A Challenge to Conservationists” (2004) 17(6) World Watch 17-31; and Dzingirai V 
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ROSA Harare 8. 
278 Fabricius et al (2001) Journal of the Royal Society of New Zealand 840-841. 
279 Turner et al Community-Based Natural Resource Management (2002) 11. 
280 Martin R “Murphree’s Laws and Principles, Rule and Definitions” in Mukamuri B, Manjengwa J & 
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‘long and continuously evolving process’.281 Its implementation in South Africa is in its 
relative infancy, but conservation authorities would do well to regularly heed the warning 
of one domestic commentator, that the ‘persistence of a patronistic, hegemonic 
approach is ultimately self-defeating’.282  
 
8.5 DE FACTO MANAGEMENT 
 
In addition to the above problems associated with the management institutions, 
planning frameworks and decision-making processes, the case studies highlight several 
additional practical challenges that impact on the de facto management of CCAs.  
 
The first key challenge stems from the legislative and institutional fragmentation that 
continues to confound South Africa’s conservation regime.283 This is epitomised in the 
Dwesa-Cwebe case study where the delegation and/or assignment of responsibility 
from one entity to another has diluted understanding of the tenor underpinning the 
Settlement Agreement and Community Agreement; led to confusion regarding who is 
the competent authority for the Reserve; confounded the membership of the Reserve’s 
co-management committee; and undermined the ideal of regulating the terrestrial and 
marine components of the Reserve as a single unit.284  
 
The second challenge is the apparent assumption that the parties to the founding 
agreements have the requisite capacity, resources and political will to fulfil their 
management obligations. There is evidence in several of the case studies of the 
designated management authority failing to fulfil its management obligations prescribed 
in the agreement.285 As highlighted above, this is frequently a result of the vague 
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284 Eastern Cape Parks Board Draft Integrated Reserve Management Plan: Strategic Management Plan: 
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formulation of the parties’ respective management functions in the underlying 
agreement.286 The challenge is compounded in certain of the case studies by the 
equally vague and often inequitably formulated provisions for holding defaulting parties 
to account and for resolving disputes.287 Fortunately, this challenge is partly mitigated 
by the range of mechanisms contained in the contemporary conservation regime that 
are specifically designed to promote the performance and accountability of such 
management authorities.288  
 
The failure of existing management authorities to fulfil their management mandates has 
resulted on occasion in the appointment of third parties to undertake management 
functions in CCAs. This is perhaps best epitomised in the Makuleke case study where 
one of the concessionaires running a private lodge in the Pafuri Region, employed a 
private security company to curb rhino poaching in the area.289 The initiative appears to 
have provided an effective stop-gap solution to curb poaching and ultimately led to the 
management authority recently reassuming its responsibilities in the apparent face of 
competition.290 Given the budgetary constraints faced by many domestic conservation 
authorities,291 such initiatives may provide a workable model for sharing management 
costs with concessionaires whose economic returns are dependent on the effective 
management of the area. Important lessons can however be learnt from the controversy 
associated with the above initiative.292 The first is the need to consider including 
                                                                                                                                                                           
Makuleke case study, see: Collins “The Makuleke Conservation and Land Reform Project” (2010) 1-2; 
and Grossman et al “Towards Transformation” in Suich et al Evolution and Innovation (2009) 364. In the 
context of the Dwesa-Cwebe case study, see: De Satgé Issues for the Development of Post-Settlement 
Support Strategy (2006) 55-56 & 64; and Draft Integrated Reserve Management Plan (2006) 17.  
286 For a discussion of this issue, see Chapter 9 (Part 5.2). 
287 In the context of the Dwesa-Cwebe case study, see: Palmer et al The Dwesa-Cwebe Restitution Claim 
(2006) 43. For a further discussion of the dispute resolution procedures contained in the agreements 
underpinning the four case studies, see Chapter 9 (Part 5.2). 
288For further information on these mechanisms, see Chapter 5 (Part 3.1.2). 
289See generally: De Villiers People and Parks - Sharing the Benefits (2008) 78; and Whande Trans-
boundary Natural Resource Management in Southern Africa (2007) 28. 
290 The private security company’s services were terminated in May 2010. SANParks now employ the 
rangers who used to work for the private security company and they fulfil their same functions in the 
Pafuri Region of the Kruger National Park (Collins “The Makuleke Conservation and Land Reform 
Project” (2010) 6). 
291 For a discussion on these financial constraints, see Chapter 5 (Part 2). 
292 The initiative caused significant tension between the private security company and SANParks, who 
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concessionaires as parties to the co-management institutions in order to give credence 
to the key role they frequently play in the de facto management of CCAs. This should 
ideally be in an advisory capacity so as to not unduly skew the power relations between 
the conservation authorities and community representatives on the co-management 
institutions. Interestingly, the conservation authorities in the Makuleke case study 
continue to preclude the participation of concessionaires, notwithstanding calls from the 
community for them to be afforded an observer status at Joint Management Board 
meetings.293 The second is the need to consult with the management authority prior to 
commissioning third parties to undertake management functions in the CCA. The third is 
the need to define the geographical scope and nature of their functions and authority 
clearly. 
 
The final challenge reflected in the case studies which impacts on the de facto 
management of CCAs relates to the role of traditional knowledge and management 
practices in conservation.  If one surveys the founding agreements of all four case 
studies and the planning frameworks that inform their management, they are 
predominantly founded within a westernised scientific discourse. They accordingly 
afford very little recognition to the significant historic and future role traditional 
knowledge and management practices have and can play in conserving the resources 
situated in CCAs. This is clearly at odds with the contemporary international 
conservation discourse that seeks to promote their recognition and use.294 Tensions 
have been recorded in certain of the case studies between scientific knowledge and 
traditional knowledge specifically relating to the state of natural resources and 
management practices.295 These tensions will hopefully compel domestic policy-makers 
to rethink their current blinkered and out-dated approach.  
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9. ACCESS, USE AND BENEFIT-SHARING 
 
The fragility of an approach that seeks to promote conservation without simultaneously 
providing communities with appropriate access, use and benefit-sharing opportunities 
within the CCA has been noted previously in this dissertation.296 This issue is highly 
relevant in the South African context where the majority of rural communities situated 
within or adjacent to CCAs are ‘locked in a cycle of poverty’ and for which ‘the cost-
benefit analysis between having land for farming and grazing or for conservation is a 
matter of survival’.297 The negotiations preceding the formation of these CCAs therefore 
need to acknowledge these realities and ensure that tangible and intangible benefits 
accrue to communities.298 These benefits should ideally be shown to outweigh those 
that could accrue through alternative land uses and the failure to realise such benefits 
may lead to CCAs becoming the ‘victim of competition from other land-use options’.299 
 
As highlighted by the diverse forms of access, use and benefit-sharing schemes 
prevalent in the four case studies, domestic policy-makers appear to have taken the 
above to heart. The schemes include provision for both tangible benefits300 and 
intangible benefits.301 They differ not only in nature but degree, with the rights of access 
and use in some of the case studies being far more extensive than in others.302 This 
would appear to provide some evidence of the stakeholders involved in the formation of 
                                                     
296 For a discussion of this element, see Chapter 3 (Part 4.8). 
297 De Villiers “People and Parks: Challenges and Opportunities” in Land Reform in South Africa (2009) 
80-81. 
298 Ibid. 
299 De Villiers “People and Parks: Challenges and Opportunities” in Land Reform in South Africa (2009) 
96; Turner et al Community-Based Natural Resource Management (2002) 15-16. 
300 Tangible benefits reflected in the founding agreements of the case studies include: residence rights; 
grazing rights; harvesting rights; development and commercial rights (predominantly relating to hunting 
and lodge concessions); employment benefits; financial benefits (predominantly comprising of 
compensation; settlement grants; rental and tourism levies); capacity and training benefits; and the grant 
of alternative land. 
301 Intangible benefits reflected in the founding agreements of the case studies include: the recognition 
and protection of sites of cultural, spiritual and cultural importance; and the grant of access rights to 
communities to undertake spiritual and cultural rituals and ceremonies. 
302 The rights of access and use in the Richtersveld case study are, for example, far more extensive than 
those in the Makuleke case study and Dwesa-Cwebe case study. The least extensive rights of access 
and use are not surprisingly evident in the Bhangazi case study, given that the community forwent 
restoration of their land in favour of compensation. See in this regard the discussion of the four case 












these areas seeking to tailor the schemes to suit their needs and the specificity of the 
area. Several key factors appear to have influenced the negotiation and shape of these 
schemes, such as: the nature, resources and capacity of the community; the presence 
or absence of external support for the community; the strength of the communities’ 
tenure rights preceding the negotiations; and the nature of the land restitutions 
settlement option chosen by them.303 
 
Notwithstanding the recordal of apparently diverse access, use and benefit-sharing 
schemes in the majority of the case studies’ founding agreements, several challenges 
have on occasion thwarted their realisation. These challenges relate to the negotiation 
process through which the schemes arose, their nature and form, their implementation 
and the distribution of rights and benefits accruing from them. 
 
9.1 NEGOTIATION PROCESS 
 
In the majority of case studies, the relevant access, use and benefit-sharing scheme 
was negotiated prior to the establishment of the area and recorded in the founding 
agreement. This would appear to be in line with the approach advocated by 
international scholars.304 The Richtersveld case study is, however, a notable exception. 
The failure of the stakeholders to canvas the community’s commercial development 
rights in the Richtersveld National Park prior to its formation, coupled with their inability 
to amend the founding agreement until 2014, compelled them to record such rights 
within the Park’s management plan.305 As highlighted above, this is not an ideal 
approach and reiterates the need to provide for the periodic review and amendment of 
the founding agreements to enable them to adapt the schemes to changing 
circumstances.306 
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A further challenge relates to the skewed and unrealistic expectations often created 
during the negotiation of the schemes.307 The failure of the promised and often 
unrealisable rights and benefits to materialise has led to frustration and conflict in 
several of the case studies.308 Realism clearly needs to permeate the negotiation 
process from the outset. Such realism could be facilitated through conducting feasibility 
studies to inform the selection of appropriate, viable and long-term rights and 
benefits.309 It could furthermore be facilitated by reinforcing the following general 
realities relating to protected areas during the negotiation process: ownership of the 
area will not necessarily lead to the resolution of the economic and social ills prevalent 
in and around it;310 restitution is not in itself a panacea for rural development;311 
providing access to and development opportunities within the area cannot alone 
facilitate rural development within and adjacent to it;312 and relying on a single strategy 
for promoting rural development may ultimately undermine the livelihoods of groups 
living within or adjacent to it, thereby fuelling conflict and instability.313 While the access, 
use and benefit-sharing schemes associated with CCAs can contribute towards 
sustaining rural livelihoods and alleviating poverty, the parties should ideally seek to 
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integrate these schemes within a far more holistic approach to rural development, one 
preferably led by local government.314  
 
9.2 NATURE AND FORM OF THE RIGHTS AND BENEFITS 
 
While there is evidence of a diverse array of access, use and benefit-sharing schemes 
in operation in the case studies, several commentators have argued that their ambit is 
still too narrow in formulation, particularly regarding eco-tourism opportunities provided 
by the CCAs.315 Criticism has specifically been levelled at the heavy reliance placed on 
concession lodges as the preferred eco-tourism model.316 This criticism stems from the 
high-capital costs associated with their construction; the often unfavourable terms on 
which the communities enter into the agreements with the lodge concessionaires;317 the 
lack of control the communities exercise over the lodge concessionaires’ 
performance;318 the propensity of the lodge concessionaires to preclude other 
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Makuleke Conservation and Land Reform Project” (2010) 8; Spierenburg et al “Transfrontier Tourism and 
Relations between Local Communities and the Private Sector” in Hottola Tourism Strategies and Local 
Responses in Southern Africa (2009) 176; and Spierenburg et al (2008) Conservation & Society 92-93. 
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conflicting but potentially more lucrative forms of commercial concessions;319 the long-
term nature of the anticipated economic returns for the community; and the danger 
inherent in outsourcing all profitable ventures to lodge concessionaires with no 
associated obligation being placed on them to contribute to the management costs 
associated with the CCA.320 These problems could be mitigated by providing support to 
the communities in their dealings with commercial operators; providing for some form of 
public oversight of the negotiation process; fostering realism regarding the nature and 
anticipated returns from the concession agreements; ensuring that concessionaires 
contribute to the costs of managing the area; and diversifying the range of eco-tourism 
enterprises undertaken in the CCA.  
 
Owing to the challenges associated with concession lodges, domestic commentators 
have called for greater emphasis to be placed on small community-based enterprises 
that often require low capital investment.321 These would include locally driven cultural 
and heritage tourism-related activities.322 Given the often erratic nature of the economic 
returns associated with eco-tourism ventures, other commentators advocate the 
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resumption of traditional land use practices323 within and adjacent to the CCA, thereby 
ensuring the resilience of community livelihoods.324 Furthermore, calls have been made 
to acknowledge the significant indirect benefits often associated with the establishment 
of CCAs, such as: increased employment; improved municipal infrastructure and 
services; education and training; institutional development; and social empowerment.325 
Several of these indirect benefits have been noted in the case studies.326  
 
Finally, one major yet largely untapped source of benefits in the context of South 
Africa’s CCAs, stem from the global climate change regime prescribed under the United 
Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change,327 read together with the Kyoto 
Protocol.328 Given the key potential role protected areas can play in climate change 
mitigation,329 opportunities arise for tapping into the potentially lucrative climate change 
incentive schemes, most notably those associated with the Reduced Emissions from 
Deforestation and Forest Degradation (REDD) Mechanism and its REDD Plus 
counterpart.330 These mechanisms feasibly provide a vital tool for providing significant 
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tangible benefits to local communities and potentially aiding in ensuring the financial 




Notwithstanding the inclusion of fairly extensive access, use and benefit-sharing 
schemes in the founding agreements, there is evidence in some of the case studies of 
conservation authorities simply not honouring their undertakings.331 The implementation 
of the schemes is further confounded by the lack of clarity characterising many of the 
access and use rights.332 Furthermore, even where such rights are relatively clearly 
defined in the founding agreements, their exercise is often subject to unduly stringent 
conditions333 and often the prior approval of the management authority.334 This has 
effectively placed several communities ‘at the mercy of conservation agencies who tend 
to pursue conservation goals and the prevention of the consumptive use of natural 
resources at all costs’.335  
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Isimangaliso Wetland Park Authority is yet to designate the community’s heritage site on the shores of 
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335 Kepe et al (2005) International Journal of Biodiversity Science & Management 13. See further: 
Wynberg et al (2007) Journal of Environmental Planning & Management 792; and Magome et al “Sharing 












Several additional practical challenges undermine the implementation of the access, 
use and benefit-sharing schemes. The lack of cooperative governance between 
conservation authorities has frustrated the realisation of the anticipated benefits flowing 
from eco-tourism in certain areas.336 The lack of capacity and resources of some 
communities has undermined their ability to take effective advantage of the access, use 
and development rights recorded in the founding agreements.337 The slow transfer of 
title deeds to successful claimant communities has precluded the ability of certain 
communities to secure finance and enter into commercial partnerships with private 
operators.338 Finally, the improper regulation of commercial operators undertaking 
lucrative commercial ventures within or immediately adjacent to the CCA has on 
occasion precluded the flow of benefits to the community.339 
 
As cautioned by several domestic scholars, a failure to address the above challenges 
undermining the implementation of certain schemes may marginalise the communities 
on which the ‘social and political sustainability of conservation’ often depends.340 It may 
furthermore result in South Africa’s CCAs becoming ‘new rural dumping grounds, 
differing from their apartheid predecessors in that their poverty stricken inhabitants own 
their land’.341 
 
                                                     
336 Take for instance the Dwesa-Cwebe case study, where the lack of cooperative governance between 
the terrestrial and marine conservation authorities regarding fishing rights has led to the ‘still-birth’ of eco-
tourism’ in the Reserve. See in this regard: Fay “Property, Subjection and Protected Areas” in Fay et al 
The Rights and Wrongs of Land Restitution (2009) 36; and Palmer et al The Dwesa-Cwebe Restitution 
Claim (2006) 54. 
337 Take for instance the Makuleke case study, where the community lacks transportation to or from the 
Pafuri Region of the Kruger National Park to enable them to exercise their access and use rights 
(Friedman “Winning Isn’t Everything” (2005) 44). Furthermore, take for instance the Dwesa-Cwebe case 
study, where the community’s lack of capacity has been recorded as undermining their ability to realise 
their ‘environmental entitlements’ in the Reserve (Fabricius “Conservation and Communities” in Palmer et 
al From Conflict to Negotiation (2002) 259 & 262). On ‘environmental entitlements’, see generally: Leach 
M, Mearns R & Scoones I “Environmental Entitlements: Dynamics and Institutions in Community-Based 
Natural Resource Management” (1999) 27(2) World Development 225-247. 
338 Conservation for the People with the People (2010) 36. 
339 Take for instance the Richtersveld case study, where several private operators run commercial rafting 
ventures on the Orange River immediately abutting the Richtersveld National Park, and return no form of 
benefits to the community. See further: Boonzaier “Negotiating the Development of Tourism in the 
Richtersveld” in Price People and Tourism in Fragile Environments (1996) 132; and Boonzaier (1996) 
Biodiversity & Conservation 311-312. 
340 Steenkamp et al People and Parks: Cracks in the Paradigm (2001) 7. 














While ensuring the flow of direct benefits from the CCA to the community no doubt 
reinforces their support for it,342 a ‘sudden rush of benefits can be particularly disruptive 
to community cohesion’ particularly in poor historically disempowered communities.343 
This problem is compounded where there is an absence of strong, well-capacitated, 
open and transparent institutions to ensure the equitable distribution of benefits to the 
local community.344 The general challenges inherent in the functioning of the CPIs to 
which such benefits are allocated have been canvassed above.345 Several problems 
regarding the distribution of benefits by these institutions are specifically noted in the 
case studies. There have been protracted delays in the CPIs to which economic 
benefits generally accrue, spending them for the general benefit of the community.346 
Certain of the access and use rights allocated to the institutions have been monopolised 
by influential members of the community.347 Finally, decisions regarding who constitute 
beneficiaries and the allocation of the benefits between them have on occasion led to 
intra-community and inter-community conflicts.348  
 
There is clearly a need to think strategically about: how best to ensure the equitable, 
transparent and accountable distribution of rights and benefits where they are not 
                                                     
342 Turner et al Community-Based Natural Resource Management (2002) 19. 
343 Fabricius “Conservation and Communities” in Palmer et al (eds) From Conflict to Negotiation (2002) 
267-268. 
344 Kepe (2008) Environmental Management 317. 
345 See Chapter 9 (Part 7.2). 
346 Take for instance the Bhangazi case study, where there have been significant delays in the spending 
of the resources accruing to Bhangazi Community Trust through the tourism levy. See further in this 
regard: Larsson-Lidén “For Whom is the Isimangaliso World Heritage Site” (2007) 10; and Walker (2005) 
Transformation: Critical Perspectives on Southern Africa 20. 
347 Take for instance the Richtersveld case study, where the grazing rights allocated to the community are 
effectively held by six influential members of the community. See further: Grossman et al “Towards 
Transformation” in Suich et al Evolution and Innovation (2009) 360-361; and Boonzaier “Negotiating the 
Development of Tourism in the Richtersveld” in Price People and Tourism in Fragile Environments (1996) 
130. 
348 Take for instance the Bhangazi case study, where the payout of settlement benefits was recorded as 
‘socially destabilising, rousing antagonistic expectations of compensation beyond those households 
represented in the agreement’ and causing tensions within beneficiary households ‘as to who would 
receive the money and how it should be spent’ (Walker Land-Marked (2008) 138). See further: Kepe et al 
(2005) International Journal of Biodiversity Science & Management 14; and Turner et al Community-












derived from any tangible community inputs; how best to support those institutions 
tasked with doing so; and what forms of dispute resolution procedures would be most 
apt to deal with the inevitable conflict.349 One favourable example emanating from the 
case studies is the decision by the Bhangazi community to share a portion of the 
proceeds generated from the tourism levy in operation in the Isimangaliso Wetland Park 
with the neighbouring tribal authority.350 This not only ensures the more equitable 
allocation of benefits to the broader community who have a vested interest in the Park, 
but also provides a tool for sweetening the relationship between the new CPIs and their 
traditional counterparts. 
 
There are clearly several significant challenges facing the realisation of the access, use 
and benefit-sharing schemes at play in the case studies. What is interesting to note is 
that the majority of the challenges reflected in the case studies would not appear to 
stem from the underlying legal regime itself, but rather the political will of the 
conservation authorities to allow for de facto access, use and development rights within 
the area, and the capacity of the communities to negotiate and take on such rights. 
Steps clearly need to be taken to resolve these issues and provide for more extensive 
yet realistic access, use and benefit-sharing schemes in CCAs. However, as illustrated 
in several of these case studies, steps should simultaneously be taken to improve 
compliance monitoring and enforcement.351 Care should furthermore be taken to ensure 
that any renewed focus on improving access, use and benefit-sharing in CCAs does not 
side-line the interest and role of communities in the management of the area.352 
                                                     
349 Kepe et al (2005) International Journal of Biodiversity Science and Management 14; and Fabricius, 
“Conservation and Communities” in Palmer et al From Conflict to Negotiation (2002) 270. 
350 For a discussion of this issue, see Chapter 8 (Part 2.4) .  
351 Take for instance the Dwesa-Cwebe case study, where the lack of direct monitoring, compliance and 
enforcement has been recorded as contributing to the significant increase in the illegal harvesting of 
forest and marine resources. See further in this regard: De Satgé Issues for the Development of Post-
Settlement Support Strategy (2006) 56; Fabricius “Conservation and Communities” in Palmer et al From 
Conflict to Negotiation (2002) 260; and Fabricius et al (2001) Journal of the Royal Society of New 
Zealand 837. Furthermore, take for instance the Richtersveld study where the lack of management 
oversight has been recorded as leading to overgrazing within the Richtersveld National Park and the 
degradation of the landscape caused by tourism-related activities (Boonzaier “Negotiating the 
Development of Tourism in the Richtersveld, South Africa” in Price People and Tourism in Fragile 
Environments (1996) 132. 
352 Reid H, Fig D, Magome H & Leader-Williams N “Co-Management of Contractual National Parks in 













10. FINANCING AND SUPPORT 
 
It is the exception rather than the norm that CCAs are financially self-sufficient.353 This 
is clearly reflected in the case studies where the management authorities continue to 
rely heavily on government and foreign agency grants to fund their operations.354 These 
grants have not only ensured the financial sustainability of the case studies, but have 
furthermore provided employment for members of the communities through poverty 
alleviation schemes such as: Working for Water;355 Working on Fire;356 Landcare;357 and 
the Coastcare Programme.358  This employment is however of a temporary nature and 
attention should be paid to improve the skills and capacity of those benefitting from 
these schemes with a view to securing them long-term employment within the CCAs.359  
 
                                                     
353 For a discussion of this issue, see Chapter 3 (Part 4.9). 
354 Owing to the unavailability of financial statements on the four specific case studies, the following 
information has been distilled from the financial statements of the management authorities tasked with 
their administration. In the context of the Dwesa-Cwebe case study, approximately 90 % (R105 million of 
R114 million) of the Eastern Cape Parks Board’s annual revenue comprised of government grants in 
2009 (Eastern Cape Parks Board Annual Report 2008/2009 (2009) 96). In the context of the Bhangazi 
case study, approximately 64 % (R32 million of R64 million) of the Isimangaliso Wetland Park Authority’s 
annual revenue comprised of government and foreign donor grants in 2009 (Isimangaliso Wetland Park 
Authority Isimangaliso Wetland Park 2008/2009 Annual Report and Financial Statements (2009) 
Presentation to Portfolio Committee, dated 4 November 2009). In the context of the Makuleke and 
Richtersveld case studies, approximately 35 % (R406 million of R1.1 billion) of SANPark’s annual 
revenue comprised of government grants in 2010 (South African National Parks SANParks Annual Report 
2010 (2010) Presentation to Portfolio Committee, dated 10 November 2010). 
355 The Working for Water Programme, introduced by the erstwhile Department of Water Affairs and 
Forestry in 1995, is a government-funded programme that seeks to control and eradicate alien and 
invasive plant species in South Africa. For further information on the programme, see: 
http://www.dwaf.gov.za/wfw/. 
356 The Working on Fire Programme, launched by four non-profit organisations in 2003, is a government-
funded programme that undertakes integrated fire management and veld and wild fire fighting. For further 
information on the programme, see: http://www.workingonfire.org/. 
357 The Landcare Programme, introduced by the erstwhile Department of Agriculture in 1999, is a 
government funded programme that seeks to promote the conservation of natural resources (soil, water 
and vegetation). For further information on the programme, see: Department of Agriculture, 
Implementation Framework for the Landcare Programme: Discussion Document, dated February 1999). 
358 The Coast-Care Programme, introduced by the erstwhile Department of Environmental Affairs and 
Tourism, is a government funded programme which seeks to provide jobs and training for unemployed 
people in coastal communities to create and maintain a cleaner and safer coastal environment. For 
further information on the programme, see: http://www.environment.gov.za/ProjProg/CoastCare/ 
index.htm. 













The case studies provide evidence of the conservation authorities responsible for their 
management seeking to generate their own revenue through concession fees, 
conservation fees and tourism related-income. Some have recorded an increase in self-
generated revenue, but this trend appears limited to national authorities managing 
CCAs of international repute and/or with existing tourism-related infrastructure.360 Those 
tasked with managing provincial CCAs with limited tourism-related infrastructure have in 
contrast recorded a decrease in such income.361 Efforts have furthermore been made in 
certain of the case studies to ensure that claimant communities with development rights 
contribute a share of the income generated through the exercise of such rights, towards 
the management of the CCA.362 However, the income thresholds that trigger such 
contributions are yet to be realised and therefore such contributions have not been 
forthcoming to date.363 This may be partly a result of the heavy reliance placed on the 
lodge concession model as the primary mechanism for generating income within the 
CCA.364 The frailties inherent in this model have been canvassed above.365 Cognisance 
should therefore be accorded to the full range of potential mechanisms for facilitating 
the financial sustainability of CCAs, rather than seeking to rely on one mechanism to do 
so.366 
 
In this regard, it is important to note the broad range of economic incentives introduced 
by the Government in the past five years with the specific purpose of encouraging the 
role of the public in conservation. These economic incentives include: property tax 
                                                     
360 Take for instance the Bhangazi case study, where tourism, retail and concession related income within 
the Isimangaliso Wetland Park increased by 27 % in 2010 (Isimangaliso Wetland Park 2009/2010 Annual 
Report and Financial Statements (2010)). Furthermore, take for instance the Richtersveld and Makuleke 
case studies, where SANParks, which is tasked with managing these areas, recorded a 10 % increase in 
such revenue (from R664 million in 2009 to R726 million in 2010) in 2010 (SANParks Annual Report 2010 
(2010)). 
361 Take for instance the Dwesa-Cwebe case study, where the Eastern Cape Parks Board responsible for 
its administration, recorded a 30 % decrease in self-generated income, from R6.9 million in 2008 to R5.3 
million in 2009 (Eastern Cape Parks Board Annual Report 2008/2009, 96). 
362 In the context of the Makuleke and Dwesa-Cwebe Case studies, see respectively: Chapter 8 (Part 2.2) 
and (Part 2.3). 
363 For a discussion of this issue, see Chapter 9 (Part 9). 
364 Lodge concessions are either currently prevalent (Makuleke and Dwesa-Cwebe case studies) or 
eagerly anticipated (Richtersveld and Bhangazi case studies) as the primary source of self-generated 
income in the case studies. For further information, see the discussion of the case studies in Chapter 8. 
365 For a discussion of the potential challenges associated these concession agreements, see Chapter 9 
(Part 9.2). 












rebates, reductions and exemptions for contracting land into certain forms of protected 
areas; income tax rebates for making donations to certain types of non-profit 
organisations; donations tax exemptions for making such donations; income tax 
deductions for a diverse range of conservation-related expenditure; and income tax 
deductions enabling landowners to set off the value of their land contracted into certain 
forms of protected areas.367 While directly relevant to CCAs, their utility will remain 
somewhat limited until such time as certain anomalies inherent in their formulation are 
resolved and steps are taken to improve general awareness of their application.368 
 
Providing financing to sustain the management of CCAs is but one element essential to 
their success. Support furthermore needs to be given to relevant CPIs to enable them to 
undertake their allocated roles in respect of the CCA.369 The provision of post-
settlement support to these institutions has been identified as one of the main problems 
undermining the success of South Africa’s land reform programme.370 Several factors 
exemplifying the need for such support are reflected in the case studies, such as: the 
lack of capacity and resources amongst CPIs to regulate their internal and external 
relations;371 the ill-defined nature of the rights and benefits allocated to them;372 and 
poor intergovernmental relations between the many relevant government authorities 
who have a role to play in managing the CCA and promoting rural development within 
and adjacent to it.373 Two institutions are perhaps best placed to mitigate these 
challenges and provide the appropriate form of support to the CPIs. These are the 
                                                     
367 A full discussion of these economic incentives unfortunately falls outside the purview of this 
dissertation. For further information, see generally: Paterson A “Considering Recent Developments in 
Environmental Fiscal Reform in South Africa” (2009) 16(1) South African Journal of Environmental Law & 
Policy 29-34; Paterson A “Property Tax - A Friend or Foe for Landscape Protection in South Africa (2005) 
12 South African Journal of Environmental Law & Policy 97-121; and Paterson A “Tax Incentives - 
Valuable Tools for Biodiversity Conservation in South Africa’ (2005) 122 South African Law Journal 182-
216. 
368 A full discussion of these issues similarly unfortunately falls outside the purview of this dissertation. For 
further information, see the array of resources listed in note 367 above. 
369 For a discussion of this essential element, see Chapter 3 (Part 4.9). For a discussion of these potential 
roles, see Chapter 7 (Part 3.1). 
370 For a general discussion of this challenge, see Chapter 6 (Part 4.2). Take for instance the Dwesa-
Cwebe case study, where the nature and responsibility for post-settlement support was not properly 
canvassed at the time the Settlement Agreement (2001) was concluded (Palmer et al The Dwesa-Cwebe 
Restitution Claim (2006) 6, 39 & 43. 
371 For a discussion of this issue, see Chapter 9 (Part 7.2). 
372 For a discussion of this issue, see Chapter 9 (Parts 4, 8 and 9). 












conservation agencies tasked with managing the CCA, and the municipalities within 
whose jurisdiction the CCAs are established.  
 
Notwithstanding express provision for skills transfer and capacity building in most of the 
founding agreements, the management authorities in certain of case studies have failed 
to give effect to them.374 This undermines both the functioning of the area, particularly 
the role of the co-management institution, and the potential for transferring management 
of the CCA to the community at some stage in the future. This would appear to be a 
very short-sighted approach given that the bulk of CCAs are subject to a fixed duration 
and will ultimately revert to the communities to manage, unless agreed otherwise. While 
the conservation authorities may point to the transfer of skills and capacity to community 
members through the employment opportunities provided within the CCA, these have 
largely been in unskilled and low-wage jobs.375 Some commentators have even gone so 
far as arguing that claimant communities effectively constitute ‘a new form of colonial 
and apartheid labour reserves’.376 There is clearly a need to provide ongoing capacity 
development and support to enable communities to become more active participants in 
managing and developing CCAs.377 
 
CCAs can play a vital role in rural development in South Africa.378 Therefore, given their 
proximity to many of the CCAs and the nature of their core functions,379 municipalities 
could and should play a significant role in supporting the CCAs, the CPIs and the 
development priorities of rural communities living within and adjacent to the CCAs. 
Municipalities’ functions are guided by the integrated development plans (IDPs) they are 
                                                     
374 In the context of the Makuleke case study, see: Grossman et al “Towards Transformation” in Suich et 
al Evolution and Innovation (2009) 364; De Villiers People and Parks - Sharing the Benefits (2008) 80-81; 
and Reid (2002) Human Ecology 151. In the context of the Richtersveld case study, see: Grossman et al 
“Towards Transformation” in Suich et al Evolution and Innovation (2009) 360; and Fabricius et al (2007) 
Water Policy 88. 
375 In the context of the Makuleke case study, see: Robins et al (2008) Development & Change 67; 
Friedman “Winning Isn’t Everything” (2005) 34-35; De Villiers et al Land Reform: Trailblazers (2006) 28; 
Reid (2002) Human Ecology 145; and Tapela B & Omara-Ojungu P “Towards Bridging the Gap Between 
Wildlife Conservation and Rural Development in Post-Apartheid South Africa: The Case of the Makuleke 
Community and the Kruger National Park” (1999) 81(3) South African Geographical Journal 148-155. 
376 Friedman “Winning Isn’t Everything” (2005) 35. 
377 De Villiers et al Land Reform: Trailblazers (2006) 29. 
378 De Villiers Land Claims and National Parks: The Makuleke Experience (1998) 2. 












tasked with preparing, implementing and reviewing on an annual basis.380 A fair degree 
of alignment is evident in some of the case studies between the relevant IDPs and the 
CCA management plans.381 However, this is not always the case, especially where no 
management plan has been approved and therefore no alignment is feasible.382 This 
latter conundrum has been partially overcome in certain of the case studies through the 
joint production of CCA specific development plans by the municipal authority, CPI and 
management authority.383 
 
Notwithstanding such developments, significant challenges remain regarding the 
tangible provision of adequate municipal support to CCAs. These emanate from the 
scale of the demarcated municipal areas and the size of the populations falling within 
them. Take for instance the Makuleke case study, where these factors have conspired 
to ensure that there is little meaningful engagement between the Makuleke CPA and 
their geographically distant municipal authority.384 The annual IDP review process385 
theoretically provides an excellent opportunity to reinvigorate such relations; refine and 
harmonise the relevant planning processes to ensure that they promote an appropriate 
form of development within and adjacent to the CCA; and ensure that they prescribe 
                                                     
380 In terms of the Local Government: Transition Act (209 of 1993) and Local Government: Municipal 
Systems Act (32 of 2000), all local government authorities are compelled to prepare an integrated 
development plan (including a spatial development framework) that should guide their functions within 
their municipal area.  
381 Take for instance the Richtersveld case study where commentators have acknowledged the alignment 
between the Park’s Management and Development Plan (South African National Parks Richtersveld 
National Park Management and Development Plan (undated) and the Richtersveld Municipality’s 
Integrated Development Plan (Richtersveld Local Municipality Integrated Development Plan (2009)). See 
further in this regard: Turner et al Community-Based Natural Resource Management (2002) 39-40 & 42. 
382 Take for instance the Dwesa-Cwebe case study, where the absence of an approved management plan 
for the area has precluded its alignment with the relevant municipal IDPs (Amathole District Municipality 
Integrated Development Plan (2009-2010) and the Mbashe Local Municipality Integrated Development 
Plan (2009)). See further in this regard: Fay (2009) World Development 1424; and De Satgé Issues for 
the Development of Post-Settlement Support Strategy (2006) 53-55. 
383 Take for instance the Dwesa-Cwebe case study, where the Amathole District Municipality published a 
specific Development Plan for the Dwesa-Cwebe Nature Reserve (Amathole District Municipality Dwesa-
Cwebe Development Plan (2003)). The plan seeks to promote institutional and functional alignment; and 
clarify the nature of the municipal authority’s supporting role to the Dwesa-Cwebe Nature Reserve. See 
further in this regard: Palmer et al The Dwesa-Cwebe Restitution Claim (2006) 52; and Draft Integrated 
Reserve Management Plan (2006) 6-7. 
384 Turner et al Community-Based Natural Resource Management (2002) 36-38. 
385 Section 34 of the Local Government: Municipal Systems Act (32 of 2000) provides for the mandatory 












detailed timelines and clearly allocated responsibilities.386 Some commentators are 
however of the view that this is unlikely to occur given the relatively small size of many 
of the CCAs and the populations directly affected by them.387 As a result, the CPIs may 
effectively be compelled to take on municipal functions in and adjacent to the CCAs, 
fund these through the meagre proceeds derived from the CCA, and manage their 
relations with third parties without support from municipal structures.388  
 
Providing support to CPIs and CCAs is clearly an essential but difficult enterprise given 
the broad range of institutions and authorities within whose mandate the task potentially 
falls, and the lack of coordination frequently characterising the relations between 
them.389 It has therefore been suggested that overarching structures be created, 
representative of all relevant institutions and authorities, to co rdinate the provision of 
such support and to improve communication between them.390 Calls have furthermore 
been made to ensure that such structures are appropriately resourced and 
capacitated.391 These suggestions would appear well founded but will need to be 
reviewed and amended on a regular basis given the shifting needs and nature of the 




Using the four case studies canvassed in Chapter 8, I have sought to assess critically 
the extent to which South Africa’s legal framework reflects general adherence to the 
essential elements identified by international scholars as theoretically underpinning 
successful CCAs. What should be very evident from the analysis of the four case 
                                                     
386 De Satgé Issues for the Development of Post-Settlement Support Strategy (2006) 64. See further: Hall 
The Impact of Land Restitution and Land Reform on Livelihoods (2007) 17-18. 
387 Turner et al Community-Based Natural Resource Management (2002) 37. See further: Isaacs et al Co-
Managing the Commons in the ‘New’ South Africa (2000) 18. 
388 Turner et al Community-Based Natural Resource Management (2002) 17. 
389 De Satgé Issues for the Development of Post-Settlement Support Strategy (2006) 60. 
390 In the context of the Dwesa-Cwebe case study, see: De Satgé Issues for the Development of Post-
Settlement Support Strategy (2006) 60-61; and Palmer et al The Dwesa-Cwebe Restitution Claim (2006) 
43. 
391 In the context of the Dwesa-Cwebe case study, see: Palmer et al The Dwesa-Cwebe Restitution Claim 
(2006) 45-50; and De Satgé Issues for the Development of Post-Settlement Support Strategy (2006) 64. 












studies is that South Africa’s scorecard is far from ideal. Domestic administrators 
continue to rely on a very narrow array of governance options for promoting CCAs. The 
planning process which precedes their establishment, while frequently protracted, often 
fails to lay an adequate, objective and informed platform for subsequent negotiations 
over the precise nature and form of land tenure, management and access, use and 
benefit-sharing. The consultation and negotiation process itself is in turn often 
undermined by problems associated with identifying relevant stakeholders and ensuring 
parity in their capacity and resources to participate within the process. As a result, 
questions are raised about the equity of the process and its outcome, as reflected in the 
founding agreements, with the interests of conservation frequently seemingly to 
outweigh those of land reform and rural development. 
 
If one considers the manner in which the founding agreements cater for the three main 
components underlying protected areas governance, additional concerns become 
evident. Regarding land tenure, the adoption of an all or nothing approach appears to 
have precluded a consideration of available nuanced forms of limited tenure rights that 
may provide more workable and realistic options for matching the de iure legal option to 
the de facto reality. The issue of land tenure is furthermore clouded by the failure to 
clearly define the land tenure rights in the founding agreements, an array of practical 
obstacles in the land restitution process and the continued absence of South Africa’s 
communal land tenure regime. Regarding management, the heavy reliance placed on 
the contested co-management option, and a very narrow formulation of it, has barred 
several other viable options for facilitating active community participation in the 
management of CCAs. Furthermore, the manner in which it has been implemented has 
frequently precluded equitable and participatory decision-making within the co-
management institutions, leading to a clear disjuncture between form and practice. 
Finally, regarding access, use and benefit-sharing schemes, their nature is similarly 
narrow in formulation and they often fail to consider the full array of realistic and viable 
options that can deliver significant tangible and intangible benefits to communities. 












schemes and the extent to which the distribution of the limited benefits which accrue 
through them are distributed in an equitable and accountable manner.  
 
The problems characterising the above three broad components are compounded by 
significant challenges facing the CPIs and government authorities tasked with their 
implementation. Specific concerns noted in the context of the CPIs relate to their rigid 
composition, capacity constraints, lack of open and accountable decision-making 
processes and their uncertain relationship with institutions of traditional authority. In the 
context of government authorities, the main concerns relate to the fragility or absence of 
cooperative governance and the shifting nature of the functions of certain authorities 
with a key role to play in supporting CCAs, most notably municipal authorities. The case 
studies do provide evidence of several measures specifically aimed at providing support 
to CPIs, improving their relationship with relevant government authorities and promoting 
cooperative governance between government authorities with relevant overlapping 
mandates. The implementation of such measures is unfortunately rather sporadic. 
Extending their application will no doubt improve the current functioning of CCAs. 
However, unless they are accompanied by moves to diversify the models for financing 
the CCAs themselves, particularly those with limited eco-tourism potential and/or 
infrastructure, these institutions and authorities will have no purpose to serve. 
 
The case studies clearly illustrate significant challenges and anomalies within South 
Africa’s domestic legal framework of relevance to CCAs. As highlighted at the outset of 
this chapter, its content does not purport to provide an exhaustive analysis of the extent 
to which each case study reflects the presence or absence of each of the essential 
elements highlighted in Chapter 3. I have rather sought to draw pertinent examples from 
the four case studies which illustrate the challenges faced by policy-makers in giving 
domestic effect to these elements; highlight inherent strengths and weaknesses of the 
existing legal framework; and hold lessons for future legislative reform to provide for the 
more effective domestic implementation of these elements. It is to this analysis of future 
















Part IV of the dissertation seeks to plot the way forward for the extended use of communally-
conserved areas as a tool for bridging South Africa’s conservation and land reform imperatives. 
Chapter 11 (titled Tweaking the Legal Landscape to Improve its Effectiveness and 
Sustainability) seeks to distil a series of concrete recommendations on how to reform the 
current domestic legal framework to create a more effective and sustainable regime for 
communally-conserved areas. It draws together the following key aspects discussed in the 
previous chapters of the dissertation. First, the elements identified by international and domestic 
scholars during the past two decades as essential to the proper regulation of the natural 
commons and communally-conserved areas (Chapters 2 and 3). Secondly, the strengths and 
weakness of South Africa’s existing regime of relevance to communally-conserved areas 
(Chapters 4, 5, 6 and 7) and how these have manifest in several domestic case studies 
















TWEAKING THE DOMESTIC LEGAL LANDSCAPE TO 





The primary question sought to be addressed in this dissertation is whether 
communally-conserved areas (CCAs) provide a useful tool for bridging the gap between 
South Africa’s conservation and land reform agendas; and if so, how to provide for their 
effective and equitable implementation. I proposed at the outset that in order to answer 
this question I would need to consider several subsidiary questions.1 First, how do 
concepts such as the natural commons, protected areas and governance relate to one 
another? Secondly, what are CCAs and why have they recently come to the fore as a 
prominent form of protected areas governance? Thirdly, what elements underpin 
successful CCAs? Fourthly, how does South Africa’s current legal framework provide 
for CCAs to balance the country’s conservation and land reform agendas? Fifthly, how 
has this legal framework been implemented to date to provide for CCAs? Sixthly, has 
the implementation of this legal framework been successful and to what extent does it 
reflect the elements identified by international protected areas scholars as integral to 
well-functioning CCAs? Finally, how can South Africa’s regime as regards CCAs be 
improved to strike an optimal balance between the country’s conservation and land 
reform agendas? Prior to considering this last question, it would be prudent to briefly 






                                                     












2. A BRIEF REFLECTION 
 
2.1 THE CONTEXT 
 
I began the enquiry in Chapter 2 (titled The Role of Protected Areas as a Tool for 
Managing the Natural Commons) by traversing two broad contextual and largely 
theoretical issues relating to protected areas founded on communal property regimes, 
namely: the objective of the CCAs – managing the natural commons; and the general 
form of CCAs – protected areas. Regarding their object, I sought to highlight how the 
meaning of the natural commons remains troubled, but is integrally connected to issues 
of property rights and land tenure. I emphasised how the failure by traditional 
‘commons’ scholars to draw clear distinctions between the nature of the resource 
system and the nature of the property rights applicable to it, has been manipulated in 
the past by policy-makers to entrench exclusionary, protectionist and state-centred 
approaches to conservation in areas previously subject to effective communal property 
regimes. I highlighted that although the concept of ‘the commons’ remains somewhat 
ambiguous and its regulation subject to continued debate, shifting conservation 
paradigms in the past two decades have significantly altered the path of these debates. 
These debates now largely focus on identifying necessary prerequisites for 
implementing effective communal property regimes aimed at conserving common-pool 
natural resources. I emphasized that it was this aspect of the broader commons puzzle 
and its relationship to protected areas, specifically terrestrial and statutory prescribed 
protected areas subject to communal property regimes, which form the focus of this 
dissertation. 
 
Regarding their form, I traversed the array of recent efforts to improve the 
understanding, planning for and recording of the diversity of forms of protected areas 
that exist across the globe. While acknowledging recent initiatives to generate a global 
governance typology for protected areas, most notably the inclusion of governance 
types in the IUCN Management Guidelines (2008), I highlighted several inherent frailties 












protected areas governance, one that seeks to identify the elements underpinning 
protected areas governance, rather than uncomfortably delimiting governance types 
within pre-labelled boxes. 
 
Through the above analysis, I sought to circumscribe the meaning of several very 
anomalous terms of relevance to this enquiry (such as the commons; common pool 
resources; communal property; protected areas; governance; and protected areas 
governance); clearly delimit the ambit of the general enquiry to terrestrial and statutory 
prescribed protected areas subject to communal property regimes; and provide the 
necessary context for the subsequent theoretical analysis of what I termed CCAs. 
 
In Chapter 3 (titled The Nature, Form and Factors Influencing Communally-Conserved 
Areas) I introduced and defined the concept of CCAs. I proposed that this concept 
provides a more workable lens than the IUCN protected area governance paradigm, 
through which to describe, plan for and evaluate the exceedingly diverse efforts to 
conserve common-pool natural resources through communal property regimes. I 
surveyed the trends inherent in recent economic, property rights, ecology, human rights 
and protected areas dialogues which have contributed to the tectonic shift in 
conservation ideology – a shift from conventional protectionist, exclusionary and state-
centred approaches to contemporary inclusive, participatory and human-centred 
approaches. I illustrated how this shift has led to the rise in prominence of CCAs and 
how current debates focus less on the merits of the conventional verse contemporary 
approaches, and more on the elements that promote the latter’s successful 
implementation. I thereafter drew from relevant international literature to distil a series of 
elements that I argued should underpin any regime seeking to provide for CCAs. I 
arranged these elements under several themes, namely: types of CCAs; planning; land 
tenure; consultation and negotiation; declaration; institutions; management; access, use 















2.2 THE LAW 
 
Having defined the concept of CCAs and distilled the elements that theoretically 
underlie their successful implementation, I then turned in Part II of the dissertation to an 
evaluation of the extent to which South Africa’s legal framework provides for their use 
as a tool for bridging the country’s conservation and land reform agendas. I highlighted 
the challenges inherent in undertaking such an analysis given that the requisite 
domestic legal framework sits somewhat uncomfortably between two legal domains, 
namely conservation and land reform, which have both undergone significant 
transformation in the past decade or so following South Africa’s transition to a 
constitutional democracy in the mid-1990s.  
 
I commenced this analysis from a broad perspective by examining the country’s 
constitutional dispensation of relevance to CCAs in Chapter 4 (titled South Africa’s 
Constitutional Regime of Relevance to Communally-Conserved Areas). I analysed the 
array of relevant rights enshrined in the Constitution of the Republic of South Africa, 
1996, most notably the environmental right and the property clause, and how these 
have shaped South Africa’s contemporary conservation and land regime of relevance to 
CCAs. I emphasised that while providing their constitutional foundation, very little clarity 
is unfortunately provided as to the intersection of these rights and how to resolve 
tensions that arise between them. I further emphasised how this apparent disjuncture in 
the Constitution has permeated the contemporary conservation and land regime of 
relevance to CCAs. I then considered the constitutional recognition afforded to 
customary laws and institutions of traditional authority. I highlighted that while 
customary law and traditional authorities continue to play a significant role in the context 
of rural land administration, their role in the context of conservation and CCAs in 
particular is yet to be clearly articulated. I finally addressed the issue of governance and 
specifically the legislative and executive competences afforded to the three spheres of 
government to make and administer laws of relevant to CCAs. I argued that the 












dysfunctional divide that has characterised the domestic relationship between the 
conservation and land reform regimes for the bulk of the past two decades. 
 
I then traversed South Africa’s extensive conservation regime of relevance to CCAs in 
Chapter 5 (titled South Africa’s Environmental Regime of Relevance to Communally-
Conserved Areas). I discussed the significant reforms of the past five years that seek to 
promote a far more inclusive, participatory and human-centred approach to 
conservation, to that which existed prior to 2005. I highlighted the number of 
mechanisms inherent in these reforms for implementing CCAs, several recent policies 
and programmes which have sought to facilitate the implementation of these 
mechanisms, and the exceedingly diverse array of institutions tasked with doing so. I 
concluded that South Africa’s contemporary conservation regime holds great potential 
for implementing CCAs but that notwithstanding its promulgation over five years ago, 
the use of these mechanisms has been disconcertingly sporadic. I furthermore stressed 
the anomaly that the majority of these mechanisms were absent during the first decade 
of South Africa’s land reform programme and that in their absence, the country’s land 
reform authorities were compelled to fashion their own mechanisms when restoring 
communal land situated within protected areas. 
 
This land reform regime formed the focus of Chapter 6 (titled South Africa’s Land 
Regime of Relevance to Communally-Conserved Areas). I critically considered the 
elements of South Africa’s land reform programme of relevance to CCAs, specifically 
those relating to land restitution and land tenure reform. In the context of land 
restitution, I called into question the trend of land authorities in implementing this regime 
to adopt one governance option when resolving land restitution claims in protected 
areas, rather than tailoring different land tenure and management options to suit the 
specificity of each. I furthermore highlighted the practical problems inherent in the 
existing land restitution regime that hold potential for complicating the resolution of the 
extensive outstanding restitution claims over land situated in protected areas. In the 
context of the land tenure component of the land reform programme, I addressed the 












that currently undermine, and will continue to undermine, their role as effective and 
equitable institutions for holding restored land situated within protected areas. I 
furthermore analysed the anticipated legal regime governing communal land rights and 
the extent to which its procedures, tenure options and institutions hold potential for both 
overcoming and further complicating the historic problems associated with communal 
land administration in rural areas. 
 
Having highlighted the manner in which these two regimes have operated in isolation 
from one another for the bulk of the past two decades, I then turned to analyse several 
recent government initiatives which have sought to traverse this artificial and 
dysfunctional divide in Chapter 7 (titled Linking South Africa’s Conservation and Land 
Reform Regimes). While acknowledging the valuable guidance that these initiatives 
have provided to administrators tasked with settling the outstanding communal land 
restitution claims in protected areas, I sought to illustrate through my critical appraisal of 
these initiatives, their inherent theoretical and practical frailties. Perhaps the most 
significant of these frailties is the entrenchment of co-management, and an 
exceptionally narrow formulation of it, as the favoured governance option for 
perpetuating CCAs in South Africa. I argued that this narrow vision shrouds several 
other governance options provided for within South Africa’s domestic legal framework 
for implementing CCAs. I suggested further that this might in turn undermine the role of 
CCAs as tools for bridging South Africa’s conservation and land reform regimes.  
 
I thereafter considered these apparently misunderstood governance options that 
theoretically provide domestic stakeholders with a far more diverse and nuanced array 
of tools for linking the country’s conservation and land reform agendas. In order to 
unpack these governance options, I briefly returned to the issue of protected areas 
governance and distilled an array of governance options which theoretically underpin 
the implementation of CCAs, namely: owner/manager; owner/co-manager; 
owner/beneficiary; non-owner/manager; non-owner/co-manager; and non-owner/non-
manager/beneficiary. I illustrated how South Africa’s current relevant legal framework 












concluded that while South Africa appears on paper to have a comprehensive legal 
framework providing for the implementation CCAs, the regime is beset by several 
inherent challenges. 
 
2.3 THE PRACTICE 
 
To better illustrate these challenges, and the various opportunities that exist for 
overcoming them, I sought to reflect critically on the manner in which domestic 
administrators have sought to implement the various components of this regime to 
balance the country’s conservation and land reform agendas. This enquiry formed the 
focus of Part III of the dissertation, in which I considered the functioning of four case 
studies – four domestic CCAs established during the course f the past two decades. 
These case studies, introduced in Chapter 8 (titled South Africa’s Experimentation with 
Communally Conserved Areas), are the Richtersveld National Park, the Pafuri Region 
of the Kruger National Park, the Dwesa-Cwebe Nature Reserve and the Eastern Shores 
Region of the Isimangaliso Wetland Park. While acknowledging the desirability of 
considering all CCAs established in the past two decades in order to evaluate the merits 
of the domestic regime, I highlighted that this was simply unfeasible and justified my 
selection of the four case studies from a geographical, governance, temporal and 
practical perspective. Drawing on their founding agreements and the comprehensive 
research undertaken by several anthropologists, sociologists, ecologists and 
economists working in each of the four CCAs in the past two decades, I described the 
history of each and objectively detailed the governance options that underpin them. 
 
This analysis effectively provided the context for Chapter 9 (titled Evaluating South 
Africa’s Experiment with Communally-Conserved Areas). In this chapter, I critically 
considered the extent to which the case studies reflect general adherence to the 
essential elements identified by international scholars as theoretically underpinning 
successful CCAs (which I distilled in Chapter 3). The outcome of this analysis indicated 
that South Africa’s scorecard is far from ideal. Domestic administrators continue to rely 












process which precedes their establishment often fails to lay an adequate, objective and 
informed platform for subsequent negotiations over the precise nature and form of land 
tenure, management and access, use and benefit-sharing arrangements. The 
consultation and negotiation process is itself often undermined by problems associated 
with identifying relevant stakeholders and ensuring parity in their capacity and resources 
to participate. As a result, the equity of the process and its outcome, as reflected in the 
founding agreements, is brought into question with the interests of conservation 
frequently seemingly to outweigh those of land reform and rural development.  
 
In the context of land tenure, the adoption of an all (full title) or nothing (no-title) 
approach has precluded the consideration of available nuanced forms of limited tenure 
rights that may provide more workable and realistic options for matching the de iure 
legal option to the de facto reality. The issue of land tenure is furthermore clouded by 
the failure to clearly define the land tenure rights in the founding agreements, an array 
of practical obstacles in the land restitution process and the continued absence of South 
Africa’s communal land tenure regime. With regard to management, heavy reliance is 
placed on the contested co-management option, and a very narrow formulation of it. 
This has prevented several other viable options for facilitating active community 
participation in the management of CCAs. Furthermore, the manner in which it has been 
implemented often precludes equitable and participatory decision-making within the co-
management institutions. This has often led to a clear disjuncture between form and 
practice. Finally, regarding access, use and benefit-sharing schemes, their nature is 
similarly narrow in formulation. These schemes also often fail to consider the full array 
of realistic and viable options that can deliver significant tangible and intangible benefits 
to communities. Problems have furthermore been noted both in relation of the 
implementation of these schemes and the extent to which the limited benefits which 
accrue through them are distributed in an equitable and accountable manner.  
 
Significant hurdles facing CPIs and government authorities tasked with their 
implementation further compound the above challenges. Specific concerns noted in the 












and accountable decision-making processes and their uncertain relationship with 
institutions of traditional authority. In the context of government authorities the main 
concerns relate to the fragility or absence of cooperative governance and the shifting 
nature of the functions of certain authorities with a key role to play in supporting CCAs, 
most notably municipal authorities. The case studies do provide evidence of several 
measures specifically aimed at providing support to CPIs, improving their relationship 
with relevant government authorities and promoting cooperative governance between 
government authorities with relevant overlapping mandates. The implementation of 
such measures is unfortunately rather sporadic. Extending their application will no doubt 
improve the current functioning of CCAs. However, unless they are accompanied by 
moves to diversify the models for financing the CCAs themselves, particularly those with 
limited eco-tourism potential and/or infrastructure, these institutions and authorities will 
have no purpose to serve. 
 
3. OPTIONS FOR REFORM 
 
The case studies clearly illustrate significant challenges facing the implementation of 
South Africa’s vast domestic legal framework of relevant to CCAs. All that now remains 
to be considered are several recommendations (the solutions) for tweaking this legal 
regime so as to ensure that it promotes a more effective and equitable balance between 
South Africa’s conservation and land reform agendas. These recommendations are 
similarly structured according to the themes identified as underlying successful CCAs in 
Chapter 3 and used to analyse the case studies in Chapter 9. At the outset, it must be 
emphasised that these recommendations highlight the general areas requiring reform 
and possible broad options for such reform. They do not purport to provide an extensive 
analysis of the precise nature and detail of such reform. The latter falls outside the 
















3.1 TYPES OF COMMUNALLY-CONSERVED AREAS 
 
While South Africa’s relevant legal framework does not provide expressly for CCAs, it 
does contain several options enabling local communities to become involved in 
protected areas whether as owners, managers, beneficiaries or developers.2 While this 
flexibility is desirable, it can unfortunately lead to confusion and discontent.3 This is 
particularly so where capacity-building programmes aimed at promoting understanding 
of the options and the factors that should inform their selection do not accompany its 
introduction. Such confusion and discontent is reflected in the case studies, most clearly 
in the Government’s narrow reliance on the co-management ‘lease model’ to settle the 
majority of land reform claims in protected areas.4 Each land claim in a protected area is 
unique and role-players therefore have to fashion unique solutions. Adopting a ‘one-
size-fits-all approach’ is not the solution.5 
 
The existing legal framework providing for these options accordingly does not appear to 
require reform. What is urgently required however, is the implementation of capacity-
building programmes aimed at promote understanding of these options amongst all 
relevant stakeholders. This would assist in ensuring that the most appropriate legal 
option is selected – one ideally matched to the specificity of the community and the 
area. The existing National and Provincial People and Parks Forums and Steering 
Committees6 would appear the natural structures through which to implement such 
programmes. These programmes will clearly need to be accompanied by a review of 
the Memorandum of Understanding7 and National Co-Management Framework8 so as 
to ensure that both accurately reflect the full array of options inherent in the relevant 
                                                     
2 See Chapter 7 (Part 3.1). 
3 See Chapter 9 (Part 2). 
4 Ibid. 
5 De Villiers B People and Parks - Sharing the Benefits (2008) KAS Johannesburg 83; De Villiers B 
“People and Parks: Challenges and Opportunities” in Land Reform in South Africa: Constructive Aims and 
Positive Outcomes - Reflecting on Experiences on the Way to 2014 (2009) Seminar Report No.20, KAS 
Johannesburg 84; and Walker C Land-Marked (2008) Jacana Media (Pty) Ltd Auckland Park 140. 
6 See Chapter 5 (Part 3.3.3). 
7 Minister of Agriculture and Land Affairs and Minister of Environmental Affairs and Tourism Memorandum 
of Agreement (2007) dated 2 May 2007. 












legal framework and the array of factors that should inform their selection.9 These 
factors would include: the nature of the local community (the size of the community; 
their proximity to the protected area; the coherence of the community; the connectivity 
of the community to the protected area; the development potential of the community; the 
resources and capacity of the community; and the availability of support for the 
community);10 and the nature of the land and resources situated in, or to be 
incorporated in, the CCA (the conservation and cultural importance of the area; the 
viability of alternative land-use and resource-use in the area; the development and 
beneficiation potential of the area; and the availability and feasibility of alternative land 
claim settlement options). Attention should also be drawn to the fact that these options 
are not cast in stone, and that local communities can accordingly shift between them 




What should be clear from the analysis of South Africa’s contemporary conservation 
and land reform regimes is that both make provision for comprehensive planning 
processes.12 However, as indicated by the case studies, their implementation has been 
far from ideal.13 While legislative reform may not again prove necessary, steps clearly 
need to be taken to improve the alignment between the two planning processes and the 
efficiency and inclusivity of both. First, in the context of conservation planning, often 
well-developed but somewhat outdated park-level plans should be reconsidered and 
aligned with contemporary national, regional and local conservation planning 
frameworks. This would ensure that land situated within any existing protected area, 
which is subject to a land claim, actually constitutes land of high conservation value. 
This may aid in legitimising the conservation authorities desire to conserve the land, 
                                                     
9 See Chapter 7 (Part 3.2). 
10 De Koning M “Co-Management and its Options in Protected Areas of South Africa’ (2009) 39(2) 
Africanus 8. 
11 See Chapter 7 (Part 3.2). 
12 The conservation regime makes provision for an array of planning mechanisms at national, regional 
and local level (see further Chapter 5 (Part 3)). The land reform regime includes provision for pre-
feasibility studies to inform the selection of the most appropriate land claim settlement options (see further 
Chapter 6 (Part 2)). 












remove the tendency of some conservation authorities to hold onto land of low 
conservation value, and potentially free up land for alternative land uses by claimant 
communities. Secondly, the inclusion of environmental factors into relevant land reform 
policies and plans should be promoted.14 Thirdly, steps should be taken to ensure that 
the implementation of the statutory conservation and land reform planning processes 
which precede the formation of a CCA, are far better aligned with one another; more 
inclusive, transparent and participatory; and realistic regarding the array of possible and 
viable CCA options presented to claimant communities. Fourthly, given the often 
integral link between CCAs and rural development, the planning processes informing 
their creation and implementation should be better aligned to local development 
planning processes (such as integrated development plans and spatial development 
frameworks) and the rural development programmes (most notably the Comprehensive 
Rural Development Programme15 and the Settlement and Implementation Support 
Strategy for Land and Agrarian Reform in South Africa16). This may aid in ensuring the 
long-term sustainability of the CCA and promote the inclusion of local and district 
municipalities as key role players in the planning process. Finally, to promote tangible 
inclusivity and participation, the requisite resources and capacity should to be afforded 
to all stakeholders to enable them to properly engage in the planning process. 
 
3.3 LAND TENURE 
 
As I have illustrated through the case studies, the adoption of an ‘all or nothing’ 
approach to land tenure in the restitution context has proven very problematic.17 I would 
accordingly urge the Government to consider carefully the merits of granting alternative 
and limited forms of tenure (in the form of access and use rights) as opposed to full 
tenure to land claimant communities in appropriate circumstances. As I have previously 
                                                     
14 This is specifically recognised in Sustainable Development Consortium Settlement and Implementation 
Support Strategy for Land and Agrarian Reform in South Africa: A Synthesis Report (2007) Commission 
on Restitution of Land Rights Pretoria 222-223. 
15 Ministry of Rural Development and Land Reform The Comprehensive Rural Development Programme 
Framework (2009). See Chapter 6 (Part 4.1). 
16 Sustainable Development Consortium Settlement and Implementation Support Strategy for Land and 
Agrarian Reform in South Africa: A Synthesis Report (2007) Commission on Restitution of Land Rights 
Pretoria. See Chapter 6 (Part 4.2). 












indicated, the Restitution of Land Rights Act makes specific provision for the restoration 
of not only full tenure, but also “rights in land”.18 Granting the latter may better enable 
authorities to tailor unique solutions to suit the specificities of the particular community 
and protected area. It may also ensure that the de iure settlement arrangement better 
reflects the de facto reality, thereby minimising the misconception over the nature of 
land rights held by claimant communities, and the potential for future discontent and 
conflict between them and conservation authorities. These misconceptions, discontent 
and conflict are clearly illustrated in all four of the case studies canvassed in this 
dissertation.19 I would furthermore advocate a rethink of the current aversion reflected in 
both the Memorandum of Understanding and National Co-Management Framework to 
occupation as a viable restoration option within protected areas, where appropriate.20 
The contemporary international conservation discourse of relevance to CCAs clearly 
dispels the myth that conservation and occupation are mutually exclusive concepts.21 
While such occupation would need to be very carefully structured and managed, its 
preclusion as a possible restitution option would not appear justified. 
 
Integrally linked to the above, is the manner in which the relevant land tenure rights and 
responsibilities are recorded in the agreements underpinning the formation of the CCAs. 
As is once again illustrated by the case studies, current practice is far from ideal.22 
Urgent measures are required to ensure that the land tenure rights and responsibilities 
of all parties are very clearly framed in these agreements to promote clarity and 
certainty.23 They should furthermore ideally be recorded in one agreement and not have 
to be distilled from several different documents. 
 
                                                     
18 See Chapter 6 (Part 2.1). 
19 See Chapter 9 (Part 4). 
20 See Chapter 7 (Part 2) 
21 See Chapter 3 (Part 4.4). 
22 See Chapter 9 (Part 4.2). 












The process for concluding these contractual relations has clearly been improved in 
recent times, especially since the introduction of the Memorandum of Understanding 
(together with its Operational Protocol) and the National Co-Management Framework.24  
Not only do they prescribe a principle framework for guiding the content of these 
agreements, but also clearly set out the process to be followed and the requisite 
responsibilities of the conservation and land reform authorities in it. This clarity is 
naturally to be welcomed. There are however several aspects which often hamper the 
process and accordingly require urgent attention.25 First, the significant capacity and 
resource constraints undermining particularly the Department of Rural Development and 
Land Reform and the Restitution of Land Rights Commission need to be resolved. 
Secondly, where the land in question is state-owned, the procedures relating to the 
disposal of such land need to be expedited. Thirdly, where full title is to be transferred, 
the procedures for the transfer of title deeds need to be hastened. The current slow rate 
of transfer is recognised as frustrating the ability of local communities to secure 
essential financing and enter partnerships with commercial entities. 
 
However, none of these proposed reforms will prove successful until such time as the 
Government finalises the country’s future communal land tenure regime. The general 
problems associated with its continued absence have been comprehensively canvassed 
in this dissertation.26 In the context of CCAs, the prescription of South Africa’s 
communal land tenure regime is paramount from three main perspectives. First, it is 
communal land tenure that underlies CCAs. The absence of a coherent regime 
governing communal land tenure therefore seriously undermines the current and future 
use of CCAs as an effective tool for simultaneously realising vital conservation 
objectives, real transformation in rural land ownership patterns and tangible rural 
development. Secondly, the administration of communal land tenure in rural areas is 
integrally intertwined with the status of traditional leadership structures. It is the newer 
often more democratic CPIs, such a communal property associations and trusts, which 
generally hold tenure over the land and resources situated in CCAs. They are the 
                                                     
24 See Chapter 7 (Part 2). 
25 For a discussion of these problems, see Chapter 9 (Part 4.3). 












institutions that accordingly represent community interests in the agreements 
underpinning the formation of CCAs. However, the boundaries of CCAs often overlap 
with land falling under the administration of traditional leadership structures. Until such 
time as domestic policy-makers clearly circumscribe the role and functions of these 
often-autocratic traditional leadership structures in South Africa’s future communal land 
tenure regime, destructive battles will continue to wage between them and their 
contemporary counterparts. Finally, while these contemporary CPIs have been used to 
fill the apparent vacuum, history has shown that their composition, decision-making 
processes and the nature of the tenure rights held by them is far from ideal. These 
challenges will similarly continue to abound until such time as South Africa’s communal 
land tenure regime, together with its revised communal land tenure institutions, is 
prescribed. 
 
It is acknowledged that this is no easy task given its political ramifications – most 
notably the erosion of traditional leadership authority over rural land administration. 
Fourteen years have passed however, since the publication of the White Paper on 
South African Land Policy,27 within which the Government undertook to address the 
issue of communal land tenure. The time is clearly ‘over-ripe’ for the Government to do 
so – to tackle one of the hardest and politically sensitive issues it has had to address – 
one which is however essential for promoting equity, transparency and certainty 
amongst the 14 million people who practice communal land tenure in South Africa.28 
The precise nature and form of South Africa’s future communal land tenure regime 
cannot be determined by this thesis. I can recommend, however, that policy-makers 
draw from the comprehensive academic debate that has surrounded the formulation of 
the draft versions of the Communal Land Rights Act and the constitutional challenges to 
its final iteration.29 The underlying approach advocated by the bulk of this commentary is 
one which recognizes the flexible, inclusive, layered and nested nature of communal 
land tenure rights; and one which affords statutory recognition to both group rights and 
                                                     
27 Department of Land Affairs White Paper on South African Land Policy (1997). 
28 Pienaar G “The Land Titling Debate in South Africa” (2006) 3 Tydskrif vir die Suid Afrikaanse Reg 435. 












the myriad forms of fragmented-use rights which are prevalent in rural areas of South 
Africa. 
 
3.4 CONSULTATION AND NEGOTIATION 
 
While the analysis of the case studies reflect several problems in the consultation and 
negotiation process that preceded their formation,30 the majority of these appear to have 
been resolved through the promulgation of South Africa’s contemporary conservation 
regime. This regime contains several procedural safeguards that should promote 
fairness, openness and transparency within the statutory processes governing the 
formation of CCAs.31 These safeguards are complemented by recent initiatives aimed at 
linking its implementation with that of the land reform regime, most notably the 
Memorandum of Understanding and the National Co-Management Framework. Read 
together, they furthermore contain several mechanisms for resolving conflicts that may 
arise in the negotiating process, through both formal and alternative forms of dispute 
resolution.32 
 
However, notwithstanding these legislative and policy developments, there remains 
room for improvement with regard to the negotiation process and the agreements to 
emerge from it. In respect of the former, problems relating to the identification of 
claimant communities remain, as does the unfortunate trend of compressing often-
diverse communities into fictitiously unified CPIs for the purpose of negotiating land 
restitution settlements.33 The promulgation of a communal land rights regime of the 
nature proposed above should go some way toward assisting in identifying relevant 
community stakeholders, affording recognition to the diversity inherent within and 
between them, and creating appropriate institutions to represent them in their dealings 
with one another and with relevant government authorities. This re-emphasises the 
need for South Africa’s communal land rights regime to be finalised forthwith. 
                                                     
30 See Chapter 9 (Part 5). 
31 See Chapter 5 (Part 3). 
32 See Chapter 5 (Part 3) and Chapter 6 (Part 2). 













Problems do not however only arise in relation to identifying relevant local community 
stakeholders. The case studies further reflect the tardy participation or omission of key 
government authorities from the negotiation process. While both the land restitution 
regime34 and contemporary conservation regime35 mandate consultation with relevant 
government authorities, there appears on occasion to be uncertainty as to who these 
relevant authorities are. It may therefore be prudent to impose a statutory obligation on 
those stakeholders initiating the process to establish a CCA: to first, scope all potentially 
relevant stakeholders, including relevant government authorities, as part of the planning 
process; and secondly, to include them in all subsequent negotiations. This may ensure 
that all relevant stakeholders are drawn into the negotiating process as early as 
possible. 
 
Additional measures are also required to ensure that the CPIs in particular have the 
requisite capacity and resources to participate equitably in the negotiation process.36 
Owing to its inherent value in forging not only viable solutions but also fostering long-
term relationships based on trust and mutual respect, I advocate that clarity as to the 
precise form and nature of such measures be prescribed as a matter of law, rather than 
left to the whim of administrators and external benefactors. Furthermore, I propose the 
prescription of a set of negotiating principles to guide the conduct of all stakeholders 
that are party to such negotiations; and the statutory identification of an array of factors 
that must be taken into account by these stakeholders in selecting the most appropriate 
legal option. These measures could be complemented by the appointment of 
independent observers or ombudsmen to monitor and vouch for the equity, inclusivity 
and transparency of the negotiating process. 
 
Several of the case studies provide excellent examples of the fact that the creation of 
CCAs frequently involves ‘a clash of local, regional, national and even international 
                                                     
34 See Chapter 6 (Part 2.1). 
35 See Chapter 5 (Part 3.1). 












interests’.37 The latter clash of interests is very evident where CCAs are established and 
then subsequently incorporated into transboundary conservation initiatives. Government 
authorities need to ensure that local community representatives are invited to be a party 
to the negotiation of these transboundary initiates, especially where the community 
holds tenure over the land, or a part thereof, to be included in the transfrontier park. 
Their notable omission, as vividly illustrated in the Richtersveld and Makuleke case 
studies, may well stem from the absence of a statutory or policy framework guiding the 
process to be followed in establishing transfrontier parks. While not advocating an entire 
new domestic regime to specifically govern such parks, I do propose the prescription of 
clear procedures to ensure that the negotiation of the international agreements 
underpinning them take place in an open, accountable and inclusive manner. I further 
propose that these procedures ensure that relevant communities holding tenure within 
the anticipated transfrontier park are a party to these negotiations, and that provision is 
made for them to be duly represented on the transfrontier park’s management and/or 
advisory institutions. 
 
As has been identified in the context of land tenure above, the terms of the founding 
agreements emanating from these negotiations need to be very clearly defined and 
recorded. The different formulations illustrated by the case studies are rich in their 
diversity, yet exceedingly confusing in their application and comparison.38 Such 
confusion could potentially be mitigated through the preparation of a series of pro-forma 
agreements highlighting the generic aspects which ought to be contemplated during 
negotiations, and which should ultimately be addressed in some form in the resultant 
agreement. These aspects could include: the identification of the types of stakeholders 
who should be a party to it; the shared vision and objectives for the CCA; the 
description of the boundaries of the CCA; the governance option underpinning the CCA; 
the parties’ respective rights and obligations in respect of CCA (with clear timelines for 
executing and fulfilling them); the institutions created to administer the CCA (including 
their composition, powers and functions); any access, use and benefit-sharing 
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arrangements (including their precise nature and form, who has access to them, the 
distribution of benefits, and who is responsible for such distribution); conflict resolution 
procedures; the duration of the arrangement; and finally provision for regular monitoring, 
reporting and review (including its nature, its frequency, who is responsible for it, and 
any prerequisites and procedures for affecting amendments to, or terminating, the 
agreement). Without becoming too prescriptive and aware of the dangers inherent in the 
use of pro-forma agreements, they could be tailored to suit the different options inherent 
in South Africa’s legal framework of relevant to implementing CCAs. They could 




Since the advent of the country’s contemporary conservation regime in 2005, South 
Africa has had a rigorous regime governing the declaration of CCAs whether by 
transforming existing protected areas (through the land restitution process) or by 
creating new protected areas ab initio (under the national conservation).39 This aspect 
of the national regime would appear to satisfy all the essential elements identified by 
international scholars, crucially including extensive provision for public participation.40 
One caveat to this is the prevalence of outdated provincial conservation legislation that 
is inconsistent with the contemporary national conservation regime.41 This provincial 
legislation requires urgent amendment to bring it in line with the national conservation 
dispensation. A moratorium could be imposed on its use to establish CCAs, particularly 
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The diversity of institutions and decision-making structures at play in CCAs is very 
vividly illustrated by the case studies.42 South Africa’s overarching conservation and 
land reform regimes theoretically provide the necessary flexibility for tailoring the 
composition of these institutions to suit the specificity of the CCA.43 They furthermore 
contain several mechanisms aimed at ensuring that their decision-making takes place in 
an open, transparent, coordinated and representative manner.44 However, as is 
furthermore illustrated by the case studies, the functioning of, and coordination 
between, these institutions has been less than ideal.45 
 
In the context of relevant government institutions, the constitutional dictate of 
cooperative governance remains a myth46 and measures should be taken to promote 
coordination particularly between the conservation, land reform and local government 
authorities. While the Memorandum of Understanding and National Co-Management 
Framework have sought to promote coordination in the run up to the formation of CCAs, 
this trend unfortunately does not appear to flow through to the post-implementation 
phase. 
 
The early identification and inclusion of all relevant government authorities in the 
negotiating process and ensuring that their role is more clearly spelt out in the CCA’s 
founding agreement, will no doubt significantly improve the situation.47 This will however 
need to be complemented by initiatives aimed at building the capacity of all relevant 
government authorities to ensure that they understand the new conservation paradigm 
and the available legal options for implementing it. Steps will also need to be taken to 
address the resource constraints facing particularly the land reform authorities and 
provincial conservation authorities. This should ensure that authorities have the 
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requisite skills and resources to understand and better fulfil their mandates. The 
satisfaction associated with the latter may in turn slow the rapid turnover of staff in these 
institutions and minimise associated problems such as inadequate handover 
procedures and the loss of institutional memory. 
 
Certain of the case studies have also highlighted the value of establishing broad 
overarching advisory structures, comprising of representatives from all relevant 
stakeholders, to guide and coordinate the provision of post-settlement support to 
CCAs.48 Furthermore, given the key role now played by local government in rural 
development, including the provision of post-settlement support to CPIs and CCAs,49 
measures need to be taken to the formalise such relationships. As advocated above, 
local government authorities clearly need to be a party to the negotiations, with their 
anticipated role in the CCA clearly enunciated in the founding agreement. Some of the 
case studies have however illustrated the benefits of complementing the above by 
appointing dedicated representatives within local government to manage this increasing 
key relationship.50 
 
While the above measures will go some way towards improving the functioning of 
government institutions relevant to CCAs and their relationship with relevant CPIs 
holding tenure over, or with an interest, in the CCA, it is the functioning of the latter 
institutions that require the most urgent attention. In the absence of South Africa’s 
communal property regime, communal property associations and trusts have been the 
chosen legislative vehicles for holding communal land and representing communal 
interests. The statutory frameworks and founding agreements that regulate their 
formation and administration specifically seek to ensure that they operate in a 
representative, accountable, transparent and democratic manner.51 However, the case 
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studies reflect several challenges that preclude the realisation of this ideal.52 These 
challenges relate to both the internal functioning of these CPIs and to their dealings with 
other relevant institutions, particularly traditional authorities.  
 
Recent reports on the internal functioning of existing CPIs are exceptionally damning.53 
The key challenges currently undermining CPIs do not generally appear to be 
attributable to the comprehensive statutory framework governing their formation and 
operation. They rather appear attributable to its chequered implementation. Additional 
resources clearly need to be allocated to government authorities charged with 
overseeing these CPIs, to ensure that the statutory mechanisms aimed at promoting 
transparent, democratic and accountable governance are heeded. To promote flexibility 
and preclude the current trend of long-term despotic governance, provision could be 
made for the mandatory periodic rotation of the membership of the CPI decision-making 
structures. Provision could also be made for regular mandatory consultation between 
these structures and their constituency. To preclude the prevalent fraud and corruption 
currently associated with many CPIs, provision could also be made for mandatory 
government oversight of certain types of commercial transactions entered into between 
the CPIs and third parties (such as concessionaires seeking to undertake commercial 
activities in CCAs). Finally, although initially tasked with communal land administration, 
their functions have rapidly broadened into the realm of commerce and rural 
development. Measures accordingly need to be taken to clarify the core function of 
these institutions, either by expanding their current statutory mandate, or retaining their 
current mandate and compelling them to form special purpose vehicles (SPV) when 
entering into commercial transactions with third parties.  
 
I would advocate the former approach in order to ensure that any benefits stemming 
from these transactions accrue to the CPIs and not SPVs frequently headed up by the 
politically well-connected elite within a community. Programmes aimed at building the 
capacity of CPIs to protect their interests when concluding such transactions would 
                                                     
52 See Chapter 9 (Part 7.2). 












clearly need to precede any anticipated expansion of their mandate. It may also be 
prudent, as proposed above, to provide for compulsory government oversight of such 
transactions in an effort to ensure that the interests of all CPI members are protected 
vis-à-vis their leadership and the commercial entity with which they are transacting. 
 
The final issue to be addressed in the context of CPIs is their problematic relationship 
with traditional leadership structures. As I have argued above, until such time as 
domestic policy-makers clearly circumscribe the role and functions of these often 
autocratic traditional leadership structures in South Africa’s future communal land 
tenure regime, destructive battles will continue to wage between them and their 
contemporary counterparts.54 The finalisation of this regime is a clear priority. 
Furthermore, when formulating the nature, composition, powers and functions of its 
revised communal land tenure institutions, policy-makers should draw valuable lessons 




The first key concern raised by the case studies relating to management, is the 
wholesale adoption of co-management, and a very narrow and somewhat skewed 
formulation of it, as the preferred model for bridging the conservation and land reform 
divide. I have previously canvassed the theoretical and practical problems associated 
with this approach.55 I accordingly advocate the move away from the blind reliance 
placed on the co-management model, as formulated in the National Co-management 
Framework, to one that affords greater recognition to the broad array of governance 
options prescribed in the relevant domestic legal framework; one which correctly reflects 
co-management as one option on the continuum of protected areas governance 
options.56 New policy frameworks or guidelines will clearly need to be developed to 
clarify the nature of these diverse governance options and the factors which should 
inform their selection. Steps are fortunately underway in this regard with the launch of 
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the People and Parks Toolkit57 in March 2011, a resource aimed at demystifying these 
governance options and building capacity amongst authorities and communities to 
implement them. 
 
All four of the case studies reflect the creation of institutions to regulate the relationship 
between the local community and the conservation authorities.58 This trend is supported 
by the contemporary conservation regime, which prescribes several mechanisms to 
expressly facilitate this process.59 The structure and functioning of these institutions are 
not, however, beyond reproach with decision-making authority frequently remaining 
vested in hierarchical and centralised conservation authorities.60 Several measures 
could be introduced to counteract this unfortunate reality. 
 
Mechanisms could to be prescribed to ensure that the membership of these institutions 
is far more inclusive and equitably spread between representatives from the relevant 
CPI and the designated management authority. There may also be merit in extending 
the membership of these ‘co-management’ institutions to include representatives from 
other relevant national and provincial conservation authorities, local government, 
traditional leadership structures, surrounding communities affected by the CCA, and 
commercial entities undertaken activities within or adjacent to it. While the role of the 
latter representatives may need to be delimited to an advisory or observer capacity so 
as not to unduly congest decision-making, their inclusion feasibly promotes information 
exchange and cross-institutional collaboration and coordination. Advisory structures of 
this nature would mimic the park forums,61 recently established in many national parks 
in South Africa. However, I propose that these advisory structures, unlike the parks 
forums, be accorded statutory status, with their membership and advisory functions 
clearly defined. I would furthermore propose that the functioning of these structures be 
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initially financed through the Government’s People and Parks Programme62 until such 
time as the relevant CCA becomes financially self-sustainable. 
 
Measures also need to be introduced to preclude the current frequent turnover of 
particularly community representatives on these institutions.63 Such measures could 
include tendering in advance their out-of pocket expenses and opportunity costs 
occasioned by their participation in these institutions. This could be funded through 
either the coffers of the relevant CPI or the management authority. Whatever the 
source, nature and extent of this commitment, it should be very clearly defined in the 
CCA’s founding agreement. So too should the precise nature of the collaborative 
relationship; mandate of the ‘co-management’ institution; powers and functions of the 
institution; respective roles and commitments of its constituent members; decision-
making procedures; monitoring and reporting requirements; dispute resolution 
procedures; and the institution’s financial arrangements. 
 
Time and resources could furthermore be allocated to developing and implementing 
programmes aimed at building the technical and management capabilities of local 
community representatives. These could improve their role on, and the functioning of, 
both the ‘co-management’ institutions and CPIs. Time and resources should perhaps 
simultaneously be invested in programmes aimed at building the capacity of existing 
management authorities to understand the virtues of the contemporary conservation 
paradigm and the vital role played by local communities in its implementation. As the 
capacity of, and trust between, the constituent members of these ‘co-management’ 
institutions improves, provision could then feasibly be made for breaking down these 
institutions into smaller units and assigning them different functions – thereby seeking to 
better reflect the nested, overlapping nature of communal resource rights and 
institutions.64 
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The functioning of these institutions and the management of CCAs should be informed 
by a management plan. As reflected in the case studies, the delayed finalisation and on 
occasion continued absence of a management plan clearly frustrates the prudent 
management of a CCA, irrespective of its form. It can also lead to tensions and conflicts 
between communities and conservation authorities. Fortunately, South Africa’s 
contemporary conservation regime compels management authorities to prepare 
management plans within twelve months of their designation. 65 This should minimise 
future potential for such delay or absence. It furthermore contains several mechanisms 
promoting the regular monitoring, review and amendment of the management plan 
where appropriate.66 These latter mechanisms should cumulatively ensure that 
inappropriate management plans do not remain cast in stone. 
 
Management plans generally guide not only the management of the CCA but also the 
access and use rights that can be exercised within it. Therefore, perhaps it would be 
wise to ensure that they are negotiated simultaneously with the founding agreements 
governing the CCA, to avoid ‘potential confusion, undue expectation and conflict’.67 
Measures should also be implemented to ensure that such negotiations are inclusive 
and participatory. Provision could be made for some form of independent oversight, so 
as to minimise the potential of any inherent power imbalances and capacity differentials 
to cloud their final content. Furthermore, I would advocate the inclusion of a statutory 
obligation compelling those undertaking these negotiations to specifically consider and 
incorporate the often forgotten domain of traditional knowledge and conservation 
practices into these management plans. As one commentator has argued, the 
incorporation of traditional knowledge within management plans will lead to ‘longer-term 
sustainable solutions and relations’.68 
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3.8 ACCESS, USE AND BENEFIT-SHARING 
 
The central importance of viable and equitable access, use and benefit-sharing 
schemes to the success of CCAs has been previously noted in this dissertation.69 The 
case studies do provide some evidence of stakeholders formulating and implementing 
schemes of this nature in existing CCAs70 even in the absence of South Africa’s 
contemporary conservation regime. This regime now theoretically contains a diverse 
range of mechanisms for implementing access, use and benefit-sharing schemes in 
CCAs.71 The challenges relating to the implementation of the former schemes provide 
valuable guidance for the implementation of the latter statutory framework. 
 
Measures should be implemented to ensure that the negotiation of these schemes 
comprise an integral part of the general negotiations preceding the conclusion of the 
CCA’s founding agreement.72 The improved planning process proposed above should 
inform these negotiations.73 This would go some way towards ensuring that any such 
schemes are realistic, viable and properly matched to the management plan for the 
area. Care should furthermore be taken during these negotiations to dispel 
misconceptions as to the ability of these schemes to single-handedly sustain rural 
economies and alleviate deeply entrenched poverty. In this regard, the value of 
ensuring the participation of local government in the negotiation process to promote 
better alignment between their rural development programmes and these schemes is 
gainsaid.  
 
The importance of clearly recording the precise nature of rights and obligations 
associated with these schemes in the CCA’s founding agreement has been canvassed 
above.74 So too has the importance of including clear mechanisms for holding defaulting 
parties to account and including expeditious procedures for resolving disputes which 
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arise in the implementation of the founding agreements.75 Provisions of this nature 
should go some way towards alleviating the disconcerting trend prevalent in many of the 
case studies of conservation authorities effectively thwarting communities’ enjoyment of 
the full scope of the anticipated access and use rights.76 The founding agreement 
should also provide for regular monitoring and reporting on the implementation of the 
schemes, and enable the parties to review and amend them as changing circumstances 
so dictate. 
 
Regarding their form, the case studies reflect a very narrow approach particularly 
regarding feasible eco-tourism opportunities provided by CCAs.77 There is a clear need 
to move beyond the current heavy reliance placed on the concession lodge model for all 
CCAs. Greater emphasis should be placed on promoting and supporting smaller 
community-based enterprises (such as locally driven cultural and heritage tourism-
related enterprises) and the resumption of traditional land-use practices within and 
adjacent to the CCA, to counteract the often unpredictable nature of the returns 
associated with eco-tourism ventures.78 Irrespective of their form, measures need to be 
taken to support communities in the formulation and implementation of such schemes. 
Furthermore, where they involve the conclusion of commercial transactions with third 
parties, measures seeking to promote the openness, transparency, equity and public 
oversight of these negotiations are again of key relevance.79 These measures should 
also aid in overcoming the current challenges relating to ensuring the equitable 
distribution of benefits stemming from such schemes.80 While it will ordinarily be 
claimant communities who benefit through these schemes, certain of the case studies 
have illustrated the merits of extending their ambit to non-claimant communities residing 
adjacent to the CCA and traditional leadership structures.81 Such an approach holds 
great potential in the South African context for securing broad-based community support 
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for the CCA and improving the relationship between the relevant CPIs and their 
traditional counterparts. 
 
3.9 FINANCING AND SUPPORT 
 
Ensuring the financial sustainability of CCAs remains a key challenge in the South 
African context. The access, use and benefit-sharing schemes discussed above do 
potentially contribute to sustaining the livelihoods of those dependent on the land and 
resources situated within the CCA. They can furthermore contribute toward the costs of 
managing the CCA. However, as is clearly illustrated by the case studies, it is the 
exception rather than the norm that CCAs will ever be financially self-sufficient and 
accordingly require ongoing government support and financing.82 
 
The Government has in recent times undertaken an array of measures of relevance to 
supporting and financing the functioning of CCAs.83 These are to be welcomed but do 
appear to require refinement and extension. The Government will need to seriously 
reconsider the decreasing budgetary allocations to the conservation sector.84 Given the 
growth in the use of CCAs as a tool for balancing the country’s conservation and land 
reform agenda’s and the increasing importance attached to them as vehicles for 
promoting rural development and poverty alleviation, any such increase appears 
justifiable from an environmental, social and economic perspective. The Government 
will also need to rectify the anomalies inherent in many of the existing tax incentives 
seeking to promote the role of individuals and communities in conservation.85 Any such 
reform could include the tailoring of incentives to promote the functioning of CCAs and 
the CPIs involved in their administration specifically. An additional sphere of potential 
financing which needs future exploration are the lucrative climate-change incentive 
schemes, most notably those associated with the Reduced Emissions from 
                                                     
82 See Chapter 9 (Part 10). 
83 Ibid. 
84 See Chapter 5 (Part 2). 












Deforestation and Forest Degradation (REDD) Mechanism and its REDD Plus 
counterpart.86 
 
The provision and sourcing of additional financing to sustain CCAs and CPIs is but one 
part of the equation. One of the key challenges facing the success of the entire land 
reform programme, and accordingly similarly CCAs, is the lack of post-settlement 
support to CPIs.87 Two institutions with a key role to play in alleviating this challenge are 
the conservation authorities and local government authorities. 
 
Making clear provision in the founding agreements for skills development and transfer 
by conservation authorities to CPI members, should aid in building the capacity of the 
latter to take over the management of CCAs in the long-term. This should be 
accompanied by clear undertakings by the conservation authority to employ such 
members subsequently in the CCA’s management structures. The inclusion of rigorous 
mechanisms for holding defaulting parties to account88 is again of relevance here given 
the apparent aversion of conservation authorities in several of the case studies to 
adhere to such undertakings in the past.89 
 
A central trend permeating the majority of these recommendations is the vital role of 
local government authorities in supporting the functioning of both the CCAs and CPIs, 
given the extension of their mandate to include rural development. Several mechanisms 
have already been proposed to facilitate the provision of support by local government 
authorities such as including them in the initial negotiations;90 co-opting them as parties 
to the founding agreements;91 ensuring reciprocal alignment between their planning 
frameworks and the management plans of CCAs;92 and including them on relevant 
advisory forums with a view to facilitating information exchange and alignment between 
their relevant mandates, functions and programmes and those administered by other 
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government departments.93 These do not need repeating in detail here, save to say that 
they cumulatively hold potential for ensuring that the CPIs and CCAs receive far better 
support from local government authorities than is currently the case. 
 
4. THE LAST WORD 
 
South Africa’s transition to a constitutional democracy prompted a critical rethink of the 
skewed ownership of the country’s natural commons and entrenched awareness of the 
inherent importance of ensuring their conservation and sustainable use. The 
promulgation of the country’s land reform regime provided the impetus for addressing 
the skewed ownership patterns. The promulgation of the country’s contemporary 
conservation regime provided the impetus for recognising the vital role of people in 
promoting the conservation and sustainable use of the country’s natural commons. 
Comprehensive policy frameworks have been introduced to guide and coordinate the 
implementation of these two regimes and diverse institutional structures have been 
mandated to administer them. 
 
Inherent in the above melee of laws, policies and institutional structures are a diverse 
array of legal tools for promoting CCAs as a key mechanism for balancing the country’s 
land reform and conservation agendas. The use of these legal tools has been 
somewhat limited to date. This would not generally appear to stem from their flawed 
formulation as with the exception of the absence of an equitable and viable communal 
land rights regime, the legal framework generally reflects those elements identified by 
international commentators as underpinning successful CCA initiatives. Their limited 
use would rather appear attributable to the hesitancy of domestic policy-makers to 
acknowledge their full diversity and potential. 
 
This trend is not surprising. As is often noted in the context of the natural commons, 
‘natural resource governance issues underpin evolving relations between citizen and 
                                                     












state’94 and reforms relating to the natural commons are often not carried out because 
of the view that ‘these resources are too valuable to allow ordinary citizens to own’ 
them.95 However, South Africa seems to be beyond the point of return. Its international 
human rights and environmental obligations compel domestic policy-makers to accord 
due recognition to the land tenure and resource rights of local communities, whilst 
simultaneously extending the coverage of its protected areas estate. Its constitutional 
dispensation compels it to simultaneously transform landholding patterns, promote 
conservation and alleviate poverty. With a little tweaking, its domestic legal framework 
provides a key solution for achieving this balance; the concept of CCAs. The use of this 
solution aimed at promoting the equitable and effective regulation of South Africa’s 
natural commons, unfortunately remains in its infancy, but in the words of Murphree, its 
utility has to date ‘not been tried and found wanting; it has been found difficult and rarely 
tried’.96 Difficulty should not however preclude its use, as it is often through difficulty that 
long-term viable solutions to pressing challenges are forged. 
____________ 
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Addis Ababa Principles and Guidelines for the Sustainable Use of Biodiversity (annexed 
to COP 7 (Kuala Lumpur, 2004) Decision VII/12) 
 
Convention on Biological Diversity (1992) 31 ILM 818 
 
Convention on the Protection of Wetlands of International Importance Especially as 
Waterfowl Habitats (1983) 22 ILM 698 
 
International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (1976) 21 ILM 925 
 
ILO Convention Concerning Indigenous and Tribal Peoples in Independent Countries 
(1989) 28 ILM 1382 
 
Kyoto Protocol (1998) 37 ILM 22 
 
Nagoya Protocol on Access to Genetic Resources and the Fair and Equitable Sharing 
of Benefits Arising from their Utilisation and Benefit-Sharing (annexed to COP 10 
(Nagoya, 2010) Decision X/1) 
 
Our Common Futures (1987) Report of the World Commission on Environment and 
Development, United Nations 
 
Rio Declaration on Environment and Development, Report of the United Nations 
Conference on Environment and Development and Agenda 21 (1992) 31 ILM 874 
 
Stockholm Declaration on the Human Environment (1972) 11 ILM 1461 
 
United Nations GA Resolution 65/1 (2010 World Summit Outcome) 2010 
 
United Nations GA Resolution 55/2 (Millennium Declaration) 2000 
 
United Nations GA Resolution 1831/17 (Economic Development and the Conservation 
of Nature) 1962 
 
United Nations Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples (2007) 46 ILM 1013 
 

















Abolition of Racially Based Land Measures Act (108 of 1991) 
 
Animal Improvement Act (62 of 1998) 
 
Black Administration Act (38 of 1927) 
 
Black Authorities Act (68 of 1951) 
 
Black Communities Development Act (4 of 1984) 
 
Blacks Resettlement Act (19 of 1954) 
 
Coloured Persons Communal Reserves Act (3 of 1961) 
 
Closed Corporation Act (69 of 1984) 
 
Communal Land Rights Act (11 of 2004) 
 
Communal Property Association Act (28 of 1996) 
 
Companies Act (61 of 1973) 
 
Conservation of Agricultural Resources Act (43 of 1983) 
 
Constitution of the Republic of South Africa, 1996 
 
Development Facilitation Act (67 of 1995) 
 
Development Trust and Land Act (18 of 1936) 
 
Environment Conservation Act (73 of 1989) 
 
Extension of Security of Tenure Act (62 of 1997) 
 
Forest Act (122 of 1984) 
 
Forest Act (13 of 1941) 
 
Genetically Modified Organisms Act (15 of 1997) 
 
Group Ares Act (36 of 1966) 
 













Intergovernmental Relations Framework Act (13 of 2005) 
 
Interim Protected of Informal Land Rights Act (31 of 1996) 
 
KwaZulu-Natal Ingonyama Trust Act (3 of 1994) 
 
Lake Areas Development Act (39 of 1975) 
 
Land Administration Act (2 of 1995) 
 
Land Reform (Labour Tenants) Act (3 of 1996) 
 
Land Restitution and Reform Laws Amendment Act (18 of 1999) 
 
Land Titles Adjustment Act (111 of 1993) 
 
Less Formal Townships Establishment Act (113 of 1991) 
 
Local Government: Municipal Demarcation Act (27 of 1998) 
 
Local Government: Municipal Structures Act (117 of 1998) 
 
Local Government: Municipal Systems Act (32 of 2000) 
 
Local Government: Transition Act (209 of 1993) 
 
Marine Living Resources Act (18 of 1998) 
 
Minerals and Petroleum Resources Development Act (28 of 2002) 
 
Mountain Catchment Areas Act (63 of 1970) 
 
National Environmental Management Act (107 of 1998) 
 
National Environmental Management: Biodiversity Act (10 of 2004) 
 
National Environmental Management: Protected Areas Act (57 of 2003) 
 
National Forests Act (84 of 1998) 
 
National Heritage Resources Act (25 of 1999) 
 
National House of Traditional Leaders Act (10 of 1997) 
 













National Parks Act (56 of 1926) 
 
National Water Act (36 of 1998) 
 
Native Land Act (27 of 1913) 
 
Physical Planning Act (125 of 1991) 
 
Plant Breeders’ Rights Act (15 of 1976) 
 
Plant Improvement Act (53 of 1976) 
 
Preservation of Coloured Areas Act (31 of 1961) 
 
Prevention of Illegal Squatting Act (52 of 1951) 
 
Promotion of Access to Information Act (2 of 2000) 
 
Promotion of Administrative Justice Act (3 of 2000) 
 
Provision of Land and Assistance Act (126 of 1993) 
 
Public Finance Management Act (1 of 1999) 
 
Repeal of the Black Administration Act and Amendment of Certain Laws Amendment 
Act (20 of 2009) 
 
Repeal of the Black Administration Act and Amendment of Certain Laws Amendment 
Act (7 of 2008) 
 
Restitution of Land Rights Act (22 of 1994) 
 
Rural Areas Act (House of Representatives) (9 of 1987) 
 
Rural Coloured Areas Act (24 of 1963) 
 
Sea Birds and Seals Protection Act (46 of 1973) 
 
Self-Governing Territories Constitution Act (21 of 1971) 
 
State Land Disposal Act (48 of 1961) 
 
Traditional Leadership and Governance Framework Act (41 of 2003) 
 













Transformation of Certain Rural Areas Act (94 of 1998) 
 
Trust Property Control Act (57 of 1988) 
 
Upgrading of Land Tenure Rights Act (112 of 1991) 
 





Bophuthatswana Nature Conservation Act (3 of 1973) 
 
Eastern Cape Parks and Tourism Act (2 of 2010) 
 
Kwazulu-Natal Nature Conservation Act (29 of 1992) 
 
Kwazulu-Natal Nature Conservation Management Act (9 of 1997) 
 
KwaZulu-Natal Planning and Development Act (5 of 1998) 
 
Land-Use Planning Ordinance (15 of 1985) 
 
Limpopo Environmental Management Act (7 of 2003) 
 
Limpopo Tourism and Parks Board Act (8 of 2001) 
 
Mpumalanga Nature Conservation Act (10 of 1998) 
 
Mpumalanga Parks Board Act (6 of 1995). 
 
Mpumalanga Tourism and Parks Agency Act (5 of 2005) 
 
Northern Cape Nature Conservation Act (9 of 2009) 
 
Nature Conservation Act (Ciskei) (10 of 1987) 
 
Nature Conservation Ordinance (Cape) (19 of 1974) 
 
Nature Conservation Ordinance (Natal) (15 of 1974) 
 
Nature Conservation Ordinance (OFS) (8 of 1969) 
 
Nature Conservation Ordinance (Transvaal) (12 of 1983) 
 













Provincial Parks Board Act (Eastern Cape) (12 of 2003) 
 
Townships Ordinance (9 of 1969) 
 
Town Planning and Township Ordinance (19 of 1986) 
 
Traditional Leadership and Governance Act (Eastern Cape) (4 of 2005) 
 
Traditional Leadership and Governance Act (Kwazulu-Natal) (5 of 2005) 
 
Traditional Leadership and Institutions Act (Limpopo) (6 of 2005) 
 
Traditional Leadership and Governance Act (Mpumalanga) (3 of 2005) 
 
Transkei Environmental Conservation Decree (9 of 1992) 
 
Transkei Nature Conservation Act (6 of 1971) 
 
Western Cape Nature Conservation Laws Amendment Act (3 of 2000) 
 
 
GOVERNMENT NOTICES & REGULATIONS 
 
Commencement of the National Environmental Management: Protected Areas Act (57 
of 2003) (GN 52 GG No. 26960 dated 2 November 2004) 
 
Commencement of the National Environmental Management: Biodiversity Act (10 of 
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